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Author SHA1 Message Date
Claude
dc430dcde9 docs(website): rename project-structure root label UOMSITE/ → website/ 
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XmHdsbnLzDMAVQkAoTQSBe
 2026-07-18 16:59:54 -05:00
49 changed files with 23 additions and 8081 deletions
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---
name: Bug report
about: Report something that is broken or behaving unexpectedly
title: "[bug] "
labels:
- bug
---
## Summary
<!-- A clear, concise description of the bug. -->
## Steps to reproduce
1.
2.
3.
## Expected behavior
<!-- What you expected to happen. -->
## Actual behavior
<!-- What actually happened. Include exact error messages and logs if you have them. -->
## Environment
- Component / repo:
- Version or commit:
- OS / runtime (Node, Rust, ServUO, browser…):
- Deployment (Docker Compose, local dev, bare metal…):
## Additional context
<!-- Screenshots, config (with secrets redacted), anything else that helps. -->
<!--
Security issue? Do NOT file it here. See SECURITY.md and email
whitlocktech@gmail.com instead.
-->

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blank_issues_enabled: true
contact_links:
- name: Security vulnerability
url: https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/docs/src/branch/main/SECURITY.md
about: Please do not open a public issue for security problems — report them privately by email instead (see SECURITY.md).

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---
name: Feature request
about: Suggest an idea, enhancement, or new capability
title: "[feature] "
labels:
- enhancement
---
## Problem / motivation
<!-- What are you trying to do? What's missing or painful today? -->
## Proposed solution
<!-- What you'd like to see happen. -->
## Alternatives considered
<!-- Other approaches you thought about, and why you prefer the one above. -->
## Additional context
<!-- Mockups, links, related issues, affected component/repo, etc. -->

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<!--
Thanks for contributing to Runic Gateway!
Please fill out the sections below and check every box before requesting review.
-->
## What & why
<!-- What does this PR change, and why? Link any related issue: "Closes #123". -->
## How it was tested
<!-- Commands you ran, manual steps, screenshots. -->
## Checklist
- [ ] I have read [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md).
- [ ] The change builds and existing tests/checks pass locally.
- [ ] I have added or updated tests/docs where it makes sense.
- [ ] My commits are reasonably scoped with clear messages.
## AI-assisted contributions (required)
This project **requires disclosure of AI tool usage**. Please pick one:
- [ ] No AI tools were used to produce this contribution.
- [ ] AI tools were used. Tool(s): `___________`. I have reviewed and understand
every change, and take responsibility for it. AI-authored commits are
marked with a `Co-Authored-By` / `Assisted-By` trailer.
## License
- [ ] I agree that my contribution is licensed under this project's license
(**GNU GPL v3.0 or later**), and I have the right to contribute it.

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# Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct
## Our Pledge
We as members, contributors, and leaders pledge to make participation in our
community a harassment-free experience for everyone, regardless of age, body
size, visible or invisible disability, ethnicity, sex characteristics, gender
identity and expression, level of experience, education, socio-economic status,
nationality, personal appearance, race, caste, color, religion, or sexual
identity and orientation.
We pledge to act and interact in ways that contribute to an open, welcoming,
diverse, inclusive, and healthy community.
## Our Standards
Examples of behavior that contributes to a positive environment for our
community include:
* Demonstrating empathy and kindness toward other people
* Being respectful of differing opinions, viewpoints, and experiences
* Giving and gracefully accepting constructive feedback
* Accepting responsibility and apologizing to those affected by our mistakes,
and learning from the experience
* Focusing on what is best not just for us as individuals, but for the overall
community
Examples of unacceptable behavior include:
* The use of sexualized language or imagery, and sexual attention or advances of
any kind
* Trolling, insulting or derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks
* Public or private harassment
* Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or email address,
without their explicit permission
* Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a
professional setting
## Enforcement Responsibilities
Community leaders are responsible for clarifying and enforcing our standards of
acceptable behavior and will take appropriate and fair corrective action in
response to any behavior that they deem inappropriate, threatening, offensive,
or harmful.
Community leaders have the right and responsibility to remove, edit, or reject
comments, commits, code, wiki edits, issues, and other contributions that are
not aligned to this Code of Conduct, and will communicate reasons for moderation
decisions when appropriate.
## Scope
This Code of Conduct applies within all community spaces, and also applies when
an individual is officially representing the community in public spaces.
Examples of representing our community include using an official email address,
posting via an official social media account, or acting as an appointed
representative at an online or offline event.
## Enforcement
Instances of abusive, harassing, or otherwise unacceptable behavior may be
reported to the community leaders responsible for enforcement at
**whitlocktech@gmail.com**.
All complaints will be reviewed and investigated promptly and fairly.
All community leaders are obligated to respect the privacy and security of the
reporter of any incident.
## Enforcement Guidelines
Community leaders will follow these Community Impact Guidelines in determining
the consequences for any action they deem in violation of this Code of Conduct:
### 1. Correction
**Community Impact**: Use of inappropriate language or other behavior deemed
unprofessional or unwelcome in the community.
**Consequence**: A private, written warning from community leaders, providing
clarity around the nature of the violation and an explanation of why the
behavior was inappropriate. A public apology may be requested.
### 2. Warning
**Community Impact**: A violation through a single incident or series of
actions.
**Consequence**: A warning with consequences for continued behavior. No
interaction with the people involved, including unsolicited interaction with
those enforcing the Code of Conduct, for a specified period of time. This
includes avoiding interactions in community spaces as well as external channels
like social media. Violating these terms may lead to a temporary or permanent
ban.
### 3. Temporary Ban
**Community Impact**: A serious violation of community standards, including
sustained inappropriate behavior.
**Consequence**: A temporary ban from any sort of interaction or public
communication with the community for a specified period of time. No public or
private interaction with the people involved, including unsolicited interaction
with those enforcing the Code of Conduct, is allowed during this period.
Violating these terms may lead to a permanent ban.
### 4. Permanent Ban
**Community Impact**: Demonstrating a pattern of violation of community
standards, including sustained inappropriate behavior, harassment of an
individual, or aggression toward or disparagement of classes of individuals.
**Consequence**: A permanent ban from any sort of public interaction within the
community.
## Attribution
This Code of Conduct is adapted from the [Contributor Covenant][homepage],
version 2.1, available at
[https://www.contributor-covenant.org/version/2/1/code_of_conduct.html][v2.1].
Community Impact Guidelines were inspired by
[Mozilla's code of conduct enforcement ladder][Mozilla CoC].
For answers to common questions about this code of conduct, see the FAQ at
[https://www.contributor-covenant.org/faq][FAQ]. Translations are available at
[https://www.contributor-covenant.org/translations][translations].
[homepage]: https://www.contributor-covenant.org
[v2.1]: https://www.contributor-covenant.org/version/2/1/code_of_conduct.html
[Mozilla CoC]: https://github.com/mozilla/diversity
[FAQ]: https://www.contributor-covenant.org/faq
[translations]: https://www.contributor-covenant.org/translations

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CONTRIBUTING.md
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# Contributing to Runic Gateway — Documentation
Thanks for your interest in contributing! This repo is the **central
documentation** for the Runic Gateway platform — design docs, the protocol spec,
integration guides, and research, extracted from the code repos so they live in
one place.
By participating you agree to abide by our
[Code of Conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md).
## Ways to contribute
- **Report an error** (something wrong, outdated, or unclear) or **request new
documentation** through the
[issue tracker](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/docs/issues)
(issue templates are provided).
- **Fix or expand the docs** by opening a pull request (see below).
- **Never** report a security vulnerability in a public issue — see
[SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md).
## Working on the docs
Everything here is Markdown — no build step. Just edit the relevant file and
preview it in any Markdown viewer (or on Gitea).
```
website/ docs for the shard website (Node/Express + MariaDB + React/Vite)
link/ docs for the ServUO bridge (C# plugin + Rust sidecar)
```
Guidelines:
- Keep documents in the folder matching their subsystem (`website/` or `link/`).
- These docs are the **authoritative** copy of the protocol and design; when you
change behavior in a code repo, update the matching doc here in the same or a
follow-up PR so the spec and implementation stay in sync.
- Use relative links between docs, and check that any links you add resolve.
- Prefer clear prose and tables over screenshots where possible.
## Branch & PR workflow
1. Branch from `main` with a descriptive name (`docs/…`, `fix/…`, `chore/…`).
2. Keep changes focused; small PRs are easier to review.
3. Push and open a pull request against `main`. Fill out the PR template,
including the **AI-assisted contributions** disclosure.
4. A maintainer will review; address feedback with follow-up commits.
### Commit messages
We use [Conventional Commits](https://www.conventionalcommits.org/) —
`type(scope): summary` (e.g. `docs(link): clarify town-crier caps`).
## AI-assisted contributions (disclosure required)
This project is developed openly with AI assistance, and we ask the same
transparency of everyone. **If you used an AI tool** (Claude, Copilot, ChatGPT,
Cursor, etc.) to help produce a contribution, you must disclose it:
- Tick the AI-usage box in the pull-request template and name the tool(s).
- Mark AI-authored commits with a trailer, e.g.
`Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>` or `Assisted-By: <tool>`.
- You remain responsible for every line you submit: review it, understand it,
and make sure it is accurate and that you have the right to contribute it.
Disclosed AI assistance is welcome. Undisclosed AI-generated contributions are
not, and may be closed.
## License
Runic Gateway is licensed under the **GNU General Public License v3.0 or later**
(see [LICENSE.md](LICENSE.md)). By submitting a contribution you agree that it is
licensed under the same terms (inbound = outbound) and that you have the right to
contribute it.

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# Contributors
Runic Gateway is built and maintained by the people and tools listed here.
Thank you to everyone who has contributed.
## Maintainers
- **whitlocktech** &lt;whitlocktech@gmail.com&gt; — project lead and maintainer
## Contributors
<!--
Add yourself here when your contribution is merged — alphabetical by name or
handle. One line each:
- **Name or handle** (optional link) — what you contributed
-->
- _Your name could be here — see [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md)._
## AI-assisted development
Parts of Runic Gateway were developed with the assistance of AI coding tools,
including **Claude** (Anthropic) via Claude Code. AI-assisted commits are
attributed in their commit trailers (e.g. `Co-Authored-By: Claude ...`).
In keeping with this project's transparency policy, **all contributors must
disclose their use of AI tools** on any contribution — see the
"AI-assisted contributions" section of [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md).
Disclosed AI assistance is welcome; undisclosed AI-generated contributions are
not.

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LICENSE.md
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GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
Version 3, 29 June 2007
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Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail.
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The hypothetical commands `show w' and `show c' should show the appropriate
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You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or school,
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For more information on this, and how to apply and follow the GNU GPL, see
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The GNU General Public License does not permit incorporating your program
into proprietary programs. If your program is a subroutine library, you
may consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with
the library. If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Lesser General
Public License instead of this License. But first, please read
<https://www.gnu.org/licenses/why-not-lgpl.html>.

34
README.md
View File

@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@ so they live in one place, independent of either codebase.
```
website/ docs from the shard website (Node/Express + MariaDB + React/Vite)
link/ docs from the ServUO bridge (C# plugin + Rust sidecar + Node WS)
android/ docs from the native Android client (Kotlin + Jetpack Compose)
ci/ cross-cutting CI/quality notes
```
### `website/`
@@ -19,32 +17,18 @@ ci/ cross-cutting CI/quality notes
| [BACKEND_DESIGN.md](website/BACKEND_DESIGN.md) | API contract, DB schema, security model |
| [HERO_EDITOR.md](website/HERO_EDITOR.md) | Hero canvas editor feature spec |
| [WIKI_UPGRADE.md](website/WIKI_UPGRADE.md) | Wiki subsystem upgrade notes |
| [SHARD_VISIBILITY.md](website/SHARD_VISIBILITY.md) | Who sees which shard data — the admin-configurable audience framework |
| [website-README.md](website/website-README.md) | Snapshot of the website repo's README (setup/run reference) |
| [PROJECT_TREE.md](website/PROJECT_TREE.md) | Auto-generated snapshot of the repo's tracked file layout |
### `link/`
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| [INTEGRATION.md](link/INTEGRATION.md) | How the website integrates with the uo-link sidecar |
| [PROTOCOL_2.md](link/PROTOCOL_2.md) | Protocol 2.0 / 2.1 design |
| [v3.md](link/v3.md) | Protocol 3.0 design — shard content/standings streams + the visibility framework |
| [ADMIN_CONTROLS.md](link/ADMIN_CONTROLS.md) | Staff write-plane (kick/ban/broadcast, page queue) |
| [SHARD_PREREQS.md](link/SHARD_PREREQS.md) | Shard-side prerequisites for the bridge |
| [PLAN.md](link/PLAN.md) | uo-link build plan |
| [RESEARCH.md](link/RESEARCH.md) | Research notes |
| [link-README.md](link/link-README.md) | Snapshot of the link repo's README |
| [PROJECT_TREE.md](link/PROJECT_TREE.md) | Auto-generated snapshot of the repo's tracked file layout |
### `android/`
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| [PLAN.md](android/PLAN.md) | Android client build plan / milestones |
| [COVERAGE_PLAN.md](android/COVERAGE_PLAN.md) | Test-coverage rollout plan |
| [APP_LINKS.md](android/APP_LINKS.md) | Android App Links / deep-link setup |
| [theme-plan.md](android/theme-plan.md) | Theming plan |
| [TRUSTED_DEVICES_APP_HANDOFF.md](android/TRUSTED_DEVICES_APP_HANDOFF.md) | Trusted-devices app handoff notes |
| [PROJECT_TREE.md](android/PROJECT_TREE.md) | Auto-generated snapshot of the repo's tracked file layout |
## Provenance
@@ -54,21 +38,3 @@ ci/ cross-cutting CI/quality notes
Commit history and authorship for each doc are preserved. The two source repos
retain a short pointer to this repo in their own READMEs; the authoritative copy
of each document now lives here.
---
## License
Runic Gateway's documentation is free: licensed under the **GNU General Public
License v3.0 or later** — see [LICENSE.md](LICENSE.md).
Copyright (C) 2026 Runic Gateway
This documentation is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY. You may redistribute and/or modify it under the terms of
the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation,
either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
Contributions are welcome — please read [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) (note
the **AI-usage disclosure** requirement) and our
[Code of Conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md).

50
SECURITY.md
View File

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
# Security Policy
Thank you for helping keep Runic Gateway and its users safe.
## Reporting a vulnerability
**Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public issues, pull
requests, or the wiki.** A public report tips off attackers before a fix is
available.
Instead, report privately by email to:
**whitlocktech@gmail.com**
Please include as much of the following as you can:
- The repository and component affected.
- The type of issue (e.g. authentication bypass, injection, secret exposure,
remote code execution, denial of service).
- Step-by-step instructions to reproduce, and a proof-of-concept if you have one.
- The impact — what an attacker could do with it.
- Any suggested remediation.
You will receive an acknowledgement of your report, typically within a few days.
We will keep you informed as we investigate and work toward a fix, and we are
happy to credit you in the release notes once the issue is resolved (let us know
if you would prefer to remain anonymous).
## Scope
Runic Gateway is a self-hosted platform made up of several components:
| Component | Repo | Network exposure |
|---|---|---|
| Website (site + admin + API) | `RunicGateway/website` | Internet-facing (behind a reverse proxy) |
| uo-link sidecar | `RunicGateway/link` | The only network-facing part of the game bridge |
| ServUO plugin | `RunicGateway/servuo-plugins` | Loopback only — dials the sidecar on `127.0.0.1` |
| Documentation | `RunicGateway/docs` | Content only |
Because instances are self-hosted, the security of any given deployment also
depends on how it is configured and operated — strong secrets (`JWT_SECRET`,
`SECRET_ENC_KEY`, database and admin passwords), a correctly configured reverse
proxy and `TRUST_PROXY`, and keeping the shard itself unreachable from the
internet (only the sidecar should be exposed). See each repo's README for the
security model.
## Supported versions
This project is developed continuously and does not maintain long-term release
branches. Security fixes land on `main`; please run a recent build.

196
android/APP_LINKS.md
View File

@@ -1,196 +0,0 @@
# Android App Links — implementation spec
Status: **implementation spec (M9 follow-up).** Stacks on the native SSO bridge (M9 Part 2):
the app already handles the **custom-scheme** callback `runicgateway://auth/callback`, and that stays
the permanent default and universal fallback. App Links are an **opt-in hardening** layered on top —
a verified `https://` callback that only the domain's real owner can claim.
Read alongside: the "Mobile SSO Authorization Bridge" section of
[`../website/BACKEND_DESIGN.md`](../website/BACKEND_DESIGN.md) (endpoints/tables/allowlist), and
[`PLAN.md`](./PLAN.md) §4.2 / §9 (the app milestone). This spec matches what ships on the
`feat/mobile-app-links` (website) and `feat/app-links` (android) branches.
---
## 1. The problem it solves
The mobile SSO bridge redirects the browser back to the app with a one-time code:
```
runicgateway://auth/callback?code=…&state=…
```
A **custom URI scheme** is fine for a self-hosted internal client, but it is not *owned* by anyone:
any other Android app can register an intent-filter for `runicgateway://auth/callback` and, if chosen
by the user, intercept the callback. The code is single-use, PKCE-bound (Layer B), and short-lived —
so an interceptor still cannot complete `/exchange` without the app's `code_verifier` — but a hijacked
callback is still a denial-of-service and a phishing surface we would rather close.
**Android App Links** (verified `https://` deep links) close it: the OS only routes an `https://`
link to an app that has proven, via a file served from *that domain*, that it owns the app. An
attacker cannot serve that file on a domain they do not control.
## 2. Why this is harder here than in a normal app
RunicGateway is **self-hosted per shard**. There is no single canonical domain — every shard owner
runs the website on **their own** domain (`play.exampleshard.com`, `uo.anothershard.net`, …). App
Links verification is **per-domain**: the domain must serve
```
https://<shard-domain>/.well-known/assetlinks.json
```
asserting the Android app's **package name** + **signing-certificate SHA-256 fingerprint**.
That is only half the problem. The other half is an Android platform constraint that decides the whole
shape of the app side:
> **`android:autoVerify` needs a *literal* host at build time.** An intent-filter's `<data android:host>`
> is a static string in the merged manifest; there is no "any host" or runtime host. A **single
> published multi-tenant APK therefore cannot autoVerify an open-ended set of shard domains** — the set
> is not known when the APK is built.
So App Links here are **not** a drop-in replacement for the custom scheme. They split into two pieces
that ship independently:
1. **Server (`assetlinks.json`) — shippable now, benefits any App-Links-capable build.** Every shard
can auto-serve its Digital Asset Links statement behind an admin toggle. This is a pure add and is
implemented on `feat/mobile-app-links`.
2. **App (`autoVerify` intent-filter) — a *build-time* opt-in.** Because the host must be baked in,
App Links are available to:
- a **white-label / first-party build** that bakes one shard's host (`-PappLinkHost=play.myshard.com`);
- a future **canonical relay domain** (`runicgateway.app`, PLAN §14 — *not yet secured*) that all
shards could bounce their final callback through, autoVerified by the generic build.
The **generic multi-tenant build bakes no host and stays custom-scheme-only** — correct and safe.
The custom scheme is never removed. It is the fallback on every build, for every shard, always.
## 3. Server design — `feat/mobile-app-links`
### 3.1 Auto-served `assetlinks.json`
- **Route:** `GET /.well-known/assetlinks.json`, served at the **web root** (outside `/api/v1`, before
the SPA catch-all) in `server/src/app.js`.
- **Gate:** the admin setting `mobile_app_links_enabled` (default **off**). Off ⇒ the route **404s** and
the app stays on the custom scheme for that shard. On ⇒ the shard opts into App Links.
- **Body:** the Digital Asset Links statement for the fixed package `com.runicgateway.app` and the
release signing cert SHA-256 fingerprint(s):
```json
[
{
"relation": ["delegate_permission/common.handle_all_urls"],
"target": {
"namespace": "android_app",
"package_name": "com.runicgateway.app",
"sha256_cert_fingerprints": ["AB:CD:…"]
}
}
]
```
- **Fingerprint source:** env `MOBILE_APP_CERT_SHA256` — comma-separated (supports **cert rotation** and
a debug + release cert during testing). It is a **constant of the published app**, identical for every
shard, so it is a shipped/env default, not something each owner types. The package name is likewise
fixed (`MOBILE_APP_PACKAGE`, default `com.runicgateway.app`).
- **Enabled but no fingerprint configured ⇒ 404** (+ a one-time warn): serving a statement with no
fingerprint asserts nothing and would only mislead the verifier.
- Response is `application/json`, `Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600` (the Play verifier and the OS
re-fetch it; it changes only on a cert rotation).
### 3.2 Redirect-URI allowlist extension
`mobileSso.controller` validates the app's `redirect_uri` by **exact match** against
`MOBILE_AUTH_REDIRECT_URIS` (default `runicgateway://auth/callback`). App Links add exactly one more
acceptable value, and **only when the toggle is on**:
- When `mobile_app_links_enabled`, `/start` additionally accepts the **self-origin** HTTPS callback
`https://<request-host>/mobile/callback` (derived from the request/`APP_BASE_URL`, never from
attacker-controlled input). Still **exact match** — never a prefix match.
- The static custom-scheme allowlist is never narrowed; the HTTPS entry is *additive*.
- No new table or schema: the check reads the one boolean setting.
### 3.3 Public settings advertise the capability
`settings.getPublic()` gains `mobileAppLinks: <bool>` (mirrors the toggle) so a client can tell whether
a shard opted in before requesting an HTTPS `redirect_uri` (a white-label build uses it to avoid asking
for a callback the server would reject).
## 4. App design — `feat/app-links`
### 4.1 Build-time host (`appLinkHost`)
- Gradle property `appLinkHost` (default empty). Wired in `app/build.gradle.kts` into **both**:
- `BuildConfig.APP_LINK_HOST` — read by `SsoAuthManager` to decide the redirect;
- `manifestPlaceholders["appLinkHost"]` — substituted into the App Link intent-filter's host.
- **Default (generic build):** empty ⇒ `BuildConfig.APP_LINK_HOST = ""` and the placeholder falls back
to the reserved sentinel `runic-gateway.invalid` (RFC 6761 — never resolves), so the `autoVerify`
filter is **inert**: it matches no real link and verification simply never succeeds. No custom-scheme
behaviour changes.
- **White-label build:** `./gradlew assembleRelease -PappLinkHost=play.myshard.com` bakes that one host
into the filter and enables the HTTPS redirect for that host.
### 4.2 Manifest
A second intent-filter on `MainActivity`, alongside the unchanged custom-scheme one:
```xml
<intent-filter android:autoVerify="true">
<action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW" />
<category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
<category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" />
<data android:scheme="https"
android:host="${appLinkHost}"
android:path="/mobile/callback" />
</intent-filter>
```
### 4.3 `SsoAuthManager` (pure Kotlin, unit-tested on the JVM)
- **Redirect selection in `buildStartUrl`:** request the HTTPS `redirect_uri`
`https://<pairedHost>/mobile/callback` **iff** `BuildConfig.APP_LINK_HOST` is non-blank *and* equals
the paired base-URL host (case-insensitive); otherwise the fixed custom-scheme `REDIRECT_URI`. A
white-label build that bakes the host is responsible for enabling the server toggle too (§3.2).
- **Verified-callback matcher + host-trust check:** a new `matchesAppLinkCallback(scheme, host, path)`
accepts only `scheme == https`, `path == /mobile/callback`, and **`host == the paired base-URL host`**.
The paired-host equality is defense-in-depth: even though `autoVerify` already means only a real,
opted-in shard domain can route here, the app still refuses any HTTPS callback whose host isn't the
shard it is currently paired to.
- The rest is unchanged: both matchers feed the *same* `complete(state, code, error)` → `/exchange` →
`SessionManager.onSignedIn`. There is no second auth path.
### 4.4 `MainActivity`
`handleSsoCallback` routes a VIEW intent through **`matchesCallback(...) || matchesAppLinkCallback(...)`**;
everything downstream (state check, exchange, sign-in) is shared. Custom-scheme and App Link callbacks
are indistinguishable past the edge.
## 5. Turning it on for a shard
1. Publish/point the app build at the shard host (`-PappLinkHost=<host>`) — or use the generic build and
leave App Links off.
2. Set `MOBILE_APP_CERT_SHA256` (release cert fingerprint) in the website env.
3. Admin → Shard/Settings: enable **App Links** (`mobile_app_links_enabled`).
4. Verify `https://<host>/.well-known/assetlinks.json` returns the statement; confirm Android verifies
(`adb shell pm get-app-links com.runicgateway.app`).
If any step is skipped the app transparently keeps using the custom scheme — nothing breaks.
## 6. Testing
- **Server (`node --test`):** route 404s when the toggle is off; 404s when on but no fingerprint;
returns the correct statement + content-type when on and configured; the redirect allowlist accepts
`https://<host>/mobile/callback` only when enabled and rejects it otherwise (custom scheme always
accepted).
- **App (JVM unit tests):** `matchesAppLinkCallback` accepts only https + `/mobile/callback` + the paired
host and rejects a foreign host / http / wrong path; `buildStartUrl` requests the HTTPS redirect only
when the baked host matches the paired host, else the custom scheme.
## 7. What does *not* change
- The bridge's server design (PKCE Layer A/B, single-use codes, `/start` + `/exchange`) is untouched;
App Links are *one more allowlist entry* + *one static file route*. That is the whole point of keeping
the allowlist exact-match and configurable from day one.
- The custom scheme remains on every build and is the permanent fallback.
- No change to `servuo-plugins/` — App Links are entirely a website ↔ app concern.

