overlay.toml

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 # PROTOCOL_VERSION and the module bumps its own constant.
 #
 # Current: 2 — the transport plus the read path (docs/rust-link/PROTOCOL.md §8).
-protocol = 2
+protocol = 3
 
 # ── Oxide compatibility ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 #

overlay/oxide/plugins/RunicGateway.cs

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ namespace Oxide.Plugins
         ///     overlay's <c>overlay.toml</c> carries this same number so the installer can refuse
         ///     to pair a sidecar and an overlay that disagree.
         /// </summary>
-        private const int ProtocolVersion = 2;
+        private const int ProtocolVersion = 3;
 
         /// <summary>
         ///     Loopback reconnects are cheap, so the ceiling is low. A sidecar restart should cost
@@ -243,6 +243,10 @@ namespace Oxide.Plugins
             _wipeId = ResolveWipeId();
             _running = true;
 
+            // Expired link codes are dropped on a timer, not on lookup: an unconfirmed code is
+            // never looked up, so nothing else would ever remove one (protocol 3).
+            timer.Every(60f, PurgeExpiredCodes);
+
             _link = new Thread(LinkLoop)
             {
                 Name = "RunicGateway Link",
@@ -743,6 +747,13 @@ namespace Oxide.Plugins
                     EmitFrame(status);
                     break;
 
+                case "link.confirm":
+                    // The first command the WEBSITE originates (protocol 3). Everything before it
+                    // was the game talking, or the sidecar asking the game to say something it
+                    // already knew.
+                    HandleLinkConfirm(cmd, reqId);
+                    break;
+
                 default:
                     Puts($"unknown command '{verb}'");
                     break;
@@ -1645,6 +1656,346 @@ namespace Oxide.Plugins
                 .TotalMilliseconds;
         }
 
