ACCOUNT_DELETION.md phase 2 (core): a member deletes their own account on
the website, and the admin route runs the same procedure.
- DELETE /api/v1/auth/me/account: typed username, password always (AD7),
and a 2FA or recovery code when 2FA is on. A wrong password or code is
400, not 401 (AD12), so the app's refresh-on-401 never replays it.
409 password_required and last_admin; the demo's shared logins are
locked.
- auth/accountDeletion.js: module hooks first, then one transaction that
reserves a staff username (reserved_usernames, AD9) and deletes the row,
then a Teams reconcile, the audit entry (no username) and a notice to
the old address (new protected template auth.account-deleted).
- MODULE_API 1.20.0: api.onUserDeleting({ userId, deletedBy }), before the
delete, 10 s limit, cannot veto (AD10, AD11).
- utils/displayAuthor.js: a deleted account's username snapshots read
"[deleted player]" to members and the stored name, marked, to staff
(AD5, AD6). Used by the forum, the Reports queue, the guest list and
the Team digest. A deleted account drops off Forum guests (AD13).
- Reserved names refuse at every username write, answered as "taken".
- Web: Delete my account on the player and staff Account pages; staff
views mark "(deleted account)".
- OpenAPI regenerated; route manifest and engagement manifest regenerated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E14m6SuuY6i1vASFeGDBeY
187 lines
6.7 KiB
JavaScript
187 lines
6.7 KiB
JavaScript
const { query, transaction } = require('../../utils/db')
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const PUBLIC_COLS =
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'id, username, role, status, email, email_verified, email_pending, totp_enabled, created_at, last_login_at'
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// passwordHash may be null (SSO-provisioned players who have not set one yet).
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// email/status/emailVerified are optional so existing admin-create callers are
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// unaffected.
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async function insertUser({
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username,
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passwordHash = null,
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role = 'admin',
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email = null,
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status = 'active',
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emailVerified = false,
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}) {
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const res = await query(
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'INSERT INTO users (username, password_hash, role, email, status, email_verified) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)',
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[username, passwordHash, role, email, status, emailVerified ? 1 : 0],
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)
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return res.insertId
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}
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async function findByUsername(username) {
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const rows = await query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ? LIMIT 1', [username])
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return rows[0] || null
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}
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async function findById(id) {
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const rows = await query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ? LIMIT 1', [id])
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return rows[0] || null
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}
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// The ACTIVE account on an email address, as a list. Unique since engagement
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// Phase 1b, so this returns at most one row — the array shape is kept because the
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// password-reset caller iterates and there is nothing to gain from making it care.
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// accounts; the caller issues one reset link per row. Case-insensitive to match
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// however the address was stored. Excludes disabled/banned accounts.
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// Active accounts on an address. Matches on email_norm, the same generated column
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// the UNIQUE index uses, so a lookup folds case exactly the way uniqueness does —
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// LOWER() here and LOWER() there can never drift apart. Since Phase 1b this
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// returns at most one row; it still returns an array because the password-reset
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// caller iterates and there is no value in making that caller care.
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async function findActiveByEmail(email) {
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return query(
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"SELECT * FROM users WHERE email_norm = LOWER(?) AND status = 'active'",
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[email],
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)
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}
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// Stage an address the user has asked for but not yet proved. Does not touch
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// `email`, so their current address keeps receiving mail until the link is used.
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async function setPendingEmail(id, email) {
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const res = await query('UPDATE users SET email_pending = ? WHERE id = ?', [email, id])
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return res.affectedRows || 0
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}
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// Promote a proved address into place. Guarded on email_pending still matching, so
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// a stale link (the user asked again for a different address) cannot install the
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// address it was minted for. Returns rows changed — 0 means the guard rejected it.