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# Android App — Test Coverage Plan
**Goal:** clear the SonarQube coverage quality gate (`new_coverage ≥ 50%`) for
`Runic-Gateway-Android-app`, and leave a durable unit-test culture behind it. Companion to
[`PLAN.md`](./PLAN.md) §12.1 (the JaCoCo wiring that made coverage measurable).
## 1. Current state (2026-07-22, post `Android-app#26`)
The JaCoCo→Sonar wiring is live on `main`, so coverage is now real — and the gate is **failing**:
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Quality gate | **ERROR** (one condition) |
| `new_coverage` | **16.4%** (threshold ≥ 50%) |
| overall `coverage` | 16.3% |
| lines to cover | 3,188 |
| covered | 542 |
Everything else on the gate is green (reliability/security/maintainability **A**, duplication 0%).
Because this is the *first* measured version, Sonar's "new code" window is essentially the whole
codebase, so `new_coverage ≈ overall coverage` — to pass we need to roughly **triple** covered
lines, from 542 to ~1,600.
### Where the uncovered lines are
Bucketed from Sonar's per-file `uncovered_lines` (exclusions from #26 already applied, so `*Screen.kt`
is absent):
| Bucket | Files | Lines to cover | Covered % | Verdict |
|---|--:|--:|--:|---|
| **ViewModels** | 28 | 1,153 | **0.1%** | **Test** — the dominant lever; no ViewModel has any test |
| **DTOs** | 12 | 648 | 26.7% | **Test** — trivial (serialization); a pattern already exists |
| **Repositories** | 11 | 274 | 11.3% | **Test** — fake the API interface |
| **core/\* (logic)** | 21 | 365 | 56.2% | **Test** — top up the partially-covered ones |
| UI composables (`*Components.kt`, `BlockRenderer`, …) | 7 | 255 | 3.9% | **Exclude** — not JVM-unit-testable, and `*Screen.kt`'s exclusion missed them |
| core/push (Android services) | 4 | ~191 | ~0% | **Exclude** (or Robolectric later) — foreground service / notifications |
| core/auth `Encrypted*` stores | 3 | 76 | 0% | **Exclude** — Android Keystore / EncryptedSharedPreferences |
| framework glue (`di/`, `RunicGatewayApp`, `LocalAssetResolver`) | 3 | ~17 | 0% | **Exclude** |
**Two levers, applied together:** (a) stop *counting* code a JVM unit test physically cannot execute,
and (b) actually *test* the logic — ViewModels, DTOs, repositories, core utilities.
## 2. Strategy & projected math
Numbers below are line-coverage projections against Sonar's `lines_to_cover`. They are estimates, but
grounded in the current per-bucket totals.
### Phase 0 — Broaden coverage exclusions (no tests; ~½ day)
Move non-unit-testable code out of the **coverage** denominator (it stays in *analysis* — bugs and
smells are still reported). Extend `sonar.coverage.exclusions` in `sonar-project.properties`:
```properties
sonar.coverage.exclusions=\
app/src/main/java/**/ui/**/*Screen.kt,\
app/src/main/java/**/ui/**/*Screen*.kt,\
app/src/main/java/**/ui/**/*Components.kt,\
app/src/main/java/**/ui/page/BlockRenderer.kt,\
app/src/main/java/**/ui/components/**,\
app/src/main/java/**/ui/shard/FrameFields.kt,\
app/src/main/java/**/ui/theme/**,\
app/src/main/java/**/ui/LocalAssetResolver.kt,\
app/src/main/java/**/RunicApp.kt,\
app/src/main/java/**/MainActivity.kt,\
app/src/main/java/**/*Application.kt,\
app/src/main/java/**/RunicGatewayApp.kt,\
app/src/main/java/**/di/**,\
app/src/main/java/**/core/push/PushService.kt,\
app/src/main/java/**/core/push/PushManager.kt,\
app/src/main/java/**/core/push/PushNotifier.kt,\
app/src/main/java/**/core/push/NtfyStreamClient.kt,\
app/src/main/java/**/core/auth/Encrypted*.kt
```
> Verify each glob targets composable-only / framework-only files before committing (e.g. confirm
> `FrameFields.kt` holds no testable logic). Keep the *pure-logic* push files in coverage
> (`PushPreferences`, `PushTickle`, `NtfyTopic`, `PushStreams`) — they already have tests.
Effect: denominator ~3,188 → ~2,650; covered ~542 → ~532. **Coverage ≈ 20%.** (Removing ~540 lines
that were ~2% covered.)
### Phase 1 — DTO serialization tests (highest ROI; ~1 day) → ~34%
DTOs are `@Serializable` data classes; test them with kotlinx-serialization round-trips against
representative backend JSON. The pattern already exists (`AccountDtoTest`, `AuthDtoTest`,
`NotificationsDtoTest`, `PlayerShardDtoTest`, `ShardDtoTest`). Add/extend:
- **New:** `AdminDto` (111 uncov — biggest single file), `WikiDto` (51), `PublicDto` (32),
`PageDto` (16), `PostDto` (12), `ContactDto` (11), `SsoDto`, `PageDto`.
- **Extend to ~85%:** `PlayerShardDto` (30.8%), `ShardDto` (35.6%), `AccountDto` (50.7%),
`AuthDto` (47.4%).
Target DTOs to ~85%: **+~380 covered lines** → covered ~912 / ~2,650 ≈ **34%**.
### Phase 2 — ViewModel tests (the big one; ~3–4 days) → clears the gate
28 ViewModels, ~1,153 lines, currently 0%. This is where the gate is won. Requires a small test
harness (§3). Each test drives the VM with fake collaborators and asserts `UiState` transitions
(loading → success/error, form validation, actions).
Priority by uncovered lines:
1. `LoginViewModel` (116), `AccountViewModel` (104), `CharactersViewModel` (77),
`AdminContentViewModel` (74), `NotificationsViewModel` (66), `TrustedDevicesViewModel` (63),
`ShardViewModel` (59)
2. `HousesViewModel` (51), `GovernorsViewModel` (47), `AdminDashboardViewModel` (43),
`AdminSupportViewModel` (41), `ChampsViewModel` (40), `AdminModerationViewModel` (40),
`GuildsViewModel` (39), `RecoveryCodesViewModel` (38), `ConnectViewModel` (37),
`ContactViewModel` (36), `VendorsViewModel` (32), `AppViewModel` (29)
3. The small ones (`PostViewModel`, `NewsViewModel`, `WikiViewModel`, `CharacterViewModel`,
`MyHousesViewModel`, `WikiPageViewModel`, `PageViewModel`, `HomeViewModel`, `SessionViewModel`)
Target ViewModels to ~70%: **+~800 covered lines** → covered ~1,712 / ~2,650 ≈ **65%. ✅ Gate passes.**
> Phases 0 + 2 alone (skipping DTOs) already reach ~50.5% — but DTOs are cheap insurance and Phase 1
> lands first because it de-risks the harness work.
### Phase 3 — Repository tests (~1–2 days) → margin
Repositories map API `Response`/exceptions to `ApiResult`; test with a fake `*Api` interface (or
OkHttp `MockWebServer`). Priority: `AuthRepository` (89), `ConnectionRepository` (43),
`ShardRepository` (27), `AdminRepository` (21), then the small content/wiki/player repos. Target ~70%:
**+~160 lines** → buffer well above 50% and resilience as the new-code window narrows.
### Phase 4 — core/net + core/auth top-up (~½–1 day) → durability
Fill the partially-covered utilities: `TokenAuthenticator` (31), `ShardStreamClient` (36),
`HostSelectionInterceptor` (9), `ApiResult` (6), `WebHandoff`, `WebsiteUrls`, `DeviceNameProvider`,
`ServerPreferences`, `AppConfig`.
### Trajectory
| After | Denominator | Covered | Coverage |
|---|--:|--:|--:|
| Today | 3,188 | 542 | 16.3% |
| Phase 0 (exclusions) | ~2,650 | ~532 | ~20% |
| Phase 1 (DTOs) | ~2,650 | ~912 | ~34% |
| **Phase 2 (ViewModels)** | ~2,650 | ~1,712 | **~65% ✅** |
| Phase 3 (repos) | ~2,650 | ~1,872 | ~71% |
| Phase 4 (core) | ~2,650 | ~2,000+ | ~75%+ |
## 3. Test infrastructure to add
The existing suite tests pure-logic classes only; ViewModel/coroutine testing needs a little scaffold.
`kotlinx-coroutines-test` is already a `testImplementation` dependency.
**`MainDispatcherRule`** (JUnit4) — swaps `Dispatchers.Main` (used by `viewModelScope`) for a test
dispatcher:
```kotlin
// app/src/test/java/com/runicgateway/app/util/MainDispatcherRule.kt
@OptIn(ExperimentalCoroutinesApi::class)
class MainDispatcherRule(
private val dispatcher: TestDispatcher = StandardTestDispatcher(),
) : TestWatcher() {
override fun starting(d: Description) = Dispatchers.setMain(dispatcher)
override fun finished(d: Description) = Dispatchers.resetMain()
}
```
**ViewModel test pattern** — hand-written fakes (matches the repo's existing no-mock convention; no new
dependency):
```kotlin
class LoginViewModelTest {
@get:Rule val mainDispatcher = MainDispatcherRule()
private class FakeAuthRepository(var result: LoginResult) : AuthRepository { /* stub the seam */ }
@Test fun `blank credentials surface INVALID_CREDENTIALS without a network call`() = runTest {
val vm = LoginViewModel(FakeAuthRepository(LoginResult.Success), /* … */)
vm.submit()
assertEquals(LoginError.INVALID_CREDENTIALS, vm.state.value.error)
}
}
```
- Assert on `viewModel.state.value` after `advanceUntilIdle()`; or collect the `StateFlow` in a
background `launch` when you need to see intermediate (loading) states.
- **Optional deps (decide once):** `mockk` would cut fake-writing for wide interfaces, and `turbine`
simplifies Flow assertions. Recommendation: **stay with hand fakes** to match convention; revisit
only if VM tests get boilerplate-heavy.
## 4. Execution notes
- CI already runs `./gradlew testDebugUnitTest jacocoTestReport` before the scan (`sonarqube.yml`),
so new tests count automatically on merge to `main`. Locally on this machine: JDK 21 needs
`-Pksp.incremental=false`.
- Sonar recomputes the gate on the post-merge scan; there's no way to fully confirm the number
pre-merge. Land phases as separate PRs (0, 1, 2, …) so coverage climbs visibly and reviews stay
small.
- `sonar.coverage.exclusions` removes files from **coverage only** — analysis still flags bugs/smells
in them, so excluding UI/framework code is safe.
- **Android-framework code deferred, not abandoned:** push services and `Encrypted*` stores are
excluded now; if we want them covered later, add Robolectric (`testImplementation`) and a
`RobolectricTestRunner` suite rather than instrumented tests, to keep it in the fast JVM `test`
source set the scan already consumes.
## 5. Definition of done
- `new_coverage ≥ 50%` and the SonarQube quality gate is **green**.
- `MainDispatcherRule` + a documented ViewModel test pattern exist and are reused.
- Coverage exclusions list only genuinely non-unit-testable files (UI composables, Android-framework
glue) — no ViewModel, repository, DTO, or pure core-logic file is excluded.

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# Android App — Project Tree
> **Auto-generated.** This file is maintained by the `sync-project-tree` CI workflow in
> the [`RunicGateway/Android-app`](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/Android-app) repository, which
> opens a pull request here whenever the tracked file layout on `main` changes. Do not edit
> by hand — changes will be overwritten by the next sync.
A snapshot of the tracked files in the repository (build output, dependencies, and other
git-ignored paths are excluded).
```text
android-app/
├── .gitea/
│ ├── scripts/
│ │ └── gen_tree.py
│ └── workflows/
│ ├── pr-checks.yml
│ ├── release.yml
│ ├── sonarqube.yml
│ └── sync-project-tree.yml
├── app/
│ ├── licenses/
│ │ └── Cinzel-OFL.txt
│ ├── src/
│ │ ├── debug/
│ │ │ └── res/
│ │ │ └── xml/
│ │ │ └── network_security_config.xml
│ │ ├── main/
│ │ │ ├── java/
│ │ │ │ └── com/
│ │ │ │ └── runicgateway/
│ │ │ │ └── app/
│ │ │ │ ├── core/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── auth/
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── sso/
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ ├── EncryptedPendingSsoStore.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ ├── PendingSsoStore.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ ├── Pkce.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ └── SsoAuthManager.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── DeviceNameProvider.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── EncryptedTokenStore.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── EncryptedTrustTokenStore.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── Session.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── SessionManager.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── TokenStore.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── TrustTokenStore.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── net/
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── AuthInterceptor.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── BaseUrlHolder.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── HostSelectionInterceptor.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── Http.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── ServerUrl.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── ShardStream.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── ShardStreamClient.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── ShardStreamEvent.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── TokenAuthenticator.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── UserAgentInterceptor.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── prefs/
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── ServerPreferences.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── push/
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── NtfyStreamClient.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── NtfyTopic.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── PushManager.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── PushNotifier.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── PushPreferences.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── PushService.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── PushStreams.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── PushTickle.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── result/
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── ApiResult.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── web/
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── WebHandoff.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── WebsiteUrls.kt
│ │ │ │ │ └── AppConfig.kt
│ │ │ │ ├── data/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── api/
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── dto/
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ ├── AccountDto.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ ├── AdminDto.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ ├── AuthDto.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ ├── ContactDto.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ ├── NotificationsDto.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ ├── PageDto.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ ├── PlayerShardDto.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ ├── PostDto.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ ├── PublicDto.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ ├── ShardDto.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ ├── SsoDto.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ └── WikiDto.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── AdminApi.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── AuthApi.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── AuthRefreshApi.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── MeApi.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── NotificationsApi.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── PlayerShardApi.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── PublicApi.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── SsoApi.kt
│ │ │ │ │ └── repository/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── AccountRepository.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── AdminRepository.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── AuthRepository.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ConnectionRepository.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ContactRepository.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ContentRepository.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── NotificationsRepository.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── PlayerShardRepository.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── SettingsRepository.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ShardRepository.kt
│ │ │ │ │ └── WikiRepository.kt
│ │ │ │ ├── di/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── AppModule.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── NetworkModule.kt
│ │ │ │ │ └── StorageModule.kt
│ │ │ │ ├── ui/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── admin/
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── AdminContentScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── AdminContentViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── AdminDashboardScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── AdminDashboardViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── AdminModerationScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── AdminModerationViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── AdminSupportScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── AdminSupportViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── auth/
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── AccountScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── AccountViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── LoginScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── LoginViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── RecoveryCodesScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── RecoveryCodesViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── TrustedDevicesScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── TrustedDevicesViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── components/
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── HtmlText.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── StateViews.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── ThemeComponents.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── connect/
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── ConnectScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── ConnectViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── contact/
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── ContactScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── ContactViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── home/
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── HomeScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── HomeViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── navigation/
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── Menu.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── Routes.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── news/
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── NewsScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── NewsViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── PostScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── PostViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── notifications/
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── NotificationsScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── NotificationsViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── page/
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── BlockRenderer.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── PageScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── PageViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── player/
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── CharacterSheetScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── CharactersScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── CharactersViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── CharacterViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── MyHousesScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── MyHousesViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── VendorsScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── VendorsViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── session/
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── SessionViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── shard/
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── ChampsScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── ChampsViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── FrameFields.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── GovernorsScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── GovernorsViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── GuildsScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── GuildsViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── HousesScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── HousesViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── LiveBoard.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── ShardComponents.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── ShardEventText.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── ShardScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── ShardViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── theme/
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── BrandColor.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── Color.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── Font.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── Theme.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── Type.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── wiki/
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── WikiPageScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── WikiPageViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ ├── WikiScreen.kt
│ │ │ │ │ │ └── WikiViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── AppViewModel.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── LocalAssetResolver.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── RunicApp.kt
│ │ │ │ │ └── UiState.kt
│ │ │ │ ├── MainActivity.kt
│ │ │ │ └── RunicGatewayApp.kt
│ │ │ ├── res/
│ │ │ │ ├── drawable/
│ │ │ │ │ └── ic_launcher_background.xml
│ │ │ │ ├── drawable-anydpi/
│ │ │ │ │ └── ic_stat_name.xml
│ │ │ │ ├── drawable-hdpi/
│ │ │ │ │ └── ic_stat_name.png
│ │ │ │ ├── drawable-mdpi/
│ │ │ │ │ └── ic_stat_name.png
│ │ │ │ ├── drawable-xhdpi/
│ │ │ │ │ └── ic_stat_name.png
│ │ │ │ ├── drawable-xxhdpi/
│ │ │ │ │ └── ic_stat_name.png
│ │ │ │ ├── font/
│ │ │ │ │ └── cinzel_variable.ttf
│ │ │ │ ├── mipmap-anydpi-v26/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ic_launcher.xml
│ │ │ │ │ └── ic_launcher_round.xml
│ │ │ │ ├── mipmap-hdpi/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ic_launcher.webp
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ic_launcher_foreground.webp
│ │ │ │ │ └── ic_launcher_round.webp
│ │ │ │ ├── mipmap-mdpi/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ic_launcher.webp
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ic_launcher_foreground.webp
│ │ │ │ │ └── ic_launcher_round.webp
│ │ │ │ ├── mipmap-xhdpi/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ic_launcher.webp
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ic_launcher_foreground.webp
│ │ │ │ │ └── ic_launcher_round.webp
│ │ │ │ ├── mipmap-xxhdpi/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ic_launcher.webp
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ic_launcher_foreground.webp
│ │ │ │ │ └── ic_launcher_round.webp
│ │ │ │ ├── mipmap-xxxhdpi/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ic_launcher.webp
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ic_launcher_foreground.webp
│ │ │ │ │ └── ic_launcher_round.webp
│ │ │ │ ├── values/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── colors.xml
│ │ │ │ │ ├── strings.xml
│ │ │ │ │ └── themes.xml
│ │ │ │ └── xml/
│ │ │ │ ├── backup_rules.xml
│ │ │ │ ├── data_extraction_rules.xml
│ │ │ │ └── network_security_config.xml
│ │ │ ├── AndroidManifest.xml
│ │ │ └── ic_launcher-playstore.png
│ │ └── test/
│ │ └── java/
│ │ └── com/
│ │ └── runicgateway/
│ │ └── app/
│ │ ├── core/
│ │ │ ├── auth/
│ │ │ │ ├── sso/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── PkceTest.kt
│ │ │ │ │ └── SsoAuthManagerTest.kt
│ │ │ │ └── SessionManagerTest.kt
│ │ │ ├── net/
│ │ │ │ ├── HostRewriteTest.kt
│ │ │ │ ├── ServerUrlTest.kt
│ │ │ │ └── ShardStreamClientTest.kt
│ │ │ ├── push/
│ │ │ │ ├── NtfyTopicTest.kt
│ │ │ │ └── PushTickleTest.kt
│ │ │ └── result/
│ │ │ ├── ApiResultExtrasTest.kt
│ │ │ └── ApiResultTest.kt
│ │ ├── data/
│ │ │ ├── api/
│ │ │ │ ├── dto/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── AccountDtoTest.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── AdminDtoTest.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── AuthDtoTest.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── AuthRequestDtoTest.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ContentDtoTest.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── NotificationsDtoTest.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── PlayerGameDataDtoTest.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── PlayerShardDtoTest.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── PublicDtoTest.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ShardBoardDtoTest.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ShardDtoTest.kt
│ │ │ │ │ ├── SsoDtoTest.kt
│ │ │ │ │ └── WikiDtoTest.kt
│ │ │ │ └── fake/
│ │ │ │ ├── FakeAdminApi.kt
│ │ │ │ ├── FakePlayerShardApi.kt
│ │ │ │ ├── FakePublicApi.kt
│ │ │ │ └── FakeShardStream.kt
│ │ │ └── repository/
│ │ │ ├── AccountTrustedDevicesTest.kt
│ │ │ └── ConnectionVersionGuardTest.kt
│ │ ├── ui/
│ │ │ ├── admin/
│ │ │ │ ├── AdminContentViewModelTest.kt
│ │ │ │ ├── AdminDashboardViewModelTest.kt
│ │ │ │ ├── AdminModerationViewModelTest.kt
│ │ │ │ └── AdminSupportViewModelTest.kt
│ │ │ ├── contact/
│ │ │ │ └── ContactViewModelTest.kt
│ │ │ ├── navigation/
│ │ │ │ └── MenuAccessTest.kt
│ │ │ ├── notifications/
│ │ │ │ └── NotificationRoutingTest.kt
│ │ │ ├── player/
│ │ │ │ ├── CharacterSheetHelpersTest.kt
│ │ │ │ ├── CharactersViewModelTest.kt
│ │ │ │ └── PlayerViewModelTest.kt
│ │ │ ├── shard/
│ │ │ │ ├── FrameFieldsTest.kt
│ │ │ │ ├── LiveBoardTest.kt
│ │ │ │ ├── ShardBoardViewModelTest.kt
│ │ │ │ └── ShardEventTextTest.kt
│ │ │ ├── theme/
│ │ │ │ └── BrandColorTest.kt
│ │ │ ├── ContentViewModelTest.kt
│ │ │ └── UiStateTest.kt
│ │ ├── util/
│ │ │ ├── FakeApiSupport.kt
│ │ │ └── MainDispatcherRule.kt
│ │ └── ScaffoldSanityTest.kt
│ ├── build.gradle.kts
│ └── proguard-rules.pro
├── gradle/
│ ├── wrapper/
│ │ ├── gradle-wrapper.jar
│ │ └── gradle-wrapper.properties
│ └── libs.versions.toml
├── .gitattributes
├── .gitignore
├── build.gradle.kts
├── CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
├── CONTRIBUTING.md
├── CONTRIBUTORS.md
├── gradle.properties
├── gradlew
├── gradlew.bat
├── LICENSE.md
├── README.md
├── SECURITY.md
├── settings.gradle.kts
└── sonar-project.properties
```

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49
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# Android app — trusted devices & recovery codes (live smoke test)
Screenshots from a live end-to-end smoke test of the trusted-device + MFA feature on
the Android client (app PR `RunicGateway/Android-app#23`), captured against the local
Node server (`127.0.0.1:3000`) and a `uomysticmoon` MariaDB, on an API 36 emulator.
See `../PLAN.md §4.1.1` for the design and `../../website/TRUSTED_DEVICES_MFA.md` for
the canonical contract.
| # | Screenshot | Shows |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | [`01-login-2fa-trust-device.png`](01-login-2fa-trust-device.png) | The `401 { totpRequired }` login step: the **authentication code** field, the **"Use a recovery code instead"** toggle, and the **"Trust this device (skip codes for 30 days)"** checkbox (ticked). |
| 2 | [`02-account-security-section.png`](02-account-security-section.png) | The new **Security** section on the account screen linking to Trusted devices and Recovery codes. |
| 3 | [`03-trusted-devices.png`](03-trusted-devices.png) | The **Trusted Devices** screen listing this device (`Google sdk_gphone64_x86_64` — the `device_name` sent at login) with revoke / trust-this-device / untrust-all. |
| 4 | [`04-recovery-codes-show-once.png`](04-recovery-codes-show-once.png) | The **Recovery Codes** screen after a password-stepped regenerate: the one-time batch shown once with copy / share, and the updated remaining count. |
| 5 | [`05-recovery-code-login.png`](05-recovery-code-login.png) | Signing in with a **single-use recovery code** instead of the authenticator code. |
## Verified flows (all passed)
1. **2FA login + "Trust this device"** → `200`, trust token stored; server logged `device trusted`.
2. **Trust survives logout** — after signing out, a **password-only** sign-in skipped the
TOTP step entirely (server: a clean `200` with **no** preceding `401 totpRequired`).
This is the headline behaviour: the trust token is *only* consulted at a fresh login,
so it must outlive logout (see PLAN §4.1.1).
3. **Trusted Devices** — list, and the device's `last_used` stamp advancing after the
trust-skip login.
4. **Untrust all** — cleared the server rows **and** the local token; the next
password-only sign-in correctly required the TOTP step again (server: `401`).
5. **Recovery codes** — generate (password step-up, shown once) and a successful
**recovery-code login** (server: `mobile login via recovery code` → `200`).
## Full step-by-step walkthrough
The five images above are the curated highlights. These `walkthrough-*` frames are the
rest of the same smoke-test session, in flow order, for a complete record. (Pure
automation-artifact frames — soft-keyboard popups, mid-transition spinners, and
duplicate Home landings — are omitted; the raws that the highlights above supersede are
not repeated here.)
| # | Screenshot | Shows |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | [`walkthrough-01-home-connected.png`](walkthrough-01-home-connected.png) | Home with the shard **Online** (already connected to the local server), signed out. |
| 2 | [`walkthrough-02-drawer-signed-out.png`](walkthrough-02-drawer-signed-out.png) | Navigation drawer while signed out — **Sign in** entry. |
| 3 | [`walkthrough-03-login-screen.png`](walkthrough-03-login-screen.png) | The native login screen (no SSO providers configured in dev). |
| 4 | [`walkthrough-04-login-2fa-step.png`](walkthrough-04-login-2fa-step.png) | The `401 { totpRequired }` step with the fields empty — the **"Use a recovery code instead"** toggle and **"Trust this device"** checkbox before entry (companion to highlight #1, which shows them filled). |
| 5 | [`walkthrough-05-drawer-signed-in.png`](walkthrough-05-drawer-signed-in.png) | Drawer once signed in — **My account**, Notifications, player groups, **Sign out**. |
| 6 | [`walkthrough-06-account-overview.png`](walkthrough-06-account-overview.png) | Top of the account screen: identity, username/password, **two-factor ENABLED**. |
| 7 | [`walkthrough-07-recovery-codes-before-generate.png`](walkthrough-07-recovery-codes-before-generate.png) | Recovery Codes screen before generating — **0 codes remaining** + the password-step-up form. |
| 8 | [`walkthrough-08-trusted-devices-empty-after-untrust.png`](walkthrough-08-trusted-devices-empty-after-untrust.png) | Trusted Devices after **Untrust all** — "All devices untrusted." and the empty state. |
| 9 | [`walkthrough-09-login-2fa-required-after-untrust.png`](walkthrough-09-login-2fa-required-after-untrust.png) | The next sign-in **re-prompting for the TOTP step** — proof that untrust-all cleared the local trust token. |

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# Android theme plan — mirroring the website frontend
This is a summary of the **website frontend theme** (source of truth:
`website/client/src/styles/theme.css`, applied at runtime by
`website/client/src/contexts/SiteContext.jsx`) so the native Android client can
present a visually consistent brand. Where the web uses CSS custom properties,
the Android equivalent is a Compose `MaterialTheme` `ColorScheme` + `Typography`.
## Overall character
A **dark, moody, "arcane fantasy" theme** — deep blue-black backgrounds, muted
slate-blue accent, parchment-white text, and an engraved serif display face. It
reads like a leather-and-moonlight fantasy ledger, not a bright consumer app.
There is **no light mode** on the web; the app should ship dark-only to match.
## Color tokens
The web theme is a flat set of CSS variables under `:root`. Map them to Compose
as follows (hex is authoritative):
| Web token | Hex | Role | Compose slot (suggested) |
|-------------------|------------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| `--bg` | `#0e1318` | App background | `background` |
| `--bg-deep` | `#0b0f14` | Deepest surface / on-accent text | `surfaceDim` / `onPrimary` |
| `--panel-a` | `#192231` | Card gradient top | `surface` |
| `--panel-b` | `#141a21` | Card gradient bottom | `surfaceContainer` |
| `--panel-flat` | `#11161d` | Flat panels, toolbars | `surfaceContainerLow` |
| `--line` | `#2a3544` | Borders / dividers | `outline` |
| `--line-soft` | `#1d2733` | Subtle row dividers | `outlineVariant` |
| `--accent` | `#7f99bd` | **Primary accent** (brand-overridable) | `primary` |
| `--accent-bright` | `#cdd9e8` | Primary button fill, active states | `primaryContainer` / bright |
| `--ink` | `#eef3f8` | Highest-contrast text | `onBackground` |
| `--head` | `#e6edf6` | Headings | heading color |
| `--text` | `#c4cdd8` | Body prose | `onSurface` |
| `--muted` | `#aeb8c4` | Secondary text | `onSurfaceVariant` |
| `--dim` | `#6f7d8e` | Meta / captions / placeholders | dim / disabled text |
| `--blue` | `#13243c` | Accent hover/active background | `secondaryContainer` |
| `--mode-live` | `#5fb98a` | "Shard live" status (green) | success |
| `--mode-maint` | `#e6c26a` | "Maintenance" status (amber) | warning |
### Semantic / status colors (used in badges, diffs, moderation)
- **Success / published / live:** green `#5fb98a` (fills at ~16–22% alpha, text `#7fd0a4`).
- **Warning / maintenance / moderation (kick/mute/warn):** amber `#e0b070` / `#e6c26a`.
- **Danger / ban / red-link / errors:** desaturated red `#d98b84` (borders `#6e3b38`).
- **Admin badge:** near-white `#d8e2ef` on `#3a4a5e`.
## Branding is data, not code
The `--accent` value is **overridden at runtime** per shard instance. On the web,
`SiteContext` reads `brand.accent` from the site settings API and sets the CSS
variable, so one build reskins for any shard. **The Android app should do the
same:** fetch the brand payload (name, `accent`, colors, logo/hero/favicon) from
the website API and derive the `primary` color at runtime rather than hardcoding
`#7f99bd`. Default to `#7f99bd` when the brand payload is absent/offline.
## Typography
Three font families, by role:
- **Display** (`--display`): **Cinzel**, falling back to Georgia serif — an
engraved Roman capitals face used for the logo, `h1`/`.h1`, and prose
`h2`/`h3`. Bundle Cinzel as an app font; this face carries the brand.
- **Serif body** (`--serif`): **Georgia / Times New Roman** — default body and
prose text; `line-height ≈ 1.6`.
- **Sans** (`--sans`): **Helvetica Neue / Arial** — UI chrome: buttons, pills,
form labels, table headers, badges, meta. Labels/eyebrows/kickers are
UPPERCASE with wide letter-spacing (`0.1–0.18em`) and small (0.68–0.86rem).
Heading scale is fluid on web (`h1` clamps ~2.4–3.6rem); pick fixed Material type
scale equivalents (e.g. display for `h1`, headline for `h2`, title for `h3`).
## Shape, elevation & motion
- **Corners:** cards/panels `10–12px` radius; inputs/small elements `8px`;
pills and buttons are **fully rounded** (`999px` / capsule).
- **Cards:** vertical gradient `--panel-a → --panel-b`, 1px `--line` border, soft
drop shadow (`0 14px 34px rgba(0,0,0,0.3)`). On hover the web lifts `-3px` and
brightens the border to `--accent` — translate to a pressed/focused accent
border on Android.
- **Buttons:** primary = bright fill (`--accent-bright`) with dark text;
ghost/secondary = translucent dark fill with accent-on-hover border.
- **Motion:** short, subtle transitions (0.12–0.18s). Keep animations understated.
## Signature accents (nice-to-have)
- The **"moon"** motif: a radial-gradient sphere (`#eef3f8 → #9fb0c6 → #5d6e88`) —
a small brand flourish worth reproducing.
- Accent-tinted focus rings and left-border "note" callouts
(`border-left: 3px solid --accent` over a translucent `--blue` background).
## Implementation note for Compose
Define one `darkColorScheme(...)` from the table above, a `Typography` binding the
three families, and a `Shapes` set (`small = 8.dp`, `medium = 10.dp`, capsule for
buttons). Load `accent` from the brand API into a state holder and rebuild the
`primary` (and derived `primaryContainer`) at runtime so a shard's custom accent
flows through the whole UI — exactly as `SiteContext` does on the web.