+        // ---- account linking ----
+
+        /// <summary>
+        ///     The alphabet a link code is drawn from.
+        ///
+        ///     <para>
+        ///     <b>No O, 0, I or 1.</b> A player reads this code off their screen and types it into
+        ///     a browser, often on a phone, sometimes reading it aloud to somebody else. Those four
+        ///     glyphs are the ones that get transcribed wrong, and a code that fails for a reason
+        ///     the player cannot see is worse than a longer one.
+        ///     </para>
+        /// </summary>
+        private const string CodeAlphabet = "ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ23456789";
+
+        private const int CodeLength = 6;
+
+        /// <summary>
+        ///     How long a code is good for. Short on purpose: R1 made this an authorization path,
+        ///     not a convenience — the site becomes the author of who may do what in game, so a
+        ///     code that lingers is a privilege waiting to be picked up.
+        /// </summary>
+        private static readonly TimeSpan CodeTtl = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5);
+
+        /// <summary>How long a player must wait between <c>/link</c> requests.</summary>
+        private static readonly TimeSpan RequestCooldown = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30);
+
+        /// <summary>
+        ///     An unconfirmed code, and the Steam identity it will bind.
+        ///
+        ///     <para>
+        ///     <b>These live in memory and nowhere else</b>, which is the same call the UO bridge
+        ///     made and it is the right one for the same reason: the secret exists only on the
+        ///     server that minted it, for five minutes, and nothing writes it to disk. A plugin
+        ///     reload drops every pending code — and phase 7b's config editor reloads plugins
+        ///     routinely — but the cost of that is a player typing <c>/link</c> again, which is
+        ///     cheaper than a credential in a second process.
+        ///     </para>
+        /// </summary>
+        private sealed class PendingLink
+        {
+            public string SteamId;
+            public string Name;
+            public DateTime Expires;
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>code -> pending link. Main thread only, like every world read here.</summary>
+        private readonly Dictionary<string, PendingLink> _codes =
+            new Dictionary<string, PendingLink>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
+
+        /// <summary>steam id -> when they last asked, so <c>/link</c> cannot be spammed.</summary>
+        private readonly Dictionary<string, DateTime> _lastLinkRequest =
+            new Dictionary<string, DateTime>(StringComparer.Ordinal);
+
+        private readonly System.Random _codeRandom = new System.Random();
+
+        /// <summary>
+        ///     <c>/link</c> — mint a one-time code for the caller and tell the sidecar about it.
+        ///
+        ///     <para>
+        ///     <b>Chat, not console, and the reply is private.</b> Both frameworks consume a
+        ///     <c>/</c> command rather than broadcasting it, and <c>SendReply</c> addresses one
+        ///     player — so neither the request nor the code reaches anybody else's chat. That is
+        ///     load-bearing rather than polish: a code read off a stream is a code somebody else
+        ///     can spend.
+        ///     </para>
+        ///
+        ///     <para>
+        ///     The plugin does <b>not</b> record who is linked. The website is the author of
+        ///     record for that (R2), and a second copy here would be a second thing to keep in
+        ///     step across a wipe. So there is no "you are already linked" check on this path —
+        ///     the site refuses a Steam id it already holds, where it can say which account holds
+        ///     it.
+        ///     </para>
+        /// </summary>
+        [ChatCommand("link")]
+        private void CmdLinkChat(BasePlayer player, string command, string[] args)
+        {
+            if (player == null)
+                return;
+
+            string steamId = player.UserIDString;
+            if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(steamId))
+                return;
+
+            DateTime last;
+            if (_lastLinkRequest.TryGetValue(steamId, out last) && DateTime.UtcNow - last < RequestCooldown)
+            {
+                SendReply(player, "Please wait a moment before asking for another link code.");
+                return;
+            }
+
+            // One outstanding code per player: drop any earlier one so only the newest works.
+            // Without this a player who ran /link three times leaves three live codes behind.
+            DropCodesFor(steamId);
+
+            string code = MintCode();
+            _codes[code] = new PendingLink
+            {
+                SteamId = steamId,
+                Name = player.displayName,
+                Expires = DateTime.UtcNow + CodeTtl
+            };
+            _lastLinkRequest[steamId] = DateTime.UtcNow;
+
+            Dictionary<string, object> frame = Frame("account.link.requested", "event");
+            frame["steamId"] = steamId;
+            frame["name"] = player.displayName;
+            frame["ttlSec"] = (long)CodeTtl.TotalSeconds;
+
+            // **The code is NOT in this frame, and that is the point.** The event exists so an
+            // operator can see that linking is being used and so the site can rate-limit a player
+            // who is fishing; it is not how the code travels. The code travels through the player,
+            // which is what makes typing it proof that they are the one who asked.
+            EmitFrame(frame);
+
+            SendReply(player, "Your link code is <color=#e0b34d>" + code + "</color>.");
+            SendReply(
+                player,
+                "Enter it on the website within " + (int)CodeTtl.TotalMinutes +
+                " minutes to link this Steam account. It works once.");
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        ///     <c>/unlink</c> — ask the website to sever this Steam id's link.
+        ///
+        ///     <para>
+        ///     <b>It emits rather than deletes</b>, because the plugin holds no link to delete. The
+        ///     site owns the record and applies this like any other event off the feed.
+        ///     </para>
+        ///
+        ///     <para>
+        ///     It exists because the site <b>refuses</b> to move a Steam id that another account
+        ///     already holds. Without a way out, a player who linked the wrong account while logged
+        ///     in as it would need staff; with this they walk to a computer they are already sitting
+        ///     at. The authority is the Steam id itself — whoever is connected as it is who it is.
+        ///     </para>
+        /// </summary>
+        [ChatCommand("unlink")]
+        private void CmdUnlinkChat(BasePlayer player, string command, string[] args)
+        {
+            if (player == null)
+                return;
+
+            string steamId = player.UserIDString;
+            if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(steamId))
