Two scope decisions taken by the org lead on 2026-08-31, before any Phase 10 code,
plus the three factual corrections that finding them out produced.
Phase 10 — the protocol bump now carries three enrichments, not one. The argument is
specific to this phase: a bump costs a sidecar release, a republished bundle and an
operator update on every shard, so a field left out does not cost a follow-up commit,
it costs a second bump with the same lead time and a split operator population. The
two additions:
* player-vendor fee state on vendor.listing (ownerAcct, holdGold, chargePerDay,
daysRemaining), because uo.vendor.expiring is the same "owned asset at risk with
a deadline" shape as the flagship and today has neither an address nor a deadline;
* a post-decision account.login.result, because EventSink.AccountLogin is a veto
hook that fires BEFORE the auth decision.
Moving vendor.sale out of the opt-in patch tier was explicitly declined.
Phase 11 — ships every checked row of 8.6 rather than a single rule, carving out
uo.market.item_listed (a saved search; no per-user query store exists). ~23 triggers
grouped by the audience kind each family exercises, since exercising the ceiling
lattice at scale is the point rather than volume of mail. Every rule still ships
enabled = 0 per Q3. Notes that the phase will likely want an 11a/11b split on the
4a/4b precedent, to confirm at its start.
Three corrections to 8.6, each verified against the emitters rather than the table:
* uo.vendor.sale is real and does carry ownerAcct, but lives in servuo-plugins/
patches/ (opt-in, verified only against ServUO 57.4) — dormant, not broken, on a
shard that declined the tier;
* uo.vendor.expiring had no data at all, not merely no mapper — vendor.listing
carries ownerSerial/ownerName and nothing carries held gold or daily charge;
* uo.account.login_attempt could not have been built as described — it would have
mailed "someone tried to log into your account" on every successful login.
Renamed uo.account.login_failed so the id cannot be misread again.
Also amended: the status header, scope decision 3, and 6.0b's documentation
assignment for rows 10 and 11 (v5.md now earned; the patch-tier caveat is an
operator-facing doc obligation; runicgateway.com's capability claim changes when
"one rule" becomes "the catalogue").
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Records what Phase 9 shipped (website#176) and the four decisions the org lead
settled before any of it: mechanism plus SMTP's own synchronous refusal rather
than an API transport; suppression scoped to engagement rules only; an
`address_masked` column added to §4.5's DDL; and the verification gate applied at
enqueue rather than at delivery.
The correction the phase's own text needed: "SMTP has none" is too strong. SMTP
has no asynchronous bounce feed, but a single-recipient send refused at RCPT TO
throws synchronously with the reply code intact, and mailer.js was already
catching that and discarding it.
The defect worth not repeating: `PERMANENT_CODES` is not a bounce classifier. It
answers "is retrying pointless?" and contains EAUTH, so suppressing on it would
have emptied the mailing list the first time an SMTP password expired.
Also records the one thing only the live rig could find — `engagement_sends`
has carried a `bounced` status since §4.5 and nothing had ever written it, so the
Send Log's Bounced filter matched nothing — and answers §7.1 Q1's narrower half.
- ENGAGEMENT.md: Phase 9 "As built", the §4.5 DDL, Q1's narrower half, status header
- BACKEND_DESIGN.md: §3 `engagement_suppressions`, and §7's Deliverability section
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Records Phase 8 and answers §7.1 Q8, leaving Q9 as the only open question.
ENGAGEMENT.md gains the phase's as-built section: the four decisions settled
first, the relative-url finding the live rig caught (Phase 7's contract is
relative-only, and the client half of that contract was never written down), the
ref-not-stream routing rule, the (base URL, user id) snapshot scoping that is the
actual security property, and the on-device walk. Its Status paragraph was six
phases stale and now names every phase that has landed.
android/PLAN.md §7's "no offline caching, no Room in v1" decision STANDS and now
names its one exception, with the limit it comes with: the snapshot serves a
running app, not a cold start, because the shell gates the whole app on loading
the site's appearance. Widening Phase 8 into the shell's startup model is the
org lead's call, so it is written up rather than done. §11 gains the inbox and
the per-channel screen as built.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
`news.post` is a declared trigger with no caller: `coreTriggers.js` says so in
as many words, and Phase 6 migrated only the four `team.*` ones. A rule naming
it can never fire, so on a real deployment the only in-app or email items the
engine can produce today come from Teams. Phase 7 flagged it in passing; this
writes it down properly as an open question.
The substance is not the call — it is the three other things a news publish
already fires, and which of them the engine has any business replacing:
- the announce leg (`announce_job_legs`, `module-uo` owns `towncrier`) — a
one-shot delivery to a channel of the deployment, with retry. NOT the
engine's.
- a module's post hook (`registerPostHook`) — idempotent state mirroring that
also runs on delete and refreshes on a silent edit. NOT the engine's.
- the raw `pushDispatch.publish('news.post', …)` — a per-person notification.
THIS is the one that becomes an emit.
So modules keep both doors onto a news publish and neither changes. What a
module does not get is the ability to fire `news.post` itself — the id's owner
is core, `emit` binds the owner at the call, and §7.2's one namespace gives an
id exactly one owner across both facets. A module wanting its own person-facing
news notification declares its own trigger.
Three things to settle first, recorded rather than decided: continuity (the
emit replacing the tickle stops push silently until a rule is enabled — G22's
shape, and Phase 6 decision 3's), reusing the job-id transition signal rather
than re-deriving it, and which phase owns it. Recommended home: Phase 11, whose
title understates it — a pointer and an extra acceptance line land there too.
Code: RunicGateway/website#175
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2fd5d065b7)
2026-08-31 02:28:20 -05:00
3 changed files with 585 additions and 59 deletions
| user_id | INT NOT NULL FK→users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE | |
| user_id | INT NOT NULL FK→users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE | |
| channel | VARCHAR(32) NOT NULL | VARCHAR, never ENUM: the channel set is data, and a module must not require an ALTER |
| channel | VARCHAR(32) NOT NULL | VARCHAR, never ENUM: the channel set is data, and a module must not require an ALTER |
| subject_key | VARCHAR(190) NOT NULL DEFAULT '' | what a COOLDOWN counts, from the trigger's declared `subjectKey`. A display string is fine here: it is only ever compared with itself |
| subject_key | VARCHAR(190) NOT NULL DEFAULT '' | what a COOLDOWN counts, from the trigger's declared `subjectKey`. A display string is fine here: it is only ever compared with itself |
| scope_key | VARCHAR(190) NULL | what a PREFERENCE and an UNSUBSCRIBE are keyed on (engagement phase 6), e.g. `team:12`. Deliberately **not**`subject_key`: an unsubscribe token is signed over this and sits in a mailbox for months, so it has to be a stable identifier — signing over a display name orphans every link the first time somebody renames a Team. NULL means an unscoped event; `''` is reserved for "deployment-wide" in `engagement_digest_state` |
| scope_key | VARCHAR(190) NULL | what a PREFERENCE and an UNSUBSCRIBE are keyed on (engagement phase 6), e.g. `team:12`. Deliberately **not**`subject_key`: an unsubscribe token is signed over this and sits in a mailbox for months, so it has to be a stable identifier — signing over a display name orphans every link the first time somebody renames a Team. NULL means an unscoped event; `''` is reserved for "deployment-wide" in `engagement_digest_state` |
| payload | JSON NOT NULL | the declared variables, snapshotted at emit |
| payload | JSON NOT NULL | the declared variables, snapshotted at emit |
| dedupe_key | VARCHAR(190) NULL | the emitter's replay guard; NULL never collides |
| dedupe_key | VARCHAR(190) NULL | the emitter's replay guard; NULL never collides |
@@ -623,6 +624,35 @@ a rule's budget and mute it.
appear here, and neither do they appear in the engagement log lines, which carry variable *names* and
appear here, and neither do they appear in the engagement log lines, which carry variable *names* and
counts only.
counts only.