59
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# SonarQube static analysis
Each code repo in the Runic Gateway org reports static-analysis results to the
self-hosted **SonarQube** server for review. Analysis is **non-blocking**: it
runs on push to `main` (i.e. *after* merge), never on pull requests, so it never
gates a PR. It complements each repo's PR gate and release pipeline — it only
feeds the dashboard.
## Server
- **URL:** `https://sonar.whitlocktech.com`
- Each repo is a separate SonarQube project, keyed as below.
## Projects
| Repo | Project key | Sources analysed | Language |
|---|---|---|---|
| `website` | `runic-gateway-website` | `server/src`, `client/src`, `bot/src` | JS/TS |
| `link` | `runic-gateway-link` | `sidecar/src` | Rust |
| `Android-app` | `runic-gateway-android-app` | `app/src/main` | Kotlin |
## How it's wired
Each repo carries two files, identical in shape across repos:
- **`sonar-project.properties`** (repo root) — declares the project key, sources,
tests, and exclusions. The Sonar scanner reads this.
- **`.gitea/workflows/sonarqube.yml`** — a `SonarQube` workflow that, on push to
`main` (and via manual `workflow_dispatch`), checks out with full history
(`fetch-depth: 0`, needed for accurate blame + "new code") and runs
`sonarsource/sonarqube-scan-action@v4`.
The scan is **source-based** — it does not build the project or run a language
toolchain, so the workflows are lightweight (checkout + scan only). Richer
signals (Rust Clippy, Android Lint, JaCoCo coverage) are left as documented,
commented-out enrichment in each repo's `sonar-project.properties`; enable them
per repo when wanted.
## One-time setup per repo (Gitea UI → Repo → Settings → Actions)
Both are consumed by the scan action via `env:` in the workflow:
- **Secret `SONAR_TOKEN`** — a SonarQube *Analysis* token (My Account →
Security in SonarQube; project-scoped or global).
- **Variable `SONAR_HOST_URL`** — the SonarQube base URL reachable from the
self-hosted runner. Kept as a **variable, not committed**, so the internal
address stays out of git.
The self-hosted `ubuntu-latest` runner must be able to reach `SONAR_HOST_URL` on
the network. Nothing waits on the SonarQube Quality Gate, so a failing gate does
not fail the job — check the dashboard.
## Adding a new repo
1. Create the project in SonarQube; note its key.
2. Add `sonar-project.properties` (copy an existing repo's, adjust key + sources).
3. Add `.gitea/workflows/sonarqube.yml` (copy verbatim — it's language-agnostic).
4. Set the `SONAR_TOKEN` secret and `SONAR_HOST_URL` variable in the repo's
Gitea Actions settings.

82
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@@ -43,20 +43,6 @@ Pin the version you built against and compare it to the header (or `/health.prot
**v2 (Protocol 2.0)** added the account-provisioning surface (§6.x: `POST /accounts/create`, `DELETE /link/{account}`) and the `account.*` events. Outbound event kinds are **additive** — a v1 client that ignores unknown kinds keeps working against the live feed — but the new *endpoints* require a v2 sidecar. If you send `X-UOLink-Version: 1`, calls to the new endpoints are refused with the 409 above.
**v3 (Protocol 3.0) is being built and the version has not been bumped yet.** It is defined as *adds
`world.ruleset`, `points.board`, `vendor.listing` / `vendor.listing.remove`*, and the bump to
`X-UOLink-Version: 3` happens **exactly once**, at the end, when [`v3.md`](v3.md) §4's `edge` → `main`
cutover lands — because a bump is an operator-visible hard break (409 on every protected route, and
the website's WS closes on the `ws.hello` mismatch), so doing it per phase would break the site
repeatedly.
Until then, sidecars on `edge` still report `2` while already carrying some v3 kinds and endpoints.
That is safe in the direction that matters: event kinds are additive, and a client that ignores
unknown kinds and tolerates a `404` on a not-yet-present endpoint keeps working. What you must **not**
do is infer feature availability from the version number during this window — probe the endpoint, or
treat a missing `world.ruleset` as "this shard hasn't published one". There is deliberately **no
feature-negotiation array**: v3 implies all three kinds.
---
## 3. Health
@@ -329,58 +315,6 @@ The house registry — one row per house, complementing the `house.decay` *trans
Render from `GET /houses` (§6) on connect, then keep live with these events.
#### Shard ruleset (Protocol 3.0)
How the shard is actually configured, published by the shard itself. **Not a sweep** — it changes only
when an operator edits `Config/*.cfg`, so it is emitted once per shard↔sidecar connect (and on
`[bridge reload`), exactly like `server.hello`.
| kind | fields | notes |
|------|--------|-------|
| `world.ruleset` | `rev`, `shard`, `expansion`, `connect?`, `systems`, `caps`, `housing`, `accounts`, `vetRewards`, `loot`, `vendors`, `champions?`, `treasureMaps`, `vvv?`, `store`, `schedule?` | The whole ruleset, always complete — **never a delta**, so the latest frame replaces the previous one outright. Every block except `shard`/`expansion` is optional and is **omitted when its system is off**, so absence means "not applicable here", not "unknown". |
`rev` is the shard's FNV-1a of the body: identical `rev` means the ruleset is unchanged and this frame
is just a reconnect re-send, so a consumer can skip the write. It is deliberately **not**
`String.GetHashCode()`, which is seeded per process and would change on every shard restart.
```json
{"kind":"world.ruleset","rev":"1a2b3c4d","shard":"UOMysticmoon","expansion":"EJ",
"systems":{"cityLoyalty":true,"vvv":true,"factions":false,"siege":false,"chat":true,
"store":true,"dailyRares":true,"honesty":true,"shadowguard":true,
"treasureMaps":true,"vetRewards":true,"testCenter":false},
"caps":{"skill":1000,"totalSkill":7000,"stat":225,"str":125,"dex":125,"int":125,
"strMax":150,"dexMax":150,"intMax":150},
"housing":{"accountHouseLimit":1},
"accounts":{"perIp":3,"charSlots":7,"autoCreate":true},
"vetRewards":{"enabled":true,"rewardIntervalDays":30},
"loot":{"feluccaLuckBonus":1000,"feluccaBudgetBonus":100,"feluccaMaxProps":11},
"vendors":{"restockDelayMinutes":60,"maxSell":500,"economyStockAmount":500},
"champions":{"powerScrolls":6,"statScrolls":16,"scrollChance":0.1,
"transcendenceChance":50.0,"rankThresholds":[5,10,13]},
"treasureMaps":{"enabled":true,"lootChance":0.01,"resetDays":30},
"vvv":{"enabled":true,"startSilver":2000,"enhancedRules":false},
"store":{"enabled":true,"currencyName":"Sovereigns"},
"schedule":{"autoSaveEnabled":true,"autoSaveFrequencyMinutes":15,"autoRestartEnabled":false},
"t":1752489280000}
```
**Two things consumers get wrong.**
1. **`caps.skill` and `caps.totalSkill` are in tenths**, the way ServUO stores them: `1000` is `100.0`
skill and `7000` is `700.0` total. Rendering the raw number is actively misleading. The other caps
(`stat`, `str`, …) are plain integers.
2. **`connect` is present only if the operator set `Bridge.PublicConnectAddress`.** The shard's real
listen address (`Server.cfg`) is never published; nor are `Staff.cfg`, `Email.cfg`, `DataPath.cfg`,
`Bridge.cfg`, `Compiler.cfg`, `Reports.cfg` or `Client.cfg`. The frame is built from an explicit
allowlist in `BridgeRuleset.cs` — `Config.Entries` is never enumerated, because that would sweep in
every key on the server.
Absent entirely if the shard runs `Bridge.RulesetEnabled=false` or an older plugin. Render from
`GET /ruleset` (§6) on connect, then keep live with this event.
This **supersedes the `world.systems` frame** sketched in [`PROTOCOL_2.md`](PROTOCOL_2.md) §10.4 and
never implemented; the `systems` block above is what that asked for.
---
## 5. REST — read queries
@@ -724,22 +658,6 @@ GET /houses
Every house's latest snapshot — owner→houses map. Served from the sidecar's projection, kept current by the `house.*` stream (§4). Ordered by name. Survives a sidecar restart.
### Shard ruleset (Protocol 3.0)
```
GET /ruleset
→ { "ruleset": {"kind":"world.ruleset","rev":"1a2b3c4d","shard":"UOMysticmoon",
"expansion":"EJ","systems":{...},"caps":{...},"accounts":{...}, ... } }
```
The shard's published ruleset (§4 for the full frame and its two gotchas). Served from the sidecar's
store, so it **answers while the shard is down** — a rules page that goes blank during a restart is
worse than one that is briefly stale. Keep it current with the `world.ruleset` stream.
`{"ruleset": null}` means the shard has never published one — an older plugin, or
`Bridge.RulesetEnabled=false`. That is a real answer distinct from a published ruleset, and worth
rendering differently ("not published yet") rather than as an empty ruleset.
---
## 7. Status codes

13
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@@ -315,14 +315,6 @@ Counts in `hello` are a live snapshot taken on the Core thread, not a cached val
7. **Core edit: `PlayerVendorSale`** (§6). Then the cheat-detection feed.
8. **Cheat signals.** `FastWalk`, `OnPropertyChanged` audit, vendor-sale anomaly detection in the sidecar.
**Beyond 1.0.** Phases above are the 1.0 read/event plane. Protocol 2.0's phasing (provisioning +
world-state boards) is [`PROTOCOL_2.md`](PROTOCOL_2.md) §13; Protocol 3.0's (visibility framework,
shard content and standings) is [`v3.md`](v3.md) §9, which also tracks what has landed. Shipped from
3.0 so far: **Part A** — the visibility framework — and **`world.ruleset`** ([`v3.md`](v3.md) §5),
`BridgeRuleset.cs`, the first bridge stream that is neither an event subscription nor a sweep: it is
emitted once per connect, like `server.hello`, because shard config changes only when an operator
edits a file.
### Config keys (`Config/Bridge.cfg`)
```ini
@@ -336,11 +328,6 @@ EconomySweepSeconds=300
Read in `Configure()` via `Config.Get<T>("Bridge.<Key>", default)`. Key scope is the filename: `Bridge.cfg` + `StatSweepSeconds` → `Bridge.StatSweepSeconds`.
The set above is the 1.0 sample, not the current one — every later phase added keys (sweep intervals
for each board, the town-crier/news caps, the admin write plane, account provisioning, and 3.0's
`RulesetEnabled` / `PublicConnectAddress` / `RulesetIncludeSchedule`). **`servuo-plugins/overlay/Config/Bridge.cfg`
is the authoritative, commented list**; `BridgeConfig.cs` holds the defaults.
---
## 11. Phase 1 acceptance

46
link/PROJECT_TREE.md
View File

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
# uo-link — Project Tree
> **Auto-generated.** This file is maintained by the `sync-project-tree` CI workflow in
> the [`RunicGateway/link`](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/link) repository, which
> opens a pull request here whenever the tracked file layout on `main` changes. Do not edit
> by hand — changes will be overwritten by the next sync.
A snapshot of the tracked files in the repository (build output, dependencies, and other
git-ignored paths are excluded).
```text
link/
├── .gitea/
│ ├── ISSUE_TEMPLATE/
│ │ ├── bug_report.md
│ │ ├── config.yaml
│ │ └── feature_request.md
│ ├── scripts/
│ │ └── gen_tree.py
│ ├── workflows/
│ │ ├── release.yml
│ │ ├── sonarqube.yml
│ │ └── sync-project-tree.yml
│ └── PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md
├── sidecar/
│ ├── src/
│ │ ├── config.rs
│ │ ├── main.rs
│ │ ├── rpc.rs
│ │ ├── shard.rs
│ │ ├── store.rs
│ │ └── web.rs
│ ├── .gitignore
│ ├── Cargo.lock
│ ├── Cargo.toml
│ ├── README.md
│ └── sidecar.toml.example
├── .gitignore
├── CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
├── CONTRIBUTING.md
├── CONTRIBUTORS.md
├── LICENSE.md
├── README.md
├── SECURITY.md
└── sonar-project.properties
```

17
link/PROTOCOL_2.md
View File

@@ -285,18 +285,6 @@ City titles and faction/VvV merchant titles (`CityLoyaltySystem.ApplyCityTitle`,
### 10.4 Factions / Vice vs Virtue
> **Status update (Protocol 3.0, 2026-07-28).**
>
> - **The deferred question is answered.** This shard runs **Vice vs Virtue** (`VvV.cfg Enabled=True`);
> old Factions is off, and in stock ServUO that is not a coincidence —
> `Services/Factions/Core/Faction.cs` sets `Settings.Enabled = !ViceVsVirtueSystem.Enabled`, so the
> two are mutually exclusive by construction. The `vvv.standings` / `vvv.battle` streams below are
> therefore unblocked, but are **not** scoped for 3.0 (see [`v3.md`](v3.md) §2 row 5).
> - **`world.systems` is superseded by `world.ruleset`** ([`v3.md`](v3.md) §5), which shipped in 3.0.
> It was never implemented under this name. `world.ruleset` carries the same
> `systems{cityLoyalty, vvv, factions, …}` sub-object this section asked for, plus the rest of the
> shard's published ruleset, so no orphan kind is left behind. Do not implement `world.systems`.
**Which system is live is a shard decision — verify before building.** Two exist:
- **Old Factions** (`Scripts/Services/Factions`): `Faction.Commander` (leader, `Faction.cs:160`), `Faction.Election`, `Faction.Members` (`List<PlayerState>`), and faction-controlled **Towns** (`Town.cs` — each town has an owning faction, a sheriff, and finance). Config-gated and, on most modern shards, **off**.
@@ -312,10 +300,7 @@ City titles and faction/VvV merchant titles (`CityLoyaltySystem.ApplyCityTitle`,
{"kind":"vvv.standings","order":142000,"chaos":138500,"leaderSide":"Order"}
```
> Start by detecting which system is enabled at boot and streaming only that one. ~~emit a one-time
> `world.systems` frame (what's on: cityLoyalty, vvv, factions) so the website renders the right panels
> instead of guessing.~~ — **superseded: `world.ruleset` already carries that `systems` block** (see the
> status note at the top of this section).
> Start by detecting which system is enabled at boot and streaming only that one; emit a one-time `world.systems` frame (what's on: cityLoyalty, vvv, factions) so the website renders the right panels instead of guessing.
## 11. Further integration points — a menu to pick from

