Claude
d38c98ad9e
Adds a layered set of protections around the admin login and the app edge.
Trust proxy (server/src/utils/trustProxy.js)
- Configurable via TRUST_PROXY; pin to the newt agent ("ptero") LAN IP so
X-Forwarded-For is trusted ONLY from that peer. A blanket "true" is
rejected (coerced to 1) to prevent XFF spoofing that would dodge every
IP-based control. DEBUG_TRUST_PROXY logs peer/XFF/req.ip to re-verify the
proxy IP without a redeploy. Documents the Omada static-reservation
assumption.
Login throttling (server/src/middleware/loginProtection.js, rateLimit.js)
- express-slow-down progressive delay + the existing hard rate cap + a
separate per-IP exponential backoff that persists across the rate window.
All failures return one generic message (no user/pass disclosure).
Honeypot (login form + auth.controller)
- Hidden, plausibly-named field ("company"); a filled value fails
generically and is scored as an unambiguous bot.
Optional per-user TOTP 2FA (speakeasy/qrcode)
- totp_secret/totp_enabled columns (+ idempotent migration). Self-service
Account page: enroll via QR, confirm a code to enable, code-gated disable.
- Login is two-step for enrolled users: after the password, a short-lived
signed challenge (stage:'totp', not a session) is required before the
real session is issued.
Bot / scanner scoring + IP ban (server/src/middleware/botScore.js)
- Weighted CMS-scanner paths (this app uses none). Junk paths 404 FIRST,
unconditionally — independent of score/ban state, so a scanner rotating
through fresh Cloudflare IPs gets no free pass. /wp-admin/install.php is
the top-weighted near-1-hit ban (worst offender in prod logs). Per-IP
score with quiet-period decay temp-bans an IP from ALL routes once past a
(deliberately low) threshold, to protect /admin from credential stuffing.
Failed logins and honeypot hits feed the same score.
- Periodic sweep evicts stale, unbanned, quiet entries so the in-memory
store can't grow unbounded; the interval is unref'd and cleared on
graceful shutdown.
Tests: node --test suite (40) covering trust-proxy parsing + live req.ip
(incl. pinned-IP), rate limiter + exponential backoff, honeypot rejection,
TOTP verify (enabled/disabled) + challenge-isn't-a-session, bot-score
threshold/decay/ban + junk-404-independence + install.php + store sweep.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
61 lines
2.2 KiB
Plaintext
61 lines
2.2 KiB
Plaintext
# ─── UOMysticmoon server — local dev environment ───
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# Copy to server/.env for running `npm run dev` outside Docker.
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# (In Docker, the root .env / docker-compose provides these instead.)
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NODE_ENV=development
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PORT=3000
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# Logging — written to BOTH the console and a log file (default <server>/logs/app.log).
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LOG_LEVEL=debug # console verbosity: error | warn | info | debug
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FILE_LOG_LEVEL=debug # file verbosity
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LOG_TO_FILE=true # set false for console-only
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# LOG_DIR= # defaults to server/logs
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# LOG_FILE=app.log
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# Point at a local or Dockerized MariaDB
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DB_HOST=127.0.0.1
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DB_PORT=3306
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DB_NAME=uomysticmoon
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DB_USER=uomm
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DB_PASSWORD=change-me-db-password
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JWT_SECRET=dev-only-change-me
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JWT_EXPIRES_IN=1d
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COOKIE_SECURE=auto
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COOKIE_NAME=uomm_token
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# Reverse-proxy trust. Request path: client -> Pangolin -> newt agent "ptero"
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# (separate VM) -> this app. ptero is the hop that connects to us, so pin
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# TRUST_PROXY to ptero's LAN IP: Express then honours X-Forwarded-For ONLY on
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# connections from ptero, and req.ip / req.secure reflect the real client (used
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# by rate limiting, backoff, bot-ban, activity log).
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# <ptero LAN IP> -> e.g. 10.0.0.42 (RECOMMENDED in prod; requires a static
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# DHCP reservation for ptero in Omada — a lease change would
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# silently break IP trust)
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# an integer -> that many hops (fallback if you can't pin an IP)
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# false -> no proxy (direct connections)
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# NOTE: a blanket "true" is intentionally rejected (coerced to 1) — it would let
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# clients spoof their IP via a forged X-Forwarded-For and dodge rate limits/bans.
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TRUST_PROXY=1
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# Set to 1 to log each request's raw peer address + X-Forwarded-For + resolved
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# req.ip, so you can verify/refresh ptero's IP without redeploying. Noisy —
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# leave off in normal operation.
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DEBUG_TRUST_PROXY=0
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# Optional TOTP two-factor (opt-in per user).
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TOTP_ISSUER=UOMysticmoon
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# How long the "password verified, awaiting code" step stays valid.
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TOTP_CHALLENGE_TTL=5m
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# Created on first boot if the users table is empty
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ADMIN_USERNAME=admin
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ADMIN_PASSWORD=change-me-admin-password
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SMTP_HOST=
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SMTP_PORT=587
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SMTP_USER=
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SMTP_PASS=
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CONTACT_TO=UOMysticmoon@gmail.com
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CLIENT_ORIGIN=http://localhost:5173
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