Phase 9 gave two of those statuses their first writers. `suppressed` means the address was on the
suppression list and **no transport call was made**; `bounced` means one was, and the mailbox does
not exist. `complained` still has none — it needs a provider feedback loop, which SMTP has not got.
### engagement_suppressions — addresses we have stopped mailing (engagement phase 9)
| col | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
| address_hash | CHAR(64) NOT NULL PK | sha256 of the **lower-cased, trimmed** address |
| address_masked | VARCHAR(190) NULL | `d***@example.com`. Phase 9's one addition to the planned DDL |
| channel | VARCHAR(32) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'email' | |
| created_by | INT NULL FK→users(id) ON DELETE SET NULL | the admin, for a manual row; **NULL for an automatic one**, which is what separates the two |
| created_at | DATETIME | |
`INDEX(created_at)`, `INDEX(reason, created_at)` — the screen's two orderings.
G16. **Keyed on the address, not the user**, and after Phase 1b made addresses unique that is a
choice rather than a workaround: a bounce arrives as an address, it does not know which account was
behind it, and it stays true after that account changed its address or was deleted.
Writes are `INSERT IGNORE`, so **the first reason an address was suppressed is the one that
survives** — an address that hard-bounced in March and was manually re-added in June still reads
`bounce`, because that is the fact explaining why the mail stopped. An upsert would let the most
recent write overwrite the diagnosis.
`address_masked` exists because a hash-only table cannot be operated; the reasoning and the routes
are in §7's *Deliverability* subsection.
### engagement_digest_state — how far each digest has got (engagement phase 6)
### engagement_digest_state — how far each digest has got (engagement phase 6)
| col | type | notes |
| col | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
|---|---|---|
@@ -1601,6 +1631,72 @@ credentials.
stops**. The admin dashboard warns whenever the deprecated Gmail token is present and no replacement
stops**. The admin dashboard warns whenever the deprecated Gmail token is present and no replacement
credential is; see [`UPGRADE_NOTES.md`](UPGRADE_NOTES.md).
credential is; see [`UPGRADE_NOTES.md`](UPGRADE_NOTES.md).
### Deliverability: suppression, bounces and the verification gate *(engagement phase 9)*
Engagement Phase 9 ([`ENGAGEMENT.md`](ENGAGEMENT.md) Phase 9). Two mechanisms decide that a person
who is *in* a rule's audience does not get the mail, and they are deliberately at different points
in the pipeline.
**`engagement_suppressions` — checked at DELIVERY.** Keyed on `address_hash` (sha256 of the
lower-cased address), because a bounce arrives as an address and stays true after the account behind
it changed its address or was deleted. An outbox row can sit through a rule's `delay_seconds` grace
window and an address can bounce inside it, so the only correct check is the one taken immediately
before the transport call — which is also what produces the `status='suppressed'` row in
`engagement_sends` with no transport call at all.
**The verification gate — applied at ENQUEUE.** With the `email_verification_required` setting on
(seeded in Phase 1b: `on` for a fresh install, `off` for an upgrade), an unverified address is
excluded before an outbox row is written. It hangs off a channel's optional **`eligible(userIds)`**
registration rather than living in the engine: being unverified is an *email* fact, and a rule
spanning email and in-app must still reach that person's inbox. Only `email` declares one. The
excluded count comes back so the admin reach preview reports it instead of quietly promising a
number the engine will not deliver.
**Scope: engagement rules only.** Password resets, invites, verification mails and the contact form
still attempt to a suppressed or unverified address. This is the posture `passwordReset.controller.js`
already took — user-initiated mail must not be blocked by a background system's opinion, and one
reset to a dead mailbox is not a reputation problem, whereas a rule mailing thousands of people
weekly is.
**What may write a `bounce` row is narrower than "the send failed".**`src/engagement/bounceClassify.js`
is the only judge, and it is deliberately **not**`mailer.PERMANENT_CODES` — that set answers "is
retrying pointless?" and contains `EAUTH` and `554`, so reusing it would mean one stale SMTP password
suppressing every address the worker touched, silently. The classifier reads the **RFC 3463 enhanced
status** first (`5.1.1`, `5.1.2`, `5.1.3`, `5.1.6`, `5.1.10`, `5.2.1` suppress; `5.3.x`, `5.5.x` and
`5.7.x` never do, being about the server or our standing with it), and falls back — only for `550`,
`551` and `553`, and only past a veto list — to a phrase match. **Anything it is unsure about is not
suppressed:** a false negative costs one retry next month, a false positive costs a person who
silently stops hearing from the deployment.
SMTP has no *asynchronous* bounce or complaint feed — that is where an API-based provider would earn
its place — but a single-recipient send refused at `RCPT TO` throws synchronously with the reply
code intact, which is the highest-value signal there is and is what this reads. `sendNotification`
therefore returns an `smtp: { code, responseCode, response }` triple alongside its classification;
`retry` and `detail` cannot answer "was this the recipient's fault", since `550 5.1.1` and
`550 5.7.1` are an identical `retry: false`.
**Statuses.**`engagement_sends.status` gains two real writers: `suppressed` (declined to try) and
`bounced` (tried, the mailbox does not exist). `engagement_outbox.status` records `bounced` as
`failed` — its ENUM has no such value and, from the queue's point of view, a bounced row is one that
finished unsuccessfully. `complained` still has no writer: it needs a provider feedback loop.
