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website/server/.env.example
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feat(auth): trusted devices, recovery codes, and admin MFA management
Add opt-in "Trust this device" so a browser/app skips the TOTP step (never
the password) for 30 days, single-use bcrypt recovery codes as a 2FA-lockout
fallback, and admin trusted-device/MFA-reset management — backend, web UI,
OpenAPI spec, and tests.

- Schema: trusted_devices (sha256 token hash, looked up by unique index) and
  recovery_codes (bcrypt, single-use). Both additive/idempotent.
- Session service: trust-token mint/hash/resolve + cap helpers; new rg_trust
  httpOnly cookie (survives logout, revoked on untrust/password change/reset/
  TOTP disable). JWTs stay stateless — trust is a server-side row, not a claim.
- Web + mobile login accept a trusted-device token / recovery code; login/totp
  gains trustDevice + recoveryCode. Cap of 10/user with NO silent pruning — an
  over-cap trust returns 409/trustLimitReached and the client prompts to revoke.
- Self-service /auth/me/trusted-devices* + recovery-codes*; admin
  /admin/users/:id/trusted-devices* + /mfa/reset. All actions audit-logged.
- Client: "Trust this device" + recovery-code login options, one-time recovery
  code display, Trusted Devices + Recovery Codes account panels, a TOTP-styled
  revoke-to-continue cap modal, and admin per-user security controls.
- OpenAPI regenerated; 33 new server tests (all suites green).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-21 23:38:48 -05:00

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# ─── Runic Gateway server — local dev environment ───
