Phase 7: PlayerVendorSale core event + subscriber

The one non-drop-in piece. Player-vendor purchases raise no EventSink, so the
sale is invisible to subscription. Two git-format core patches add a
PlayerVendorSale event and raise it at the committed sale in
PlayerVendorBuyGump.OnResponse (right after HoldGold +=), where buyer, vendor
owner, item, price, and commission are all in scope. The subscriber
BridgeVendorSale emits vendor.sale.

All three are a coupled unit. The subscriber references PlayerVendorSaleEventArgs,
which does not exist until the EventSink patch is applied, so it lives in patches/
not overlay/ -- shipping it in overlay would break the build on any unpatched
install. patches/README.md documents applying the unit; both patches verified
with git apply --check against stock ServUO 57.4. This is the first phase that
rebuilds the core (ServUO.exe), not just Scripts.dll.

vendor.sale carries buyer and vendor-owner accounts, both present and distinct,
which is the pair that flags gold-laundering when they match -- richer than the
ownerless NPC ValidVendor* events, and on a committed sale rather than a
validation stage.

Verified with a probe firing the event on real seeded-vendor data: vendor.sale
emitted with buyerAcct=seed_001, ownerAcct=seed_000, Longsword, price 69819. The
probe proves the event, args, subscriber, and payload; the literal gump call site
firing on a real purchase needs a live buyer with a NetState and is confirmed by
an in-game buy. Evidence in docs/PLAN.md §17.

This completes every phase on the ServUO side. Phases 0-6 are drop-in (overlay/);
7 is patches/. Cheat signals are folded into existing streams (fastwalk, audit,
vendor.sale), not a separate phase. Remaining work is the Rust sidecar.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-10 15:46:07 -05:00
parent db7c0adbf0
commit ee425f95d9

View File

@@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ Counts in `hello` are a live snapshot taken on the Core thread, not a cached val
4. ~~**Request/response.**~~ **Done.** `BridgeProfile` + `BridgeRequests`: `char.profile` (by account+slot or serial), `account.roster`, `vendor.snapshot`, `bridge.error`. Evidence in §14. Sidecar should cache profiles and rate-limit requests.
5. ~~**`[link` account linking.**~~ **Done.** `BridgeAccountLink`: `[link` → one-time code → `link.confirm``WebsiteUserId` tag, persisted to `accounts.xml`. `mob.login` carries `webId`. Evidence in §15.
6. ~~**Town-crier inbound.**~~ **Done.** `BridgeTownCrier`: `towncrier.add` / `remove` into `GlobalTownCrierEntryList`, with abuse caps. Evidence in §16.
7. ~~**Core edit: `PlayerVendorSale`.**~~ **Done.** Two core patches + `BridgeVendorSale` subscriber → `vendor.sale` with buyer + owner + price + commission. Evidence in §17.
5. **`[link` account linking.** `CommandSystem.Register("link", AccessLevel.Player, …)`, one-time short-TTL codes in a main-thread dict, `Account.SetTag("WebsiteUserId", id)` — persists to `accounts.xml` for free. Loopback-only is the trust boundary; add a shared secret if the sidecar is ever exposed.
6. **Town-crier inbound.** `GlobalTownCrierEntryList.Instance.AddEntry(lines, duration)` (`Scripts/Mobiles/NPCs/TownCrier.cs:96`), marshaled to the Core thread. Cap line count/length and active entries.
7. **Core edit: `PlayerVendorSale`** (§6). Then the cheat-detection feed.
@@ -350,6 +351,28 @@ Two defects were found this way and fixed:
---
## 17. Phase 7 acceptance
The one non-drop-in piece. Two `git`-format core patches (`patches/playervendor-sale-*.patch`) add a `PlayerVendorSale` EventSink event and raise it at the committed sale in `PlayerVendorBuyGump.OnResponse` (right after `HoldGold +=`). The subscriber `patches/BridgeVendorSale.cs` emits `vendor.sale`. All three are a coupled unit — the subscriber references a type the patch creates, so it lives in `patches/`, not `overlay/`.
Both patches verified with `git apply --check` against stock ServUO 57.4. Applying them rebuilds the **core** (`ServUO.exe`), not just `Scripts.dll` — the first phase to do so.
Verified end to end with a probe that fired the event using **real seeded-vendor data**:
```json
{"kind":"vendor.sale","committed":true,
"buyerSerial":"0x1F8","buyerAcct":"seed_001",
"ownerSerial":"0x1F5","ownerAcct":"seed_000",
"vendorSerial":"0x2C0","itemSerial":"0x4001440F","itemType":"Longsword",
"itemId":3937,"amount":1,"price":69819,"commission":0}
```
Both **buyer and owner accounts are present and distinct** — the pair that flags gold-laundering when they match, and the reason this event beats the ownerless NPC `ValidVendor*` events.
**Test boundary, stated honestly:** the probe proves the patched event, its args, the subscriber, and the payload. It does **not** exercise the literal call site in `OnResponse` firing on a real purchase — that needs a live buyer with a `NetState` at a vendor, which cannot be faked. That one line is at the verified committed-sale point; the gold-standard confirmation is an in-game buy from a player vendor (buy from a seeded vendor and watch for `vendor.sale committed:true`).
---
## 16. Phase 6 acceptance
`BridgeTownCrier.cs` handles inbound `towncrier.add` / `towncrier.remove`, pushing website news into `GlobalTownCrierEntryList` on the Core thread. Caps (line count, line length, active-entry count, duration) are enforced before touching the shared list — defense in depth on top of the loopback trust boundary.