**Routes** (all `adminOnly`, under `/api/v1/admin/engagement`):
| Route | Notes |
| --- | --- |
| `GET /suppressions` | Paged, filterable by `reason` / `channel` / `search`, plus unfiltered `byReason` totals |
| `POST /suppressions` | `reason` is forced to `manual` — an admin typing an address is not evidence of a bounce. An address already listed answers 200 with `created: false`, not 409 |
| `DELETE /suppressions` | The only way out of the list. The address goes in the **body**, not the path: a path parameter lands in the access log, the browser history and every proxy in front of the deployment |
**Neither route ever returns `address_hash`**, the same rule `GET /sends` follows: a sha256 of every
address on the deployment, handed to a browser, is an offline dictionary attack. What the list
returns is `address_masked` — `d***@example.com` — which Phase 9 added to §4.5's DDL because a
hash-only table cannot be operated: an operator has to be able to see a whole domain refusing mail
and to let back in somebody who fixed their mailbox. The domain survives intact for the first; the
local part is destroyed rather than shortened, so the column can never be read back as an address
book. The consequence is that **lifting a suppression needs the full address typed in** — the screen
genuinely does not have it, which is the privacy design working rather than a rough edge.
-- G17: the in-app inbox. Core, game-agnostic, content-carrying.
-- G17: the in-app inbox. Core, game-agnostic, content-carrying.
@@ -1335,10 +1362,10 @@ change is not complete until `docs/` reflects it" — is the floor; this table i
| **5b** The editor | `website/ENGAGEMENT.md` §4.6.2 as built · `BACKEND_DESIGN.md` route table | **`runicgateway.com`**: a new admin docs page for the template editor |
| **5b** The editor | `website/ENGAGEMENT.md` §4.6.2 as built · `BACKEND_DESIGN.md` route table | **`runicgateway.com`**: a new admin docs page for the template editor |
| **6** Email channel + Teams migration ✅ | `website/TEAMS.md` §6.3/§6.4 **rewritten** — the Team pipeline it describes no longer exists as its own thing · `website/ENGAGEMENT.md` §4.2b + this phase as built · `BACKEND_DESIGN.md` route table and table inventory | **`runicgateway.com`**: `administration/teams.mdx` notification section. Landed with the phase |
| **6** Email channel + Teams migration ✅ | `website/TEAMS.md` §6.3/§6.4 **rewritten** — the Team pipeline it describes no longer exists as its own thing · `website/ENGAGEMENT.md` §4.2b + this phase as built · `BACKEND_DESIGN.md` route table and table inventory | **`runicgateway.com`**: `administration/teams.mdx` notification section. Landed with the phase |
| **7** In-app channel (core+web) ✅ | `website/BACKEND_DESIGN.md` routes + tables (the four inbox routes, `user_notifications`) · `website/ENGAGEMENT.md` this phase as built | **`runicgateway.com`**: `notifications-and-email.mdx` gains the in-app channel. Landed with the phase |
| **7** In-app channel (core+web) ✅ | `website/BACKEND_DESIGN.md` routes + tables (the four inbox routes, `user_notifications`) · `website/ENGAGEMENT.md` this phase as built | **`runicgateway.com`**: `notifications-and-email.mdx` gains the in-app channel. Landed with the phase |
| **8** In-app (Android) ✅ | `android/PLAN.md` §7 (the Room exception) + §11 (the inbox as built) · `website/ENGAGEMENT.md` this phase as built | `android-app/README.md`. Landed with the phase |
| **9** Deliverability | `website/BACKEND_DESIGN.md` §7 · a suppression/bounce operator section (the verification flow is Phase 1b's) | **`runicgateway.com`**: `troubleshooting.mdx` gains bounce/suppression · **`PLAY_DATA_SAFETY.md` + `/privacy`** — see Phase 12 |
| **9** Deliverability | `website/BACKEND_DESIGN.md` §7 · a suppression/bounce operator section (the verification flow is Phase 1b's) | **`runicgateway.com`**: `troubleshooting.mdx` gains bounce/suppression · **`PLAY_DATA_SAFETY.md` + `/privacy`** — see Phase 12 |
| **10** Protocol bump | `link/INTEGRATION.md` §Housing (table + example) · `link/PLAN.md` §5/§7 · a `link/v5.md` if the bump earns its own design doc, as v3 and v4 did | `servuo-plugins/overlay.toml` · **`runicgateway.com`**: `platform.json.protocol` → 5, `bundle.*`, `architecture/protocol-versions.mdx` |
| **10** Protocol bump | `link/INTEGRATION.md` §Housing**and §Market** (tables + examples) + the new `account.login.result` row · `link/PLAN.md` §5/§7 · **a `link/v5.md`** — the bump now carries three enrichments across three subsystems, which is what earned v3 and v4 their own design docs | `servuo-plugins/overlay.toml` · `servuo-plugins/patches/README.md` — `vendor.sale` stays in the tier and the docs must say what that costs · **`runicgateway.com`**: `platform.json.protocol` → 5, `bundle.*`, `architecture/protocol-versions.mdx` |
| **11** module-uo triggers | `modules/uo/API.md`— **the full trigger catalogue, its audiences and its ceilings**, not one entry · `modules/uo/README.md` · `website/ENGAGEMENT.md` §8.6 kept true as rows ship | `module-uo/README.md` · **`runicgateway.com`**: `capabilities.mjs` and the notifications page — "one rule" and "the whole catalogue" are different marketing claims |
| **12** Public site | — | **`runicgateway.com`**, in full — see the phase |
| **12** Public site | — | **`runicgateway.com`**, in full — see the phase |
| **13** Cutover | `README.md` index rows · every doc's status line | `.profile/README.md` if this is a headline capability |
| **13** Cutover | `README.md` index rows · every doc's status line | `.profile/README.md` if this is a headline capability |
@@ -2764,14 +2791,17 @@ declared trigger that **nothing emits through the engine** — `coreTriggers.js`
admin publish path still fires a raw `pushDispatch.publish` beside the engine rather than through it.
admin publish path still fires a raw `pushDispatch.publish` beside the engine rather than through it.
The consequence for this phase: on a real deployment the only in-app items a rule can produce today
The consequence for this phase: on a real deployment the only in-app items a rule can produce today
come from the four Team triggers. Wiring the news emitter is a one-line `ctx.events.emit`-shaped change
come from the four Team triggers. Wiring the news emitter is a one-line `ctx.events.emit`-shaped change
that belongs with whoever owns that decision, not smuggled into the channel's own phase.
that belongs with whoever owns that decision, not smuggled into the channel's own phase. **Written up as
§7.1 Q9**, which sets out the three other things a publish already fires (an announce leg, a module's
post hook, the raw tickle), which of them the engine replaces and which it must not touch, and the
continuity question that has to be answered before anyone writes the line. Recommended home: Phase 11.
**Still later phases':** the app's inbox screen and the tickle → pull → inbox path (Phase 8), and the
**Still later phases':** the app's inbox screen and the tickle → pull → inbox path (Phase 8), and the
suppression list, which this channel has no equivalent of — there is no address to suppress.
suppression list, which this channel has no equivalent of — there is no address to suppress.
---
---
### Phase 8 — The in-app channel (Android)
### Phase 8 — The in-app channel (Android) ✅
Inbox screen, unread badge, and the tickle → pull → inbox path. App-store cadence, separate repo,
Inbox screen, unread badge, and the tickle → pull → inbox path. App-store cadence, separate repo,
separate release.
separate release.