740
link/v3.md
View File

@@ -1,740 +0,0 @@
# Protocol 3.0 — Shard content, standings & the visibility framework
**Status:** In progress. All work lands on an `edge` branch in each repo; `edge` → `main` is the v3 cutover.
**Date:** 2026-07-28
**Codebase:** ServUO 57.4, `<servuo>`, net48 / x64, Expansion **EJ**.
**Companion to** [`PLAN.md`](PLAN.md) (1.0 read/event plane), [`PROTOCOL_2.md`](PROTOCOL_2.md) (2.0 provisioning + world-state streams), [`ADMIN_CONTROLS.md`](ADMIN_CONTROLS.md) (staff write plane), [`INTEGRATION.md`](INTEGRATION.md) (website API).
### Progress
Each part is marked off here as it lands on `edge`. §9 carries the same state per sequencing row.
| Order | Part | State | Landed on `edge` |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | **A** — visibility framework + actor-leak fix (§3) | ✅ **Done** | website [#109](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/website/pulls/109) + [#110](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/website/pulls/110), docs [#64](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/docs/pulls/64) + [#65](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/docs/pulls/65) |
| 2 | **B/1** — `world.ruleset` (§5) | ✅ **Done** | servuo-plugins [#3](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/servuo-plugins/pulls/3), link [#17](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/link/pulls/17), website [#111](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/website/pulls/111), docs [#66](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/docs/pulls/66) |
| 3 | **C** — spawn atlas (§6) | 🟡 **Data pipeline done** | website [#112](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/website/pulls/112) (parsers + CLI + tables); API/client PR next |
| 4 | **B/2** — `points.board` (§7) | ⬜ Not started | — |
| 5 | **B/3** — `vendor.listing` (§8) | ⬜ Not started | — |
| 6 | **Cutover** — `PROTOCOL_VERSION` 2→3 (§4) | ⬜ Not started | — |
---
## 1. Why 3.0
A survey of the live ServUO tree against everything the bridge already surfaces end-to-end found that
**the bridge covers live *activity* well and covers shard *content and standings* almost not at all.**
Covered by 1.0 + 2.0: presence/online, region transitions, char vitals + profile + roster, house
registry + IDOC decay, champion spawns, guild board, city governors + term history, help-page queue,
total gold supply, player-vendor sales log, deaths/murders/kills, skill gains, fame/karma, quest
completes, staff/cheat audit, account linking + creation, town crier + news.
Not covered by anything: every leaderboard, every ruleset fact, every "where do I find X", and the
entire player economy outside a player's own vendors.
3.0 has **three scope areas**:
- **A — The visibility framework (§3).** Admin-configurable, per-feature and per-field audience
control over every shard-derived surface on the website. Ships first; the rest depends on it.
- **B — Three new wire streams (§5, §7, §8).** `world.ruleset`, `points.board`,
`vendor.listing`/`vendor.listing.remove`.
- **C — One website-only feature (§6).** The spawn atlas, built from static ServUO data files with no
wire involvement at all.
---
## 2. Survey: the full gap list
Recorded so the items *not* scoped for 3.0 aren't re-derived later.
| # | Gap | Source on the shard | Value | Cost | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | **Points/loyalty leaderboards** — 25 point currencies | `Scripts/Services/PointsSystems/PointsSystem.cs` → `static List<PointsSystem> Systems`, each `List<PointsEntry>{Player,Points}` | Very high | Low | **3.0 §7** |
| 2 | **Shard ruleset page** | `Config/*.cfg` via `Server.Config.Get` | High | Very low | **3.0 §5** |
| 3 | **Shard-wide marketplace** | `PlayerVendor.PlayerVendors` + `VendorSearch.cs` | Very high | High | **3.0 §8** |
| 4 | **Spawn atlas / bestiary** | `Spawns/*.xml` (6,455 spawners), `RevampedSpawns/*.xml` (333), `Data/Regions.xml`, `Data/Locations/*.xml`, `Config/ChampionSpawns.xml`, `Data/teleporters.csv`, `Data/HarvestLocs/*` | High | Medium | **3.0 §6** |
| 5 | VvV standings + battle status | `Services/ViceVsVirtue/{ViceVsVirtueSystem,GuildStats,VvVBattle}.cs` | High | Medium | `PROTOCOL_2.md` §10.4 deferred this pending "which PvP system does this shard run?" — **now answered: `VvV.cfg Enabled=True`, `Factions.cfg` off.** Unblocked, not scoped here |
| 6 | Skill leaderboards + shard census | `Services/Reports/Reports.cs` → `GetSkillDistribution()`, `CompileGeneralStats()`, `StaffHistory` | High | Low | Spec'd `PROTOCOL_2.md` §14 (Part B phase 6), unbuilt. Shares §7's UI — fold in after |
| 7 | Custom mounts/pets codex — ~35 across 4 tiers | `Scripts/Custom/{Companions,Legendary,Named,New Legacy}` | Medium-high | Very low | Pure wiki/CMS content, zero bridge work. The shard's most distinctive content, with zero site presence |
| 8 | Community Collections progress | `Services/CommunityCollections/CollectionsSystem.cs` | Medium | Low | Natural public "community goal" widget |
| 9 | Seasonal/holiday event calendar | `Services/Seasonal Events/SeasonalEventSystem.cs`, Krampus, Forsaken Foes | Medium | Low | "What's live now / what's next" |
| 10 | Crafting / taming / harvesting feeds | `EventSink.CraftSuccess` / `TameCreature` / `ResourceHarvestSuccess` | Medium | Low | Spec'd `PROTOCOL_2.md` §11 #3/#4/#5, unbuilt |
| 11 | Virtue progression | `EventSink.VirtueLevelChange`, `Services/Ethics/` | Medium | Low | Spec'd §11 #6, unbuilt |
| 12 | Bulk Order Deeds + reward tables | `Services/BulkOrders/`, `Data/Bulk Orders/*` | Medium | Low | Feed spec'd §11 #7; the static reward tables are a free wiki page |
| 13 | Guild wars | war state on `Guild` | Low-medium | Low | Spec'd §11 #8, unbuilt |
| 14 | Astronomy discovery log | `Services/Astronomy/AstronomySystem.cs` (104 KB save) | Low | Low | Niche completion leaderboard |
| 15 | In-game chat relay | `Services/Chat/`, `Logs/Chat/{General,Help,Trade,LFG}` | Low | Medium | Privacy-sensitive; staff-only at most |
| 16 | Shard health telemetry | Crash logs, `LayerConflict.log`, `throttle.log`, `world.save.after` counts, AutoSave/AutoRestart schedule | Low-medium | Low | `world.save.after` is already ingested but never charted — world-size-over-time is nearly free |
| 17 | Ultima Store / Sovereigns balance | `Store.cfg Enabled=True, CurrencyName=Sovereigns`; `UltimaStore.GetCurrency` | ? | Medium | Only worth it if sovereigns are actually sold |
**Excluded permanently** — see [`ADMIN_CONTROLS.md`](ADMIN_CONTROLS.md) Tier H/N: firewall/IP-block,
kill/resurrect, jail, item/gold grants, set-access-level, arbitrary `[set`/`[add`.
**Noticed during the survey, out of scope:** `Scripts/Custom/PerryOwnerFix.cs` hardcodes an
`EventSink.Login` hook granting `AccessLevel.Owner` to account `"ShardOnwerPerry"`. Worth reviewing
independently of this work.
---
## 3. Part A — The visibility framework ✅ Done
*Landed on `edge`: website [#109](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/website/pulls/109) (the framework)
and [#110](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/website/pulls/110) (the REST-projection gap §3.6.1
records), docs [#64](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/docs/pulls/64) + [#65](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/docs/pulls/65).
Smoke-tested across all five rungs per §11.*
### 3.1 The leak this replaces (verified 2026-07-28)
`BridgeJson.Actor()` (`BridgeJson.cs:85-117`) writes `serial`, `name`, **`acct`**, **`webId`**,
`player`. `shardState.model.js:346 shapeGuild()` returns `r.payload` verbatim, and
`GET /api/v1/public/shard/guilds` (anonymous, `shard.controller.js:131`) serves it. **A guild
leader's game account name and website user id are readable on an anonymous public endpoint today.**
The same path exists for `shapeGovernor` → `/public/shard/governors`. `Actor` also feeds
`guild.join`, `city.update` and `region.enter`, all three in `PUBLIC_KINDS` on the anonymous SSE
stream.
The framework below is the vehicle for the fix, and the reason it ships before anything else.
### 3.2 Where visibility lives
**On the website, never in the sidecar.** The sidecar's job for 3.0 is unchanged in character: accept
frames, persist them to its SQLite store, forward them verbatim over WS, and serve store-backed reads
that survive a shard outage. It defines no access parameters, no audiences, no field projection, and
advertises no capabilities.
### 3.3 The audience ladder
`anonymous → logged_in → player → staff → admin`, each rung implying the ones below it.
`viewerLevel(req)` resolves: no session ⇒ `anonymous`; authenticated ⇒ `logged_in`; authenticated
with a linked shard account ⇒ `player`; moderator/admin role ⇒ `staff`/`admin`. **Staff always
satisfy the `player` rung** even without a linked game account, consistent with the existing rule
that `/player/*` is role-agnostic self-service.
### 3.4 Two limits an admin cannot override
1. **`acct` and `webId` are admin-only, always.** They are not in-game-visible and are not exposed as
configurable fields.
2. **A kind absent from the kind→feature map is never broadcast below `admin`.** Fail closed. This
preserves the property that today's static `PUBLIC_KINDS` allowlist is a security boundary rather
than a convenience filter.
### 3.5 Configuration
```sql
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS shard_feature_visibility (
feature VARCHAR(48) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
enabled TINYINT(1) NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
audience VARCHAR(20) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'anonymous',
field_rules JSON NULL, -- {"<field>": "<rung>"} for sensitive fields only
updated_by INT NULL,
updated_at DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP ON UPDATE CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4;
```
**Not** seeded on boot (this changed during implementation): an **absent row means "use the compiled
default"**, so the table starts empty and only ever holds rows an admin has actually touched. The
defaults live in one place — `FEATURES` in `shardVisibility.js` — instead of being duplicated into a
seeder that could drift from it, and a DB blip degrades to those same defaults rather than to
"everything is public". **All ten shard features are covered — the four new ones and the six that
already ship — and every default reproduces today's behavior, so the retrofit is a no-op until an
admin changes something.**
| Feature | Default audience | Sensitive fields (default rung) |
|---|---|---|
| `status`, `activity`, `champs`, `guilds`, `governors` | `anonymous` | guilds/governors: `leaderAcct` / `leaderWebId` → **admin (locked)** |
| `houses` | `anonymous` | `owner` → `staff`, `price` → `staff` (matches today's IDOC-only public view) |
| `presence` | `anonymous` | `location` → `staff` (matches today's staff-only, location-gated `/online`) |
| `ruleset` (new) | `anonymous` | `connect` → `anonymous` |
| `atlas` (new) | `anonymous` | — |
| `leaderboards` (new) | `anonymous` | `characterName` → `anonymous` |
| `market` (new) | `anonymous` | `ownerName` → `anonymous`, `location` → `anonymous` |
### 3.6 Enforcement — three points, one config
New `website/server/src/utils/shardVisibility.js`:
- `LADDER = ['anonymous','logged_in','player','staff','admin']`, `rank()`, `meets(viewer, required)`
- `viewerLevel(req)` (§3.3)
- `KIND_FEATURE` — every event kind → its feature; unmapped ⇒ admin-only (§3.4)
- `getConfig()` — DB-backed, cached ~5 s like `uoLinkClient`'s config cache, busted on admin `PUT`
- `requireFeature(name)` — **404 when disabled** (don't leak existence), **403 when enabled but the
viewer is below the audience**
- `projectFeature(name, payload, viewerLevel)` — strips fields whose rung the viewer doesn't meet;
`acct`/`webId` always stripped below `admin`
Applied at:
1. **Routes** — `requireFeature(…)` on every `/public/shard/*`, `/public/atlas/*` and the
shard-derived player routes; `projectFeature` in the controllers, replacing the ad-hoc
`shapeGuild`-returns-payload-verbatim path.
2. **SSE** — `shardBroadcast.js` moves from *"one public channel with a static `PUBLIC_KINDS`
allowlist plus one admin channel"* to **per-connection filtering**: each subscriber carries its
`viewerLevel`; each frame is mapped kind→feature, gated on `enabled && meets(...)`, then passed
through `projectFeature` before write. `PUBLIC_KINDS` becomes the seed data for `KIND_FEATURE`
rather than a hardcoded gate. **This is the largest single change in Part A and where the security
boundary now lives.**
3. **Nav** — `GET /api/v1/public/shard/features` returns only the features the calling viewer can
see, so the SPA hides nav entries rather than rendering links that 403.
### 3.6.1 What the first implementation missed (found by the §11 smoke test, fixed)
Part A shipped enforcement on the SSE path and on `/guilds` + `/governors`, but the **remaining public
REST reads never called into it** — so the same event was projected live and served verbatim from
history. Recorded because each miss is a shape the next phase can repeat:
- **`/public/shard/feed` returned the stored payload as-is.** `actor.acct` / `actor.webId` were
readable *anonymously* for every logged kind (`player.death`, `mob.killed`, `skill.gain`,
`guild.join`, …) — broader than the §3.1 leak, which was limited to board holders.
- **`/public/shard/idoc` returned `ownerAcct`.** Rule 1 keyed on the exact strings `acct`/`webId`,
but `shapeHouse` flattens the actor into `ownerAcct` / `ownerName` / `ownerSerial`. The lock is now
on the field's **meaning** — a key that is or ends in `acct`/`webId`, case-insensitively — so
flattened spellings are covered and unwritten shapes fail closed.
- **The `houses` field rules were dead config.** Neither `getIdoc` nor `getHouses` projected, so the
panel offered toggles that did nothing. **Every feature's declared fields must name the keys the
read model actually emits**, not just the wire frame's.
- **`/feed` filtered on `PUBLIC_KINDS`**, a module-load constant derived from the compiled defaults,
so live audience changes never reached it. `visibleKinds(level, config)` resolves the readable set
from live config; it deliberately ignores the `stream` flag, which governs SSE fan-out only (market
history stays readable with its firehose off).
- **`shardEvents.db.list` treated an empty `kinds` array as "no filter"** and fell through to an
unfiltered `SELECT`. A fully-gated config would have dumped the whole event log, staff audit
included. An empty allowlist now serves nothing.
- **`projectValue` recursed into every object**, so a `Date` column came back as `{}`. It walks
arrays and plain objects only. The unit tests used JSON fixtures and could not have caught this —
the live read did, which is the argument for §11's smoke test over tests alone.
**The rule this leaves behind:** *a read path that returns shard data and does not call
`projectFeature` is a bug.* Every new surface in Parts B and C — `/ruleset`, `/points`, `/market`,
`/atlas` — must project, and must gate its kind set on live config rather than on `PUBLIC_KINDS`.
### 3.7 Admin surface
`GET` / `PUT /api/v1/admin/shard/visibility` (admin-only). Validate feature names against the known
set and rungs against the ladder; reject any attempt to set a locked field below `admin` — including
its flattened spellings (`ownerAcct`, `leaderWebId`), see §3.6.1. Writes an
`admin.audit`-style row so visibility changes are traceable. New client panel
`routes/admin/ShardVisibility.jsx` at `/admin/shard-visibility`, linked from `ShardAdmin.jsx`.
---
## 4. The version bump and the rollout
`PROTOCOL_VERSION` **2 → 3** in `link/sidecar/src/main.rs:27`. v3 is defined as *"adds
`world.ruleset`, `points.board`, `vendor.listing` / `vendor.listing.remove`"*.
A bump is an operator-visible hard cutover — `web.rs::gate` returns 409 on every protected route on
mismatch, `uoLinkSocket.js::handleHello` closes the WS, and the website's declared version is the
admin-set `uo_link_config.protocol` column — so it happens **exactly once**, at the end:
- Cut an **`edge`** branch from `main` in each of `website/`, `link/`, `servuo-plugins/`, `docs/`.
- Every phase PRs into `edge`, never `main`. Feature branches are cut from `edge`.
- Part A lands first, alone.
- When all parts are built and tested, one `edge` → `main` PR per repo, merged together. **That merge
is the v3 cutover.**
- A schema migration sets `uo_link_config.protocol` (the existing row **and** the column default)
from 2 to 3, so the cutover doesn't require a manual admin edit. `UOLINK_PROTOCOL` still overrides.
- No feature-negotiation array anywhere — v3 implies all three kinds.
---
## 5. Part B/1 — `world.ruleset` ✅ Done
*Landed on `edge`: servuo-plugins [#3](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/servuo-plugins/pulls/3), link [#17](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/link/pulls/17), website [#111](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/website/pulls/111), docs [#66](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/docs/pulls/66). Implementation notes worth keeping:*
- ***`shadowguard` is derived, not configured.*** `Shadowguard.cfg` carries only `ReadyDuration` and
`RandomizeInstances` — there is no `Enabled` key — so the systems block reports `Core.TOL`
(the expansion gate) instead. Same shape for `factions`: `Factions.cfg` has no `Enabled` either, and
`Services/Factions/Core/Faction.cs` sets `Settings.Enabled = !ViceVsVirtueSystem.Enabled`, so the
frame reads that static rather than inventing a key. **Where a system's on/off state is derived, read
the system's own static; only read `Config.Get` where the .cfg key IS the truth.**
- **`caps.skill` / `caps.totalSkill` are in tenths** (1000 = 100.0), the way ServUO stores them.
Documented in `INTEGRATION.md` and converted in the client, because the raw number is actively
misleading rather than merely unhelpful.
- **`Config.Get` re-parses when the cached type differs.** `InternalGet<T>` caches the parsed value on
the entry and re-parses if `entry.Object is T` fails, so reading `PlayerCaps.SkillCap` as an `int`
where ServUO reads it as a `double` is correct (both parse) — it just re-parses. Harmless, but worth
knowing before assuming a shared cache.
- **The plugin CAN be compile-verified**, contrary to "no standalone build": point Roslyn
(`dotnet sdk/*/Roslyn/bincore/csc.dll`, `/langversion:7.3`, net48 reference assemblies) at the whole
ServUO `Scripts` tree with `overlay/Scripts/Custom/Bridge/*.cs` substituted for the deployed copy,
excluding `Scripts/obj` and `Scripts/bin`. 6,205 files, ~40 s, and it catches every signature error
a boot would. Worth doing before every plugin PR.
`PROTOCOL_2.md` §10.4 sketches a `world.systems` capability frame that was never implemented
(`grep` returns nothing across all four repos). **`world.ruleset` subsumes it**, carrying a `systems`
sub-object with the `cityLoyalty` / `vvv` / `factions` booleans §10.4 asked for. §10.4 is marked
superseded; no orphan kind is left behind.
### 5.1 Plugin
NEW `servuo-plugins/overlay/Scripts/Custom/Bridge/BridgeRuleset.cs`, modelled on
`BridgeBoot.EmitHello` — **not** a sweep. Subscribes `BridgeLink.Connected_Core += Emit` so a sidecar
that comes up second still learns the ruleset.
Built from an **explicit allowlist** of `Server.Config.Get<T>` calls. **Never enumerate
`Config.Entries`** (`Server/Config.cs:162`) — it would sweep in secrets. An FNV-1a `rev` over the body
makes an unchanged reconnect a site-side no-op (`String.GetHashCode()` is not stable across runs and
must not be used).
`BridgeConfig.cs` + `overlay/Config/Bridge.cfg`: `RulesetEnabled=true`, `PublicConnectAddress=""`,
`RulesetIncludeSchedule=true`. `BridgeBoot.cs`: `reload` → re-emit, `status` → rev/bytes. Not wired
to `sweepnow`; it isn't a sweep.
### 5.2 Payload
Every block optional, omitted when its system is off:
`shard`, `expansion`, `connect` (only from `PublicConnectAddress`),
`systems{cityLoyalty,vvv,factions,siege,chat,store,dailyRares,honesty,shadowguard,treasureMaps,vetRewards,testCenter}`,
`caps{skill:1000,totalSkill:7000,stat:225,str/dex/int:125,strMax/dexMax/intMax:150}`,
`housing{accountHouseLimit:1}`, `accounts{perIp:3,charSlots:7,autoCreate}`,
`vetRewards{enabled,rewardIntervalDays:30}`,
`loot{feluccaLuckBonus:1000,feluccaBudgetBonus:100,feluccaMaxProps:11}`,
`vendors{restockDelayMinutes,maxSell,economyStockAmount}`,
`champions{powerScrolls:6,statScrolls:16,scrollChance,transcendenceChance,rankThresholds}`,
`treasureMaps`, `vvv{enabled,startSilver:2000,enhancedRules}`, `store{enabled,currencyName}`,
`schedule{autoSaveFrequencyMinutes,autoRestart*}`.
**Excluded by name — in a code comment and here:** `Server.cfg` (Address/Listen/Port; only
`PublicConnectAddress` is published), `Staff.cfg`, `Email.cfg`, `DataPath.cfg`, `Bridge.cfg`,
`Compiler.cfg`, `Reports.cfg`, `Client.cfg`.
### 5.3 Sidecar and website
Sidecar — `store.rs`: singleton `ruleset(id CHECK(id=1), rev, json, updated_t)` + upsert/get;
`main.rs`: new arm in the board-projection match; `web.rs`: `GET /ruleset` served from the store, so
it answers during a shard outage (`PROTOCOL_2.md` §12.2).
Website — `uoLinkClient.getRuleset()`; `uoLinkSocket.backfill()` (object-shaped, so follow the
`getPresence()` block's explicit form, not the array-only `snapshot()` helper); `shardIngest.js` →
`shardState.setRuleset`, **not** in `LOGGED_KINDS` (it re-arrives every reconnect and `server.hello`
already marks those); `KIND_FEATURE['world.ruleset'] = 'ruleset'`; `shard_ruleset` singleton table
(`rev`, `expansion`, `payload JSON`, `t`); `GET /public/shard/ruleset` behind
`requireFeature('ruleset')`, returning `null` ⇒ "not published yet".
Client — NEW `routes/public/Rules.jsx` at `/site/rules`, alongside
`/site/champs|guilds|governors|houses`; live via `useShardFeed({ filter: new Set(['world.ruleset']) })`.
### 5.4 Risk
Perf is nil (~3 KB per connect). The only real risk is publishing a secret, mitigated by the explicit
allowlist, the no-`Config.Entries` rule, the named exclusion list, and a manual eyeball of the emitted
frame during verification.
---
## 6. Part C — Spawn atlas / bestiary (website-only)
**No plugin, no sidecar, no `Bridge.cfg` knob, no new kinds.** Not part of the v3 wire change.
> **Status:** data pipeline landed on `edge` — website [#112](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/website/pulls/112)
> (parsers, build/import CLI, tables, artifact). API + client pages are the second website PR.
> Part C ships as **two** website PRs, not one: the parsing half is where the correctness risk
> lives, and burying it under routes and React would have meant reviewing it in a 10k-line diff.
> Full operator documentation: [`docs/website/SPAWN_ATLAS.md`](../website/SPAWN_ATLAS.md).
>
> **§6 below is the original design and is partly superseded.** §6.1 records two decisions that were
> rejected in review and replaced (the committed artifact, and the fixed facet list); §6.2 records
> the corrections the real ServUO data forced. Read both before trusting §6.
**Decision (revised at implementation time): the shard's ServUO tree is the single source of truth,
re-derived on every server boot.** The original plan here was a committed generated artifact plus an
idempotent import. That was rejected in review for two reasons, recorded in §6.1: a snapshot in the
repo goes stale as a shard's maps change, and the design leaned on a fixed facet list that no shard
is obliged to keep. Still not a browser-served blob; still parsed server-side only.
New in `website/server/`:
- `src/utils/spawnAtlasParse.js` — **pure functions, no fs**, so they are unit-testable in CI without
a ServUO tree: `parseObjects2()`, `parsePoints()`, `parseRegions()`, `parseLocations()`,
`resolveRegion()`.
- ~~`scripts/buildSpawnAtlas.js` and a committed `db/data/spawnAtlas.*.json` artifact~~ — dropped,
see §6.1 R1. Replaced by `src/utils/spawnAtlasSource.js` (the only thing that reads a ServUO tree,
shared by the boot path and the CLI) and a `scripts/importSpawnAtlas.js` that is a thin CLI over
the model. `package.json` gains `atlas:import` only.
- `src/model/shardAtlas/{shardAtlas.db.js,shardAtlas.model.js}` following the `shardState` split.
- `src/router/v1/public/atlas.{router,controller}.js`; `test/spawnAtlas.parse.test.js`.
Two parsing notes that matter:
- `<Objects2>` is `Type:MX=n:SB=…` segments joined by `:OBJ=` — verified against `trammel.xml`, where
a single point carries six types. Split on `:OBJ=`; the token before the first `:` is the type.
- **The high-value transform:** point-in-rect each spawn against the facet's `Regions.xml` rects
(highest `priority` wins), falling back to the nearest `Data/Locations` landmark, else
`"Wilderness"`. This is what turns *"lizardman at 5411,1234"* into ***"Despise, Felucca"*** and is
the entire reason the page is worth building. `Regions.xml` is genuinely nested and needs a ~120-line
recursive tokenizer **or** one devDependency (`fast-xml-parser`) — the server has zero XML deps
today, so that is an explicit call to make at implementation time. The flat `<Points>` files need
only regex/streaming; **do not** put 10.5 MB through a DOM parser.
Tables: `shard_spawn_creatures` (slug PK, name, total, facets JSON), `shard_spawn_points` (slug,
facet, x, y, region, landmark, max_count, tod_*), `shard_regions`, `shard_landmarks`,
`shard_champion_spawns`, `shard_atlas_meta`. Plain `INDEX` on name, **not `FULLTEXT`** — ~1,500
creature rows makes a `LIKE` scan free, and FULLTEXT brings min-token-length trouble for names like
"orc". No FKs, consistent with every existing `shard_*` table.
Routes at `/api/v1/public/atlas`, **not** under `/shard` — the atlas is static shard *content*, not
live shard *state*; it must not look sidecar-dependent, and unlike `/shard/*` it *should* be
`siteMode`-gated like `/posts` and `/wiki`. `GET /creatures?q=&facet=`, `/creatures/:slug`,
`/regions`, `/landmarks`, `/champions`, `/meta`, all behind `requireFeature('atlas')`. Admin:
`GET /admin/shard/atlas/status` (artifact-vs-DB drift) and `POST /admin/shard/atlas/import`. **Build
stays CLI-only.**
Client: `routes/public/Atlas.jsx` (`/site/atlas`) and `AtlasCreature.jsx` (`/site/atlas/:slug`).
**Payload risk** — *superseded by §6.1 R1; nothing is committed.* The field selection it describes
still applies at parse time: every `<Points>` field the site cannot use (`UniqueId`, all
trigger/refractory/proximity/sequential fields, sound ids) is dropped, keeping
Name/Map/X/Y/W/H/Range/MaxCount/MinDelay/MaxDelay/TOD*/types. Parsed data never reaches the browser;
the browser sees only paginated API responses.
**Operator re-run story** — *revised by §6.1 R1.* Spawns changed → restart, or
`npm run atlas:import` / `POST /admin/shard/atlas/import` to apply without one. `shard_atlas_meta`
holds a sha256 per source file, so the server can tell on boot whether anything changed, and
`GET /admin/shard/atlas/status` reports drift. If the change would remove a facet it is staged for
approval rather than applied (§6.1 R3). Full detail in `docs/website/SPAWN_ATLAS.md`.
### 6.1 What implementation changed
Two design decisions in §6 were rejected in review and replaced; the rest are corrections the real
ServUO data forced. Kept as a diff rather than edited in place, because each is a trap the next
person would otherwise re-enter.
**R1. The committed artifact is gone — the tree is re-parsed on every boot.** §6 proposed building a
generated artifact, committing it, and importing it. Two problems. A shard's maps change over its
life, so a snapshot in the repo silently drifts from the world players actually see; and the build/
import split existed only to work around the website container not having a tree, which is a
deployment question (mount it) rather than a reason to freeze data. The server now hashes the source
files on boot and re-derives the atlas when they differ. `scripts/buildSpawnAtlas.js`, the 1.41 MB
artifact, and the whole encode/decode seam it needed are deleted.
**R2. Nothing may name a facet.** The first implementation carried a lookup table of the six stock
UO facets to reconcile the spelling drift between sources. A shard may add facets, replace them
outright, or rename them when its maps are updated, and a built-in list mishandles all three
silently. Reconciliation is now by *matching* against the facet set discovered from the shard's own
spawn and region data — exact key, then prefix in either direction — with an unmatched name keeping
its own rather than being forced into a wrong bucket.
**R3. Two contracts on the boot path.** It never blocks startup: no path, an unreadable mount, a
malformed file or a database error is caught and logged, and the site comes up serving whatever
atlas it had. And a refresh that would REMOVE a facet is never applied automatically — facet loss
is indistinguishable at boot from a half-copied or mid-update tree, so it is staged in
`shard_atlas_pending` for an admin to approve or reject. Only the decision is stored (source hashes
+ the facet diff, a few KB); approving re-parses, so what lands matches the tree at approval time.
A rejection is remembered against those hashes so it does not re-prompt every restart.
### 6.2 What the build against real data changed
Six corrections to the design above, from running it against stock ServUO 57.4. Kept as a diff
rather than edited in place, because each one is a trap the next person would otherwise re-enter.
**1. Six facets, not thirteen.** The design said `spawnAtlas.<facet>.json ×13`, assuming one facet
per spawn file. There are 13 files but only **6** facets — `Eodon.xml`, `GravewaterLake.xml`,
`TreasuresOfKotl.xml` and the other named-area files carry TerMur/Trammel points. The facet comes
from each record's own `<Map>`, never the file name, and the artifact shards 6 ways.
**2. The XML dependency call: hand-rolled, zero deps.** §6 left `fast-xml-parser` vs a ~120-line
tokenizer open. Resolved as the tokenizer — a deliberate *subset* parser covering only what these
files use. The server keeps zero XML dependencies at any tier.
**3. Facet names disagree between sources — a silent failure.** `Data/Locations/*.xml` spells them
`Ter Mur` and `Tokuno Islands`; `<Map>` and `<Facet name>` say `TerMur` and `Tokuno`. Unreconciled,
the landmark bucket is keyed differently from the points looking it up, so the fallback never fires
and **every unregioned spawn in Ter Mur and Tokuno reads "Wilderness"** — a plausible-looking atlas
that is quietly wrong for two facets. All facet names now pass through `normalizeFacet()`.
**4. Spawn type tokens carry XmlSpawner directives.** `<Objects2>` types are not always bare class
names: `Fairy,{RND,4,8}`, `alchemist/z/-50`, `Agralem/Name/Agralem`, `greatape,true`. Taken literally
they invent creatures that do not exist *and* split real ones in two, since `Fairy` and
`Fairy,{RND,4,8}` slug apart. 71 of 845 entries were affected; stripping at the first `/` or `,`
leaves **800** real creatures. (The design's "~1,500 creature rows" estimate was high; 800 only
reinforces the plain-`INDEX`-not-`FULLTEXT` call.)
**5. The artifact would have been 1.41 MB, not "well under 1 MB" — and is now moot.** Dropping the
unused `<Points>` fields as the design directed still left 4.40 MB; three further encodings brought
it to 1.41 MB, and getting under 1 MB would have meant dropping the spawner `name`. The size budget
in §6 was simply optimistic for 6,455 points. Superseded by §6.1 R1: there is no artifact, so there
is no payload to budget and no encode/decode seam to keep in sync.
**6. `DELETE`, not `TRUNCATE`.** The design said "TRUNCATE + batched INSERT in one transaction",
which does not hold: `TRUNCATE` is DDL in MariaDB and implicitly commits, so a mid-import failure
would leave the atlas half-loaded. `DELETE` is transactional, and at ~7k rows the cost is
irrelevant. Point ids are also assigned explicitly rather than by `AUTO_INCREMENT`, because the
join rows need them and `conn.batch()` reports no usable `insertId`.
**Measured result:** 6,455 points, 800 creatures, 23,927 point/type rows, 387 regions, 558
landmarks, 25 champion altars. The placement transform resolves **83.2%** of points (3,689 by
region, 1,690 by landmark, 1,086 Wilderness).
**One thing the design got exactly right:** the point-in-rect transform really is the reason to
build this. "Where does a lizardman spawn?" answers *Shrines, Isamu-Jima, Yew* across three facets.
---
## 7. Part B/2 — `points.board`
Two deliverables: a diff sweep for the boards, and a `points` block folded into `char.profile` —
the `PROTOCOL_2.md` §10.3 `titles` precedent (read-model enrichment, no new request kind).
### 7.1 Plugin
NEW `BridgePoints.cs`, copying the `BridgeHousing.cs` diff-sweep shape (`Initialize` →
`ServerStarted`, `Connected_Core += OnConnected` clearing `_last` + `Rearm()`, `SweepOnce()`,
`Status()`, skip when `!BridgeLink.Connected`, try/catch throughout).
Which systems: default to `PointsSystem.Systems` filtered to `ShowOnLoyaltyGump == true` — reuse the
shard's own "this is player-facing" signal rather than inventing one. `Bridge.cfg PointsSystems=`
overrides. Null-guard `PointsSystem.Systems`; it is a mutable static populated by 25 separate
subsystem constructors.
**The perf trap.** `PlayerTable` is a plain `List<PointsEntry>`, and `QueensLoyalty` has `AutoAdd`, so
it can hold an entry for every `PlayerMobile` that ever existed. A naive
`.OrderByDescending().Take(N)` across 25 systems is 25 full sorts — at 20,000 historical characters,
~7.5 M comparisons, tens of ms on the Core thread. `BRIDGE_PLUGIN_PLAN.md` §1 found that nothing
except bulk profile generation comes close to a frame budget; this would be the second thing that
does.
**Mitigation — single-pass bounded selection** into a fixed N-element sorted array (N=10): O(n·N) with
tiny constants and one allocation. Skip `Player == null || Deleted` and `Points <= 0`. ~500 k cheap
iterations at a 300 s interval.
Diff signature per system: `concat(serial + ":" + (long)points)` over the top N, plus the entry count.
**No `points.remove`** — the system set is fixed, the same argument `city.update` already uses.
### 7.2 Payload — one frame per system
25 × ~600 B rather than one 12 KB frame, matching `champ.update` / `guild.update`:
```jsonc
{"t":…,"kind":"points.board","system":"QueensLoyalty",
"nameString":"Queen's Loyalty","nameNumber":1114938,
"maxPoints":30000,"showOnGump":true,"players":842,
"top":[{"rank":1,"serial":"0x1A2B","name":"Darrow","points":29500}, …]}
```
`nameString` **and** `nameNumber` are both emitted (a `TextDefinition` may be a cliloc), resolved
website-side — the contract `titles.reward` already documents at `BridgeProfile.cs:107-110`.
**Entries are written inline as `{serial, name}` — never via `BridgeJson.Actor`.** Deliberate even
though the website can now reveal fields by rung: `acct`/`webId` are not needed here, because the
website resolves serial→user from its own `shard_account_links` mirror for staff views. Keep the wire
minimal.
### 7.3 `char.profile` enrichment
`BridgeProfile.cs` gains `WritePoints(sb, m)` alongside `WriteTitles`:
`"points":[{system,nameString,points,maxPoints}]`, omitting systems with no entry or 0 points.
**Deliberately no `rank`** — computing it means scanning each system's `PlayerTable` once per profile
(25 × n), which would dominate the measured 0.069 ms/profile budget. The website derives rank from
the board when the character appears in the top N. Gate behind `PointsProfileRank=false` if it is
ever wanted.
### 7.4 Config, sidecar, website
`Bridge.cfg`: `PointsSweepSeconds=300`, `PointsLeaderboardEnabled=true`, `PointsTopN=10`,
`PointsSystems=` (blank ⇒ auto), `PointsProfileEnabled=true`, `PointsProfileRank=false`.
`BridgeBoot.cs`: `Rearm()` in `reload`, `SweepOnce()` in `sweepnow`, `Status()` in both.
Sidecar — `points_boards(system PK, name, json, updated_t)`; `main.rs` arm keyed on `system`;
`GET /points` and `GET /points/:system`.
Website — `shard_points_boards(system PK, name, name_cliloc, max_points, players, show_on_gump,
payload JSON, t)`. **The top-N list stays in `payload`** — a fixed-size list read whole, exactly like
`shard_governors.candidates`. Do not normalize into a `shard_points_entries` table until a
per-character reverse lookup is actually needed. `shardIngest.js` → `upsertPointsBoard`, **not** in
`LOGGED_KINDS` (board state, like `guild.update`). `KIND_FEATURE['points.board'] = 'leaderboards'`,
with `characterName` as its per-field rule. `GET /public/shard/points` and `/points/:system` behind
`requireFeature('leaderboards')`; validate `system` ≤ 48 chars.
**No new player route** — per-character points ride inside `char.profile`, already served by
`GET /player/shard/char/:serial` with its `shardLinks.ownsAccount` check.
Client — NEW `routes/public/Leaderboards.jsx` at `/site/leaderboards`; a "Loyalty & Points" section
added to `components/CharacterSheet.jsx`, one edit serving both `PlayerCharacter.jsx` and
`AdminCharacter.jsx`.
---
## 8. Part B/3 — `vendor.listing`
### 8.1 It cannot be an RPC, and this is load-bearing
`rpc.rs::try_route` correlates on the **first** frame carrying a matching `reqId` and resolves a
single `oneshot`. A chunked reply sharing one `reqId` would deliver chunk 1 to the HTTP caller and
**leak chunks 2..N onto the broadcast feed**. `REPLY_TIMEOUT` is 10 s (the client waits 12 s), so a
whole-world snapshot could not fit regardless.
⇒ **a per-vendor diff sweep on the broadcast stream**, like `champ.update` / `house.update`. The
existing per-account `vendor.snapshot` RPC is untouched; the player portal keeps using it.
Kinds: `vendor.listing` (one frame per vendor, authoritative for that vendor) and
`vendor.listing.remove`. Payload: `serial, shopName, owner:{serial,name}, map, x, y, region, house,
count, truncated, items:[{serial,itemId,hue,amount,price,name,cliloc,child}]`.
### 8.2 Two perf traps
Measured baseline (`BRIDGE_PLUGIN_PLAN.md` §1): 30 vendors / 1,200 listings = 0.343 ms via
`pack.Items` + `GetVendorItem`; extrapolated to 500 vendors / 40,000 listings ≈ 12 ms per full pass.
Except:
1. **`VendorSearch.GetItemName(Item)` is a packet builder, not a field read.** It constructs an
`ObjectPropertyList`, calls `GetProperties`, serialises, then byte-parses the packet
(`VendorSearch.cs:681-789`) — per item. Across 40,000 items in one tick that is a
multi-hundred-millisecond stall. **Mandatory: never call it in the sweep.** Emit `itemId`, `hue`,
`amount`, `price`, `item.Name` (the plain field, null for most) and `item.LabelNumber`, resolving
display names website-side — exactly what `char.profile.equipment` already does
(`BridgeProfile.cs:173`).
2. **`VendorSearch.GetItems(PlayerVendor)` is private** (`:791`). The reusable public API is
`GetItems(Container, List<Item>)` (`:807`), which recurses into sub-containers, so real item counts
run above the top-level `pack.Items` the 0.343 ms measurement used. Budget accordingly.
### 8.3 Mitigations
- **Amortized round-robin sweep** — `MarketSweepSeconds=60`, at most `MarketSweepBatch=25` vendors per
tick, with a persistent cursor over `PlayerVendor.PlayerVendors`. Full coverage in
`ceil(vendors/25) × 60 s`, with **per-tick cost bounded independent of world size**. This is the one
genuinely new pattern versus the existing sweeps and should be flagged in review.
- **Per-vendor signature diff** (`count | Σ(serial ^ price) | x | y | shopName`), as `BridgeHousing`
does — most vendors are static, so steady-state emission is near zero.
- **`MarketMaxListings=250`**, then `"truncated":true`. `BridgeJson.Parse` caps *inbound* at 1 MB;
outbound is uncapped and `shard.rs::read_line` will allocate whatever arrives.
- On `Connected_Core`, clear `_last` **and reset the cursor**; the re-emit is self-throttled by the
round-robin window.
### 8.4 Player opt-out and privacy
**Honour `pv.VendorSearch`** — ServUO's own per-vendor opt-out, which `DoSearch` filters on (`:62`).
Skip opted-out vendors entirely; the seen-set removal then drops them from the board, so **a player
who hid their vendor in game is hidden on the website too.** Also skip `Map == null || Map.Internal`
and `Backpack == null`, matching `DoSearch`.
A vendor's shop name, owner character name and location are **already globally visible in-game** — the
stock Vendor Search gump surfaces exactly this set to any player — which is why they default to
`anonymous`. They remain per-field configurable (`ownerName`, `location`) so an admin can tighten
them. Account name and website user id never go on the wire.
### 8.5 Sidecar and website
Sidecar — one table `vendors(serial PK, shop_name, owner_name, map, x, y, region, count, json,
updated_t)` storing the whole-vendor blob. **No `vendor_items` table** — the sidecar's job here is
outage resilience (`PROTOCOL_2.md` §12.2), not search; search lives in MariaDB. Endpoint is
**`GET /market`**, not `/vendors` — axum would route the latter fine, but the collision with the
per-account RPC is a readability trap.
Website — `shard_vendors` + `shard_vendor_items` (indexes on `vendor_serial`, `price`, `item_id`,
`display_name`; delete-then-insert per vendor in one transaction; no FKs). `shardIngest.js` handles
both kinds; **not** in `LOGGED_KINDS`.
`KIND_FEATURE['vendor.listing'] = 'market'`, but the market feature's **SSE mapping is disabled by
default**: a live firehose of full vendor inventories would be the site's single biggest bandwidth
consumer, and no page needs it live. The page is a paginated DB query with a staleness stamp; an
admin can turn the stream on. `uoLinkSocket` paginates `/market` on reconnect, bounded by
`MARKET_SNAPSHOT_MAX = 5000` vendors so a pathological world cannot hang startup.
`GET /public/shard/market?q=&minPrice=&maxPrice=&itemId=&map=&region=&sort=&limit=&offset=`
(limit 1..100, default 50; `q` ≤ 60 chars; `sort ∈ {price_asc, price_desc, recent}`) and
`/market/vendors/:serial`, behind `requireFeature('market')`. **Rate-limit it** — this is the first
genuinely expensive public endpoint; `express-rate-limit` is already a dependency.
### 8.6 The open dependency — cliloc names
`CharacterSheet.jsx:14-15` already documents the gap ("without a cliloc table on the site we can only
show literals") and renders equipment as `id {itemId}`. Search-by-name needs that table.
- **Recommended:** `scripts/buildClilocs.js` reads the UO client's `Cliloc.enu` → committed
`db/data/clilocs.json`; ingest denormalizes into `shard_vendor_items.display_name`. Same
build-artifact pattern as §6, and it **also fixes the character sheet**.
- **Fallback:** ship with item-art + price + region filters, and name search only over renamed items.
This decision is the reason §8 is sequenced last.
### 8.7 Client
`routes/public/Market.jsx` at `/site/market`, with a *"prices last refreshed N minutes ago"* banner
driven by `staleAt` (the oldest `shard_vendors.updated_at`). The round-robin sweep means data is
inherently up to one full cycle old, and the UI must say so.
---
## 9. Sequencing
| Order | Part | Repos touched | Wire change | State |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | **A** — visibility framework + actor-leak fix | website, docs | none | ✅ Done |
| 2 | **B/1** — `world.ruleset` (§5) | all four | new kind | ✅ Done |
| 3 | **C** — spawn atlas (§6) | website, docs | none | 🟡 Pipeline done, API/client next |
| 4 | **B/2** — `points.board` (§7) | all four | new kind + `char.profile` field | ⬜ |
| 5 | **B/3** — `vendor.listing` (§8) | all four | new kinds | ⬜ |
| 6 | **Cutover** — `PROTOCOL_VERSION` 2→3, `edge` → `main` | all four | the bump | ⬜ |
---
## 10. Documentation obligations
- This file (`link/v3.md`) is the canonical 3.0 design.
- `PROTOCOL_2.md` §10.4 gains a note that `world.systems` is superseded by `world.ruleset`, and that
the deferred VvV question is answered (`VvV.cfg Enabled=True`, Factions off).
- `INTEGRATION.md` — catalog entries and §6 consumer sections for each new kind, plus the v2→v3
upgrade note for operators.
- `PLAN.md` — phasing.
- `website/BACKEND_DESIGN.md` — every new table and route, and **the visibility framework as a
security contract**: the audience ladder, the two locked rules, and the fail-closed kind map belong
in the security section.
- NEW `website/SHARD_VISIBILITY.md` — admin-facing: what each feature exposes, what each rung means,
what cannot be loosened.
- NEW `website/SPAWN_ATLAS.md`, NEW `website/MARKETPLACE.md`.
- `PROJECT_TREE.md` in each touched repo.
- `npm run swagger` **and** `npm run routes:manifest` on every route-touching PR — both are committed
artifacts, and `test/routeManifest.test.js` fails on drift.
**Follow-up, not scoped for 3.0:** the Android app consumes the same public/player shard API and will
need `/public/shard/features` to hide its own nav. Track separately against `android-app/`.
---
## 11. Verification
**Plugin** — `servuo-plugins\deploy.ps1 -ServerPath <servuo> -Verify`, inspect the ADD/CHANGE list,
then re-run without `-Verify` (ServUO must be stopped). Boot with `tools/stub_sidecar.ps1` listening
and **confirm the compile banner in the console, not merely the absence of errors** —
`BRIDGE_PLUGIN_PLAN.md` §1 warns that a failing build is silently ignored and the previous
`Scripts.dll` reloads. Then `[bridge status`, `[bridge sweepnow`, `[bridge reload`.
- §5: eyeball the emitted `world.ruleset` frame for anything sourced from `Server.cfg`, `Staff.cfg`,
`Email.cfg`, `DataPath.cfg` or `Bridge.cfg`.
- §8: with a seeded world, time one sweep tick and confirm the batch cap holds it under ~1 ms.
**Sidecar** — `cargo build && cargo clippy`; `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>"
localhost:8080/ruleset` (and `/points`, `/market`); confirm `X-UOLink-Version: 3` and that a client
declaring 2 receives a 409.
**Website server** — `DB_HOST=127.0.0.1 DB_PORT=59999 node --test`. New tests, each modelled on an
existing sibling: `test/shardVisibility.test.js`, `test/shardBroadcast.visibility.test.js`,
`test/shardIngest.{ruleset,points,market}.test.js` (after `shardIngest.protocol2.test.js` — stubbed
deps, asserting routing and `logged` flags), `test/spawnAtlas.parse.test.js` (pure functions, inline
fixtures). Then `npm run routes:manifest` and `npm run swagger`, committing both.
**Full stack** — against a local MariaDB: apply `db/schema.sql` (idempotent), start the server,
confirm `uoLinkSocket` backfill logs the new snapshot lines and that `uo_link_config.protocol`
migrated to 3, then load `/site/rules`, `/site/atlas`, `/site/leaderboards`, `/site/market`.
**Visibility smoke test** — for each of the five rungs, walk every shard page and confirm gating and
field projection match the configured matrix. Same shape as the 200-routes × 5-access-levels sweep
already run for the domain split.
---
## 12. Critical files
| File | Why |
|---|---|
| `website/server/src/utils/shardBroadcast.js` | The security boundary; reworked from a static allowlist to per-connection audience filtering. **The highest-risk file in 3.0.** |
| `website/server/src/utils/shardVisibility.js` (new) | Ladder, kind→feature map, projection |
| `website/server/src/utils/shardIngest.js` | The dispatcher every new kind routes through |
| `website/server/src/model/shardState/shardState.model.js` | The `shape*` projections, including the `shapeGuild` leak §3.1 fixes |
| `servuo-plugins/overlay/Scripts/Custom/Bridge/BridgeHousing.cs` | Cleanest copy of the diff-sweep pattern; template for `BridgePoints.cs` and `BridgeMarket.cs` |
| `link/sidecar/src/main.rs` | `PROTOCOL_VERSION` 2→3 and the board-projection match |
| `website/server/db/schema.sql` | All new `shard_*` tables plus the `uo_link_config.protocol` migration |

