Claude
5df943095d
The GET /internal/bot-config route returns the DECRYPTED Discord bot token and was mounted on the same Express app / port 3000 that Pangolin proxies publicly. Its only guard was the BOT_INTERNAL_KEY shared secret, and .env.example shipped a placeholder default — so a forwarded path or a weak/unrotated key would expose the plaintext token to the internet. Move server<->bot internal traffic onto its own listener and fail fast on a weak key: - Add server/src/internalApp.js: a standalone Express app mounting requireInternalKey + /internal (and a no-secret /health), mirroring the bot's unpublished port-4100 pattern. - server.js starts a second listener on INTERNAL_PORT (default 3001), closed on graceful shutdown. - Remove the /internal mount from the public v1.router; the public app now 404s /api/v1/internal/bot-config even with a valid key. - Fail fast: new utils/botInternalKey.js rejects an empty, placeholder, or <16-char BOT_INTERNAL_KEY — fatal in production (exit 1), warning in dev. - docker-compose: bot SITE_INTERNAL_URL -> app:3001/internal/bot-config; document that INTERNAL_PORT stays unpublished. - .env.example (root/server/bot): document INTERNAL_PORT, the fail-fast behavior, and a defense-in-depth Pangolin deny rule for /api/v1/internal. Tests: add requireInternalKey.test.js and botInternalKey.test.js (node --test: 93 pass). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019rao86n5cXpwAyjdBFEshV
92 lines
3.9 KiB
Plaintext
92 lines
3.9 KiB
Plaintext
# ─── UOMysticmoon server — local dev environment ───
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# Copy to server/.env for running `npm run dev` outside Docker.
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# (In Docker, the root .env / docker-compose provides these instead.)
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NODE_ENV=development
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PORT=3000
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# Separate, unpublished port for server<->bot internal traffic (the decrypted
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# bot-token route). Must match the port in bot/.env's SITE_INTERNAL_URL and must
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# never be exposed through a public reverse proxy. See issue #33.
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INTERNAL_PORT=3001
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# Logging — written to BOTH the console and a log file (default <server>/logs/app.log).
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LOG_LEVEL=debug # console verbosity: error | warn | info | debug
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FILE_LOG_LEVEL=debug # file verbosity
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LOG_TO_FILE=true # set false for console-only
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# LOG_DIR= # defaults to server/logs
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# LOG_FILE=app.log
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# Point at a local or Dockerized MariaDB
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DB_HOST=127.0.0.1
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DB_PORT=3306
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DB_NAME=uomysticmoon
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DB_USER=uomm
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DB_PASSWORD=change-me-db-password
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JWT_SECRET=dev-only-change-me
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JWT_EXPIRES_IN=1d
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COOKIE_SECURE=auto
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COOKIE_NAME=uomm_token
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# Encryption key for secrets stored at rest (OAuth client secrets in auth_providers).
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# Any string — hashed to a 256-bit AES-GCM key. REQUIRED in production; in dev an
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# insecure key is derived from JWT_SECRET if unset (with a warning).
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SECRET_ENC_KEY=dev-only-change-me-too
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# Public base URL of this app, used to build the OAuth redirect_uri
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# (${APP_BASE_URL}/api/v1/auth/sso/:provider/callback). Set this in production so
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# the callback URL matches what you register with Google/Discord. If unset, it is
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# derived from the incoming request (fine for local dev).
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APP_BASE_URL=http://localhost:5173
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# Short-lived mobile access token lifetime + refresh token lifetime (Part 2).
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MOBILE_ACCESS_TTL=15m
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MOBILE_REFRESH_TTL_DAYS=30
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# Reverse-proxy trust. Request path: client -> Pangolin -> newt agent "ptero"
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# (separate VM) -> this app. ptero is the hop that connects to us, so pin
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# TRUST_PROXY to ptero's LAN IP: Express then honours X-Forwarded-For ONLY on
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# connections from ptero, and req.ip / req.secure reflect the real client (used
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# by rate limiting, backoff, bot-ban, activity log).
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# <ptero LAN IP> -> e.g. 10.0.0.42 (RECOMMENDED in prod; requires a static
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# DHCP reservation for ptero in Omada — a lease change would
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# silently break IP trust)
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# an integer -> that many hops (fallback if you can't pin an IP)
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# false -> no proxy (direct connections)
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# NOTE: a blanket "true" is intentionally rejected (coerced to 1) — it would let
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# clients spoof their IP via a forged X-Forwarded-For and dodge rate limits/bans.
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TRUST_PROXY=1
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# Set to 1 to log each request's raw peer address + X-Forwarded-For + resolved
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# req.ip, so you can verify/refresh ptero's IP without redeploying. Noisy —
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# leave off in normal operation.
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DEBUG_TRUST_PROXY=0
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# Optional TOTP two-factor (opt-in per user).
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TOTP_ISSUER=UOMysticmoon
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# How long the "password verified, awaiting code" step stays valid.
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TOTP_CHALLENGE_TTL=5m
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# Created on first boot if the users table is empty
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ADMIN_USERNAME=admin
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ADMIN_PASSWORD=change-me-admin-password
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SMTP_HOST=
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SMTP_PORT=587
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SMTP_USER=
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SMTP_PASS=
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CONTACT_TO=UOMysticmoon@gmail.com
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CLIENT_ORIGIN=http://localhost:5173
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# Discord bot — internal API (server <-> bot/). BOT_INTERNAL_KEY MUST be
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# byte-for-byte identical to the same variable in bot/.env.example — it is the
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# only auth on both sides' /internal/* routes, so a mismatch silently breaks
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# every server<->bot call with 401s. It also guards the server's
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# /internal/bot-config route, which returns the DECRYPTED Discord token: with
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# NODE_ENV=production the app REFUSES TO START if this is blank, a documented
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# placeholder, or shorter than 16 chars (a warning only in dev). The Discord bot
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# TOKEN itself is not an env var — it's entered in the admin panel and stored
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# encrypted in the DB (see the bot_config table / SECRET_ENC_KEY above).
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BOT_INTERNAL_URL=http://localhost:4100
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BOT_INTERNAL_KEY=dev-only-change-me-bot-key
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