@@ -2779,7 +2809,85 @@ separate release.
**Acceptance:** a tickle wakes the app, which pulls and shows the item; the inbox works offline from
**Acceptance:** a tickle wakes the app, which pulls and shows the item; the inbox works offline from
cache; the existing preferences screen gains the per-channel toggles from Phase 3.
cache; the existing preferences screen gains the per-channel toggles from Phase 3.
**Note:** `android-app`'s `pr-checks.yml` triggers only on PRs into `main`, so phase PRs onto a working
**Note:** `android-app`'s `pr-checks.yml` triggers only on PRs into `main`, so phase PRs onto a working
branch get **no CI** — the cutover PR is the first real run. Plan for that.
branch get **no CI** — the cutover PR is the first real run. Plan for that. **Resolved: §7.1 Q8 was
answered "fix it" and the trigger now runs on PRs into `edge` too, as this phase's first commit.**
#### As built — 8 (2026-08-31)
The four inbox routes Phase 7 shipped had no consumer on either platform; this is the Android one.
**Four decisions were settled by the org lead before any code**, and one of them resolves a
contradiction the phase carried from the day it was written.
1. **§7.1 Q8 — fix the CI trigger, as the first commit.** `pr-checks.yml` now runs on PRs into
`edge` as well as `main`. All nine M12 phase PRs merged with no CI at all and engagement Phase 8
was about to repeat it; the alternative was finding a Kotlin compile error inside the cutover
window with a whole workstream's diff to bisect. `sonarqube.yml` is untouched — it is a
push-on-`main` analysis, not a PR gate, so no phase PR was ever expected to run it.
2. **The offline snapshot is a JSON blob, not Room.** This phase's acceptance line ("the inbox works
offline from cache") **contradicted a decision already recorded in `docs/android/PLAN.md` §7**:
*"Offline caching is not a v1 requirement (decided)… does not ship a Room cache in v1. No `Room`
dependency in the initial build."* §7's decision stands and this is its one named exception. An
inbox is a short, read-only, newest-first list with a server-side cursor and no joins, so what
"works offline" needs is the newest page and the badge — one blob in the DataStore the push code
already uses, capped at the server's own default page size.
3. **The drawer's "Notifications" is the inbox; the settings are behind its gear.** Exactly the
arrangement Phase 7 shipped on the web (the bare path is the content, `…/settings` the
preferences), and what a person means when they tap the word.
4. **The settings screen moved onto `/notifications/channels`**, rendering a control per channel that
applies to each id and per mode that channel accepts.
**The one thing the app must do that no plan said: resolve the item's `url`.** Phase 7's acceptance
specifies `url` is **relative-only** and validates it as such — right for a browser already on the
site, and a dead link on a phone. The live rig caught it: every item came back as
`/guilds/the-silver-anvil/forum/403`, and the app's first cut only opened `http(s)`-prefixed strings,
so **every link in the inbox did nothing**. It now resolves against the configured base with OkHttp's
`HttpUrl.resolve`, which absolutises the path *and* returns null for anything that would not end up
http(s) — so a `javascript:` or `intent:` url in a notification body opens nothing at all. The
relative-only contract did not change; the client half of it was simply never written down.
**Three further things the build settled:**
- **The tickle's `ref` is what routes it, not its stream.** An engagement rule's tickle carries the
TRIGGER id as `stream` (§7.2's one namespace), and the app's shipped `forStream` map knows only the
eight push streams — so `team.forum.post` would have landed on Home. `Routes.forTickle(stream, ref)`
sends anything whose ref starts with `notification:` to the inbox and leaves every other tickle on
the route it has always had. The ref is not decoded past that prefix and is never rendered: it is a
hint that a row exists, and the contract stays wake-and-pull, exactly as `pushChannel.js` says.
- **The snapshot is scoped to (base URL, user id), and that is the security property** — not the
clear-on-logout beside the push deregistration. A cache is only ever handed back to the pair that
wrote it, so the teardown paths that never reach a logout at all (a dead refresh token, a server
switch) cannot surface one person's notifications under another's session.
- **Reads are optimistic and are not rolled back.** The row flips locally, the server's post-write
`unread` replaces the local guess, and a failure is left alone: un-reading a row under someone's
finger looks like a bug, and the next refresh corrects it. A local read also rewrites the snapshot,
without which going offline right after reading everything would bring the badge back on the next
cold open.
**Verified on the live rig** (throwaway emulator + the real server on `edge` + real rows emitted
through `ctx.events.emit` → engine → outbox → `inappChannel`, never hand-written):
- the drawer badge showed **3**, the inbox listed the three items newest-first with unread dots and
local-zone timestamps, and a tap marked one read (3 → 2, server-side row updated);
- tapping an item opened its resolved link in a Custom Tab at the configured shard;
- one email chip wrote **exactly one row** — `(35, news.post, email, instant)` — and disturbed nothing
else, which is the sparse PUT's whole point;
- the push controls were **absent**, correctly, because the rig's shard advertises no relay, with the
reason in a note beside the list rather than replacing the screen (email and on-site preferences are
still worth setting on a shard with no push);
- with the network cut, the inbox rendered all five items from the snapshot under **"Offline — showing
what was saved on this device."**, unread count and read flags intact;
- a simulated tapped tickle (`STREAM=team.forum.post`, `REF=notification:5` — the exact extras
`PushNotifier` builds) landed on the inbox rather than Home.
**One finding this phase did NOT fix, deliberately.** *Offline works in a running app, not on a cold
start* — and the reason is the app shell, not the inbox. `MainActivity` gates the whole of `RunicApp`
on loading the site's appearance (M12), so an offline launch shows "Can't reach the site / Retry" and
never reaches the drawer at all. Widening this phase into the shell's startup model is the kind of
out-of-scope blocker that is a reason to ask, not a licence to widen the PR, so it is written up here
for the org lead. The acceptance line holds for the case the cache exists to serve — the app you were
just using, on a train — and fails for the case where the app was killed first.
**Still later phases':** nothing of this channel. The app now consumes every route Phase 7 built.
transport call; a hard bounce suppresses the address; with the Phase 1b gate `on`, an unverified address
transport call; a hard bounce suppresses the address; with the Phase 1b gate `on`, an unverified address
is excluded from engagement rules but still receives password resets; with it `off`, it receives both.
is excluded from engagement rules but still receives password resets; with it `off`, it receives both.
#### As built (2026-08-31)
**Four decisions, settled by the org lead before any code:**
1. **Mechanism plus SMTP's real signal; no API transport.** The phase's own text says "SMTP has none —
this is where the API-based providers earn their place", and that is too strong. SMTP has no
*asynchronous* bounce or complaint feed, but a single-recipient send refused at `RCPT TO` throws
synchronously with the reply code intact — the highest-value deliverability signal there is, and
`mailer.js` was already catching it as a `PERMANENT_CODE` and throwing it away. So this phase reads
it. A transport MAY declare a bounce handler; none does, and **no webhook route ships** — a route
with no producer is §7.1 Q9's problem in a different costume.