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@@ -1,731 +0,0 @@
# Website API — router domain split + CSP hardening
Status: **domain split complete** — PR 0 (route manifest), CSP report-only and split PRs 1–5 have all
landed; only the CSP enforce PR remains, and it is blocked on soak data rather than on code ·
Target repo: `website/` · Docs owner: this file + `BACKEND_DESIGN.md`
> **This file replaces the earlier "API v2" plan** (auth merge → CSP → domain split, with a parallel
> `/api/v2` mount and an `/api/mobile` facade). Three of those four pieces are **not being built**:
> the auth merge and the mobile facade are deferred with their reasoning recorded below, and the
> parallel-version scaffold in [API_V2_SKELETON.md](./API_V2_SKELETON.md) is superseded. The filename
> is kept so existing links resolve. What remains is genuinely useful work:
>
> 1. **CSP hardening** — small, independent, ships on its own cadence.
> 2. **The domain split** — `admin.routes.js` (1552 lines, 110 routes) broken into one router file per
> business capability, **in place, with every URL unchanged**. This is the actual driver.
---
## Why the auth merge is out
The original plan replaced httpOnly session cookies with a bearer JWT + rotating refresh token for
every client, so web and mobile would share one session model. Reasons that no longer hold up:
1. **The current model is the more secure one.** httpOnly + SameSite cookies are unreadable from JS
and carry CSRF protection by default. Every migration target is a sideways or backwards move:
- Refresh token in `localStorage` → any XSS becomes **persistent full account takeover**, not a
bounded access-token window. A short access TTL does not help; the attacker mints new pairs.
- Refresh token in an httpOnly cookie scoped to the refresh endpoint → safe, but that is
*cookies with extra steps*. It concedes the premise.
2. **"One session model everywhere" is already true where it matters.** `auth/session.service.js`
unifies cookie and bearer into a single session, and `auth/token.js` already extracts from either
`Cookie` or `Authorization: Bearer`. That abstraction is written, working, and paid for. The merge
would move complexity *out* of `extractToken` and *into* the SPA.
3. **The cookie codepath survives the merge anyway.** The SSO / email-connect redirect flow must keep
its short-lived httpOnly tx / PKCE-verifier / pending-TOTP cookies — the browser leaves for the
IdP and returns with no JS context. So the merge never actually delivered "cookies are gone."
4. **It carried the plan's most bug-prone work as a dependency.** The admin SSE rewrite
(`EventSource` → hand-rolled `fetch` + `ReadableStream` + SSE frame parser + reconnect/backoff +
refresh-on-401) existed *only* to serve the bearer model. Without the merge, the admin stream stays
on `EventSource` with `withCredentials` and that code is never written.
5. **It is a contract change with no user-visible payoff**, competing for the same review attention as
the domain split, which is the thing that actually hurts today.
### Dropped with it
- v2 bearer auth routes (`/api/v2/auth/{login,refresh,logout,login/totp}`).
- Deletion of the `setAuthCookie` / `clearAuthCookie` path.
- `rg_trust` cookie → `X-Trust-Token` header migration for web (the header stays available for native
clients via `extractTrustToken`, unchanged).
- `api/client.js` bearer + silent-refresh rewrite.
- `lib/useShardFeed.js` admin-stream fetch rewrite. **The admin SSE stream stays as-is.**
### Kept from it
- **CSP hardening** — now its own phase (below). It was justified as a compensating control for a
JS-held token; it is worth doing regardless, just no longer urgent.
- **The public/admin SSE allowlist split** — unchanged security boundary, unrelated to session model.
- **The tx-cookie carve-out reasoning** — recorded here so a future merge attempt doesn't rediscover it.
---
## Deferred: the auth merge
Not cancelled — parked behind trigger conditions. Revisit if **any** of these become true:
| Trigger | Why it changes the answer |
|---|---|
| The API becomes genuinely cross-origin (separate API host) | `SameSite` cookies stop being the easy path; bearer becomes the natural model. |
| Third-party or OAuth clients are introduced | Cookies don't serve clients you don't control. |
| Mobile and web session behavior diverge enough to cause real bugs | The unification argument gets teeth it currently lacks. |
If it is ever revived, two specs the original plan lacked must be written **first**:
- **Refresh-token reuse detection.** Rotation is only useful with it: replay of an already-consumed
refresh must revoke the entire token family, not just fail the one request.
- **Rollback procedure.** Once web clients have discarded their cookies, a bad deploy locks everyone
out. Needs a documented path back.
---
## Why there is no `/api/v2`
The domain split reorganizes router *files*. It does not need to move a single URL — because the URL
surface is **already grouped by capability**. Inventory taken from the live Express stack — 196
`/api/v1` routes, plus three outside it (`GET /api/health`, `GET /api/docs.json`,
`GET /.well-known/assetlinks.json`) and 2 on the internal port. Full machine-readable list:
[`api-route-inventory.json`](./api-route-inventory.json).
| Group | Routes | Second segment → capability |
|---|---|---|
| `/admin` | 110 | `shard` 16 · `moderation` 15 · `users` 15 · `wiki` 14 · `posts` 9 · `pages` 7 · `account` 6 · `email` 6 · `uo-link` 5 · `auth` 4 · `invites` 3 · `bot-activity` 2 · `discord-bot` 2 · `settings` 2 · `activity` 1 · `dashboard` 1 · `site-mode` 1 · `uploads` 1 |
| `/auth` | 42 | `me` 23 · `mobile` 5 · `sso` 4 · `password` 3 · `invite` 2 · `login` 2 · `logout` 1 · `providers` 1 · `register` 1 |
| `/public` | 24 | `shard` 12 · `wiki` 4 · `pages` 2 · `posts` 2 · `contact` 1 · `settings` 1 · `status` 1 · `version` 1 |
| `/player` | 20 | `account` 8 · `shard` 8 · `appeals` 4 |
Every capability already owns a URL prefix, so each new router file mounts at the prefix it already
owns and the emitted paths are **byte-identical**. No URL change means no contract change, and no
contract change means no reason to mount a parallel version.
Consequences of doing it in place:
- No `/api/v2`, no dual mount, no route-by-route migration, no v1-usage telemetry project, and no
v1-retirement sequence.
- `BASE = /api/v1` in `client/src/api/client.js` never changes. The Discord bot's `SITE_PUBLIC_URL`
never changes. The Android app is untouched.
- [API_V2_SKELETON.md](./API_V2_SKELETON.md) (the `router/v2/` scaffold) is **superseded and not
scheduled**. It is kept as the concrete recipe if a real contract break ever forces a versioned API.
**Tripwire:** if any endpoint turns out to *need* a new URL, that is a contract change, not a
refactor. List it explicitly, and reopen the versioning question before writing the code — do not
smuggle a URL change into a "mechanical" PR.
---
## Deferred: the `/api/mobile` facade and the app-version floor
The earlier plan's Phase 0 stood up a version-agnostic `/api/mobile` namespace and migrated the
Android app onto it, plus an app-version header and a server-side min-version floor.
**Why it was proposed:** the app hardcodes **69** distinct `api/v1/…` paths (`data/api/*.kt`,
`core/net/ShardStreamClient.kt`, `core/net/HostSelectionInterceptor.kt`,
`core/auth/sso/SsoAuthManager.kt`), has no version negotiation and no force-update, and installs in
the wild cannot be forced forward. Under a parallel-`/api/v2` plan that made the app the load-bearing
coupling: v1 could not be retired until the fleet aged out.
**Why it is deferred:** with the split done in place, no URL moves and nothing is being deleted — so
there is no fleet to sunset and no coupling to break. A facade would add ~70 permanently maintained
delegate routes plus a contract-test suite to solve a problem that does not currently exist. The
version floor was scoped to sunsetting the pre-facade fleet, so it goes with it.
**If it is ever revived** (the trigger is the mobile contract genuinely needing to diverge from web —
different response shapes, a mobile-only aggregation endpoint, a real breaking change):
- **Start with the alias mount, not a delegate layer:** `apiRouter.use('/mobile', v1Router)` gives the
app a stable, version-agnostic namespace with identical wiring, identical middleware and zero
per-route maintenance. Build hand-written delegates only for the routes that actually diverge.
- **A facade is a security surface, not a convenience alias.** Any hand-written route must carry the
*same* middleware chain as the route it mirrors (`requireAuth`, `staffOnly`/`adminOnly`, validators,
the public/admin SSE allowlist split). A re-exposed admin route missing `adminOnly` is privilege
escalation.
- **It needs contract tests.** The moment the app pins a namespace, its response shapes are a
committed contract; an internal refactor that changes a shape must fail a test before it ships to
installed apps.
- **The mobile SSE stream stays anonymous** under whatever path it gets — the app sends no
`Authorization` header.
---
## Phase 1 — CSP hardening (independent)
Previously bundled with the auth merge as a compensating control for a JS-held token. With no token in
JS, this is **defense in depth on its own merits** — cheap, worth doing, blocking nothing. It has no
dependency on the domain split and can ship at any time.
**Sequencing fix from the original plan:** the old version both "ships with the auth merge" and called
for a one-release report-only soak. Those contradict. Correct order is **report-only first, observe one
release, then enforce** — now trivially satisfiable since nothing waits on it.
The app already ships a tuned policy (`server/src/app.js`). Two directives are load-bearing and are
**already correct** — the job is to keep them that way:
- `script-src 'self'` — no `'unsafe-inline'` / `'unsafe-eval'`. Primary defense.
- `connect-src 'self'` — the exfiltration channel. Don't widen it unless the API genuinely becomes
cross-origin (which would also reopen the auth-merge question — see the trigger table).
`style-src 'unsafe-inline'` stays — it permits inline styling, not script execution, and React's
pervasive `style={{…}}` attributes can't be nonce'd. Not a meaningful hole. The `/api/docs` route keeps
its deliberately looser policy (swagger-ui injects an inline bootstrap script); that carve-out is
scoped to the one route and stays scoped.
Target enforced policy:
```
default-src 'self';
script-src 'self';
connect-src 'self';
img-src 'self' data: https:;
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; /* + fonts.googleapis.com only until fonts are self-hosted */
font-src 'self'; /* + fonts.gstatic.com only until fonts are self-hosted */
object-src 'none';
base-uri 'self';
form-action 'self';
frame-ancestors 'none';
```
Delta vs. the policy in `server/src/app.js` today. This was written as two directives; on
implementation it turned out to be **one**:
- ~~**Add `form-action 'self'`** (currently absent)~~ — **it was not absent.** The directives object in
`app.js` does not list it, but the middleware is configured `useDefaults: true`, and helmet's default
set already supplies `form-action 'self'` — so the header served in production has carried it all
along. Verified by capturing the live `Content-Security-Policy` header from the running app rather
than reading the config, which is how the plan got this wrong. **No behavioural change here.** It is
now written out explicitly in `config/csp.js` anyway: a security directive should not depend on a
third-party library's defaults surviving its next major version.
- **Tighten `frame-ancestors`** `'self'` → `'none'` — nothing legitimately frames the site. **This is
the entire behavioural delta of the phase.**
- Unchanged: `default-src`, `script-src`, `connect-src`, `object-src 'none'`, `base-uri 'self'`, and
`img-src … https:` (external `BRAND_*` logo/hero and `<img>` in sanitized wiki/news bodies rely on
`https:`).
The soak is still worth running for that one directive, and arguably it is the directive that most
needs one: a `frame-ancestors` report is generated by the browser of *whoever framed the site*, so it
is the only way to discover that something legitimately embeds us before the enforcing policy breaks
it. Nothing else can tell us that.
**Rollout:** ship via `Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only` with `report-to` for one release, watch for
violations, then flip to enforce.
Before trusting `script-src 'self'`: Vite's build injects an inline modulepreload-polyfill `<script>`
into `dist/index.html`, which that directive blocks (harmless, but throws a violation).
**Already handled** — `client/vite.config.js` sets `modulePreload: { polyfill: false }`, so the build
emits no inline bootstrap script. (The `renderIndexHtml` branding injection adds only `<meta>`/`<link>`
tags — no inline script, no nonce needed.)
### Where reports go
`report-to` needs somewhere to point, so the report-only PR stands up a same-origin sink:
**`POST /api/csp-report`** (`server/src/router/cspReport.controller.js`, wired in `app.js`). Same-origin
on purpose — violation reports describe attacks against this site and are not handed to a third-party
collector. It writes to the `csp` log tag and stores nothing.
It is mounted outside `/api/v1`, alongside `/api/health`: the browser learns the path from the policy
header, never from a client build, so it is not part of the versioned client contract. This is the
`+1` in the route manifest that made PR 0 go first (see § Sequencing).
Necessary properties, since it is an unauthenticated public `POST` (browsers send reports with no
session, and gating it would silence exactly the anonymous visitors worth hearing about):
- **Both wire formats.** `report-uri` (Firefox, Safari) sends `application/csp-report` with a single
hyphenated-key object; `report-to` (Chrome) sends `application/reports+json` with an array of
camelCase envelopes. Handling one silently drops half the browsers. Both directives are emitted, and
`report-to` additionally needs a `Reporting-Endpoints` response header or it is inert.
- **Always 204, even for junk.** A 4xx would make the global error handler write an ERROR line quoting
the attacker-supplied body — turning an open endpoint into a log-flood primitive. A browser cannot
act on an error from a report sink anyway.
- **Bounded everywhere:** 16 KB body cap, a per-IP rate limit, a fixed field allowlist, and every
logged field truncated (`script-sample` is attacker-influenced and can carry a whole inline script).
**Retiring it:** the sink exists for the soak. When the tightened policy flips to enforced and the
report-only twin is deleted, this endpoint goes with it — *unless* a `report-to` group is deliberately
kept on the enforced policy, which is a reasonable thing to want. Decide that in the enforce PR rather
than leaving an orphan route behind.
Tracked follow-ups (own PRs):
- **Self-host the Cinzel font** → drop `fonts.googleapis.com` from `style-src` and `fonts.gstatic.com`
from `font-src`, removing two third-party origins from the trust surface.
- **Trusted Types** — `require-trusted-types-for 'script'` + a `trusted-types` policy, report-only
first. Audit `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` + the `sanitizeHtml` render path first.
---
## Phase 2 — The domain split
**This is the reason the plan exists.** Everything else is supporting work.
**Rule:** one router file = one business capability; the URL names the domain; related endpoints live
together regardless of HTTP method; no generic `admin.routes.js` catch-all. Controllers are **already**
domain-split — this re-wires routes, not logic.
**Invariant:** each capability router mounts at the prefix it already owns, so the emitted URL set does
not change. Proved per PR by the route manifest (§ PR 0).
Target tree — derived from the inventory above, **inside `router/v1/`** (no `v2/` directory):
```
router/v1/
admin/
index.js # mounts the capability routers below under /admin, keeps the
# shared `noindex, isLoggedIn, staffOnly` gate in one place
users.router.js account.router.js invites.router.js
authProviders.router.js moderation.router.js botActivity.router.js
posts.router.js pages.router.js wiki.router.js
uploads.router.js shard.router.js uoLink.router.js
email.router.js discordBot.router.js settings.router.js
activity.router.js # the staff audit log — landed in PR 2, not with dashboard
dashboard.router.js # + the /site-mode singleton
auth/
login.router.js register.router.js password.router.js invite.router.js
sso.router.js mobile.router.js me.routes.js (already split, 23 routes)
public/
news.router.js (posts) pages.router.js wiki.router.js shard.router.js
site.router.js # status, settings, version, contact
player/
account.router.js shard.router.js appeals.router.js
internal/ (unchanged — stays on the unpublished port, never mounted publicly)
```
Steps:
1. **Land PR 0 (route manifest) first** — the mechanical proof that later PRs move no URL.
2. Carve `admin.routes.js` into the per-capability files above, each requiring its already-existing
controller. `admin/index.js` keeps the shared gate (`noindex, isLoggedIn, staffOnly`) and mounts
each capability router at its existing prefix; the `adminOnly` / `modAccess` gates move with the
routes that use them.
3. Split `public.routes.js`, `player.routes.js`, and the remaining `auth.routes.js` groups the same
way. `auth/me.routes.js` is already a separate file and stays.
4. Keep `/internal` off the public listener exactly as today (separate `internalApp.js` port).
5. Move each route's `#swagger.*` annotations **with** the route, then regenerate
(`cd website/server && npm run swagger`).
6. Update `BACKEND_DESIGN.md` §2 (folder structure) and §4 (API contract — it names
`admin.routes.js → admin.controller.js` and friends) as routers move, plus `PROJECT_TREE.md`.
Because the auth model is untouched and the URLs are frozen, each PR is a **pure mechanical refactor
with a green test suite and a zero-diff route manifest as its acceptance criteria** — which is what
makes grouped PRs actually reviewable.
> **Step 6 correction:** `PROJECT_TREE.md` is no longer hand-edited. Since website#98 it is
> auto-generated by the `sync-project-tree` CI workflow, which opens its own docs PR after a merge to
> `main`. Leave it alone in split PRs. `BACKEND_DESIGN.md` §2/§4 are still manual.
### PR 1 — as landed
`admin/index.js` owns the shared `noindex, isLoggedIn, staffOnly` gate and the mount table, and
declares no routes itself. The gate sits **ahead of every mount**, so a capability router extracted in
a later PR cannot silently ship without it. Route counts:
| Router | Routes | Prefix | Extra gate |
|---|---|---|---|
| `account.router.js` | 6 | `/admin/account` | none — self-service, an editor manages their own 2FA |
| `users.router.js` | 15 | `/admin/users` | `adminOnly` at router level |
| `invites.router.js` | 3 | `/admin/invites` | `adminOnly` per route |
| `authProviders.router.js` | 4 | `/admin/auth` (routes are `/providers[/:id]`) | `adminOnly` per route |
| `admin.routes.js` (residual) | 82 | group root, mounted last | unchanged |
6 + 15 + 3 + 4 + 82 = the 110 inventoried admin routes. None of the four prefixes appears in the
residual file, so nothing depends on mount ordering.
Three findings worth carrying into PRs 2–5:
- **The self-service `/shard/*` routes stay with `shard` (PR 4), despite their `Admin · Account`
swagger tag.** The invariant is *prefix ownership*, not tag agreement: one router owns `/shard`, so
splitting six routes off it by capability would mean two routers mounting under the same prefix and
an ordering hazard for no gain. Retag them in PR 4 if the tag still grates.
- **`usersRouter.use(adminOnly)` is exactly equivalent to the old `adminRouter.use('/users', adminOnly)`**
now that the router is mounted at `/users` — but only because it is mounted at a prefix. Under a
*pathless* mount, a bare `use(gate)` would run for every request passing through en route to a later
mount, 403-ing an editor on `/admin/posts`. Do not "simplify" a prefix mount away.
- **`routes.guards.json` came back zero-diff too**, not just the manifest — no route lost or gained a
gate. Worth checking both every time; the guards file is the one that would catch a dropped
`adminOnly` that the method+path freeze cannot see.
The OpenAPI spec was also byte-for-byte unchanged, which required a prerequisite fix — see below.
### PR 2 — as landed
`moderation`, `bot-activity` and `activity` — 18 routes, leaving 64 in the residual file.
| Router | Routes | Prefix | Extra gate |
|---|---|---|---|
| `moderation.router.js` | 15 | `/admin/moderation` | `modAccess` (admin + moderator) at router level |
| `botActivity.router.js` | 2 | `/admin/bot-activity` | `adminOnly` per route |
| `activity.router.js` | 1 | `/admin/activity` | none — staff-wide audit log |
| `admin.routes.js` (residual) | 64 | group root, mounted last | unchanged |
All four gates came back zero-diff: `routes.manifest.json` (200 public + 2 internal),
`routes.guards.json`, `swagger-output.json` (198 operations), and `docs/website/api-route-inventory.json`
was already in sync. 434 server tests green.
Notes:
- **`/activity` gets its own file, deviating from the target tree above**, which parked it as a
singleton inside `dashboard.router.js`. It is folded into PR 2 by the sequencing list, and PR 4 is
where `dashboard` lands — so honouring the tree would have meant leaving one route in the residual
file for two PRs to satisfy a filename. It is also a genuinely separate capability: `/activity` is
the **staff audit log** (`activity.model.js`), while `/dashboard` is a stats overview and
`/bot-activity` is the botScore middleware's in-memory ban state. Three different things that read
alike. **PR 4 mounts `dashboard` and `site-mode` only.**
- **`modAccess` moved to a router-level `use`; `adminOnly` on bot-activity deliberately did not.**
Moderation was already gated by a *prefix* mount (`adminRouter.use('/moderation', modAccess)`), so
`moderationRouter.use(modAccess)` is the exact equivalent (the PR 1 `users` case). Bot-activity's
gate was per-route, and keeping it per-route is what holds the per-route handler count — the one
number in `routes.guards.json` that would catch a dropped `adminOnly`, since `requireRole(...)`
returns an anonymous arrow and never shows up by name. **Rule for PRs 3–5: move a gate to router
level only where it was already a prefix mount; otherwise leave it on the route.**
- **`modAccess` stays in the residual file** — the `/shard/*` in-game staff operations still use it
and do not move until PR 4. Its comment there was retargeted rather than deleted.
### PR 3 — as landed
`posts`, `uploads`, `wiki` and `pages` — 31 routes, leaving 33 in the residual file. The content tier,
and the first split PR where no gate moved at all: all four capabilities are editor-tier, so the shared
`staffOnly` in `admin/index.js` is their whole gate.
| Router | Routes | Prefix | Extra gate |
|---|---|---|---|
| `posts.router.js` | 9 | `/admin/posts` | none — editor tier |
| `uploads.router.js` | 1 | `/admin/uploads` | none — editor tier |
| `wiki.router.js` | 14 | `/admin/wiki` | none — editor tier |
| `pages.router.js` | 7 | `/admin/pages` | none — editor tier |
| `admin.routes.js` (residual) | 33 | group root, mounted last | unchanged |
All four gates zero-diff: `routes.manifest.json` (200 public + 2 internal), `routes.guards.json`,
`swagger-output.json` (198 operations), and `docs/website/api-route-inventory.json` was already in
sync. 434 server tests green.
Notes:
- **The residual 33 is exactly PR 4's list** — `shard` 16, `email` 6, `uo-link` 5, `settings` 2,
`discord-bot` 2, `dashboard` 1, `site-mode` 1. So `admin.routes.js` is deleted by PR 4, one PR
earlier than the sequencing list implies, and PR 5 touches only `public/*`, `player/*` and `auth/*`.
- **A shared module was unavoidable here, and it is the first one in the split.** The multer config
(upload dir, mimetype→extension allowlist, 8 MB cap) was defined inline in `admin.routes.js` and used
by *two* routes that this PR puts in different files: `POST /posts/upload` (→ `{image_url}`) and
`POST /uploads` (→ `{url}`). It moved to `admin/imageUpload.js` rather than being duplicated —
duplicating a security allowlist is how the two copies drift. It stays in `admin/` deliberately:
`UPLOAD_DIR` is resolved `__dirname`-relative, so relocating the file would silently repoint the
upload directory. Guard freshness is unaffected — multer's middleware is named `multerMiddleware`
wherever it is constructed, so `routes.guards.json` did not move.
- **`POST /uploads` keeps its `Admin · Posts` swagger tag**, which now disagrees with its filename. The
acceptance criterion is a byte-identical spec, so retagging is a real OpenAPI diff and does not
belong in a route-move PR. Same call as PR 1's `/shard/*` tag mismatch: fix tags in a PR that is
*about* tags.
- **The wiki router is the first one with load-bearing intra-file route order.** `/categories` and
`/tags` are literal paths that must stay ahead of `/:slug`, or `GET /admin/wiki/categories` gets
dispatched as a page whose slug is "categories". **The manifest cannot catch this — it sorts its
entries, so a reordering is invisible in all three gates.** It was verified separately by
introspecting the built router stack and asserting the last literal layer precedes the first `/:slug`
layer. Any future PR moving `/:slug`-style routes needs the same explicit check.
- **`/admin/pages` (CMS page builder) and `/admin/shard/pages` (in-game help-page queue) are unrelated
capabilities that read alike** — the latter stays with `shard` in PR 4. Same trap as PR 2's
`activity` / `dashboard` / `bot-activity` trio.
### PR 4 — as landed
`shard`, `uo-link`, `email`, `discord-bot`, `settings` and `dashboard`/`site-mode` — the whole residual
33. **`admin.routes.js` is deleted**, so the admin group is fully split and every one of its 110 routes
is declared in a capability router.
| Router | Routes | Prefix | Extra gate |
|---|---|---|---|
| `shard.router.js` | 16 | `/admin/shard` | none on the 7 self-service routes; `modAccess` per route on the 9 staff ops |
| `uoLink.router.js` | 5 | `/admin/uo-link` | `adminOnly` per route |
| `email.router.js` | 6 | `/admin/email` | `adminOnly` per route |
| `discordBot.router.js` | 2 | `/admin/discord-bot` | `adminOnly` per route |
| `settings.router.js` | 2 | `/admin/settings` | `adminOnly` per route |
| `dashboard.router.js` | 2 | **group root** (`/dashboard`, `/site-mode`) | `adminOnly` per route on `/site-mode` only |
| ~~`admin.routes.js`~~ | — | deleted | — |
16 + 5 + 6 + 2 + 2 + 2 = 33. All four gates zero-diff: `routes.manifest.json` (200 public + 2
internal), `routes.guards.json`, `swagger-output.json` (198 operations), and
`docs/website/api-route-inventory.json` was already in sync. 434 server tests green.
Notes:
- **`dashboard.router.js` is mounted at the group root, not a prefix — the one relaxation of the
"always mount at a prefix" rule, and it is deliberate.** `GET /dashboard` and `PUT /site-mode` own no
common path segment, so a prefix mount would mean two one-route files instead of the single file the
target tree calls for. It is safe **only** because the file declares no router-level middleware: a
bare `use(gate)` in a root-mounted router runs for every request passing through toward another
mount and would 403 an editor on an unrelated route (the PR 1 finding). The file says so in a
comment, because the next person to add a gate there is the one who needs to know.
- **`/shard` is the first prefix where two tiers share one router**, and it is why prefix ownership
beats swagger-tag grouping. The 7 self-service routes (`link`, `accounts`, `roster/:account`,
`vendors/:account`, `char/:serial`, `sales`, `POST account`) are tagged `Admin · Account`, run with
no gate beyond the shared `staffOnly`, and are served by the very same `player/shard.controller`
handlers as `/player/shard` — staff are a superset of players, and the controller keys off
`req.user.id`. The 9 in-game ops are tagged `Admin · Shard` and carry `modAccess`. Splitting them by
tag would put two routers under one prefix for no gain; instead one router owns `/shard` and gates
per route. The tag mismatch stays, on the PR 1 and PR 3 precedent: retagging is a real spec diff and
belongs in a PR that is about tags.
- **No gate moved to router level anywhere in this PR.** Every `adminOnly` in the residual file was
per-route, and `modAccess` on `/shard` must stay per-route because half that router must *not* have
it. This keeps the per-route handler count intact — the one number `routes.guards.json` can actually
check, since `requireRole(...)` returns an anonymous arrow.
- **The `/:param` shadowing check was run again and is clean**, since the manifest sorts and therefore
cannot see declaration order. Introspecting the built stack, all 110 admin routes and all 59 literal
admin paths dispatch to their own layer — nothing is captured first by a `:param` sibling. The
near-misses worth naming: `GET /shard/pages` (help-page queue) sits alongside
`POST /shard/pages/:id/respond|close`, and `POST /shard/towncrier` alongside
`DELETE /uo-link/towncrier/:id` — different depths and methods, so neither collides.
- **Deleting the file left dangling `see admin.routes.js` pointers**, which were repointed in the same
PR: `botActivity.controller.js` → `botActivity.router.js`, `moderation.controller.js` →
`moderation.router.js`, `announceJobs.logic.js`'s town-crier cap mirror → `admin/uoLink.router.js`,
and the "route paths sit on the line *after* `adminRouter.get(`" rationale in
`scripts/routeManifest.js`, `README.md` and `pr-checks.yml` was generalized (it was never about that
one file).
- **`/admin/shard/pages` vs `/admin/pages` stayed separate**, as PR 3 flagged: the former is the
in-game help-page (support) queue and belongs to `shard`; the latter is the CMS page builder.
### PR 5 — as landed
`public`, `player` and the residual `auth` — 54 routes across three groups, the last split PR.
`public.routes.js`, `player.routes.js` and `auth.routes.js` are all **deleted**, so every one of the
200 routes in the manifest is now declared in a capability router and no monolithic route file
remains anywhere in `router/v1/`.
| Group | Router | Routes | Prefix | Extra gate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `public` | `posts.router.js` | 2 | `/public/posts` | none — `siteMode` per route |
| | `wiki.router.js` | 4 | `/public/wiki` | none — `siteMode` per route |
| | `pages.router.js` | 2 | `/public/pages` | none — `siteMode` per route except the preview |
| | `shard.router.js` | 12 | `/public/shard` | none — never `siteMode` gated |
| | `site.router.js` | 4 | **group root** (`/settings`, `/status`, `/version`, `/contact`) | none |
| `player` | `account.router.js` | 8 | `/player/account` | none beyond the group gate |
| | `shard.router.js` | 8 | `/player/shard` | none beyond the group gate |
| | `appeals.router.js` | 4 | `/player/appeals` | none beyond the group gate |
| `auth` | `login.router.js` | 2 | `/auth/login` | `loginGuards` per route |
| | `register.router.js` | 1 | `/auth/register` | `loginGuards` + `registerLimiter` |
| | `invite.router.js` | 2 | `/auth/invite` | `loginGuards` + `registerLimiter` on accept |
| | `password.router.js` | 3 | `/auth/password` | per-route reset limiters |
| | `session.router.js` | 2 | **group root** (`/logout`, `/me`) | per route |
24 + 20 + 10 = 54. `auth/`'s other 32 routes (`me` 23, `mobile` 5, `sso` 4) were already in their own
files and did not move. All four gates zero-diff: `routes.manifest.json` (200 public + 2 internal),
`routes.guards.json`, `swagger-output.json` (198 operations), and `docs/website/api-route-inventory.json`
was already in sync. 434 server tests green.
Notes:
- **Each group is now a directory with an `index.js`**, matching `admin/`: `public/index.js`,
`player/index.js`, `auth/index.js` own the group gate (where there is one) and the mount table and
declare no routes. `v1.router.js` requires the directories. The four tests that imported the
deleted entry files were repointed.
- **Two of the three groups have no group gate, and that is the security-relevant fact about them.**
`player/index.js` carries `noindex, requireAuth` — authenticated, *any* role, because staff are a
superset of players. `public/index.js` and `auth/index.js` carry **nothing**, deliberately: the
public surface is anonymous by contract (logged-out SPA, Discord bot, and the Android
`ShardStreamClient` on `/public/shard/stream`, none of which send credentials), and `/auth` is where
an anonymous caller *becomes* authenticated. Both index files say so, because the obvious "hardening"
edit to either one is an outage.
- **`GET /auth/me` has a mount-order dependency, and it is the one genuinely non-obvious thing in this
PR.** `authRouter.use('/me', meRouter)` matches the bare path `/me`, not just `/me/*` — so a request
to `GET /auth/me` runs `meRouter`'s (and `notifRouter`'s) `noindex, requireAuth`, matches no route
inside either, and falls through to its own handler. `session.router.js` must therefore stay mounted
**last**. Verified by the counterfactual rather than by reading the mount table: moving the mount to
the top of `auth/index.js` still answers `401`, but the response loses its `X-Robots-Tag` header. No
gate file and neither manifest can see that — only a header assertion can.
- **Two root-mounted routers, on the PR 4 `dashboard.router.js` precedent.** `public/site.router.js`
(`/settings`, `/status`, `/version`, `/contact`) and `auth/session.router.js` (`/logout`, `/me`) hold
the routes that own no path segment. Both are safe at the root **only** because they declare no
router-level middleware — a bare `use(gate)` there runs for every request passing through toward
another mount. Both files say so.
- **`loginGuards` is the PR's one shared module**, the counterpart to PR 3's `imageUpload.js`. The
`[backoffGuard, slowLogin, loginLimiter]` array was defined inline in `auth.routes.js` and spread by
four routes that this PR puts in three different files — plus a fifth, already-duplicated copy in
`sso.routes.js`. It moved to `auth/loginGuards.js` and `sso.routes.js` now imports it too, so there
is one definition rather than five: duplicating a throttling stack is how the copies drift, and the
copy that drifts is the one that stops throttling. It is exported `Object.freeze`d — it is
module-level shared state, and a router that pushed onto it would silently add middleware to every
other login surface. Guard freshness is unaffected: the same three named functions, so
`routes.guards.json` did not move.
- **The `/:param` shadowing check was run again and is clean.** All 86 public/player/auth routes and
all 64 literal paths among them dispatch to their own layer. This was checked in *dispatch* order
against the built stack, since the manifest sorts and therefore cannot see declaration order. The
only ordering-sensitive pair is `GET /public/wiki/{categories,tags}` ahead of `/public/wiki/:slug` —
the public twin of the `admin/wiki.router.js` trap PR 3 found, and `wiki.router.js` says so. The
`/public/pages` preview route also stays ahead of `/:slug`, though at a different depth.
- **Filename deviations from the target tree, both for prefix agreement.** The tree named the public
posts router `news.router.js`; it is `posts.router.js`, matching the `/posts` prefix it owns and its
`admin/posts.router.js` sibling. The tree also implied `sso.router.js` / `mobile.router.js`; those
files already exist as `sso.routes.js` / `mobile.routes.js` and were not renamed — they did not move
in this PR, and churning their names would add diff noise to a PR whose value is being reviewable.
- **`auth/session.router.js` is a deviation the target tree did not anticipate**, the same shape as
PR 2's `activity.router.js`. The tree listed `login.router.js` but had nowhere to put `/logout` and
`GET /me`, which own no prefix. Folding them into `login.router.js` would have forced *that* router
to the group root and given up prefix ownership for the four login routes; a separate root-mounted
singleton file keeps `/login` a real prefix mount.
- **Tag mismatches were left alone again**, on the PR 1 / PR 3 / PR 4 precedent: the acceptance
criterion is a byte-identical spec, so retagging belongs in a PR that is about tags.
- **`public.controller.js` was not split.** Unlike the admin controllers, it is still one file serving
settings/status/version/contact *and* posts/wiki/pages. The plan's rule is that these PRs re-wire
routes, not logic — splitting a controller is a separate change with a separate risk profile, and
bundling it would have cost this PR its "pure mechanical refactor" acceptance criteria.
### The swagger path-normalization prerequisite (landed before PR 1)
swagger-autogen builds a path by string-concatenating the mount prefix with the route argument, so a
capability router mounted at `/users` whose collection route is `router.get('/')` documents as
`/api/v1/admin/users/` — advertising a URL no client calls while dropping the one the SPA, the Android
app and the Discord bot all do. Express is indifferent; the published spec is not. It also emits path
keys in *router-traversal order*, so moving a route between files rewrote most of the ~5k-line
committed artifact even when the API was provably unchanged — burying the one line a reviewer needs.
Both are fixed once in `server/swagger/swagger.js`, which post-processes the generator's output to
strip trailing slashes and sort path keys (throwing on a collision rather than silently dropping an
operation). It shipped as its own PR ahead of PR 1, verified inert by the regenerated spec being
byte-for-byte the sorted form of the previously committed one — 198 operations, none added or removed.
`#swagger.path` was rejected as the fix: it bypasses the mount prefix, so every route would hardcode
its absolute path in a comment that silently lies the moment a mount moves.
**Consequence for PRs 2–5: the swagger diff is now a signal.** With sorting in place, a pure route
move produces *no* spec diff at all, so any diff there means an annotation actually changed. Treat
`swagger-output.json`, `routes.manifest.json` and `routes.guards.json` as three zero-diff gates.
### PR 0 — the route manifest (prerequisite of the first split PR) — **landed**
> **Status: shipped.** `server/scripts/routeManifest.js` + `npm run routes:manifest`,
> `server/routes.manifest.json` (199 public + 2 internal), `server/routes.guards.json`,
> `server/test/routeManifest.test.js`, and a `routes:manifest -- --check` step in
> `.gitea/workflows/pr-checks.yml`. No router file moved. **The generator reproduced
> `api-route-inventory.json` byte-for-byte on first run**, so the freeze is in effect and the
> committed baseline is confirmed accurate rather than merely asserted.
>
> Two deviations from the design below, both deliberate:
>
> - **The unauthenticated-status snapshot was tried and dropped**, exactly as this section allowed.
> Firing unauthenticated GETs at every manifest path against the dead-port mariadb pool the tests
> use does not fail fast — the pool sits on its acquire timeout, and a partial sweep had not
> finished after two minutes. A flaky two-minute gate is worse than none. What replaced it is
> cheap and deterministic: the test suite asserts from the introspected stack that every
> `/api/v1/admin/**` and `/api/v1/player/**` route still carries `requireAuth`.
> - **`routes.guards.json` is committed and staleness-checked**, though a diff in it is explicitly
> *not* a contract change. Left ungenerated it would rot into a misleading review aid within a
> release. The gate is on freshness; the meaning of a guards diff is still "read this", not
> "justify this". The generator drops app-level plumbing (helmet, morgan, the JSON parser, the bot
> guard) since it applies uniformly to all 199 routes and would bury the per-route gates.
"Every URL is unchanged" must be *proved by a diff*, not asserted in review. PR 0 lands the tool that
proves it, with no router file moved.
- **Generator:** `server/scripts/routeManifest.js`, wired as `npm run routes:manifest`. It requires
`src/app.js` (which exports the app and neither listens nor connects to the DB — `server.js` owns
those), walks `app._router.stack` recursively through mounted routers, reconstructs each full path
from the layer regexps, and writes a **sorted** array of
`{ "method": "GET", "path": "/api/v1/admin/users/:id" }` to `server/routes.manifest.json`.
`internalApp.js` is walked into a separate `internal` section so the unpublished port is inventoried
without being confused for public surface.
- **Scope it to the API surface, or it won't be deterministic.** Three mounts are *filesystem*
conditional: the SPA catch-all `GET *` (only when `client/dist/index.html` exists), the `/brand`
static mount, and `/api/docs*` (only when `swagger-output.json` is present — it is committed, so it
is stable). The manifest keeps only `/api/**`, `/.well-known/**`, and the internal app's routes, so
it does not change depending on whether CI built the client. Static mounts are not API contract.
- **The baseline already exists:** [`api-route-inventory.json`](./api-route-inventory.json) in this
directory is the frozen surface — **199 API routes** (110 of them `/api/v1/admin`) plus 2
internal at the time PR 0 was written. PR 0's generator must **reproduce this file byte-for-byte**;
that is PR 0's own acceptance test, and it means the freeze is already in effect before the first
router moves. *(It did, on first run. The file has since moved to **200** — the CSP report-only PR
added `POST /api/csp-report`, the first deliberate, reviewed manifest diff.)*
- **Runtime introspection, not source parsing.** It is authoritative about mounts, and the route paths
in `admin.routes.js` sit on the line *after* `adminRouter.get(`, which defeats naive greps.
- **Not `swagger-output.json`.** That is annotation-derived (only annotated routes appear) and churns
for unrelated reasons; it documents intent, the manifest records reality.
- **Frozen key: method + path only.** That is exactly the contract being preserved. Handler names are
useless as a guard check here — `requireRole(...)` returns an anonymous arrow, and router-level gates
like `adminRouter.use(noindex, isLoggedIn, staffOnly)` never appear in a route's own stack.
- **Guard coverage, separately.** The generator also emits a non-gated review aid: per route, the
handler count plus any *named* middleware collected along the mount chain. If a stable behavioral
check proves cheap, prefer it — a test that fires an **unauthenticated** request at every manifest
path and snapshots the status code catches a dropped `adminOnly` (403 → 200) in a way names cannot.
Try it in PR 0; if DB-touching public routes make it slow or noisy against the dead-port pool the
tests use, drop it rather than ship a flaky gate.
- **CI:** `.gitea/workflows/pr-checks.yml` runs `npm run routes:manifest` and
`git diff --exit-code server/routes.manifest.json`. A PR that moves a URL fails unless it
deliberately commits the new manifest — which puts the URL change in front of a reviewer instead of
letting it pass silently.
- **Published copy:** `docs/website/api-route-inventory.json` mirrors `server/routes.manifest.json` and
is refreshed in each split PR's mandatory docs edit. The markdown table above is orientation for a
human reader; **the manifest is the authoritative freeze.**
---
## Sequencing & PR breakdown
CSP and the split are independent; the only hard ordering is PR 0 before the first split PR.
**Resequenced during implementation: PR 0 ships first, before the CSP pair.** The CSP report-only PR
has to stand up a violation collector (`POST /api/csp-report`) for `report-to` to point at — which is
a new URL under `/api/**`. Landing it first would mean PR 0's generator emitting 200 routes against a
199-route committed baseline, so PR 0 could no longer prove itself by reproducing
`api-route-inventory.json` byte-for-byte. With PR 0 first, the collector shows up as a reviewed,
deliberate `+1` in the manifest — which is exactly the mechanism working as designed.
1. **PR 0 — route manifest.** Generator + CI check + committed baseline of today's surface. No routers moved. ✅ landed
2. **PR — CSP report-only.** Tightened policy behind `Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only` + `report-to`,
plus the report collector (manifest `+1` — the first deliberate, reviewed manifest diff). ✅ landed
3. **PR — CSP enforce.** One release later, assuming a clean violation report. **Blocked on real soak
data**, not on code: watch the `csp` log tag for `frame-ancestors` reports across one release before
flipping. Also decide there whether `/api/csp-report` is retired with the report-only twin or kept
as a `report-to` group on the enforced policy.
4. **PR 1 — admin:** `users`, `account`, `invites`, `auth` (providers). ✅ landed
5. **PR 2 — admin:** `moderation`, `bot-activity`, `activity`. ✅ landed
6. **PR 3 — admin (content):** `posts`, `pages`, `wiki`, `uploads`. ✅ landed
7. **PR 4 — admin (ops/config):** `shard`, `uo-link`, `email`, `discord-bot`, `settings`, `site-mode`,
`dashboard`. (`activity` went with PR 2 — see § PR 2 — as landed.) **This is the whole residual
file** — `admin.routes.js` is deleted here, not by PR 5. ✅ landed
8. **PR 5 — `public/*` + `player/*`** (and the residual `auth/*` grouping). ✅ landed — **the domain
split is complete.** The only remaining item in this plan is the CSP enforce PR (3), which is
blocked on soak data, not on code.
Each PR: **zero-line diff in `routes.manifest.json`**, server tests green
(`cd website/server && npm test`), Swagger regenerated, matching `docs/` edit, Conventional Commit,
AI-disclosure trailer, branch from a freshly-pulled `main`.
---
## Cross-component blast radius
Three independent clients consume the site's HTTP/SSE API, two of them in separate repos on separate
release cadences. **With the auth merge and the version bump both gone, the blast radius is empty** —
no client's URLs or authentication change at all.
| Consumer | Repo (cadence) | Pinning | Impact under this plan |
|---|---|---|---|
| Browser SPA | `website/client` (lockstep) | `BASE = /api/v1` in `client/src/api/client.js` | **None.** Same URLs, same cookie session. |
| Android app | `android-app` (app-store cadence, un-updatable installs in the wild) | 69 hardcoded `api/v1/…` paths; SSE path in `ShardStreamClient.kt`; SSO in `SsoAuthManager.kt` | **None.** No repoint, no release required. |
| Discord bot | `website/bot` (separate deploy, env-configured) | `SITE_PUBLIC_URL` env → `/api/v1/public` | **None.** Anonymous public reads on unchanged paths. |
Standing constraints, unchanged:
- **The public SSE stream stays anonymous.** Consumed by logged-out browser visitors *and* the Android
`ShardStreamClient`, neither of which sends an `Authorization` header. Adding `requireAuth` blacks
out the public live boards on web and mobile. The single most likely regression in a careless
refactor is reflexively wrapping *both* shard streams in auth.
- **The admin SSE stream keeps its current cookie-based gating** (`isLoggedIn`, `EventSource` +
`withCredentials`) — the rewrite that would have changed this went out with the auth merge.
- **The public/admin allowlist split is a security boundary**, not an implementation detail. Preserve
it verbatim in `utils/shardBroadcast.js` / `utils/shardIngest.js` as routes move.
- **SSO / email-connect transaction cookies are load-bearing for web *and* native.** The Android SSO
flow opens a Custom Tab to the website's `/auth/…/sso/start` and rides the same server-side redirect
transaction and the same tx cookies. Nothing in this plan touches them; don't let a future "cookies
go away" push delete them.
- **`link/` is out of scope.** The sidecar contract (`uoLinkConfig`, `utils/uoLinkClient.js`,
`utils/shardIngest.js`, `X-UOLink-Version`) is a separate versioning axis. `PROTOCOL_VERSION` does
**not** bump for this work.
---
## Appendix: mapping from the previous plan
| Previous | Now |
|---|---|
| Phase 0 — `/api/mobile` facade + app-version floor | **Deferred.** See § Deferred: the `/api/mobile` facade |
| Phase 1 — auth merge | **Removed.** See § Why the auth merge is out and § Deferred: the auth merge |
| Phase 1b — CSP hardening (shipped with the auth merge) | **Phase 1**, standalone; report-only-first ordering fixed |
| Phase 2 — domain split under `router/v2/` | **Phase 2**, in place under `router/v1/`; now the primary driver |
| PR 1 — `/api/v2` scaffold ([API_V2_SKELETON.md](./API_V2_SKELETON.md)) | **Superseded**, kept as the recipe if a versioned API is ever forced |
| PR final — retire v1 | **Not applicable** — v1 is never replaced |