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async function promotePendingEmail(id, email) {
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const res = await query(
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`UPDATE users SET email = ?, email_verified = 1, email_pending = NULL
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WHERE id = ? AND email_pending = ?`,
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[email, id, email],
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)
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return res.affectedRows || 0
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}
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async function clearPendingEmail(id) {
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const res = await query('UPDATE users SET email_pending = NULL WHERE id = ?', [id])
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return res.affectedRows || 0
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}
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async function listUsers() {
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return query(`SELECT ${PUBLIC_COLS} FROM users ORDER BY id ASC`)
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}
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async function updateUser(id, fields) {
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const cols = []
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const params = []
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for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(fields)) {
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cols.push(`${key} = ?`)
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params.push(val)
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}
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if (cols.length === 0) return
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params.push(id)
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await query(`UPDATE users SET ${cols.join(', ')} WHERE id = ?`, params)
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}
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async function deleteUser(id) {
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return query('DELETE FROM users WHERE id = ?', [id])
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}
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// Delete the account and, when `reserveName` is given, reserve it, as ONE
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// transaction (ACCOUNT_DELETION.md §4.1 step 2): a staff name is never free for
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// a moment between the two. `INSERT IGNORE` because a name already reserved
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// (a second staff account renamed onto it cannot exist, but a hand-inserted row
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// can) is the state wanted, not an error. Returns the rows deleted, 0 or 1.
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async function deleteUserReserving(id, reserveName = null) {
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return transaction(async (conn) => {
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if (reserveName) {
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await conn.query(
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"INSERT IGNORE INTO reserved_usernames (username_norm, reason) VALUES (LOWER(?), 'deleted_staff')",
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[reserveName],
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)
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}
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const result = await conn.query('DELETE FROM users WHERE id = ?', [id])
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return Number(result.affectedRows || 0)
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})
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}
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// True when the name can never be taken again (AD9). The column's collation is
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// users.username's, so this folds case exactly as the UNIQUE index does.
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async function isUsernameReserved(username) {
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const rows = await query('SELECT 1 FROM reserved_usernames WHERE username_norm = LOWER(?) LIMIT 1', [username])
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return rows.length > 0
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}
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async function countUsers() {
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const rows = await query('SELECT COUNT(*) AS c FROM users')
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return Number(rows[0].c)
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}
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async function countAdmins() {
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const rows = await query("SELECT COUNT(*) AS c FROM users WHERE role = 'admin'")
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return Number(rows[0].c)
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}
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async function touchLastLogin(id, ip = null) {
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return query('UPDATE users SET last_login_at = NOW(), last_login_ip = ? WHERE id = ?', [ip, id])
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}
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// Move the "tokens valid after" cutoff to now, invalidating every session token
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// issued before this instant (password change / log out everywhere). requireAuth
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// compares each session's issued-at against this column.
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async function bumpTokensValidAfter(id) {
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return query('UPDATE users SET tokens_valid_after = NOW() WHERE id = ?', [id])
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}
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// Set the cutoff to an explicit instant. Used when re-issuing the caller's own
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// session right after a password change: the bump above revokes everything at
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// NOW(), and requireAuth's cutoff test is inclusive (createdAt <= cutoff), so a
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// freshly-minted token sharing that same wall-clock second would be revoked too.
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// Rewinding the cutoff a hair below the new token's issued-at lets it survive
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// while still revoking every older session.
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async function setTokensValidAfter(id, when) {
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return query('UPDATE users SET tokens_valid_after = ? WHERE id = ?', [when, id])
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}
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// Store a (not-yet-enabled) TOTP secret for a user. Enabling is a separate step
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// so a secret is never trusted until the user has confirmed one code.
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async function setTotpSecret(id, secret) {
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return query('UPDATE users SET totp_secret = ?, totp_enabled = 0 WHERE id = ?', [secret, id])
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}
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async function enableTotp(id) {
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return query('UPDATE users SET totp_enabled = 1 WHERE id = ?', [id])
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}
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async function disableTotp(id) {
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return query('UPDATE users SET totp_secret = NULL, totp_enabled = 0 WHERE id = ?', [id])
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}
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module.exports = {
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insertUser,
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findByUsername,
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findById,
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findActiveByEmail,
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setPendingEmail,
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promotePendingEmail,
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clearPendingEmail,
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listUsers,
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updateUser,
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deleteUser,
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deleteUserReserving,
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isUsernameReserved,
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countUsers,
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countAdmins,
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touchLastLogin,
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bumpTokensValidAfter,
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setTokensValidAfter,
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setTotpSecret,
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enableTotp,
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disableTotp,
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}
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