Claude
f8bcc7f6a3
- Widen users.role enum to include 'player'; make password_hash nullable; add email/email_verified/status/last_login_ip; pin username _ci collation. - POST /auth/register (honeypot + registerLimiter + botScore, reserved-name blocklist, duplicate->409, auto-login). player_registration setting gates it. - SSO auto-provision in finishLogin (setting-gated); return/portal-aware SSO redirects for the player portal; status refusal on login + requireAuth. - New /player self-service group (account, change username/password, TOTP, identities), reusing account.controller; accountChangeLimiter. - Admin: 'player' role + status/email on user create/update, role/status audit, player_registration enum validation, derived public registration flags. - usernamePolicy module (reserved, sanitize, derive, dedup) + unit tests; extend SSO callback tests. 133 server tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019rao86n5cXpwAyjdBFEshV
82 lines
2.4 KiB
JavaScript
82 lines
2.4 KiB
JavaScript
const rateLimit = require('express-rate-limit')
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const log = require('../utils/logger')('ratelimit')
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function makeLimiter({ windowMs, max, label, message }) {
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return rateLimit({
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windowMs,
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max,
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standardHeaders: true,
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legacyHeaders: false,
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message: { message },
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handler: (req, res, next, options) => {
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log.warn(`${label} rate limit exceeded`, { ip: req.ip, path: req.originalUrl })
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res.status(options.statusCode).json(options.message)
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},
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})
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}
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// Brute-force protection on login.
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const loginLimiter = makeLimiter({
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windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
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max: 10,
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label: 'login',
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message: 'Too many login attempts. Please try again later.',
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})
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// Public self-registration. Mirrors the login cap: a handful of legitimate
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// attempts per window, a flood is abuse. The global botScore guard + honeypot
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// cover the rest.
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const registerLimiter = makeLimiter({
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windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
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max: 10,
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label: 'register',
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message: 'Too many registration attempts. Please try again later.',
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})
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// Authenticated self-service credential changes (username / password). Tighter
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// than login — a signed-in player rarely changes these, and the wrong-current-
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// password path also feeds the shared login backoff (see the controller).
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const accountChangeLimiter = makeLimiter({
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windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
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max: 10,
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label: 'account-change',
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message: 'Too many changes. Please try again later.',
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})
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// Throttle the public contact form.
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const contactLimiter = makeLimiter({
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windowMs: 60 * 60 * 1000,
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max: 5,
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label: 'contact',
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message: 'Too many messages sent. Please try again later.',
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})
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// Cap mobile refresh-token exchanges per IP. Legitimate apps refresh at most a
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// handful of times per window; a flood is either a bug or an attempt to brute
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// the refresh endpoint.
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const mobileRefreshLimiter = makeLimiter({
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windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
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max: 30,
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label: 'mobile-refresh',
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message: 'Too many refresh attempts. Please try again later.',
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})
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// Throttle SSO redirect starts per IP — cheap to trigger, and a flood is either a
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// bug or an attempt to spin the OAuth flow. Generous enough for real users.
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const ssoStartLimiter = makeLimiter({
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windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
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max: 30,
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label: 'sso-start',
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message: 'Too many sign-in attempts. Please try again later.',
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})
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module.exports = {
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loginLimiter,
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registerLimiter,
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accountChangeLimiter,
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contactLimiter,
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mobileRefreshLimiter,
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ssoStartLimiter,
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}
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