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@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
# Website API v2 — `/api/v2` Skeleton (PR 1)
> ## ⚠ Superseded — not scheduled
>
> The router domain split is being done **in place**, with every URL byte-identical, so there is no
> parallel version to stand up and this scaffold will not be built. See
> [API_V2_PLAN.md](./API_V2_PLAN.md) § Why there is no `/api/v2`.
>
> The file is kept, unedited below, as the concrete recipe **if** a real contract break ever forces a
> versioned API. Nothing here describes current or planned work.
Companion to [API_V2_PLAN.md](./API_V2_PLAN.md) — this is the concrete scaffold for **PR 1** in that
plan's sequencing. It stands up `/api/v2` **empty but wired**, next to a frozen `/api/v1`, with **no
behavior change**. Endpoints are filled in by the later PRs (auth merge, then the domain split).
## Scope
- Create the `router/v2/` tree of empty, domain-named routers.
- Mount `/v2` alongside `/v1` in `api.router.js`.
- Add a single trivial `GET /api/v2/version` so the mount is testable end-to-end.
- **Out of scope:** any real endpoint, any auth change, any controller edit. Those are PR 2+.
## File tree to create
```
website/server/src/router/v2/
v2.router.js # mounts the domain sub-routers; adds GET /version
admin/
index.js # mounts the admin capability routers under /admin
dashboard.router.js users.router.js moderation.router.js
content.router.js wiki.router.js shard.router.js
settings.router.js invites.router.js bot-activity.router.js
auth/
index.js login.router.js sso.router.js totp.router.js session.router.js
public/
index.js news.router.js wiki.router.js page.router.js shard.router.js
player/
index.js profile.router.js appeals.router.js shard.router.js
```
`internal/` is **not** part of v2's public tree — the internal routes stay on the separate,
unpublished port (`internalApp.js`), exactly as in v1. See `API_V2_PLAN.md` § Phase 2.
## Wiring
`api.router.js` gains the v2 mount next to v1:
```js
const v1Router = require('./v1/v1.router')
const v2Router = require('./v2/v2.router')
apiRouter.use('/v1', v1Router)
apiRouter.use('/v2', v2Router) // NEW — parallel version, migrate off v1 route-by-route
```
`v2.router.js` mounts each domain group and exposes the version ping:
```js
const express = require('express')
const v2Router = express.Router()
const adminRouter = require('./admin')
const authRouter = require('./auth')
const publicRouter = require('./public')
const playerRouter = require('./player')
// Cheap liveness/mount check so the parallel version is testable before any
// real endpoint exists. Returns the API major version, nothing sensitive.
v2Router.get('/version', (req, res) => res.json({ version: 2 }))
v2Router.use('/auth', authRouter)
v2Router.use('/public', publicRouter)
v2Router.use('/admin', adminRouter)
v2Router.use('/player', playerRouter)
// NOTE: /internal is intentionally NOT mounted here — same reason as v1.
module.exports = v2Router
```
Each capability router is an empty stub at this stage — a router that mounts cleanly and adds no
routes yet, so PR 2+ only has to add handlers, never re-wire:
```js
// router/v2/admin/dashboard.router.js
const express = require('express')
const router = express.Router()
// Routes added in the admin domain-split PR (see API_V2_PLAN.md § Phase 2).
module.exports = router
```
Each `index.js` mounts its group's capability routers under the URL that names them, e.g.:
```js
// router/v2/admin/index.js
const express = require('express')
const admin = express.Router()
admin.use('/dashboard', require('./dashboard.router'))
admin.use('/users', require('./users.router'))
admin.use('/moderation', require('./moderation.router'))
admin.use('/content', require('./content.router'))
admin.use('/wiki', require('./wiki.router'))
admin.use('/shard', require('./shard.router'))
admin.use('/settings', require('./settings.router'))
admin.use('/invites', require('./invites.router'))
admin.use('/bot-activity', require('./bot-activity.router'))
module.exports = admin
```
## Acceptance criteria
- Server boots with no error; every sub-router mounts.
- `GET /api/v2/version` → `200 { "version": 2 }`.
- `GET /api/v1/**` behavior is **byte-for-byte unchanged** — v1 is untouched.
- Existing server tests stay green (`cd website/server && npm test`).
- A new test asserts the `/api/v2/version` mount (smallest possible coverage of the wiring).
## Docs / spec
- Swagger regeneration is deferred until v2 has real routes (PR 2) — a lone `/version` ping doesn't
need an annotation. When PR 2 lands, add `#swagger.*` to the new routes and run `npm run swagger`.
- No `BACKEND_DESIGN.md` change here beyond noting the parallel `/api/v2` mount exists; the
route-map/security-contract edits land with the PRs that add real endpoints.
## Next
PR 2 fills the `auth/` routers with the bearer access + refresh flow and drops the session cookie —
see [API_V2_PLAN.md](./API_V2_PLAN.md) § Phase 1.

120
website/ARCHITECTURE.md
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@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
# Website — Architecture
How the pieces of `RunicGateway/website` fit together. The React SPA and the native mobile app
talk to one Express backend (`router → controller → model → db`), which persists to MariaDB and
bridges to the live game world **only** through the **uo-link** sidecar. The ServUO shard itself is
never internet-facing — it dials out to the sidecar over loopback, and only the sidecar is exposed.
This is the canonical copy of the diagram; the same diagram is embedded in the website's
[`README.md`](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/website/src/branch/main/README.md#architecture).
See [BACKEND_DESIGN.md](BACKEND_DESIGN.md) for the full API / schema / security contract, and
[`docs/link/`](../link/) for the wire protocol between the sidecar and the shard.
```mermaid
flowchart TB
%% ---------- Clients ----------
subgraph clients["Clients"]
browser["Browser<br/>React + Vite SPA<br/>(public · wiki · admin)"]
mobile["Native mobile app<br/>(bearer tokens)"]
end
idp["SSO providers<br/>Google · Discord · custom OIDC"]
discord["Discord"]
%% ---------- Website (one repo) ----------
subgraph website["website/ &nbsp;— Node app (one repo)"]
direction TB
subgraph backend["server/ — Express backend"]
direction TB
mw["Middleware<br/>helmet · siteMode · noindex<br/>rateLimit · loginProtection · botScore · validate"]
router["Router /api/v1<br/>auth (web · mobile · sso) · public · admin"]
ctrl["Controllers"]
auth["Session layer (auth/)<br/>sessionService · JWT/cookie · bearer · SSO+PKCE"]
model["Models (.model + .db)<br/>raw parameterized SQL — no ORM"]
sse["SSE fan-out<br/>public stream (allowlist) · admin stream (sensitive)"]
subgraph shardutil["Shard integration (utils/)"]
ingest["shardIngest.js<br/>WS ingest dispatcher"]
restcli["uoLinkClient.js<br/>REST client (never throws)"]
end
secret["secretBox.js<br/>AES-256-GCM secrets at rest"]
end
bot["bot/<br/>Discord bot"]
end
db[("MariaDB<br/>users · posts · wiki · settings · activity<br/>mobileSessions · authProviders · userIdentities<br/>uoLinkConfig · shard_online/economy/houses/events")]
%% ---------- Shard side ----------
subgraph shardside["Game shard (never internet-facing)"]
direction TB
sidecar["uo-link sidecar<br/>(Rust) — the only bridge exposed"]
servuo["ServUO shard<br/>(C# plugin)"]
end
%% ---------- Edges ----------
browser <-->|"same-origin JSON + SSE (cookie)"| mw
mobile -->|"REST (bearer access/refresh)"| mw
browser -.->|"OAuth redirect + PKCE"| idp
auth -.->|"token exchange"| idp
mw --> router --> ctrl
ctrl --> auth
ctrl --> model
ctrl --> restcli
ctrl --> sse
auth --> model
model <--> db
auth -. reads/writes secrets .-> secret
restcli -. reads config/token .-> secret
ingest --> model
ingest --> sse
sse -->|"live events"| browser
bot -->|"messages"| discord
bot <--> db
restcli -->|"REST: /char /roster /economy /history · /link/confirm · /towncrier"| sidecar
sidecar -->|"WebSocket live event feed (bearer + X-UOLink-Version)"| ingest
servuo -->|"loopback TCP 127.0.0.1:7788<br/>newline-delimited JSON (shard dials out)"| sidecar
%% ---------- Styling ----------
classDef ext fill:#2d2233,stroke:#7a5c94,color:#e8dff0;
classDef store fill:#1f2d2a,stroke:#4c8c7d,color:#dff0ea;
classDef bridge fill:#2d2620,stroke:#94764c,color:#f0e6d8;
class idp,discord ext;
class db store;
class sidecar,servuo bridge;
```
## Notes on the diagram
- **One backend, layered.** Every request flows `middleware → router → controller → model → db`.
Web browsers authenticate with an httpOnly JWT cookie; the native app uses short-lived bearer
access tokens plus rotated, hashed, revocable refresh tokens; SSO (Google/Discord/OIDC) is
link-only and PKCE-guarded. All three surfaces resolve to the *same* session model via the session
layer, and admin routes are re-validated against the DB on every request.
- **The shard is never reachable.** The ServUO shard *dials out* over loopback TCP `127.0.0.1:7788`
(newline-delimited JSON) to the uo-link sidecar; only the sidecar is exposed, and only the backend
talks to it. Every backend→sidecar call carries `Authorization: Bearer <token>` and an
`X-UOLink-Version` header (a protocol mismatch fails fast with `409`). The REST client
(`uoLinkClient.js`) never throws — every call returns `{ ok, data, status }` — so the site degrades
gracefully when the shard is down. That guarantee covers **reading the config too**: resolving the
admin-managed config decrypts the stored auth token, which throws when the ciphertext can't be
authenticated (`SECRET_ENC_KEY` rotated, or a DB dump restored under a different key). This is
handled inside the client and reported as `{ ok: false, status: 0, error: 'uo-link config
unreadable' }` plus a distinct `ERROR`-level log, so a wrong key degrades the shard surface to
"unavailable" instead of 500ing it — and `GET /admin/uo-link/config` keeps working, which is the
screen an admin needs to re-enter the token and recover.
- **Two ways in from the sidecar.** Live game events arrive over an outbound **WebSocket** and are
routed by the `shardIngest.js` dispatcher (state-changing kinds update `shard_*` tables, notable
kinds append to `shard_events`, high-frequency kinds only update state). Point-in-time reads and
commands go over **REST** through `uoLinkClient.js`.
- **Sensitive events stay private.** Ingested events fan out to browsers over two **SSE** channels —
a public allowlist stream and an admin-only stream that additionally carries staff audit, cheat
detection, and login-attempt events. The allowlist split is a security boundary; sensitive kinds
can never leak onto the public channel.
- **Secrets at rest.** OAuth client secrets, the uo-link token, and the Gmail refresh token are
AES-256-GCM encrypted via `secretBox.js` (keyed by `SECRET_ENC_KEY`). The uo-link token is
write-only in the API — never returned to any client.