2. **Suppression scopes to engagement rules only.** Password resets, invites, verification mail and
the contact form still attempt. This is the posture `passwordReset.controller.js` already stated
for the verification gate, and the argument carries: user-initiated mail must not be blocked by a
background system's opinion, and one reset to a dead mailbox is not a reputation problem.
3. **`address_masked` is added to §4.5's DDL.** The hash-only table cannot be operated — an operator
staring at sha256 digests cannot tell three typos from a whole domain refusing mail, and
un-suppressing somebody who fixed their mailbox is the one action the table must support.
4. **The verification gate filters at ENQUEUE, not at delivery.**
**The defect this phase exists to have avoided: `PERMANENT_CODES` is not a bounce classifier.**
The obvious implementation is "the mailer already tells us a failure is terminal, so suppress on
that". `mailer.PERMANENT_CODES` is `{550, 553, 554, EENVELOPE, EAUTH}`, and it answers a different
question — *is retrying pointless?* `EAUTH` is the operator's password being wrong and `554` is a
relay-wide policy refusal; neither says anything about the recipient. Under that implementation **one
stale SMTP credential suppresses every address the outbox worker touches**, with a clean send log, no
warning, and a mailing list that has to be rebuilt by hand. So `bounceClassify.js` is its own judge:
- the **RFC 3463 enhanced status** decides on its own where there is one — `5.1.1`, `5.1.2`, `5.1.3`,
`5.1.6`, `5.1.10` and `5.2.1` suppress, and `5.3.x`, `5.5.x` and `5.7.x` explicitly never do, being
about the server or about our standing with it;
- without one, a phrase match applies **only** after `550`/`551`/`553` has already narrowed the
failure to the recipient address, and only past a veto list — `552` and `554` are excluded from even
that, because a full mailbox gets emptied and "transaction failed" is what a relay says when it does
not want to say why;
- **anything it is unsure about is not suppressed.** A false negative costs one retry next month; a
false positive costs a person who silently stops hearing from the deployment and cannot find out.
`sendNotification` now returns an `smtp: { code, responseCode, response }` triple so this is
answerable at all: `retry` and `detail` cannot distinguish `550 5.1.1` from `550 5.7.1`, which are an
identical `retry: false` and mean completely different things.
**The two mechanisms sit at different points, and the split is the design.** A suppression can appear
inside a rule's `delay_seconds` grace window, so the only correct check is the one taken immediately
before the transport call — which is also what produces the `status='suppressed'` row with no
transport call that the acceptance line asks for. Being unverified is a *standing* property, stable
across that window, so excluding at delivery would write an outbox row purely to throw it away — and
on a deployment that upgraded before verifying anybody, one rule firing would write thousands of
`suppressed` rows nobody can read.
**The gate is a channel hook, not an engine branch.** It hangs off a new optional
`registerDeliveryChannel({ eligible })`, and `email` is the only channel that declares one. Both
alternatives were wrong in a way the build made obvious: filtering the shared audience before the
per-channel loop silences the wrong sink — **a rule spanning email and in-app must still put an item
in an unverified user's inbox**, since being unverified is a reason not to mail somebody and no reason
at all to hide their notifications — and an `if (channel === 'email')` in `engine.js` puts one
channel's rule inside the generic engine. Its excluded counts flow into `summary.ineligible` and into
the admin reach preview, which until now reported an audience size that was never the number of people
who would get a mail.
**Both new checks fail OPEN**, and the `try/catch` in `eligible` is load-bearing rather than habit:
`applyRule` awaits it *before* the per-user loop, so an uncaught throw abandons the whole rule for
every channel it names — a rule that silently sent nothing, with a clean log and an empty outbox. That
is G22's shape again, and the recoverable mistake is mail going out.
**The live rig found the one defect the stubs could not.** Against a real MariaDB, a real SMTP
conversation (mailpit) and the real engine and worker, a hard bounce was recorded as `status='failed'`
— honest, but `engagement_sends.status` has carried **`bounced`** since §4.5 and nothing had ever
written it, so the Send Log's "Bounced" filter matched nothing and always would have. It is now a
distinct outcome, because "the relay would not take this" and "this mailbox does not exist" send an
operator to two different places. `engagement_outbox.status` still records it as `failed`: that ENUM
has no `bounced`, and from the queue's point of view a bounced row is one that finished
unsuccessfully. `complained` still has no writer, and cannot have one without a provider feedback loop.
**Verified on the live rig**, seven rungs, each one a real send or a real refusal:
1. baseline — three recipients, three mails in mailpit, three `sent` rows;
2. one address suppressed by hand — **two** mails, and a `suppressed` row naming the reason;
3. suppression lifted — three mails again;
4. gate `on` — two mails, `ineligible: { unverified: 1 }`, and **no send-log row at all** for the
excluded user, which is what enqueue-time exclusion means;
5. a `550 5.1.1` from the relay — two mails, one `bounced` row, and `b***@example.test` written to the
suppression list with `detail: hard bounce: 5.1.1`;
6. the same rule again — that address `suppressed`, with no transport call;
7. **a password reset to the suppressed address still arrived**, which is decision 2 proved rather
than asserted.
The three admin routes were then driven over real HTTP: `created_by` records the admin on a manual row
and stays **NULL** on the worker's automatic one, which is what separates them in the list; a repeat
POST answers `200 {created:false}` rather than a 409; DELETE matches case-insensitively, which is the
whole point of hashing a folded address; no response contains `address_hash`; and all three refuse a
signed-out caller.
**Still later phases':** an API-based transport with a signed webhook receiver, which is what would
bring asynchronous bounces and `complained` to life. Nothing here blocks it — a transport may declare
a bounce handler today.
---
---
### Phase 10 — Protocol bump: `house.decay` enrichment *(parallel from day one)*
### Phase 10 — Protocol bump: three wire enrichments *(parallel from day one)*
Four repos plus the overlay declaration, per CLAUDE.md's "The bridge is a contract":
**Scope widened 2026-08-31, by the org lead, before any code.** The phase was written as the
`house.decay` enrichment alone. It now carries **three** enrichments, for one reason that is a property
of this phase and of no other: **a protocol bump costs a sidecar release, a republished bundle and an
operator update on every shard.** A field left out here does not cost a follow-up commit — it costs a
*second* bump with the same three-part lead time, and an operator population split across two protocol
versions in the meantime. So everything the engagement workstream is known to need from the wire is
decided **now** and rides the single v4 → v5 bump.
The two additions come from Phase 11's expanded trigger set (below). Each was verified against the
emitters rather than assumed, and each closes a gap that §8.6 did not know it had:
- **Player-vendor fee state.** `uo.vendor.expiring` is the same shape as the flagship — an owned asset
at risk, with a real deadline — and is the second-strongest driver in the catalogue. But
`vendor.listing` carries `ownerSerial` and `ownerName` and **no `ownerAcct` and no fee state at
all**, so the trigger can today neither be addressed to a person nor know that anything is expiring.
