Adds a layered set of protections around the admin login and the app edge.
Trust proxy (server/src/utils/trustProxy.js)
- Configurable via TRUST_PROXY; pin to the newt agent ("ptero") LAN IP so
X-Forwarded-For is trusted ONLY from that peer. A blanket "true" is
rejected (coerced to 1) to prevent XFF spoofing that would dodge every
IP-based control. DEBUG_TRUST_PROXY logs peer/XFF/req.ip to re-verify the
proxy IP without a redeploy. Documents the Omada static-reservation
assumption.
Login throttling (server/src/middleware/loginProtection.js, rateLimit.js)
- express-slow-down progressive delay + the existing hard rate cap + a
separate per-IP exponential backoff that persists across the rate window.
All failures return one generic message (no user/pass disclosure).
Honeypot (login form + auth.controller)
- Hidden, plausibly-named field ("company"); a filled value fails
generically and is scored as an unambiguous bot.
Optional per-user TOTP 2FA (speakeasy/qrcode)
- totp_secret/totp_enabled columns (+ idempotent migration). Self-service
Account page: enroll via QR, confirm a code to enable, code-gated disable.
- Login is two-step for enrolled users: after the password, a short-lived
signed challenge (stage:'totp', not a session) is required before the
real session is issued.
Bot / scanner scoring + IP ban (server/src/middleware/botScore.js)
- Weighted CMS-scanner paths (this app uses none). Junk paths 404 FIRST,
unconditionally — independent of score/ban state, so a scanner rotating
through fresh Cloudflare IPs gets no free pass. /wp-admin/install.php is
the top-weighted near-1-hit ban (worst offender in prod logs). Per-IP
score with quiet-period decay temp-bans an IP from ALL routes once past a
(deliberately low) threshold, to protect /admin from credential stuffing.
Failed logins and honeypot hits feed the same score.
- Periodic sweep evicts stale, unbanned, quiet entries so the in-memory
store can't grow unbounded; the interval is unref'd and cleared on
graceful shutdown.
Tests: node --test suite (40) covering trust-proxy parsing + live req.ip
(incl. pinned-IP), rate limiter + exponential backoff, honeypot rejection,
TOTP verify (enabled/disabled) + challenge-isn't-a-session, bot-score
threshold/decay/ban + junk-404-independence + install.php + store sweep.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
85 lines
2.2 KiB
JavaScript
85 lines
2.2 KiB
JavaScript
const { query } = require('../../utils/db')
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const PUBLIC_COLS = 'id, username, role, totp_enabled, created_at, last_login_at'
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async function insertUser({ username, passwordHash, role = 'admin' }) {
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const res = await query(
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'INSERT INTO users (username, password_hash, role) VALUES (?, ?, ?)',
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[username, passwordHash, role],
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)
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return res.insertId
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}
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async function findByUsername(username) {
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const rows = await query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ? LIMIT 1', [username])
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return rows[0] || null
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}
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async function findById(id) {
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const rows = await query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ? LIMIT 1', [id])
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return rows[0] || null
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}
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async function listUsers() {
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return query(`SELECT ${PUBLIC_COLS} FROM users ORDER BY id ASC`)
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}
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async function updateUser(id, fields) {
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const cols = []
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const params = []
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for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(fields)) {
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cols.push(`${key} = ?`)
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params.push(val)
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}
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if (cols.length === 0) return
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params.push(id)
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await query(`UPDATE users SET ${cols.join(', ')} WHERE id = ?`, params)
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}
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async function deleteUser(id) {
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return query('DELETE FROM users WHERE id = ?', [id])
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}
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async function countUsers() {
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const rows = await query('SELECT COUNT(*) AS c FROM users')
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return Number(rows[0].c)
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}
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async function countAdmins() {
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const rows = await query("SELECT COUNT(*) AS c FROM users WHERE role = 'admin'")
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return Number(rows[0].c)
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}
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async function touchLastLogin(id) {
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return query('UPDATE users SET last_login_at = NOW() WHERE id = ?', [id])
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}
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// Store a (not-yet-enabled) TOTP secret for a user. Enabling is a separate step
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// so a secret is never trusted until the user has confirmed one code.
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async function setTotpSecret(id, secret) {
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return query('UPDATE users SET totp_secret = ?, totp_enabled = 0 WHERE id = ?', [secret, id])
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}
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async function enableTotp(id) {
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return query('UPDATE users SET totp_enabled = 1 WHERE id = ?', [id])
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}
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async function disableTotp(id) {
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return query('UPDATE users SET totp_secret = NULL, totp_enabled = 0 WHERE id = ?', [id])
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}
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module.exports = {
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insertUser,
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findByUsername,
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findById,
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listUsers,
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updateUser,
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deleteUser,
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countUsers,
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countAdmins,
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touchLastLogin,
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setTotpSecret,
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enableTotp,
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disableTotp,
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}
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