# Copy to server/.env for running `npm run dev` outside Docker.
# (In Docker, the root .env / docker-compose provides these instead.)
NODE_ENV=development
PORT=3000
# Separate, unpublished port for server<->bot internal traffic (the decrypted
# bot-token route). Must match the port in bot/.env's SITE_INTERNAL_URL and must
# never be exposed through a public reverse proxy. See issue #33.
INTERNAL_PORT=3001
# Logging — written to BOTH the console and a log file (default <server>/logs/app.log).
LOG_LEVEL=debug # console verbosity: error | warn | info | debug
FILE_LOG_LEVEL=debug # file verbosity
LOG_TO_FILE=true # set false for console-only
# LOG_DIR= # defaults to server/logs
# LOG_FILE=app.log
# Point at a local or Dockerized MariaDB
DB_HOST=127.0.0.1
DB_PORT=3306
DB_NAME=runic_gateway
DB_USER=runic
DB_PASSWORD=change-me-db-password
JWT_SECRET=dev-only-change-me
JWT_EXPIRES_IN=1d
COOKIE_SECURE=auto
COOKIE_NAME=rg_token
# Trusted-device MFA ("Trust this device"). The trust cookie's name, how long a
# device stays trusted (skips the TOTP step, never the password), the per-user cap
# (no silent pruning — an over-cap trust is refused), and how many single-use
# recovery codes are generated at 2FA enrollment.
TRUST_COOKIE_NAME=rg_trust
TRUSTED_DEVICE_TTL_DAYS=30
MAX_TRUSTED_DEVICES=10
RECOVERY_CODE_COUNT=10
# Encryption key for secrets stored at rest (OAuth client secrets in auth_providers).
# Any string — hashed to a 256-bit AES-GCM key. REQUIRED in production; in dev an
# insecure key is derived from JWT_SECRET if unset (with a warning).
SECRET_ENC_KEY=dev-only-change-me-too
# Public base URL of this app, used to build the OAuth redirect_uri
# (${APP_BASE_URL}/api/v1/auth/sso/:provider/callback). Set this in production so
# the callback URL matches what you register with Google/Discord. If unset, it is
# derived from the incoming request (fine for local dev).
APP_BASE_URL=http://localhost:5173
# Short-lived mobile access token lifetime + refresh token lifetime (Part 2).
MOBILE_ACCESS_TTL=15m
MOBILE_REFRESH_TTL_DAYS=30
# Reverse-proxy trust. Request path: client -> Pangolin -> newt agent "ptero"
# (separate VM) -> this app. ptero is the hop that connects to us, so pin
# TRUST_PROXY to ptero's LAN IP: Express then honours X-Forwarded-For ONLY on
# connections from ptero, and req.ip / req.secure reflect the real client (used
# by rate limiting, backoff, bot-ban, activity log).
# <ptero LAN IP> -> e.g. 10.0.0.42 (RECOMMENDED in prod; requires a static
# DHCP reservation for ptero in Omada — a lease change would
# silently break IP trust)
# an integer -> that many hops (fallback if you can't pin an IP)
# false -> no proxy (direct connections)
# NOTE: a blanket "true" is intentionally rejected (coerced to 1) — it would let
# clients spoof their IP via a forged X-Forwarded-For and dodge rate limits/bans.
TRUST_PROXY=1
# Set to 1 to log each request's raw peer address + X-Forwarded-For + resolved
# req.ip, so you can verify/refresh ptero's IP without redeploying. Noisy —
# leave off in normal operation.
DEBUG_TRUST_PROXY=0
# Optional TOTP two-factor (opt-in per user).
# TOTP_ISSUER defaults to BRAND_NAME; BRAND_* live in the root .env (see root .env.example)
TOTP_ISSUER=Runic Gateway
# How long the "password verified, awaiting code" step stays valid.
TOTP_CHALLENGE_TTL=5m
# Created on first boot if the users table is empty
ADMIN_USERNAME=admin
ADMIN_PASSWORD=change-me-admin-password
# Email is configured in Admin → Settings → Email (Gmail over OAuth2), not here.
# It reuses the Google auth provider's OAuth client and stores an encrypted
# refresh token in the DB. The contact recipient is the `contact_email` site
# setting; while email is unconfigured the contact form falls back to a mailto: link.
CLIENT_ORIGIN=http://localhost:5173
# Discord bot — internal API (server <-> bot/). BOT_INTERNAL_KEY MUST be
# byte-for-byte identical to the same variable in bot/.env.example — it is the
# only auth on both sides' /internal/* routes, so a mismatch silently breaks
# every server<->bot call with 401s. It also guards the server's
# /internal/bot-config route, which returns the DECRYPTED Discord token: with
# NODE_ENV=production the app REFUSES TO START if this is blank, a documented
# placeholder, or shorter than 16 chars (a warning only in dev). The Discord bot
# TOKEN itself is not an env var — it's entered in the admin panel and stored
# encrypted in the DB (see the bot_config table / SECRET_ENC_KEY above).
BOT_INTERNAL_URL=http://localhost:4100
BOT_INTERNAL_KEY=dev-only-change-me-bot-key
# News announcement pipeline (published news post -> in-game town crier + Discord
# #news). The dispatcher is an in-process poller; these tune it. Links in the
# announcements use APP_BASE_URL (set above), so set that in production too.
# ANNOUNCE_POLL_MS how often the dispatcher sweeps for due/retry legs
# TOWNCRIER_DURATION_SEC how long the in-game town-crier message stays up (<= 86400)
ANNOUNCE_POLL_MS=15000
TOWNCRIER_DURATION_SEC=3600
# Push notifications (M7) — opt-in fan-out to the Android app via a self-hosted
# ntfy UnifiedPush relay (docs/android/PLAN.md §11). The publisher POSTs
# content-free tickles to each device's endpoint, so no publish token is required.
# NTFY_BASE_URL Internal relay URL the publisher POSTs to; also part of the
# backend's SSRF allow-set — a device may only register an
# endpoint on an allowed origin.
# NTFY_PUBLIC_URL Client-facing relay URL surfaced to the app via
# /public/settings.push.ntfyUrl (the app registers its topic
# endpoint here). Defaults to the first NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS
# entry; set when the public URL differs from NTFY_BASE_URL.
# NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS Optional comma-separated allowed origins (the app's endpoint
# must sit on one). Also the default source for NTFY_PUBLIC_URL.
# NTFY_PUBLISH_TOKEN Optional bearer token for backend->ntfy publishes (off by default).
# Leave NTFY_BASE_URL unset in local dev to allow any public HTTPS endpoint
# (private/loopback hosts are always rejected). Without NTFY_PUBLIC_URL /
# NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS the app shows push as unavailable for the shard.
# NTFY_BASE_URL=https://ntfy.example.com
# NTFY_PUBLIC_URL=https://ntfy.example.com
# NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://ntfy.example.com
# NTFY_PUBLISH_TOKEN=