- **A login *outcome*.** `EventSink.AccountLogin` is a pre-decision veto hook — the emitter's own
comment says so ("Fires before the auth decision, so this is an attempt, not a result"). It therefore
fires on every **successful** login too, and `uo.account.login_attempt` as §8.6 describes it
("someone tried to log into your game account") cannot be built on it: it would mail a security alert
every time the player themselves logged in. This is the one addition that is a new emitter rather
than new fields on an existing one.
**Explicitly NOT in this bump:** moving `vendor.sale` out of the opt-in patch tier. It stays where it
is (see §8.6's corrected row), which leaves `uo.vendor.sale` dormant on a shard that declined the
patches — a documentation obligation, not a protocol one.
| Repo | Change |
| Repo | Change |
| --- | --- |
| --- | --- |
| `servuo-plugins/` | `BridgeSweeps.WriteDecay` gains `ownerName` (`house.Owner.Name`), `nextStage` (`BaseHouse.NextDecayStage`), `decayPeriod`, and `estimatedCollapse` **only when `to == "IDOC"`** (§0.3) |
| `servuo-plugins/` | **(a)** `BridgeSweeps.WriteDecay` gains `ownerName` (`house.Owner.Name`), `nextStage` (`BaseHouse.NextDecayStage`), `decayPeriod`, and `estimatedCollapse` **only when `to == "IDOC"`** (§0.3) · **(b)** `BridgeMarket`'s `vendor.listing` gains `ownerAcct`, `holdGold`, `chargePerDay`, `daysRemaining` · **(c)** a new post-decision `account.login.result` (`acct`, `accepted`, `rejectReason`, `ip`) beside the existing pre-decision attempt |
| `servuo-plugins/overlay.toml` | `protocol = 4` → `5`, **in the same PR as the emitter** |
| `servuo-plugins/overlay.toml` | `protocol = 4` → `5`, **in the same PR as the emitters** |
| `link/` | `PROTOCOL_VERSION: u32 = 4` → `5` (`sidecar/src/main.rs:55`); houses board carries the new fields |
| `link/` | `PROTOCOL_VERSION: u32 = 4` → `5` (`sidecar/src/main.rs:55`); the houses board carries the new decay fields; `account.login.result` is a forwarded kind like any other — the sidecar stays a dumb forwarder |
| `website/` (`module-uo`) | ingest maps the new fields; `uoLinkConfig` protocol version |
| `website/` (`module-uo`) | ingest maps the new fields; `uoLinkConfig` protocol version; **`shardVisibility.js`'s `KIND_FEATURE` gains `account.login.result`** — rule 2 fails an unmapped kind closed to admin-only, which is the right answer for a frame carrying an IP, but it must be *chosen* here rather than inherited by accident |
**Acceptance:** a live run on the local rig (`C:\Users\colby\Desktop\ServUO` + the Rust sidecar, not the
**Two things the emitter work must not get wrong**, both following from §0.3's finding about how
PowerShell stub) shows a real transition carrying the new fields; a v4 overlay paired with a v5 sidecar
ServUO actually decays:
is **refused by the installer**, not mis-parsed; CI publishes a bundle whose manifest pairs v5 with v5.
- `estimatedCollapse` is exact **only** at IDOC, because dynamic decay draws each stage's duration at
random when the stage is entered. Emitting it at an earlier stage would publish a guess as a fact.
- `daysRemaining` for a vendor **is** exact (`HoldGold / ChargePerDay`), unlike the house. The two
fields must not be documented as though they carried the same confidence — a template that says
"your house collapses on the 4th" and one that says "your vendor is dismissed in 2 days" are making
very different promises.
**Acceptance:** a live run on the local rig (`C:\Users\colby\Desktop\ServUO` + the Rust sidecar, not
the PowerShell stub) shows **(a)** a real decay transition carrying the new fields, **(b)** a seeded
player vendor whose listing carries a fee state that falls as its held gold is drawn down, and **(c)** a
*failed* game login producing `account.login.result accepted:false` where a successful one produces
`accepted:true`; a v4 overlay paired with a v5 sidecar is **refused by the installer**, not mis-parsed;
CI publishes a bundle whose manifest pairs v5 with v5; and the five-rung shard visibility walk still
shows no leak, with `account.login.result` reaching **admin only**.
**Note:** this phase's lead time is a release plus a bundle plus an operator update, which is why it
**Note:** this phase's lead time is a release plus a bundle plus an operator update, which is why it
starts early and lands independently.
starts early and lands independently.
---
---
### Phase 11 — module-uo's triggers and the first real rule
### Phase 11 — module-uo's triggers: the full catalogue, and core's `news.post`
`module-uo` registers `uo.house.idoc_warning` (and siblings), emits from `shardIngest`, and ships the
**Scope widened 2026-08-31, by the org lead, before any code.** This phase used to say `module-uo`
"greatly damaged" mapping. **The `Greatly` transition mapping needs no protocol change** and can ship
registers `uo.house.idoc_warning` "(and siblings)", and Part 8's preamble used to say "Phase 11 ships
with Phase 6 if Phase 10 is still in flight — the trigger simply omits `nextStage`/`estimatedCollapse`
exactly one rule". Both are now wrong on purpose: **Phase 11 ships every ✅ row in §8.6**, with one
until the v5 overlay is deployed, which the `required: false` declaration already permits.
carve-out named below. §8.6 was written as "a catalogue, not a commitment" — it is now the commitment,
and the burden of proof has inverted: a row that does *not* ship needs a reason recorded here.
**Acceptance:** the five-rung shard visibility walk still shows no leak; a house transitioning to
**What that is worth, and it is not "more mail".** One trigger proves that a module can register a
trigger. Twenty-odd triggers spanning five audience kinds are the first real test of the things Parts
3–5 asserted and nothing has yet stressed: that the ceiling lattice holds when most triggers are *not*
public, that `check:modules` still finds no UO identifier in core when the module is this large, and
that a player's preferences screen stays legible when the catalogue is real rather than a demo. Every
rule ships `enabled = 0` (Q3), so this is a catalogue an operator turns on, not a switch that floods
anyone.
**The carve-out: `uo.market.item_listed` does not ship here**, for the reason §8.6 already gives — it
is a *saved search*, not a trigger. Its audience is "users whose stored query matches this listing",
and no per-user query store exists anywhere in the tree. It is its own workstream on top of this one.
`vendor.listing` remains ingested; nothing is lost by waiting.
**Two rows ship only because Phase 10 does.** `uo.house.idoc_warning`'s enrichment and
`uo.vendor.expiring` both need v5 fields; `uo.account.login_attempt` needs v5's new
`account.login.result` emitter and is renamed **`uo.account.login_failed`** to say what it actually
is. Everything else is mapping-only and can ship whether or not the bump has landed — the flagship's
`Greatly` mapping included, which **needs no protocol change** and can ship with Phase 6 if Phase 10
is still in flight, the trigger simply omitting `nextStage`/`estimatedCollapse` until the v5 overlay is
deployed, exactly as the `required: false` declaration already permits.