+                return;
+
+            DropCodesFor(steamId);
+
+            Dictionary<string, object> frame = Frame("account.unlinked", "event");
+            frame["steamId"] = steamId;
+            frame["name"] = player.displayName;
+            frame["origin"] = "in-game";
+            EmitFrame(frame);
+
+            SendReply(
+                player,
+                "Asked the website to unlink this Steam account. If it was linked, it is not now.");
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        ///     Inbound <c>link.confirm</c> — the website has been given a code and wants to know
+        ///     whose it is.
+        ///
+        ///     <para>
+        ///     <b>This is the first command the website originates</b> in this bridge; everything
+        ///     before protocol 3 was the game talking. The reply carries the Steam id and nothing
+        ///     the caller did not already prove — there is no session here, no account creation,
+        ///     and no write to the game.
+        ///     </para>
+        ///
+        ///     <para>
+        ///     A code is consumed on the <b>first</b> lookup whether or not it turns out to be
+        ///     expired, so a code cannot be probed twice. That is why the removal happens before
+        ///     the expiry check rather than after it.
+        ///     </para>
+        /// </summary>
+        private void HandleLinkConfirm(Dictionary<string, object> cmd, string reqId)
+        {
+            object codeObj;
+            string code = cmd.TryGetValue("code", out codeObj) && codeObj != null
+                ? codeObj.ToString().Trim()
+                : null;
+
+            if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(code))
+            {
+                EmitLinkError(reqId, "malformed");
+                return;
+            }
+
+            PendingLink pending;
+            if (!_codes.TryGetValue(code, out pending))
+            {
+                EmitLinkError(reqId, "unknown");
+                return;
+            }
+
+            _codes.Remove(code);
+
+            if (DateTime.UtcNow > pending.Expires)
+            {
+                EmitLinkError(reqId, "expired");
+                return;
+            }
+
+            Dictionary<string, object> ok = Frame("link.ok", "reply");
+            ok["steamId"] = pending.SteamId;
+            ok["name"] = pending.Name;
+            if (reqId != null)
+                ok["reqId"] = reqId;
+
+            EmitFrame(ok);
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        ///     A refusal, with a reason the website can turn into a sentence.
+        ///
+        ///     <para>
+        ///     <c>unknown</c> and <c>expired</c> are deliberately <b>separate</b> here and
+        ///     deliberately <b>the same</b> to the player: an operator reading a log wants to know
+        ///     whether codes are being guessed or merely going stale, and a stranger typing codes
+        ///     must not learn which of the two they hit.
+        ///     </para>
+        /// </summary>
+        private void EmitLinkError(string reqId, string reason)
+        {
+            Dictionary<string, object> frame = Frame("link.error", "reply");
+            frame["reason"] = reason;
+            if (reqId != null)
+                frame["reqId"] = reqId;
+
+            EmitFrame(frame);
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>Drops every outstanding code belonging to one Steam id.</summary>
+        private void DropCodesFor(string steamId)
+        {
+            List<string> stale = null;
+
+            foreach (KeyValuePair<string, PendingLink> entry in _codes)
+            {
+                if (entry.Value != null && entry.Value.SteamId == steamId)
+                {
+                    if (stale == null)
+                        stale = new List<string>();
+
+                    stale.Add(entry.Key);
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (stale == null)
+                return;
+
+            foreach (string key in stale)
+                _codes.Remove(key);
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        ///     Drops expired codes and stale cooldowns.
+        ///
+        ///     <para>
+        ///     Run on a timer rather than only on lookup, because an unconfirmed code is never
+        ///     looked up — a player who runs <c>/link</c> and wanders off leaves an entry that
+        ///     nothing else would ever remove.
+        ///     </para>
+        /// </summary>
+        private void PurgeExpiredCodes()
+        {
+            DateTime now = DateTime.UtcNow;
+            List<string> dead = null;
+
+            foreach (KeyValuePair<string, PendingLink> entry in _codes)
+            {
+                if (entry.Value == null || now > entry.Value.Expires)
+                {
+                    if (dead == null)
+                        dead = new List<string>();
+
+                    dead.Add(entry.Key);
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (dead != null)
+            {
+                foreach (string key in dead)
+                    _codes.Remove(key);
+            }
+
+            List<string> cold = null;
+
+            foreach (KeyValuePair<string, DateTime> entry in _lastLinkRequest)
+            {
+                if (now - entry.Value > RequestCooldown)
+                {
+                    if (cold == null)
+                        cold = new List<string>();
+
+                    cold.Add(entry.Key);
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (cold == null)
+                return;
+
+            foreach (string key in cold)
+                _lastLinkRequest.Remove(key);
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        ///     A code from <see cref="CodeAlphabet"/>, retried until it does not collide.
+        ///
+        ///     <para>
+        ///     <c>System.Random</c> rather than a cryptographic source, and the reason it is
+        ///     defensible is the shape of the guess rather than the shape of the generator: a code
+        ///     lives five minutes, is consumed on first lookup, and the website rate-limits the
+        ///     confirm endpoint. An attacker who could predict the sequence would still have to
+        ///     reach a code before the player does.
+        ///     </para>
+        /// </summary>
+        private string MintCode()
+        {
+            for (int attempt = 0; attempt < 16; attempt++)
+            {
+                var chars = new char[CodeLength];
+
+                for (int i = 0; i < CodeLength; i++)
+                    chars[i] = CodeAlphabet[_codeRandom.Next(CodeAlphabet.Length)];
+
+                string candidate = new string(chars);
+
+                if (!_codes.ContainsKey(candidate))
+                    return candidate;
+            }
+
+            // Sixteen collisions in a row against a table this small is not bit-space exhaustion,
+            // it is something being wrong. A code that cannot collide is better than a loop that
+            // might not end.
+            return Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N").Substring(0, CodeLength).ToUpperInvariant();
+        }
+
         // ---- diagnostics ----
 
