- Widen users.role enum to include 'player'; make password_hash nullable; add email/email_verified/status/last_login_ip; pin username _ci collation. - POST /auth/register (honeypot + registerLimiter + botScore, reserved-name blocklist, duplicate->409, auto-login). player_registration setting gates it. - SSO auto-provision in finishLogin (setting-gated); return/portal-aware SSO redirects for the player portal; status refusal on login + requireAuth. - New /player self-service group (account, change username/password, TOTP, identities), reusing account.controller; accountChangeLimiter. - Admin: 'player' role + status/email on user create/update, role/status audit, player_registration enum validation, derived public registration flags. - usernamePolicy module (reserved, sanitize, derive, dedup) + unit tests; extend SSO callback tests. 133 server tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019rao86n5cXpwAyjdBFEshV
115 lines
3.6 KiB
JavaScript
115 lines
3.6 KiB
JavaScript
const { query } = require('../../utils/db')
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const PUBLIC_COLS =
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'id, username, role, status, email, email_verified, totp_enabled, created_at, last_login_at'
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// passwordHash may be null (SSO-provisioned players who have not set one yet).
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// email/status/emailVerified are optional so existing admin-create callers are
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// unaffected.
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async function insertUser({
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username,
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passwordHash = null,
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role = 'admin',
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email = null,
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status = 'active',
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emailVerified = false,
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}) {
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const res = await query(
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'INSERT INTO users (username, password_hash, role, email, status, email_verified) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)',
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[username, passwordHash, role, email, status, emailVerified ? 1 : 0],
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)
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return res.insertId
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}
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async function findByUsername(username) {
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const rows = await query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ? LIMIT 1', [username])
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return rows[0] || null
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}
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async function findById(id) {
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const rows = await query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ? LIMIT 1', [id])
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return rows[0] || null
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}
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async function listUsers() {
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return query(`SELECT ${PUBLIC_COLS} FROM users ORDER BY id ASC`)
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}
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async function updateUser(id, fields) {
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const cols = []
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const params = []
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for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(fields)) {
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cols.push(`${key} = ?`)
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params.push(val)
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}
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if (cols.length === 0) return
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params.push(id)
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await query(`UPDATE users SET ${cols.join(', ')} WHERE id = ?`, params)
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}
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async function deleteUser(id) {
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return query('DELETE FROM users WHERE id = ?', [id])
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}
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async function countUsers() {
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const rows = await query('SELECT COUNT(*) AS c FROM users')
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return Number(rows[0].c)
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}
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async function countAdmins() {
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const rows = await query("SELECT COUNT(*) AS c FROM users WHERE role = 'admin'")
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return Number(rows[0].c)
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}
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async function touchLastLogin(id, ip = null) {
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return query('UPDATE users SET last_login_at = NOW(), last_login_ip = ? WHERE id = ?', [ip, id])
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}
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// Move the "tokens valid after" cutoff to now, invalidating every session token
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// issued before this instant (password change / log out everywhere). requireAuth
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// compares each session's issued-at against this column.
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async function bumpTokensValidAfter(id) {
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return query('UPDATE users SET tokens_valid_after = NOW() WHERE id = ?', [id])
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}
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// Set the cutoff to an explicit instant. Used when re-issuing the caller's own
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// session right after a password change: the bump above revokes everything at
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// NOW(), and requireAuth's cutoff test is inclusive (createdAt <= cutoff), so a
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// freshly-minted token sharing that same wall-clock second would be revoked too.
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// Rewinding the cutoff a hair below the new token's issued-at lets it survive
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// while still revoking every older session.
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async function setTokensValidAfter(id, when) {
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return query('UPDATE users SET tokens_valid_after = ? WHERE id = ?', [when, id])
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}
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// Store a (not-yet-enabled) TOTP secret for a user. Enabling is a separate step
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// so a secret is never trusted until the user has confirmed one code.
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async function setTotpSecret(id, secret) {
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return query('UPDATE users SET totp_secret = ?, totp_enabled = 0 WHERE id = ?', [secret, id])
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}
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async function enableTotp(id) {
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return query('UPDATE users SET totp_enabled = 1 WHERE id = ?', [id])
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}
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async function disableTotp(id) {
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return query('UPDATE users SET totp_secret = NULL, totp_enabled = 0 WHERE id = ?', [id])
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}
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module.exports = {
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insertUser,
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findByUsername,
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findById,
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listUsers,
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updateUser,
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deleteUser,
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countUsers,
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countAdmins,
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touchLastLogin,
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bumpTokensValidAfter,
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setTokensValidAfter,
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setTotpSecret,
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enableTotp,
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disableTotp,
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}
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