- Widen users.role enum to include 'player'; make password_hash nullable; add email/email_verified/status/last_login_ip; pin username _ci collation. - POST /auth/register (honeypot + registerLimiter + botScore, reserved-name blocklist, duplicate->409, auto-login). player_registration setting gates it. - SSO auto-provision in finishLogin (setting-gated); return/portal-aware SSO redirects for the player portal; status refusal on login + requireAuth. - New /player self-service group (account, change username/password, TOTP, identities), reusing account.controller; accountChangeLimiter. - Admin: 'player' role + status/email on user create/update, role/status audit, player_registration enum validation, derived public registration flags. - usernamePolicy module (reserved, sanitize, derive, dedup) + unit tests; extend SSO callback tests. 133 server tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019rao86n5cXpwAyjdBFEshV
192 lines
8.1 KiB
JavaScript
192 lines
8.1 KiB
JavaScript
const users = require('../../../model/users/users.model')
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const activity = require('../../../model/activity/activity.model')
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const settings = require('../../../model/settings/settings.model')
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const { setAuthCookie, clearAuthCookie } = require('../../../auth/token')
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const sessionService = require('../../../auth/session.service')
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const totp = require('../../../utils/totp')
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const botScore = require('../../../middleware/botScore')
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const loginProtection = require('../../../middleware/loginProtection')
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const usernamePolicy = require('../../../auth/usernamePolicy')
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const log = require('../../../utils/logger')('auth')
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// Honeypot input name — must match the hidden field rendered on the login form.
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// Chosen to look like a real field so naive bots fill it; real users never see it.
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const HONEYPOT_FIELD = 'company'
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// One generic failure response for every "you don't get in" case (wrong user,
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// wrong password, tripped honeypot). Never reveals which was wrong.
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const GENERIC_FAIL = { message: 'Incorrect username or password.' }
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// True when this user must complete a second factor before getting a session.
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function needsTotp(user) {
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return Boolean(user && user.totp_enabled)
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}
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// Issue the real session: create the session token via the session service, set
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// the cookie, clear the IP's failure backoff, and record the login. authMethod
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// records how this session was authenticated ('local' password, or 'totp' after
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// the second factor) — carried in the session token for downstream visibility.
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async function issueSession(req, res, user, authMethod = 'local') {
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loginProtection.recordSuccess(req.ip)
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await users.recordLogin(user.id, req.ip)
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const { token } = sessionService.createSession(user, authMethod)
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setAuthCookie(req, res, token)
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await activity.log({ req, userId: user.id, action: 'auth.login' })
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log.info('login success', { username: user.username, id: user.id, ip: req.ip, authMethod })
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return res.json({ user: { id: user.id, username: user.username, role: user.role } })
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}
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async function login(req, res) {
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const { username, password } = req.body
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// Honeypot: a populated hidden field means a bot. Fail generically, but score
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// it hard — this is an unambiguous signal, unlike a mistyped password.
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if (req.body[HONEYPOT_FIELD]) {
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botScore.recordHoneypot(req.ip)
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loginProtection.recordFailure(req.ip)
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log.warn('honeypot login hit', { ip: req.ip, username })
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return res.status(401).json(GENERIC_FAIL)
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}
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try {
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const user = await users.getRawByUsername(username)
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const ok = user && (await users.validatePassword(user, password))
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if (!ok) {
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botScore.recordLoginFailure(req.ip)
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loginProtection.recordFailure(req.ip)
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log.warn('login failed', { username, ip: req.ip })
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return res.status(401).json(GENERIC_FAIL)
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}
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// Correct credentials, but the account is disabled/banned (or pending): do
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// not issue a session or a TOTP challenge. A distinct, clear message here is
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// fine — the caller already proved the password, so this leaks nothing.
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if (user.status && user.status !== 'active') {
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log.warn('login refused: inactive account', { username, status: user.status, ip: req.ip })
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return res.status(403).json({ message: 'This account is not active. Contact an administrator.' })
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}
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// Password is correct. If this user has TOTP on, do NOT issue a session yet —
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// hand back a short-lived, signed "password verified" challenge and require
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// the code. If TOTP is off, log them straight in.