**The set, grouped by the audience kind each family exercises** — which is the point of grouping them
this way, since the audience kind is the thing being tested:
| Family | Triggers | Audience kind | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Owned asset at risk** | `uo.house.idoc_warning`, `uo.house.collapsed`, `uo.vendor.expiring` | `owner` (linked account) | The flagship family. All three resolve through `ownerAcct` → `shard_links` |
| **Passive income** | `uo.vendor.sale` | `owner` | **Patch-tier only** — see §8.6's corrected row; dormant on a shard that declined the patches, and the seeded rule's description must say so |
| **Personal security** | `uo.account.login_failed`, `uo.account.unlinked`, `uo.link.requested` | `owner`, ceiling `owner` | `uo.link.requested` is also the linking funnel: a player ran `[link` in game, finish it on the site |
| **Personal milestone** | `uo.skill.capped`, `uo.quest.complete`, `uo.character.death`, `uo.character.murdered` | `owner`, opt-in | The two death triggers are a killfeed some players want and most do not — both ship `enabled = 0` and default `off` per channel |
| **Social / civic** | `uo.guild.joined`, `uo.guild.left`, `uo.guild.disbanded`, `uo.governor.elected`, `uo.election.opened` | `members`, `subscribers` | `uo.election.opened` carries `autoPickAt` — a real deadline, so it is the first trigger whose template has a genuine call to action with an expiry |
| **Come online now** | `uo.champ.started`, `uo.champ.boss_up`, `uo.server.up`, `uo.server.down` | `subscribers` | **`uo.server.up`/`down` is the cooldown table's stress test** — a flapping shard emits both repeatedly. Hard per-rule cooldown, not a per-send one |
| **Leaderboard** | `uo.points.rank_changed` | `subscribers`, `owner` | Fires both ways (you entered a top N; you were pushed out) |
| **Staff-facing** | `uo.page.new`, `uo.cheat.detected`, `uo.audit.staff_action` | ceiling `staff` / `admin` | These are why the ceiling exists. Phase 3 already filters a `staff`-ceiling trigger out of a player's catalogue *and* gates it on write, so this family is the production proof of that work rather than new mechanism |
| **Operator-facing** | `uo.economy.milestone`, `uo.world.saved` | ceiling `admin` | Digest-shaped by nature; neither should ever be instant |
**Also core's own `news.post` emitter, which this phase's title has always understated** (§7.1 Q9).
`news.post` is declared with no caller, so a rule naming it can never fire; wiring it is one
`ctx.events.emit`-shaped call in `announceIfNewlyPublished`, gated on the same job-id transition signal
the push already uses. **The announce legs and the post hooks are untouched** — a module's town-crier
leg is a delivery to a channel of the deployment and its news-gump hook is state mirroring, neither of
which is a per-person notification. What the emit replaces is the raw `pushDispatch.publish` beside
them, and Q9's continuity question has to be answered before it does.
**On the size of this phase.** It is now the largest in the workstream: ~23 trigger declarations, their
audiences and ceilings, their `shardIngest` mappings, and a seeded template each — against Phase 5a's
nine seeded bodies in total. It will likely want to land as **11a (declarations, mappings, ceilings —
server only) / 11b (the seeded templates and the live walk)**, on the 4a/4b and 5a/5b precedent, and
that split should be confirmed with the org lead at the start of the phase rather than assumed here.
**Acceptance:** the five-rung shard visibility walk still shows no leak, and **no staff- or
admin-ceiling trigger appears by name in a player's preferences catalogue**; a house transitioning to
`Greatly` on the live rig produces one email to the linked owner and nothing to anyone else; a second
`Greatly` on the live rig produces one email to the linked owner and nothing to anyone else; a second
transition inside the cooldown produces nothing; a refresh back to `LikeNew` inside the delay window
transition inside the cooldown produces nothing; a refresh back to `LikeNew` inside the delay window
cancels the pending mail.
cancels the pending mail; a player vendor drawn down to its last day produces one `uo.vendor.expiring`
**Guardrails:** `check:modules` proves core gained no UO identifier across every phase to this point.
to its owner; a failed game login produces one `uo.account.login_failed` and a **successful** one
produces none; a shard restarted three times in a minute produces **one** downtime mail, not six; and
**a news post published on the rig reaches a rule, with the town-crier leg and every registered post
hook still firing exactly as they did.**
**Guardrails:** `check:modules` proves core gained no UO identifier across every phase to this point —
which is a materially stronger claim now that the module registers twenty-odd UO-named triggers.
---
---
@@ -2963,7 +3263,7 @@ day it ships.
## Part 7 — Open questions and forward-compat notes
## Part 7 — Open questions and forward-compat notes
### 7.1 Questions for the org lead — seven answered, one still open
### 7.1 Questions for the org lead — seven answered, two still open
1. ✅ **ANSWERED — may unverified addresses receive engagement mail?** *"Emails need to be unique and
1. ✅ **ANSWERED — may unverified addresses receive engagement mail?** *"Emails need to be unique and
verification blocking sending is an admin setting."* Combined with the opt-in answer, this settles
verification blocking sending is an admin setting."* Combined with the opt-in answer, this settles
@@ -2979,6 +3279,13 @@ day it ships.
*Consequence for ordering:* Phase 9 no longer blocks Phase 11 — the verification *mechanism* moves
*Consequence for ordering:* Phase 9 no longer blocks Phase 11 — the verification *mechanism* moves
forward into 1b, and Phase 9 keeps only bounces and suppression.
forward into 1b, and Phase 9 keeps only bounces and suppression.
**The narrower half is settled (2026-08-31, at the start of Phase 9): an unverified address is
excluded at ENQUEUE, and only from the email channel.** With the gate on, `emailChannel.eligible`
drops the user before an outbox row is written, so nothing is queued only to be thrown away and
the admin reach preview can report the exclusion. It is email-only because a rule spanning
channels must still put an item in that person's in-app inbox. Transactional mail — resets,
invites, verification itself — is unaffected either way.
2. ✅ **ANSWERED — multi-instance.** Neither of the two the question offered, and the third is
2. ✅ **ANSWERED — multi-instance.** Neither of the two the question offered, and the third is
better than both: the outbox sweep **claims each row with a compare-and-set** —
better than both: the outbox sweep **claims each row with a compare-and-set** —
`UPDATE … SET status='sending' WHERE id=? AND status='scheduled'` — and the instance the server
`UPDATE … SET status='sending' WHERE id=? AND status='scheduled'` — and the instance the server
@@ -3021,11 +3328,58 @@ day it ships.