671
website/BACKEND_DESIGN.md
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@@ -29,24 +29,6 @@ Public contact email: **UOMysticmoon@gmail.com**
Skeleton from the spec, with a small number of justified additions marked **(+)**.
> **Complete.** The monolithic route files (`admin.routes.js` especially, originally 1552 lines /
> 110 routes) have been split into one router file per business capability — **in place, with every
> URL unchanged**. See [API_V2_PLAN.md](./API_V2_PLAN.md) § Phase 2.
>
> `users`, `account`, `invites`, `auth/providers` (PR 1, 28 routes), `moderation`, `bot-activity`,
> `activity` (PR 2, 18 routes), `posts`, `uploads`, `wiki`, `pages` (PR 3, 31 routes) and `shard`,
> `uo-link`, `email`, `discord-bot`, `settings`, `dashboard`/`site-mode` (PR 4, 33 routes) each live
> in their own router under `admin/`, behind `admin/index.js`. PR 5 did the same for `public/` (24),
> `player/` (20) and the residual `auth/` (10). **`admin.routes.js`, `public.routes.js`,
> `player.routes.js` and `auth.routes.js` are all deleted**; each group is now a directory whose
> `index.js` owns the group gate and the mount table and declares no routes of its own.
>
> "Every URL unchanged" is enforced mechanically, not by review: `server/scripts/routeManifest.js`
> (`npm run routes:manifest`) walks the live Express stack and writes the sorted
> `{ method, path }` freeze to `server/routes.manifest.json`, mirrored here as
> [api-route-inventory.json](./api-route-inventory.json). PR checks regenerate it and fail on any
> diff, so a split PR that moves a URL cannot merge silently. See § 4.0.
```
server/
.env.example
@@ -60,104 +42,10 @@ server/
router/
api.router.js mounts /v1
v1/
v1.router.js mounts /auth /public /admin /player
auth/ index.js mounts the routers below; no group gate — /auth
is where an anonymous caller becomes
authenticated, so the authenticated parts gate
themselves. Mount order is load-bearing (see
session.router.js)
login.router.js (2) /auth/login + /login/totp — shared
loginGuards stack
register.router.js (1) /auth/register — honours the
player_registration setting
invite.router.js (2) /auth/invite/:token[/accept] — the
token is its own authority, so it
bypasses player_registration
password.router.js (3) /auth/password/forgot + reset/:token
session.router.js (2) POST /logout and GET /me — the two
singletons owning no path segment, so
mounted at the group root, LAST: the
/me sub-routers below also match the
bare /me and supply its noindex header
me.routes.js (23) /auth/me/account*, sessions, trusted
devices — router-level requireAuth
notifications.routes.js (3) /auth/me/devices*, notifications/*
mobile.routes.js + /auth/mobile/* — native bearer login
mobileSso.routes.js (5)
sso.routes.js (4) mounted PATHLESS: owns two prefixes,
/auth/providers and /auth/sso/*
loginGuards.js shared backoff/slow/limiter stack for
every credential-guessing surface
(not a router)
auth.controller.js + invite/passwordReset/sso/mobile controllers
public/ index.js mounts the routers below; **no group gate** —
this surface is anonymous by design (SPA
logged-out, Discord bot, Android ShardStream)
posts.router.js (2) /public/posts/:category[/:idOrSlug]
wiki.router.js (4) /public/wiki — /categories and /tags
MUST precede /:slug
pages.router.js (2) /public/pages — the draft-preview
route precedes /:slug and is
deliberately not site-mode gated
shard.router.js (14) /public/shard/* incl. the anonymous
SSE stream; never site-mode gated
site.router.js (4) /settings /status /version /contact —
the group-root singletons; declares no
router-level middleware
public.controller.js + shard.controller.js
player/ index.js owns the shared `noindex, requireAuth` gate
(authenticated, ANY role — staff are a superset
of players) and the mount table
account.router.js (8) /player/account — credentials, TOTP,
linked identities; handlers shared
with /admin/account and /auth/me
shard.router.js (8) /player/shard — linking + own roster,
vendors, chars, sales, houses
appeals.router.js (4) /player/appeals
shard.controller.js + appeals.controller.js
admin/ index.js mounts the capability routers below at their
own prefixes; owns the shared
`noindex, isLoggedIn, staffOnly` gate and
declares no routes itself
account.router.js (6) /admin/account — self-service, no adminOnly
users.router.js (15) /admin/users — adminOnly
invites.router.js (3) /admin/invites — adminOnly
authProviders.router.js (4) /admin/auth — adminOnly
moderation.router.js (15) /admin/moderation — modAccess
(admin+moderator) at router level
botActivity.router.js (2) /admin/bot-activity — adminOnly
activity.router.js (1) /admin/activity — staff-wide
audit log, no extra gate
posts.router.js (9) /admin/posts — editor tier, no
gate beyond staffOnly
uploads.router.js (1) /admin/uploads — rich-text editor
image upload
wiki.router.js (14) /admin/wiki — pages, revisions,
categories, tags
pages.router.js (7) /admin/pages — CMS page builder
imageUpload.js shared multer config for the two
upload routes above (not a router)
shard.router.js (16) /admin/shard — 7 self-service
account-linking routes (no extra
gate, handlers shared with
/player/shard) + 9 in-game staff
ops on modAccess, per route
uoLink.router.js (5) /admin/uo-link — sidecar config,
town crier, admin SSE — adminOnly
email.router.js (6) /admin/email — Gmail OAuth2
delivery — adminOnly
discordBot.router.js (2) /admin/discord-bot — adminOnly
settings.router.js (2) /admin/settings — adminOnly
dashboard.router.js (2) GET /dashboard (staff-wide) and
PUT /site-mode (adminOnly) — the
two singletons owning no path
segment, so mounted at the group
root; declares no router-level
middleware, which is what makes a
root mount safe
admin.controller.js + the per-capability controllers
(already domain-split; the split PRs re-wire
routes, not logic)
v1.router.js mounts /auth /public /admin
auth/ auth.routes.js + auth.controller.js
public/ public.routes.js + public.controller.js
admin/ admin.routes.js + admin.controller.js
model/
users/ users.model.js + users.db.js
posts/ posts.model.js + posts.db.js (news/five-on-friday/newsletter/screenshots)
@@ -254,201 +142,6 @@ Seeded keys: `site_mode` (default `maintenance`), `site_mode_changed_at`,
| ip | VARCHAR(45) NULL | from `req.ip` (needs `trust proxy`) |
| created_at | DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP | |
### password_resets — self-service reset links
| col | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
| id | INT PK AUTO_INCREMENT | |
| token_hash | CHAR(64) UNIQUE NOT NULL | sha256 hex of the opaque token; **plaintext never stored** |
| user_id | INT NOT NULL FK→users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE | the account this reset targets |
| status | ENUM('pending','used') DEFAULT 'pending' | single-use (atomic `markUsed`) |
| requested_ip | VARCHAR(64) NULL | who asked (audit only) |
| expires_at | DATETIME NOT NULL | ~1h TTL, enforced in the model on top of this |
| created_at / used_at | DATETIME | |
Same "store only the hash of an opaque token" pattern as `user_invites` / `mobile_refresh_tokens`.
A DB read never yields a usable reset link. See §4 `/auth/password/*`.
### push_devices — opt-in push endpoints (M7)
| col | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
| id | INT PK AUTO_INCREMENT | |
| user_id | INT NOT NULL FK→users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE | owner |
| transport | ENUM('unifiedpush','fcm') DEFAULT 'unifiedpush' | UnifiedPush for the sideloaded APK; FCM reserved for a later Play flavor |
| endpoint | VARCHAR(512) NOT NULL | the distributor URL the app's ntfy topic was handed (or an FCM token). Unguessable but **not a secret** — stored in the clear (unlike refresh tokens), because pushes are content-free tickles |
| platform | VARCHAR(40) NULL | free-form label, e.g. `android` |
| created_at / last_seen_at | DATETIME | |
`UNIQUE(user_id, endpoint)` — re-registering the same endpoint is an idempotent upsert.
### notification_subscriptions — which streams a user opted into (M7)
| col | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
| user_id | INT NOT NULL FK→users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE | |
| stream_id | VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL | an id from the catalog (`config/notificationStreams.js`), validated on write |
| created_at | DATETIME | |
`PRIMARY KEY(user_id, stream_id)`. Subscriptions are per-user (applied to every device); a PUT
replaces the whole set. Nothing is pushed unless the user subscribed.
### mobile_auth_sessions / mobile_auth_codes — mobile SSO bridge (M9)
Two short-lived, self-pruning tables that bridge a browser SSO redirect flow to a native client. They
carry the **app ↔ website** PKCE + CSRF state (a *second* PKCE layer, distinct from the website ↔ IdP
PKCE the `sso_tx` cookie already carries) and the one-time authorization code the app exchanges for
bearer tokens. Neither holds a secret in the clear — the PKCE `code_challenge` is a hash by
construction, and the authorization code is stored as a **sha256 hash only** (same pattern as
`user_invites` / `password_resets` / `mobile_refresh_tokens`).
`mobile_auth_sessions` — one row per `/auth/mobile/sso/start`:
| col | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
| id | INT PK AUTO_INCREMENT | |
| session_id | CHAR(36) UNIQUE | opaque uuid; carried inside the signed `sso_tx` (mode `mobile`) so the callback can find this row |
| provider | VARCHAR(40) NOT NULL | provider id validated enabled at `/start` |
| code_challenge | VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL | app-supplied PKCE S256 challenge (base64url); verified at `/exchange` |
| redirect_uri | VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL | the requested app callback — **exact-match** against the allowlist (never prefix) |
| state | VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL | app-generated opaque CSRF value, echoed on the callback for the app to verify |
| status | ENUM('pending','completed','consumed') DEFAULT 'pending' | `pending`→`completed` when the code is minted; `consumed` after a successful exchange |
| user_id | INT NULL FK→users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE | set once SSO resolves the account |
| trust_device | TINYINT(1) NOT NULL DEFAULT 0 | user ticked "trust this device" on the Custom Tab TOTP form. A **boolean only** — it tells `/exchange` to mint the app's own trust token; the token never rests here (only its sha256 reaches `trusted_devices`) |
| expires_at | DATETIME NOT NULL | short (~10 min — one redirect round-trip incl. TOTP) |
| created_at / used_at | DATETIME | `used_at` stamped at exchange |
`mobile_auth_codes` — one row per completed SSO callback (the code the app redeems):
| col | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
| id | INT PK AUTO_INCREMENT | |
| code_hash | CHAR(64) UNIQUE | sha256 hex of the opaque ≥128-bit code; the raw code never touches the DB |
| user_id | INT NOT NULL FK→users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE | the authenticated account |
| session_id | CHAR(36) NOT NULL | the owning `mobile_auth_sessions.session_id` (ties the code to its PKCE challenge) |
| expires_at | DATETIME NOT NULL | very short (~5 min) |
| used_at | DATETIME NULL | set on first successful exchange — **single use** (a reused code fails) |
| created_at | DATETIME | |
Both self-prune (indexed `expires_at`): a best-effort sweep runs at boot beside the existing
`revoked_sessions` prune, and each bridge write opportunistically deletes expired rows — so no cron
infra is added (same approach as `revoked_sessions`).
**`mobile_refresh_tokens` additions (M9).** Two nullable columns are added to support the device
list/revoke surface: `device_name VARCHAR(100) NULL` (a friendly label) and `last_used_at DATETIME
NULL` (bumped on each refresh). Existing rows get them via the schema's ALTER section; the token model
is otherwise unchanged.
### trusted_devices — MFA "Trust this device"
Lets a browser/app **skip the TOTP step** at login (never the password) for 30 days. Pattern-identical
to `mobile_refresh_tokens`: the opaque trust token lives client-side (the `rg_trust` httpOnly cookie on
web, `X-Trust-Token` / EncryptedSharedPreferences on native) and only its **sha256** hash is stored
(`token_hash CHAR(64) UNIQUE`) — sha256, not bcrypt, because a 256-bit random token is looked up **by
its hash** via the unique index (a per-row salt would break that). Columns mirror the mobile table
(`platform`, `device_name`, `device_hash`, `user_agent`, `created_at`, `last_used_at`, `expires_at`,
`revoked_at`). Capped at 10 rows/user **in application code — no silent pruning** (an over-cap trust is
refused so the client can prompt the user to revoke one first). Consulted only at the login/password
step, never at token refresh, and revoked wholesale on untrust / password change / password reset /
TOTP disable. See `docs/website/TRUSTED_DEVICES_MFA.md`.
### recovery_codes — single-use MFA backup codes
Generated at TOTP enrollment (10 at a time, shown to the user **once**) so a user who loses their
authenticator can complete login without an admin reset. `code_hash VARCHAR(72)` is a **bcrypt** hash
(not sha256): a recovery code is a human-typed, lower-entropy fallback credential — the closest
analogue to a password — and there is no hash-lookup constraint (verification fetches the user's ≤10
unused rows and `bcrypt.compare`s each, like password verification). `used_at` is the single-use
marker. Cleared wholesale on TOTP disable / password change / password reset.
### shard_ruleset — the shard's published ruleset (Protocol 3.0)
Singleton row (`id = 1`, CHECK-constrained) holding the latest `world.ruleset` frame: `rev`,
`expansion`, `payload` JSON (the whole frame), `t`, `updated_at`. The shard re-emits the complete
ruleset on every sidecar connect, so this is an **overwrite, not an append** — and the kind is
deliberately **not** in `LOGGED_KINDS`, since logging it would put a duplicate row in `shard_events`
on every reconnect while `server.hello` already marks each of those.
The frame is stored whole rather than normalized into columns: it is a flat description of server
config that is read as one page, so splitting it up would mean a schema change every time the shard
grows a new block. `rev` (the shard's FNV-1a of the body) and `expansion` are hoisted only because
they are cheap to display — the same payload-plus-hoisted-columns shape `shard_champs` uses.
**No row means the shard has never published one** (an older plugin, or `Bridge.RulesetEnabled=false`),
served as `null` rather than `{}`: "not published yet" and "published, everything off" are different
answers and the page renders them differently.
### shard_feature_visibility — per-feature audience config (Protocol 3.0)
One row per shard feature: `feature` (PK), `enabled`, `audience` (a rung on the ladder in §6.5),
`stream` (whether the feature's kinds fan out over SSE at all), `field_rules` JSON (`{field: rung}`
for the sensitive fields only), `updated_by`, `updated_at`.
**An absent row means "use the compiled default", and the compiled defaults reproduce pre-3.0
behavior — so an empty table is a no-op and there is nothing to seed.** Stored rows are merged over
the defaults on read, which is also where the invariants are re-applied: a row naming an unknown
feature is ignored (a stale row must not resurrect a removed feature), an invalid rung falls back to
the default rather than failing open, and a rule touching a locked field (`acct` / `webId`) is
discarded. See §6.5.
### shard_spawn_* / shard_regions / shard_landmarks / shard_champion_spawns / shard_atlas_meta — the spawn atlas (Protocol 3.0)
Static shard **content**, not live shard state. Nothing here comes from the sidecar: the atlas is
derived from the shard's own ServUO tree, re-read on **every server boot** and hash-gated so an
unchanged tree costs one read pass and no write. Nothing is precomputed and committed — a shard's
maps change over its life, and a snapshot in the repo would silently drift from the world players
actually see. These tables stay populated whether the shard is up or not. Full operator detail in
[`SPAWN_ATLAS.md`](SPAWN_ATLAS.md); the design is `docs/link/v3.md` §6.
**No facet name appears anywhere in the code.** A shard may add facets, replace them, or rename them
when its maps are updated; the facet set is discovered from the tree, and the loose spellings in
`Data/Locations` are matched against it rather than looked up in a table.
| Table | Key columns |
|---|---|
| `shard_spawn_creatures` | `slug` PK, `name`, `total`, `points`, `facets` JSON, `art` NULL |
| `shard_spawn_points` | `id` PK, `facet`, `name`, `x`, `y`, `width`, `height`, `spawn_range`, `max_count`, `min_delay`, `max_delay`, `tod_start/end/mode`, `region`, `landmark`, `label` |
| `shard_spawn_point_types` | `(point_id, slug)` PK, `max_count` |
| `shard_regions` | `facet`, `name`, `type`, `priority`, `parent`, `rects` JSON |
| `shard_landmarks` | `facet`, `name`, `grp`, `x`, `y`, `z` |
| `shard_champion_spawns` | `slug` PK, `name`, `grp`, `type`, `random_type`, `facet`, `x`, `y`, `z`, `radius`, `label` |
| `shard_atlas_meta` | Singleton (`id = 1`), `payload` JSON (counts + a sha256 per source file), `imported_at` |
| `shard_atlas_pending` | Singleton (`id = 1`), `status` (`pending`/`rejected`), `payload` JSON, `detected_at` |
The first seven are **import-owned**: a refresh empties and reloads every one inside a single
transaction, so a failed reload leaves the previous atlas intact rather than a half-loaded world.
Nothing else writes to them, and nothing holds a foreign key to them — no FKs at all, consistent with
every other `shard_*` table.
**`shard_atlas_pending` is the security-relevant one.** A refresh that would REMOVE a facet is never
applied automatically: facet loss is indistinguishable at boot from a half-copied or mid-update tree,
so it is staged here for an admin to approve or reject, and **startup is never blocked by it**. Only
the decision is stored — source hashes plus the facet diff, a few KB — and approving re-parses the
tree, so a multi-megabyte blob never lands in the database and what gets applied matches the tree at
approval time. A rejection is remembered against those exact hashes so a declined refresh does not
re-prompt on every restart. Everything else (new facets, renamed regions, changed spawns) applies
immediately, since none of it can destroy data an operator would miss.
The boot refresh is **best-effort by contract**: no configured path, an unreadable mount, a malformed
file or a database error is caught and logged, and the site comes up serving whatever atlas it had.
The tree path comes from the `spawn_atlas_servuo_path` setting, falling back to `SERVUO_PATH`.
Four column choices worth stating, because each one is a trap:
- **`spawn_range`, not `range`**, and **`grp`, not `group`** — both are reserved words.
- **`DELETE`, not `TRUNCATE`.** `TRUNCATE` is DDL in MariaDB and implicitly commits, which would
defeat the all-or-nothing reload. At ~7k rows the difference does not matter.
- **Point ids are assigned explicitly**, not left to `AUTO_INCREMENT`: the `shard_spawn_point_types`
rows need to know them, and `conn.batch()` reports no usable `insertId` for a multi-row insert.
- **Plain `INDEX` on `name`, deliberately not `FULLTEXT`.** ~800 creature rows makes a `LIKE` scan
free, and FULLTEXT's minimum token length would break searches for names like "orc".
`shard_champion_spawns` is the *configured* altar roster ("there is an Unholy Terror altar in
Deceit"). The live `champ.update` feed in `shard_champs` is the separate answer to "it is on level 3
right now". Both exist; they are not the same data.
**`shard_spawn_creatures.art` is always NULL on a fresh import.** The project ships no creature
artwork: sprites live in the operator's own client `.mul`/`.uop` files and are theirs, not ours to
redistribute. An operator supplies art via a gitignored map plus images under the (already
gitignored) `server/uploads/atlas/`. Text-only is the normal, supported state.
---
## 4. API contract
@@ -456,223 +149,30 @@ gitignored) `server/uploads/atlas/`. Text-only is the normal, supported state.
Base path `/api/v1`. JSON in/out. Auth via httpOnly cookie (`isLoggedIn` reads it; also
accepts `Authorization: Bearer` for API testing).
### 4.0 The authoritative route list
The prose tables below are **orientation for a human reader** and can drift. Two generated artifacts
are authoritative, and they answer different questions:
| Artifact | Source of truth for | Generated by |
|---|---|---|
| `server/routes.manifest.json` — mirrored as [api-route-inventory.json](./api-route-inventory.json) | **What URLs exist.** 200 public routes + 2 on the internal listener, sorted, method + path only. | `npm run routes:manifest`, by walking the live Express stack |
| `server/swagger/swagger-output.json` — served at `/api/docs` | **What each route means.** Parameters, bodies, response codes, security. | `npm run swagger`, from `#swagger.*` annotations |
The split is deliberate: Swagger is annotation-derived, so an unannotated route is invisible in it and
it churns whenever a description is reworded — it documents *intent*. The manifest is introspection-
derived and records *reality*, which is why it, not Swagger, is the thing PR checks freeze
(`npm run routes:manifest -- --check`).
Both artifacts are emitted with **sorted** keys, so a diff in either is proportional to the change
rather than to how the routers happen to be traversed. `swagger.js` additionally strips trailing
slashes from generated path keys — see *Regenerating the spec* in the website README for why the
domain split makes that necessary.
Scope: the manifest keeps `/api/**` and `/.well-known/**` from the public app plus everything on the
internal listener. The SPA catch-all, `/uploads` and `/brand` are filesystem-conditional static
mounts — not API contract, and including them would make the output depend on whether CI had built
the client.
A third generated file, `server/routes.guards.json`, is a **review aid and not a contract**: per route,
the middleware handler count plus the *named* middleware on its mount chain. It exists because a
router-level `router.use(noindex, isLoggedIn, staffOnly)` gate never appears in an individual route's
own stack, so a capability router extracted without re-applying the gate would otherwise publish
authenticated endpoints silently. Names are a hint only — `requireRole(...)` returns an anonymous
arrow and cannot be observed — but a *missing* `requireAuth` is unambiguous, and the server test suite
asserts every `/admin/**` and `/player/**` route still carries it.
### /auth (auth/index.js → the capability routers in §2)
No group gate — `/auth` is where an anonymous caller becomes authenticated. The authenticated parts
gate themselves: `me.routes.js` and `notifications.routes.js` each apply `noindex, requireAuth` at
their own router level, and `/sso/:provider/link` carries `requireAuth` per route.
### /auth (auth.routes.js → auth.controller.js)
| Method | Path | Auth | Body | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| POST | `/login` | — (rate-limited) | `{username,password}` | verify, set cookie, log `auth.login`, update `last_login_at`. If the account has TOTP **and this browser is a trusted device** (a valid `rg_trust` cookie bound to the user), the TOTP step is **skipped** and a session is issued directly (logs `auth.login.trusted_device`). Otherwise a 2FA account returns `{totpRequired, challenge}`. |
| POST | `/login/totp` | — (rate-limited) | `{challenge, code? \| recoveryCode?, trustDevice?, deviceName?}` | complete 2FA with a TOTP **or** single-use recovery code. `trustDevice` sets the `rg_trust` cookie so future logins skip TOTP; at the device cap the session is still issued and the body carries `{trustLimitReached, devices}`. |
| POST | `/logout` | cookie | — | clear cookie (the `rg_trust` trust cookie deliberately **survives** logout) |
| GET | `/me` | cookie / bearer | — | current user (no hash) or 401 — client bootstraps auth state |
| POST | `/password/forgot` | — (rate-limited) | `{email}` | email a single-use, ~1h reset link to **every active account** on the address; **always** returns the same generic 200 (no account enumeration). Email is non-unique, so several accounts may each get a link naming their username. Logs `account.password.reset.request`. |
| GET | `/password/reset/:token` | — | — | validate a link → `{username}` for the form, else 404 (never distinguishes expired/used/never-existed) |
| POST | `/password/reset/:token` | — (rate-limited) | `{password}` | consume the single-use link, rotate the hash, and revoke **all** sessions (web cutoff + mobile refresh tokens). Does **not** sign the user in — they log in fresh (so a 2FA account still passes TOTP). Logs `account.password.reset.complete`. |
| GET | `/me/account` | cookie / bearer | — | full self account (`id, username, role, email, status, totp_enabled, has_password`) |
| PATCH | `/me/account/username` | cookie / bearer (rate-limited) | `{username}` | change own username; re-issues the caller's session |
| PATCH | `/me/account/password` | cookie / bearer (rate-limited) | `{newPassword, currentPassword?}` | change/set own password (current required unless the account has none); revokes other sessions, keeps the caller's |
| POST | `/me/account/totp/setup` · `…/enable` · `…/disable` | cookie / bearer | `{code}` on enable/disable | self 2FA enrollment (disable needs a valid current code, not a password). **enable** returns the one-time `recoveryCodes`; **disable** clears the user's trusted devices + recovery codes |
| GET | `/me/account/identities` · DELETE `…/:provider` | cookie / bearer | — | list / unlink own SSO identities |
| GET | `/me/trusted-devices` | cookie / bearer | — | list own active trusted devices (never tokens) |
| POST | `/me/trusted-devices` | cookie / bearer (rate-limited) | `{deviceName?}` | trust the current device; web gets an httpOnly `rg_trust` cookie, native gets `{trustToken}`. **409 `{error:'trusted_device_limit', devices}`** at the cap |
| DELETE | `/me/trusted-devices` · `…/:id` | cookie / bearer | — | untrust all / one (ownership-scoped) |
| GET | `/me/account/recovery-codes/status` | cookie / bearer | — | remaining unused code count (never the codes) |
| POST | `/me/account/recovery-codes/generate` | cookie / bearer (rate-limited, **password step-up**) | `{currentPassword?}` | regenerate the one-time recovery codes (returned once); refused when 2FA is off |
| POST | `/me/devices` | cookie / bearer | `{endpoint, transport?, platform?}` | register a push endpoint; **rejects a disallowed endpoint 400** (SSRF guard). Idempotent per (user, endpoint) |
| GET | `/me/devices` · DELETE `…/:id` | cookie / bearer | — | list / unregister own push devices |
| GET | `/me/notifications/streams` | cookie / bearer | — | the subscribable catalog (`personal`/`requiresLinkedAccount` flags) |
| GET · PUT | `/me/notifications/subscriptions` | cookie / bearer | `{streams:[id]}` on PUT | get / replace own opted-in streams (unknown ids dropped) |
| POST | `/login` | — (rate-limited) | `{username,password}` | verify, set cookie, log `auth.login`, update `last_login_at` |
| POST | `/logout` | cookie | — | clear cookie |
| GET | `/me` | cookie | — | current user (no hash) or 401 — client bootstraps auth state |
**Role-agnostic self-service (`/auth/me/*`).** The canonical "me" surface for **every** authenticated
role. It reuses the exact `account.controller` handlers as `/player/account/*` and `/admin/account/*`
(no logic duplication) behind `requireAuth` **only** — any active account, never a specific role. This
lets a client (the Android app) manage its own account through one surface without ever touching
`/admin` (docs/android/PLAN.md §6.4). The older `/player/account/*` + `/admin/account/*` routes stay
for web back-compat.
**The `/player/*` group is self-service, not player-only.** Staff are a **superset** of players — every
player ability plus their staff tools on top — so the whole group (`account.router.js`,
`shard.router.js`, `appeals.router.js`, mounted by `player/index.js`) sits behind the shared
`noindex, requireAuth` gate **only**, never `requireRole('player')`. Every handler is self-scoped to the caller by `req.user.id`, so an admin/editor/
moderator using it sees only their **own** linked accounts and characters (with the pre-existing
`isAdmin` bypass still letting a genuine admin read *any* character). Staff also reach the identical
self-scoped handlers under `/admin/shard/*` (same controller) for the web admin surface; the two are
interchangeable. This is why a staff account with linked game characters gets its "My characters" and
personal notification streams on the mobile client — the group no longer 403s a non-`player` role.
**Password reset.** Uses the same audited pattern as `user_invites`: an opaque 32-byte token
whose **sha256 hash only** is stored in `password_resets`, single-use and short-lived (~1h). It
also serves SSO-only accounts (null `password_hash`) as their "set an initial password" path. The
reset link points at the web front end (`/account/reset/:token`); the Android app hands off here
rather than shipping its own reset screen (docs/android/PLAN.md §4.2). First admin is bootstrapped
by `seed.js` from env (see §6); further staff are created under `/admin/users` or via email invites.
**Push notifications (M7, opt-in).** The app subscribes per stream (`/auth/me/notifications/*`) and
registers device endpoints (`/auth/me/devices`); nothing is pushed unless subscribed. Delivery is a
**content-free tickle** — `{ stream, ref }`, no sensitive data — POSTed to each subscribed device's
self-hosted **ntfy** endpoint (`utils/pushDispatch`); the app wakes and pulls the real, ownership-
checked content over the authenticated API. Two producers fan out through the one publisher: the shard
ingest dispatcher (`utils/shardIngest`, beside the SSE broadcast) for shard-derived streams, and the
create/publish-post path for `news.post`. The stream catalog + event→stream mapping is
`config/notificationStreams.js`. Security invariants:
- **Same public/admin split as the SSE feed.** Public streams are drawn *only* from the SSE
`PUBLIC_KINDS` allowlist; a sensitive kind (audit/cheat/IP/login-attempt) can never produce a public
push.
- **Personal streams are owner-keyed.** `vendor.sale` / `house.idoc` / `account.login` are delivered
only to the *owning* user's devices, resolved via `shardLinks` (the same ownership check as
`/player/shard/*`).
- **SSRF guard.** A device `endpoint` is a client-supplied URL the server POSTs to, so registration and
every publish validate it is HTTPS, non-private/loopback, and (when configured) on the shard's ntfy
allow-set (`NTFY_BASE_URL` / `NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`).
- ntfy is treated as an **untrusted relay** — no per-user accounts, unguessable topics; an optional
`NTFY_PUBLISH_TOKEN` hardens backend→ntfy publishes but is not required. See docs/android/PLAN.md §11.
### Mobile SSO Authorization Bridge (`/auth/mobile/sso/*`, M9)
Native "Sign in with Google/Discord" for the Android app **without shipping any OAuth secret in the
app**. The website stays the identity authority: each shard owner's provider credentials live in
`auth_providers` (encrypted at rest) and are only ever used server-side. The bridge is a **new
consumer of the existing SSO + mobile-bearer machinery**, not a parallel auth path — it reuses the
`/auth/sso/:provider/*` redirect flow, the link-only + opt-in-provisioning policy, the TOTP gate, and
issues the **same** token pair as `/auth/mobile/login`.
The TOTP gate it reuses includes the **trusted-device skip** (see
`TRUSTED_DEVICES_MFA.md` §6). Because the app opens this flow in a Custom Tab, which shares the
system browser's cookie jar, the `rg_trust` cookie set on the TOTP form is presented back on the next
app sign-in — so "don't ask me again" works for native SSO without the app injecting a header into a
tab it does not control, and without a trust token ever appearing in a start URL.
| Method | Path | Auth | Body / Query | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GET | `/auth/providers` | — | — | **reused** discovery; the app renders provider buttons from this (never exposes secrets) |
| GET | `/auth/mobile/sso/start` | — (rate-limited per-IP + per-provider) | `?provider&code_challenge&state&redirect_uri` | validate provider enabled + `redirect_uri` **exact-match** allowlist; insert a `mobile_auth_sessions` row; create the existing `sso_tx` tagged `mode:'mobile'` carrying `session_id`; **302 to the IdP** (existing authorize URL) |
| GET | `/auth/sso/:provider/callback` | — (signed `sso_tx`) | `?code&state` | **existing** endpoint; a new branch when `tx.mode==='mobile'`: resolve the account (same policy as web login incl. TOTP), mint a single-use hashed authorization code into `mobile_auth_codes`, mark the session `completed`, and **302 to `redirect_uri?code=…&state=…`** (the app's original `state`) — **no cookie is set** |
| POST | `/auth/mobile/sso/exchange` | — (rate-limited per-IP) | `{code, code_verifier}` | validate the code exists / unexpired / unused (mark used) and `sha256(code_verifier)` matches the stored challenge → issue the existing mobile access + refresh pair (`createMobileSession`) → `{accessToken, refreshToken, expiresIn, user}`. When the session carries `trust_device`, also mint a `platform:'mobile'` trusted device and add `trustToken` — minted here, on an authenticated app→server call, so it never travels in the deep link. Best-effort: at the trusted-device cap the response simply omits it rather than failing the sign-in |
| POST | `/auth/mobile/refresh` | — | `{refreshToken}` | **reused** unchanged — rotate the pair |
| POST | `/auth/mobile/logout` | bearer | `{refreshToken?, all?}` | **reused** unchanged — revoke this (or all) refresh token(s) |
| GET | `/auth/me/sessions` · DELETE `…/:id` | cookie / bearer | — | list / revoke own **mobile sessions** (device_name, last_used_at, created_at) — the "Active Devices" surface (distinct from `/auth/me/devices`, which is push endpoints) |
**Two PKCE layers (do not conflate).**
- *Layer A (existing):* website ↔ IdP. The `code_verifier` is generated at `/start`, kept only in the
httpOnly `sso_tx` cookie, sent to the IdP token endpoint at the callback. Unchanged.
- *Layer B (new):* app ↔ website. The **app** generates `code_verifier`/`code_challenge`; the
challenge is stored in `mobile_auth_sessions` at `/start`; the verifier is presented at `/exchange`.
This is what stops an intercepted callback code from being redeemed by anyone but the real app.
**State / CSRF.** The app-generated `state` is stored at `/start`, echoed on the callback redirect,
and **verified by the app** before it calls `/exchange` — a CSRF guard independent of both PKCE
layers (a different app instance triggering `/start` cannot complete someone else's flow).
**Redirect-URI allowlist.** `/start` and the callback validate `redirect_uri` by **exact match**
against a configured allowlist (`MOBILE_AUTH_REDIRECT_URIS`, default the one fixed application-owned
callback `runicgateway://auth/callback`) — **never prefix match** (prefix matching on custom schemes
is a known open-redirect vector). Tokens are **never** placed in the callback URL — only the
short-lived authorization code.
*App Links (implemented).* When the admin toggle `mobile_app_links_enabled` is **on**, `/start` also
accepts the self-origin HTTPS callback `https://<request-host>/mobile/callback` — one *additive*
exact-match entry, derived from the request/`APP_BASE_URL` and never from client input; the
custom-scheme allowlist is never narrowed. The shard then auto-serves `GET
/.well-known/assetlinks.json` (fixed package `com.runicgateway.app` + `MOBILE_APP_CERT_SHA256`
fingerprints; 404 when the toggle is off or no fingerprint is configured), and
`settings.getPublic()` advertises `mobileAppLinks: <bool>`. These two things — one static file route
and one more allowlist entry — are the *entire* server surface App Links require. See
docs/android/APP_LINKS.md.
**TOTP through the bridge.** A 2FA account keeps full parity: the callback stages the existing
pending-TOTP cookie (now also carrying the bridge `session_id`) and bounces the Custom Tab through the
web TOTP form; on a correct code the completion mints the authorization code and deep-links back to
the app — it never mints a session cookie for a mobile flow.
**Revocation latency (documented tradeoff).** Revoking a refresh token (device revoke / logout) stops
future renewals but does **not** invalidate an already-issued access token until it expires — up to
the access-token lifetime (`MOBILE_ACCESS_TTL`, default 15 min) of continued access. This is an
accepted tradeoff given the short lifetime. If instant revocation is ever required, add an
access-token (jti) blocklist check on the `requireAuth` path — the same `revoked_sessions` mechanism
web sessions already use.
**Authorization code.** Cryptographically random, ≥128 bits, stored **hash-only**, single-use, short
expiry (~5 min); `/exchange` is rate-limited per-IP. The bridge tables self-prune (§3).
### /public (public/index.js → the capability routers in §2) — all GET except `/contact`, no auth
**No group gate, deliberately.** This surface is anonymous by design: the SPA renders it logged-out,
the Discord bot reads it with no credentials, and the Android `ShardStreamClient` consumes
`/public/shard/stream` without an `Authorization` header. Content visibility during maintenance comes
from the per-route **siteMode** middleware (§5), never from an auth gate.
No public `register`. First admin is bootstrapped by `seed.js` from env (see §6). Further
admins are created under `/admin/users`.
### /public (public.routes.js → public.controller.js) — all GET, no auth
| Method | Path | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| GET | `/settings` | whitelisted public keys, derived `registration`/`gameAccountSignup` flags, the per-shard **`brand`** block (name, `accent` color, logo/hero/favicon) a client themes itself from — one image runs as any shard, asset fields may be site-relative paths (resolve against the base URL) — and a **`push`** block `{ ntfyUrl }` (M7): the client-facing ntfy relay URL the app's embedded distributor registers its device topic against, from `NTFY_PUBLIC_URL` / first `NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` (never the internal `NTFY_BASE_URL`); `null` when push isn't configured for the shard. |
| GET | `/status` | status message + current mode, **plus a `version` block** (`{ service:'runic-gateway', api, server }`) so a client first-run probe recognizes the backend and can run a version-mismatch guard |
| GET | `/version` | lightweight, **DB-free** backend identity/version (`{ service, api, server }`) — the canonical target for the version guard and a cheap liveness check |
| GET | `/settings` | whitelisted public keys only (mode, maintenance_message, status_message, homepage_teaser, contact_email, site_title) |
| GET | `/status` | status message + current mode |
| GET | `/posts/:category` | published only; `category` ∈ news\|five-on-friday\|newsletter\|screenshots |
| GET | `/posts/:category/:idOrSlug` | single published post |
| GET | `/wiki` | list of pages (slug + title) |
| GET | `/wiki/:slug` | single page |
| POST | `/contact` | (rate-limited) send mail via SMTP; if unconfigured, respond `{fallback:"mailto", email}` |
| GET | `/shard/ruleset` | the shard's own published ruleset (Protocol 3.0 `world.ruleset`): expansion, which optional systems are on, skill/stat caps, account and house limits, champion scroll rules, the save/restart schedule. Served from `shard_ruleset`, so it renders while the shard is down; live via `world.ruleset` on `/shard/stream`. Behind `requireFeature('ruleset')`. **`null`** means the shard has never published one — a real answer, distinct from a published ruleset. `caps.skill` / `caps.totalSkill` are in **tenths** (1000 = 100.0). |
| GET | `/shard/features` | the shard features **this caller** may reach plus the audience rung they resolved to (§6.5), so a client hides nav it can't follow. Reports only what the caller can see — the list itself never discloses a gated feature. Consumed by the SPA header and (pending) the Android nav. |
Public content GETs pass through the **siteMode** gate (§5).
### /admin (admin/index.js → the capability routers in §2) — all behind `isLoggedIn` + `noindex` + `staffOnly`
`admin/index.js` applies the shared gate and mounts each capability router at the prefix it owns;
`users`, `invites`, `auth/providers` and `bot-activity` add `adminOnly` on top, and `moderation` adds
`modAccess` (admin + moderator, so editors are excluded). The content capabilities — `posts`,
`uploads`, `wiki`, `pages` — add nothing: managing content is the editor tier's job, so `staffOnly` is
the whole gate. The ops/config capabilities — `uo-link`, `email`, `discord-bot`, `settings`, and
`PUT /site-mode` — are `adminOnly`; `shard` is the one mixed prefix, where self-service account
linking carries no extra gate and the in-game staff operations carry `modAccess`. There is no residual
file: every admin route is declared in a capability router.
`GET`/`PUT /admin/shard/visibility` are the third tier on that mixed prefix: **`adminOnly`**, because
they decide what *anonymous* visitors can see (§6.5). They sit above `modAccess` deliberately — a
moderator can ban a player but cannot decide what the public internet reads.
`GET /dashboard` and `PUT /site-mode` are the one place where a **single screen spans two tiers**: the
dashboard is staff-wide, but the site-mode toggle on it is `adminOnly`. The client must therefore gate
that control on its own (`Dashboard.jsx` renders it only for `role === 'admin'`) rather than relying on
the route gate that admitted them to the page — the same rule the sidebar follows, so a non-admin is
never shown a control that would 403. The URLs below are unaffected by which
file a route sits in — that is the property the route manifest freezes.
### /admin (admin.routes.js → admin.controller.js) — all behind `isLoggedIn` + `noindex`
| Method | Path | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| GET | `/dashboard` | current mode, last change time + who, content counts, recent activity |
@@ -689,9 +189,6 @@ file a route sits in — that is the property the route manifest freezes.
| GET | `/settings` · PUT `/settings` | read all / update `{key:value,...}` |
| GET | `/activity?limit=&offset=` | paginated activity log |
| GET | `/users` · POST `/users` · PUT `/users/:id` · DELETE `/users/:id` | user mgmt (can't delete self / last admin; password hashed on write) |
| GET | `/users/:id/trusted-devices` | list a user's active trusted devices (never tokens) |
| DELETE | `/users/:id/trusted-devices` · `…/:deviceId` | revoke all / one of a user's trusted devices (logs `admin.trusted_device.revoke[_all]`) |
| POST | `/users/:id/mfa/reset` | recover a locked-out user: disable TOTP + revoke all trusted devices + clear recovery codes (logs `admin.user.totp.reset`) |
Every admin write logs to `activity_log`.
@@ -722,124 +219,17 @@ who"; `activity_log` provides the history feed.
## 6. Auth & security
- **JWT** signed with `JWT_SECRET`, `expiresIn=JWT_EXPIRES_IN` (default `1d`); payload `{id,username,role}`.
- **Cookie**: `httpOnly`, `sameSite=Lax`, `path=/`, and **`secure` decided per-request** (`COOKIE_SECURE=auto` → `secure: req.secure`).
- **Trusted-device MFA.** A second, separate httpOnly cookie (`rg_trust`, default 30d) — opaque, sha256-hashed server-side in `trusted_devices` — lets a browser/app **skip the TOTP step** (never the password) on future logins. It is a server-side, per-row-revocable record (never a JWT claim), so the stateless session JWT is unchanged and trust stays revocable. It only ever gates the **second factor**; it deliberately outlives logout, and is cleared on untrust / password change / password reset / TOTP disable. **Recovery codes** (bcrypt, single-use) are the 2FA-lockout fallback. All admin trusted-device/MFA actions and the self actions (`auth.login.trusted_device`, `account.trusted_device.*`, `account.recovery_code*`, `admin.trusted_device.*`, `admin.user.totp.reset`) are audit-logged. See `docs/website/TRUSTED_DEVICES_MFA.md`. This is the key to dual access: the cookie is `Secure` when reached through Pangolin (HTTPS, `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`) but **not** `Secure` when reached directly over the LAN IP on plain HTTP — so login works in both. `COOKIE_SECURE=true|false` can force it. Requires `trust proxy` (below). `localhost:5173` (Vite) and `localhost:3000` are same-site, so the cookie flows in dev too.
- **Cookie**: `httpOnly`, `sameSite=Lax`, `path=/`, and **`secure` decided per-request** (`COOKIE_SECURE=auto` → `secure: req.secure`). This is the key to dual access: the cookie is `Secure` when reached through Pangolin (HTTPS, `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`) but **not** `Secure` when reached directly over the LAN IP on plain HTTP — so login works in both. `COOKIE_SECURE=true|false` can force it. Requires `trust proxy` (below). `localhost:5173` (Vite) and `localhost:3000` are same-site, so the cookie flows in dev too.
- **bcrypt** hashing (cost 10+); plaintext passwords never stored, logged, or returned.
- **Rate limiting** (`express-rate-limit`) on `/auth/login` and `/public/contact`.
- **Validation** (`express-validator`) on all writes; centralized error handler.
- **helmet** with a Content-Security-Policy tuned for the built React SPA. The policies now live in
**`server/src/config/csp.js`** (`app.js` only wires them up):
`default-src 'self'`; `script-src 'self'` (the Vite build emits only external module chunks — the
inline module-preload polyfill is disabled in `client/vite.config.js` to keep this valid);
`style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com` (React's pervasive inline
`style={{…}}` attributes can't be nonce'd, plus the Google Fonts stylesheet); `font-src 'self'
https://fonts.gstatic.com` (Cinzel); `img-src 'self' data: https:` (same-origin uploads, plus
external https images embedded in wiki/news bodies or `BRAND_*` logo/hero/favicon); `connect-src
'self'` (REST + SSE are same-origin); `frame-ancestors 'self'`; `object-src 'none'`; `base-uri
'self'`; `form-action 'self'` (blocks an injected `<form action="https://evil">` from POSTing
credentials off-origin — an exfil path `connect-src` does not cover; it was always emitted via
helmet's `useDefaults` and is now pinned explicitly so it cannot vanish under a helmet upgrade).
`upgrade-insecure-requests` is intentionally **not** set (TLS terminates at the proxy, there
are no mixed-content subresources, and it would break a local `npm start` over plain http). The
`/api/docs` Swagger UI route gets a **looser** policy that additionally allows inline script/style,
since swagger-ui-express injects an inline bootstrap. helmet also strips `X-Powered-By`; the two
internal-only listeners (`internalApp.js`, `bot/src/app.js`) disable it explicitly too.
- **A second, tightened policy ships alongside on `Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only`** for one
release before it replaces the enforced one (`docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md` § Phase 1). It is derived
from the enforced policy so the two cannot drift, and differs by exactly one directive:
`frame-ancestors 'self'` → **`'none'`**. Serving both headers at once means the live policy keeps
protecting users while anything the tightened version would break arrives as a report rather than as
a broken page — and for `frame-ancestors` specifically, a report from the browser of whoever framed
the site is the only way to learn that something does.
- **`POST /api/csp-report`** is the same-origin violation sink that `report-to` / `report-uri` point at
(`report-to` additionally requires the `Reporting-Endpoints` response header, which is set alongside).
Same-origin on purpose: reports describe attacks against this site and are not handed to a
third-party collector. It parses **both** wire formats (`application/csp-report` from Firefox/Safari,
`application/reports+json` from Chrome's Reporting API — handling one drops half the browsers),
writes to the `csp` log tag and **stores nothing**. Necessarily unauthenticated (browsers send
reports with no session), so it is bounded on every axis: 16 KB body cap, per-IP rate limit, fixed
field allowlist, every logged field truncated, and **always 204 — even for malformed input**, since a
4xx would make the global error handler log the attacker-supplied body and turn an open endpoint into
a log-flood primitive. Mounted outside `/api/v1` next to `/api/health`: the browser learns the path
from the policy header, never from a client build, so it is not part of the versioned client
contract.
- **helmet** with a CSP suited to the SPA (self + inline styles as needed; image sources for uploads/hero).
- **Admin not indexed**: `X-Robots-Tag: noindex, nofollow` on `/api/v1/admin` and the admin SPA routes; `robots.txt` disallows `/admin`.
- **No directory browsing** (express.static doesn't list; no `serve-index`).
- **No hardcoded credentials**: first admin via `seed.js` reading `ADMIN_USERNAME`/`ADMIN_PASSWORD` from env (created only if no users exist); `.env` git-ignored, `.env.example` committed.
- **`app.set('trust proxy', 1)`** so secure cookies, `req.ip`, and rate-limiting work behind Pangolin.
- **CORS**: same-origin in prod (SPA served by Express). Dev only: allow `CLIENT_ORIGIN` (Vite, `http://localhost:5173`) with `credentials:true`.
### 6.5 Shard visibility — the audience boundary (Protocol 3.0)
Every shard-derived surface is gated by an **admin-configurable, per-feature and per-field** audience
setting. This **replaces** the static `PUBLIC_KINDS` allowlist that used to be the whole boundary.
Policy lives in `utils/shardVisibility.js`; rows live in `shard_feature_visibility`; the admin surface
is `GET`/`PUT /admin/shard/visibility` (`adminOnly`). Admin-facing guide:
[`SHARD_VISIBILITY.md`](SHARD_VISIBILITY.md). Design: [`../link/v3.md`](../link/v3.md) §3.
**The ladder.** `anonymous < logged_in < player < staff < admin`, each rung implying the ones below.
`viewerLevel(req)` resolves it: no session ⇒ `anonymous`; authenticated ⇒ `logged_in`; authenticated
with a linked game account ⇒ `player`; moderator ⇒ `staff`; admin ⇒ `admin`. **Staff satisfy the
`player` rung without a linked account** (consistent with `/player/*` being role-agnostic).
**`editor` gets no shard privilege** — it is a content role, and mapping it to `staff` would silently
widen what editors see.
**Two invariants that are code, not configuration.** Both are enforced server-side and both reject
rather than silently ignore:
1. **`acct` and `webId` are admin-only, always.** They are not exposed as configurable fields, and a
stored row attempting to loosen them is discarded on read as well as rejected on write. A character
name is visible in game; the account behind it and the website user it links to are not.
The lock is on the field's **meaning, not one spelling**: `isLockedField(key)` matches a key that
*is* or *ends in* `acct`/`webId`, case-insensitively, so the flattened forms the read models emit
(`shapeHouse` → `ownerAcct`, `shapeGuild` → `leaderWebId`) are covered too. An exact-key check was
the original implementation and it let `GET /public/shard/idoc` serve `ownerAcct` anonymously.
2. **A kind absent from `KIND_FEATURE` is never broadcast below `admin`.** Fail closed. This is what
keeps the kind map a security boundary rather than a convenience filter, and it means a shard that
starts emitting an unknown event degrades to staff-only, never to public.
**Fail-closed everywhere else too.** An unreadable visibility config withholds every public frame; a
DB failure falls back to the compiled defaults (pre-3.0 behavior), not to open; an unresolvable viewer
subscribes as `anonymous`. The ladder comparison uses **asymmetric** fallbacks by design — an unknown
*viewer* level floors to the bottom rung and an unknown *requirement* ceils to admin, so an
unrecognised value loses on both sides. (A single shared fallback cannot do that: whichever direction
it picks, it fails open on one side.)
**Three enforcement points, one config:**
| Where | Mechanism |
|---|---|
| Routes | `requireFeature(name)` — **404** when the feature is disabled (don't leak that it exists), **403** when the caller is below its audience. `projectFeature` then strips out-of-rung fields from the body. |
| SSE (`utils/shardBroadcast.js`) | Per-connection filtering. A subscriber's rung is resolved **once at subscribe time and frozen** for that connection, so a long-lived stream can't gain privilege; each frame is then mapped kind→feature, gated, and field-projected per viewer. Two subscribers can legitimately receive different versions of one event, or one of them nothing. |
| Nav | `GET /public/shard/features` returns only what the caller may reach, so the SPA never renders a link that would 403. Presentation only. |
Config reads are cached ~5s, so admin changes take effect within seconds **including on already-open
streams**. `PUBLIC_KINDS` still exists and is still exported (`notificationStreams.js`) but is now
**derived** from the kind map rather than hand-maintained, so the two cannot drift.
**`PUBLIC_KINDS` is a module-load constant and must not be used to answer "may this caller read this
kind?"** — it is computed from the compiled *defaults*, so it cannot see an admin's changes. Use
`visibleKinds(level, config)`, which resolves against the live config. `/feed` uses it; it originally
used `PUBLIC_KINDS` and consequently kept serving `guild.join` to anonymous callers after an admin had
moved `guilds` to `staff`. `visibleKinds` deliberately ignores the `stream` flag: that governs SSE
fan-out only, so a feature whose live firehose ships off (market) stays readable from stored history.
**Every read path that returns shard data must call `projectFeature`.** The stored-history endpoints
are not exempt — `/feed` returns the same events the stream does, and returning them unprojected
reopens on the REST side exactly what the stream closes. Relatedly, `shardEvents.db.list` treats an
**empty** `kinds` array as "serve nothing", never "no filter"; the fall-through it used to take would
have turned a fully-gated config into a dump of the entire event log.
`projectFeature` walks **arrays and plain objects only**. A `Date`, `Buffer` or other class instance
is passed through as a value — rebuilding one key-by-key yields `{}`, which is the difference between
the pure-JSON wire frames and the DB-backed read models whose rows carry real `Date` columns.
**Defaults reproduce pre-3.0 behavior exactly**, so installing the framework is a no-op until an admin
changes something — with deliberate exceptions, which are the leaks it was written to close.
`/public/shard/guilds`, `/public/shard/governors` and `/public/shard/feed` previously returned the raw
stored payload, whose actors carry `acct` and `webId`; `/public/shard/idoc` returned the flattened
`ownerAcct`. All are now stripped for every caller below admin.
---
## 7. Email
@@ -858,11 +248,7 @@ instead. Errors never leak credentials.
`utils/logger.js` — a small dependency-free logger with **two transports, console + file**,
and four levels (`error`/`warn`/`info`/`debug`). Each line is timestamped and tagged by
subsystem (`[server]`, `[http]`, `[db]`, `[auth]`, `[admin]`, `[ratelimit]`, `[csp]`, …).
> During the CSP report-only soak, `[csp]` is the tag to watch: a `csp violation` warn line with
> `directive: frame-ancestors` means something really does frame the site and the enforce PR would
> break it. Silence across one release is the green light to flip.
subsystem (`[server]`, `[http]`, `[db]`, `[auth]`, `[admin]`, `[ratelimit]`, …).
- **Console**: color on a TTY, plain in Docker; verbosity = `LOG_LEVEL` (default `info`).
- **File**: plain text appended to `LOG_DIR/LOG_FILE` (default `<server>/logs/app.log`,
@@ -884,15 +270,7 @@ subsystem (`[server]`, `[http]`, `[db]`, `[auth]`, `[admin]`, `[ratelimit]`, `[c
- `app`: builds the Dockerfile (installs client+server, builds Vite, serves via Express),
`env_file: .env`, `DB_HOST=db`, `depends_on: db (healthy)`, volume `uploads:/app/uploads`,
`ports: "3000:3000"` — **binds 0.0.0.0** (no `127.0.0.1:` prefix) so Pangolin reaches it.
- `ntfy` (M7): pinned upstream `binwiederhier/ntfy` image, declarative config only
(`./ntfy/server.yml` mounted `:ro` + `NTFY_BASE_URL`), volume `ntfydata:/var/lib/ntfy`,
**publishes `:80` on a host port** (`${NTFY_HOST_PORT:-2586}:80`, binds 0.0.0.0) so Pangolin — which
runs outside the compose network — can forward the notification subdomain to it, the same reason
`app` publishes `3000`. Both devices (SSE subscribe) and the backend publisher (POSTing tickles to
registered device endpoints) reach ntfy on that public origin. Anonymous read-write to unguessable
topics (no accounts to provision) — safe because pushes are content-free tickles. Bringing the stack
up provisions a working push relay with **zero interactive setup**.
- Volumes: `dbdata`, `uploads`, `ntfydata`.
- Volumes: `dbdata`, `uploads`.
Express listens on `0.0.0.0:${PORT||3000}`. Pangolin terminates TLS and proxies to `app`.
@@ -914,19 +292,6 @@ ADMIN_USERNAME=
ADMIN_PASSWORD=
# Email: configured in Admin → Settings → Email (Gmail OAuth2), not via env
CLIENT_ORIGIN=http://localhost:5173
# Push (M7): the ntfy relay URL — also the backend's SSRF allow-set for device
# endpoints. NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS / NTFY_PUBLISH_TOKEN are optional.
NTFY_BASE_URL=https://ntfy.example.com
# The client-facing ntfy URL surfaced to the app via /public/settings.push.ntfyUrl
# (the app registers its topic endpoint here). Defaults to the first
# NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS entry; set explicitly when the public URL differs from the
# internal NTFY_BASE_URL. Without it (and without NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS) the app
# shows push as unavailable for the shard.
NTFY_PUBLIC_URL=https://ntfy.example.com
NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://ntfy.example.com
# Host port the ntfy container publishes :80 on (default 2586); the reverse proxy
# forwards the notification subdomain to host:NTFY_HOST_PORT. Change on a conflict.
NTFY_HOST_PORT=2586
```
`.gitignore`: `node_modules/`, `.env`, `_reference/`, `client/dist/`, `uploads/`.