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if (needsTotp(user)) {
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const challenge = sessionService.createPartialSession(user)
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log.info('password ok, awaiting TOTP', { username: user.username, id: user.id, ip: req.ip })
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return res.json({ totpRequired: true, challenge })
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}
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return issueSession(req, res, user, 'local')
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} catch (err) {
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log.error('login error', err)
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return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
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}
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}
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// Public self-registration for a `player` account. Gated by the
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// `player_registration` setting (must allow the password path) and hardened the
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// same way as login: honeypot + registerLimiter + the global botScore guard.
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// On success the new player is auto-logged-in (session cookie set).
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async function register(req, res) {
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// Honeypot: identical treatment to login — a filled hidden field is a bot.
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if (req.body[HONEYPOT_FIELD]) {
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botScore.recordHoneypot(req.ip)
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loginProtection.recordFailure(req.ip)
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log.warn('honeypot register hit', { ip: req.ip })
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return res.status(400).json({ message: 'Registration failed.' })
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}
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try {
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const mode = await settings.getRegistrationMode()
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// Password self-registration is only open when the mode includes it.
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if (mode !== 'password' && mode !== 'both') {
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return res.status(403).json({ message: 'Registration is not open.' })
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}
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const check = usernamePolicy.validateUsername(req.body.username)
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if (!check.ok) return res.status(400).json({ message: check.message })
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const email = req.body.email ? String(req.body.email).trim() : null
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let user
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try {
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user = await users.createUser({
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username: check.name,
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password: req.body.password,
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email,
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role: 'player',
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})
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} catch (err) {
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// The UNIQUE index is the source of truth for the uniqueness race — a
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// concurrent duplicate loses here and gets a clean 409.
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if (users.isDuplicateUsername(err)) {
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return res.status(409).json({ message: 'That username is already taken.' })
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}
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throw err
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}
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await activity.log({ req, userId: user.id, action: 'auth.register', detail: { username: user.username } })
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log.info('player registered', { username: user.username, id: user.id, ip: req.ip })
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// New password accounts never have TOTP yet — log straight in.
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return issueSession(req, res, user, 'local')
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} catch (err) {
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log.error('register error', err)
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return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
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}
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}
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// Second step for TOTP users: verify the challenge token + code, then issue the
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// session. A wrong code counts as a failed attempt (backoff + bot score).
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async function loginTotp(req, res) {
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const { challenge, code } = req.body
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const decoded = sessionService.upgradeSessionAfterTotp(challenge)
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if (!decoded) {
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return res.status(401).json({ message: 'Your verification session expired. Please sign in again.' })
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}
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try {
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const user = await users.getRawById(decoded.id)
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if (!user || !user.totp_enabled || !totp.verifyCode(user.totp_secret, code)) {
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botScore.recordLoginFailure(req.ip)
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loginProtection.recordFailure(req.ip)
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log.warn('TOTP verify failed', { id: decoded.id, ip: req.ip })
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return res.status(401).json({ message: 'Invalid verification code.' })
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}
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return issueSession(req, res, user, 'totp')
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} catch (err) {
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log.error('loginTotp error', err)
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return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
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}
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}
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// Clear the caller's cookie AND revoke this session server-side, so a copy of the
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// token (proxy log, shared machine, XSS-exfiltrated cookie) can't keep being used
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// after logout. attachSession populated req.session (best-effort) with the jti +
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// expiry; if there was no valid session, there's simply nothing to revoke.
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async function logout(req, res) {
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clearAuthCookie(req, res)
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try {
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if (req.session?.sessionId) {
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await sessionService.revokeSession(req.session.sessionId, {
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userId: req.session.userId,
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expiresAt: req.session.expiresAt,
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})
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await activity.log({ req, userId: req.session.userId, action: 'auth.logout' })
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}
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} catch (err) {
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// Never fail the logout on a revocation/logging hiccup — the cookie is cleared.
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log.error('logout revoke error', err)
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}
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return res.json({ message: 'Logged out.' })
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}
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async function me(req, res) {
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try {
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const user = await users.getById(req.user.id)
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if (!user) return res.status(401).json({ message: 'Unauthorized' })
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return res.json({ user })
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} catch (err) {
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return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
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}
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}
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module.exports = { login, register, loginTotp, logout, me, needsTotp, HONEYPOT_FIELD }
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