         /// <summary>

scripts/checkPlugin.js

@@ -62,6 +62,12 @@ const ANSWERS_DELIBERATELY = Object.create(null)
 /** Anything shaped like this is a game hook, by both frameworks' own convention. */
 const HOOK_NAME = /^(?:On|Can)[A-Z]\w*$/
 
+/**
+ * The parameter list both frameworks bind a chat command on: the caller, the command word, and
+ * whatever followed it. Names are the author's; the types are not.
+ */
+const CHAT_SIGNATURE = /^BasePlayer\s+\w+,\s*string\s+\w+,\s*string\[\]\s+\w+$/
+
 /**
  * Method declarations, as this file cares about them: the return type and the
  * name. Deliberately narrow — it matches the plugin's own single style
@@ -82,6 +88,31 @@ function readExpectedHooks(source) {
     .map((m) => m[1])
 }
 
+/**
+ * Every `[ChatCommand("x")]` and the signature of the method under it.
+ *
+ * **A chat command binds by reflection, exactly like a hook**, and fails the same silent way: a
+ * method with the wrong parameter list is never called and neither framework says a word. The
+ * player types `/link`, nothing happens, and there is no log line to find. So the signature is
+ * checked here rather than discovered on a rig.
+ */
+function readChatCommands(source) {
+  const found = []
+  const attribute = /\[ChatCommand\("([^"]+)"\)\]\s*(?:\/\/[^\n]*\n\s*)*(?:private|public|protected|internal)\s+(?:static\s+)?([\w.<>[\],\s]+?)\s+(\w+)\s*\(([^)]*)\)/g
+
+  let match
+  while ((match = attribute.exec(source)) !== null) {
+    found.push({
+      command: match[1],
+      returns: match[2].trim(),
+      name: match[3],
+      params: match[4].replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim(),
+    })
+  }
+
+  return found
+}
+
 function readMethods(source) {
   const found = []
   let m
@@ -133,7 +164,39 @@ function check(source, toml) {
     }
   }
 
-  // 4. The two declaration sites this repository owns must agree.
+  // 4. Every chat command is bound by reflection and must have the signature the
+  //     frameworks call. A wrong one is never invoked and says nothing.
+  const chat = readChatCommands(source)
+
+  for (const cmd of chat) {
+    if (cmd.returns !== 'void') {
+      problems.push(
+        `/${cmd.command} (${cmd.name}) returns ${cmd.returns}, not void — a chat command's return ` +
+          'value is not read, and a non-void signature is the shape that silently binds nothing.'
+      )
+    }
+
+    if (!CHAT_SIGNATURE.test(cmd.params)) {
+      problems.push(
+        `/${cmd.command} (${cmd.name}) takes (${cmd.params}), not (BasePlayer, string, string[]). ` +
+          'Both frameworks bind a chat command by reflection on that exact signature, so this one ' +
+          'would never be called and neither would log it — the player types the command and ' +
+          'nothing happens at all.'
+      )
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Two commands answering to one name is one of them never running, and which one is
+  // whichever the framework happened to register second.
+  const seen = new Set()
+  for (const cmd of chat) {
+    if (seen.has(cmd.command)) {
+      problems.push(`/${cmd.command} is declared twice; only one of them can ever be bound`)
+    }
+    seen.add(cmd.command)
+  }
+
+  // 5. The two declaration sites this repository owns must agree.
   const inCode = /ProtocolVersion\s*=\s*(\d+)\s*;/.exec(source)
   const inToml = /^\s*protocol\s*=\s*(\d+)\s*$/m.exec(toml)
 