Composition must **narrow, never widen** — the segment takes the tightest ceiling it contains and is
Composition must **narrow, never widen** — the segment takes the tightest ceiling it contains and is
still checked against the trigger's G24 ceiling. §5.1a is the design; Phase 2 owns the surface,
still checked against the trigger's G24 ceiling. §5.1a is the design; Phase 2 owns the surface,
Phase 4 the composition UI, Phase 11 `module-uo`'s first real audiences.
Phase 4 the composition UI, Phase 11 `module-uo`'s first real audiences.
8. **Android CI on `edge`** (§6.0a). `android-app/.gitea/workflows/pr-checks.yml` triggers only on PRs
8. **Android CI on `edge`** (§6.0a). **ANSWERED 2026-08-31 (org lead), at the start of Phase 8: fix
into `main`, so Phase 8 lands with zero CI and Phase 13 is its first real build — as happened to all
it, as the phase's first commit.** `pr-checks.yml` triggered only on PRs into `main`, so Phase 8
nine M12 phase PRs. Fix the trigger as Phase 8's first commit, or accept it deliberately?
would have landed with zero CI and Phase 13 would have been its first real build — as happened to
Recommendation: fix it. It is a two-line workflow change and the alternative is finding out about a
all nine M12 phase PRs. `pull_request.branches` is now `[main, edge]`. **`sonarqube.yml` was
Kotlin compile error during the cutover window.
deliberately left alone**: it is a push-on-`main` analysis rather than a PR gate, so no phase PR
was ever expected to run it.
9. **Core's own `news.post` emitter — and the three other things a publish already fires.**
`config/coreTriggers.js` declares core's five triggers and says in as many words that **nothing here
emits yet**; Phase 6 migrated only the four `team.*` ones onto the engine. So `news.post` is a
declared payload contract with **no caller**, and on a real deployment the only in-app or email items
a rule can produce today come from Teams. Phase 7 found this and deliberately did not wire it, on the
grounds that a channel's own phase is not the place to give another phase's trigger an emitter.
**The call itself is one line. The care is entirely in what it must not disturb.**
`admin.controller.js`'s `announceIfNewlyPublished` already fans one publish four ways, and they are
different in kind — three of them are *not* the engagement engine's business:
| What fires on a publish | Whose | What kind of thing it is | The engine's? |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `announceJobs.enqueueIfNeeded` → `announce_job_legs` | core, with legs registered by modules — `module-uo` owns `towncrier` | a one-shot **delivery to a channel of the deployment**, with retry and classification | **No** |
| `registries.dispatchPostHook('onSaved')` | modules, via `registerPostHook` (API 1.1.0) | idempotent **state mirroring** — it also runs on delete, and refreshes silently on an edit | **No** |
| `pushDispatch.publish('news.post', { ref })` | core | a **per-person notification**, to whoever subscribed | **Yes — this is the one that should become an emit** |
| `uo.house.idoc_warning` | `house.decay` → `Greatly` | ⚠ mapping only (the enrichment is Phase 10) | **The flagship.** Your house is decaying; log in or lose it and its contents |
| `uo.house.idoc_warning` | `house.decay` → `Greatly` | ⚠ mapping only (the enrichment is Phase 10) | **The flagship.** Your house is decaying; log in or lose it and its contents |
| `uo.house.collapsed` | `house.decay` → `Collapsed`, `house.remove` | ✅ | The bad news, so it is not a surprise |
| `uo.house.collapsed` | `house.decay` → `Collapsed`, `house.remove` | ✅ | The bad news, so it is not a surprise |
| `uo.vendor.sale` | `vendor.sale` | ✅ (`ownerAcct` → linked user) | Your player vendor sold something, for how much |
| `uo.vendor.sale` | `vendor.sale` | ✅ (`ownerAcct` → linked user) — **but patch-tier only**, see below | Your player vendor sold something, for how much |
| `uo.vendor.expiring` | `vendor.listing`, vendor fees | ⚠ | Your vendor is about to be dismissed for unpaid fees |
| `uo.vendor.expiring` | `vendor.listing` + **v5 fee fields** | ⚠ → ✅ **after Phase 10**; `vendor.listing` carries no `ownerAcct` and no fee state today | Your vendor is about to be dismissed for unpaid fees |
| `uo.account.login_attempt` | `account.login.attempt` | ✅ (already a personal stream) | Someone tried to log into your game account, from where |
| `uo.account.login_failed` | **v5 `account.login.result`** | ⚠ → ✅ **after Phase 10**; the existing `account.login.attempt` is pre-decision, see below | Someone tried to log into your game account, and failed, and from where |
| `uo.character.death` / `murdered` | `player.death`, `player.murdered` | ✅ | Opt-in; a killfeed some players want and most do not |
| `uo.character.death` / `murdered` | `player.death`, `player.murdered` | ✅ | Opt-in; a killfeed some players want and most do not |
| `uo.skill.capped` | `skill.gain` where `base == cap` | ✅ | You hit the cap in a skill — a genuine milestone |
| `uo.skill.capped` | `skill.gain` where `base == cap` | ✅ | You hit the cap in a skill — a genuine milestone |
**Three of these are worth calling out as design pressure on Parts 3–5:**
**Three rows as originally written were wrong, and finding out cost one sweep of the emitters:**
- **`uo.vendor.sale` is real and does carry `ownerAcct` — but it lives in `servuo-plugins/patches/`,
the opt-in patch tier**, verified only against ServUO 57.4. It is a `PlayerVendorSale` EventSink the
patches *add* to core plus a subscriber that reads it, which is why it is absent from `overlay/`. A
shard that declined the tier, or runs another ServUO version, emits this kind never — so the rule is
silently dormant there rather than broken. Phase 10 deliberately does **not** try to move it into the
overlay; the obligation is that the seeded rule and the operator docs say which tier it needs.
- **`uo.vendor.expiring` had no data at all, not merely no mapper.** `vendor.listing` carries
`ownerSerial` and `ownerName` — no `ownerAcct`, so it cannot even be addressed to a website user —
and nothing anywhere on the wire carries a vendor's held gold or daily charge. Phase 10 adds all four.
- **`uo.account.login_attempt` could not have been built as described.** `EventSink.AccountLogin` is a
pre-decision veto hook; the emitter's own comment says "Fires before the auth decision, so this is an
attempt, not a result". A rule on it would have mailed "someone tried to log into your account" every
time the player logged in successfully — the exact inversion that makes people distrust security
mail. Phase 10 adds a post-decision `account.login.result`, and the trigger is renamed
**`uo.account.login_failed`** so its id cannot be misread again.
**Three others are worth calling out as design pressure on Parts 3–5:**
- **`uo.market.item_listed` is a *saved search*, not a plain trigger.** The audience is "users whose
- **`uo.market.item_listed` is a *saved search*, not a plain trigger.** The audience is "users whose
stored query matches this listing", which `audience: 'computed'` covers but a per-user query store
stored query matches this listing", which `audience: 'computed'` covers but a per-user query store
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