Files
website/client/src/contexts/AuthContext.jsx
Claude d38c98ad9e Harden admin login: RBAC-safe controls, 2FA, bot-scoring, rate limits (#9)
Adds a layered set of protections around the admin login and the app edge.

Trust proxy (server/src/utils/trustProxy.js)
- Configurable via TRUST_PROXY; pin to the newt agent ("ptero") LAN IP so
  X-Forwarded-For is trusted ONLY from that peer. A blanket "true" is
  rejected (coerced to 1) to prevent XFF spoofing that would dodge every
  IP-based control. DEBUG_TRUST_PROXY logs peer/XFF/req.ip to re-verify the
  proxy IP without a redeploy. Documents the Omada static-reservation
  assumption.

Login throttling (server/src/middleware/loginProtection.js, rateLimit.js)
- express-slow-down progressive delay + the existing hard rate cap + a
  separate per-IP exponential backoff that persists across the rate window.
  All failures return one generic message (no user/pass disclosure).

Honeypot (login form + auth.controller)
- Hidden, plausibly-named field ("company"); a filled value fails
  generically and is scored as an unambiguous bot.

Optional per-user TOTP 2FA (speakeasy/qrcode)
- totp_secret/totp_enabled columns (+ idempotent migration). Self-service
  Account page: enroll via QR, confirm a code to enable, code-gated disable.
- Login is two-step for enrolled users: after the password, a short-lived
  signed challenge (stage:'totp', not a session) is required before the
  real session is issued.

Bot / scanner scoring + IP ban (server/src/middleware/botScore.js)
- Weighted CMS-scanner paths (this app uses none). Junk paths 404 FIRST,
  unconditionally — independent of score/ban state, so a scanner rotating
  through fresh Cloudflare IPs gets no free pass. /wp-admin/install.php is
  the top-weighted near-1-hit ban (worst offender in prod logs). Per-IP
  score with quiet-period decay temp-bans an IP from ALL routes once past a
  (deliberately low) threshold, to protect /admin from credential stuffing.
  Failed logins and honeypot hits feed the same score.
- Periodic sweep evicts stale, unbanned, quiet entries so the in-memory
  store can't grow unbounded; the interval is unref'd and cleared on
  graceful shutdown.

Tests: node --test suite (40) covering trust-proxy parsing + live req.ip
(incl. pinned-IP), rate limiter + exponential backoff, honeypot rejection,
TOTP verify (enabled/disabled) + challenge-isn't-a-session, bot-score
threshold/decay/ban + junk-404-independence + install.php + store sweep.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 23:22:35 -05:00

60 lines
1.6 KiB
JavaScript

import { createContext, useContext, useEffect, useState, useCallback } from 'react'
import { api } from '../api/client.js'
const AuthContext = createContext(null)
export function AuthProvider({ children }) {
const [user, setUser] = useState(null)
const [loading, setLoading] = useState(true)
const refresh = useCallback(async () => {
try {
const data = await api.me()
setUser(data.user)
} catch {
setUser(null)
} finally {
setLoading(false)
}
}, [])
useEffect(() => {
refresh()
}, [refresh])
// Step 1. Returns { user } on success, or { totpRequired, challenge } when the
// account has 2FA on (caller then calls loginTotp). `extra` carries honeypot.
const login = useCallback(async (username, password, extra) => {
const data = await api.login(username, password, extra)
if (data.user) setUser(data.user)
return data
}, [])
// Step 2 for TOTP users: exchange the challenge + code for a real session.
const loginTotp = useCallback(async (challenge, code) => {
const data = await api.loginTotp(challenge, code)
setUser(data.user)
return data.user
}, [])
const logout = useCallback(async () => {
try {
await api.logout()
} finally {
setUser(null)
}
}, [])
return (
<AuthContext.Provider value={{ user, loading, login, loginTotp, logout, refresh }}>
{children}
</AuthContext.Provider>
)
}
export function useAuth() {
const ctx = useContext(AuthContext)
if (!ctx) throw new Error('useAuth must be used within AuthProvider')
return ctx
}