@@ -171,6 +234,6 @@ function main() {
   )
 }
 
-module.exports = { check, readExpectedHooks, readMethods, HOOK_NAME }
+module.exports = { check, readExpectedHooks, readMethods, readChatCommands, HOOK_NAME }
 
 if (require.main === module) main()

scripts/checkPlugin.test.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// A check is worth what it catches, so this breaks it seven ways.
+// A check is worth what it catches, so this breaks it thirteen ways.
 //
 // The case that matters most is the last one: `checkPlugin.js` finds hooks with a
 // deliberately narrow regex, and a regex that silently matches NOTHING passes
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ const assert = require('node:assert')
 const fs = require('node:fs')
 const path = require('node:path')
 
-const { check, readExpectedHooks, readMethods, HOOK_NAME } = require('./checkPlugin')
+const { check, readExpectedHooks, readMethods, readChatCommands, HOOK_NAME } = require('./checkPlugin')
 
 /** A minimal plugin that passes, as the baseline every case below deviates from. */
 function source({ expected = ['OnPlayerDeath'], methods, version = 2 } = {}) {
@@ -128,3 +128,85 @@ test('the parser actually reads the real plugin, rather than quietly matching no
   const expected = readExpectedHooks(real)
   assert.ok(expected.length >= 15, `only found ${expected.length} entries in ExpectedHooks`)
 })
+
+// ── Chat commands (protocol 3) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// A chat command binds by reflection on an exact signature, and a wrong one is
+// never invoked and never logged: the player types `/link` and nothing happens.
+// That is the same failure mode the hook checks exist for, one surface along.
+
+/** A plugin whose only body is one chat command. */
+function withChat(attribute, signature, returns = 'void') {
+  return source({
+    expected: [],
+    methods: `        [ChatCommand("${attribute}")]
+        private ${returns} CmdThing(${signature})
+        {
+        }`,
+  })
+}
+
+const GOOD_SIGNATURE = 'BasePlayer player, string command, string[] args'
+
+test('a correctly shaped chat command passes', () => {
+  assert.deepEqual(check(withChat('link', GOOD_SIGNATURE), toml()), [])
+})
+
+test('a chat command taking the wrong player type is caught', () => {
+  // The plausible mistake: Covalence's `IPlayer` is what a Universal plugin
+  // takes, and this plugin is not one. It compiles and binds nothing.
+  const problems = check(withChat('link', 'IPlayer player, string command, string[] args'), toml())
+
+  assert.equal(problems.length, 1)
+  assert.match(problems[0], /not \(BasePlayer, string, string\[\]\)/)
+})
+
+test('a chat command missing the trailing args is caught', () => {
+  const problems = check(withChat('link', 'BasePlayer player, string command'), toml())
+
+  assert.equal(problems.length, 1)
+  assert.match(problems[0], /nothing happens at all/)
+})
+
+test('a chat command that returns something is caught', () => {
+  const problems = check(withChat('link', GOOD_SIGNATURE, 'object'), toml())
+
+  assert.equal(problems.length, 1)
+  assert.match(problems[0], /returns object, not void/)
+})
+
+test('two chat commands answering to one name is caught', () => {
+  const both = source({
+    expected: [],
+    methods: `        [ChatCommand("link")]
+        private void CmdOne(${GOOD_SIGNATURE})
+        {
+        }
+
+        [ChatCommand("link")]
+        private void CmdTwo(${GOOD_SIGNATURE})
+        {
+        }`,
+  })
+
+  const problems = check(both, toml())
+
+  assert.equal(problems.length, 1)
+  assert.match(problems[0], /declared twice/)
+})
+
+test('the chat-command parser reads the real plugin, rather than quietly matching nothing', () => {
+  // The same trap the method parser has, and the reason this file's last test
+  // exists: a regex that matches NOTHING passes every case above.
+  const real = fs.readFileSync(
+    path.resolve(__dirname, '..', 'overlay', 'oxide', 'plugins', 'RunicGateway.cs'),
+    'utf8'
+  )
+
+  const commands = readChatCommands(real)
+  const names = new Set(commands.map((c) => c.command))
+
+  assert.ok(commands.length >= 2, `only found ${commands.length} chat commands in the real plugin`)
+  assert.ok(names.has('link'), '/link was not found by the chat-command parser')
+  assert.ok(names.has('unlink'), '/unlink was not found by the chat-command parser')
+})