Claude
31b31c3a17
Refactor authentication into a provider-agnostic session layer and build
two new auth surfaces on top of it, without changing local password/TOTP
behavior. Every flow now issues sessions through
sessionService.createSession(user, authMethod).
Part 1 — Session abstraction (backward-compatible refactor):
- New server/src/auth/: token.js (JWT/cookie primitives), session.service.js
(create/validate/partial-TOTP/revoke), session.middleware.js
(attachSession/requireAuth/requireRole). utils/auth.js is now a thin
compat facade so existing imports are unchanged.
Part 2 — Mobile bearer auth (additive):
- /api/v1/auth/mobile/{login,refresh,logout}: short-lived access JWT +
long-lived refresh token, stored hashed and rotated on use, in a new
mobile_refresh_tokens table. Reuses web bot-scoring/backoff; single-request
TOTP. token.signToken gains a backward-compatible expiresIn option.
Part 3 — Pluggable SSO (Google, Discord, generic OIDC):
- OAuth2Provider base + built-in Google/Discord (fixed endpoints) + generic
OIDC, a registry with health/validation, PKCE+CSRF transaction state, and
discovery (GET /auth/providers), start/link/callback routes.
- Link-only policy: SSO signs in only to an already-linked account; external
identities are never auto-provisioned. Client secrets encrypted at rest
(AES-256-GCM, utils/secretBox.js). Admin CRUD (/admin/auth/providers) and
account linking (/admin/account/identities). New auth_providers +
user_identities tables.
Frontend:
- Login page renders provider buttons from /auth/providers (inline SVG icons,
graceful with zero providers). New Authentication admin view
(Local/Google/Discord/Custom). Account page linked-accounts section.
Tests: 83 passing (session, mobile, providers, registry, secretBox, ssoState,
ssoCallback) — all DB-free via fetch mocks + model stubs. README + .env.example
updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
56 lines
2.5 KiB
JavaScript
56 lines
2.5 KiB
JavaScript
// ── Secret-at-rest encryption (AES-256-GCM) ────────────────────────────────
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//
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// Used to encrypt OAuth client secrets before they are written to the DB, so a
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// database read alone does not yield usable provider credentials. Output format
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// is `iv:tag:ciphertext`, each part base64. GCM provides authenticated
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// encryption, so tampering is detected on decrypt.
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//
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// The key comes from SECRET_ENC_KEY (any string — it is hashed to 32 bytes). In
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// development, if unset, we derive a key from JWT_SECRET with a loud warning
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// (mirrors token.resolveJwtSecret) so local dev works; production must set a
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// dedicated key so rotating JWT_SECRET does not silently orphan stored secrets.
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const crypto = require('crypto')
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require('dotenv').config()
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const log = require('../utils/logger')('secretbox')
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const ALGO = 'aes-256-gcm'
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function resolveKey() {
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const explicit = process.env.SECRET_ENC_KEY
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if (explicit) return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(explicit).digest()
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if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production') {
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throw new Error('SECRET_ENC_KEY must be set in production')
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}
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const jwt = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'dev-insecure-jwt-secret-do-not-use-in-production'
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log.warn('SECRET_ENC_KEY is not set — deriving an insecure key from JWT_SECRET for development. Set SECRET_ENC_KEY before deploying.')
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return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(`secretbox:${jwt}`).digest()
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}
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const KEY = resolveKey()
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// Encrypt a UTF-8 string → "iv:tag:ct" (base64 parts). Returns null for empty input.
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function encrypt(plaintext) {
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if (plaintext == null || plaintext === '') return null
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const iv = crypto.randomBytes(12)
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const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv(ALGO, KEY, iv)
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const ct = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(String(plaintext), 'utf8'), cipher.final()])
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const tag = cipher.getAuthTag()
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return `${iv.toString('base64')}:${tag.toString('base64')}:${ct.toString('base64')}`
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}
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// Decrypt a value produced by encrypt(). Returns null for null/blank input;
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// throws if the payload is malformed or fails authentication (tampered/wrong key).
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function decrypt(payload) {
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if (payload == null || payload === '') return null
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const parts = String(payload).split(':')
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if (parts.length !== 3) throw new Error('secretBox: malformed ciphertext')
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const [iv, tag, ct] = parts.map((p) => Buffer.from(p, 'base64'))
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const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(ALGO, KEY, iv)
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decipher.setAuthTag(tag)
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return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ct), decipher.final()]).toString('utf8')
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}
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module.exports = { encrypt, decrypt }
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