128
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@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
# Runic Gateway Website — Moderation Appeals (Phase 6c/6d)
> Website feature branch: **`feature/moderation-appeals`**. Builds on the moderation
> dashboard (Phase 6a/6b) and the Discord bot's `mod_actions` log. Companion to
> [website-README.md](website-README.md) (overview) and
> [BACKEND_DESIGN.md](BACKEND_DESIGN.md) (base API contract).
## 1. Overview
A player whose linked Discord identity was **banned** or **muted** — an action
recorded in the bot's `mod_actions` log — can open an **appeal** from the player
portal and track its status. Staff (**admin** or **moderator** role) work the
appeal from an **appeals queue** in the admin moderation section: claim it, then
resolve it **approved** or **denied** with a written staff response.
When staff **approve** a ban/mute appeal, the website makes a best-effort call to
the Discord bot's internal API to actually lift the ban / clear the timeout in
Discord, and the bot posts a mod-log embed ("Appeal approved"). This is
**best-effort**: if the bot is unreachable the appeal still resolves as approved,
the reversal is recorded as failed, and staff can reverse the sanction manually in
Discord.
Only **ban** and **mute** actions are appealable — the sanctions that have an
ongoing effect. Warnings/kicks and similar one-shot actions are not.
## 2. Ownership & eligibility
- **`appeals` is a server-owned table** — only the website reads/writes it. It
references the bot-owned `mod_actions` log by a plain id column
(`mod_action_id`); there is **no hard cross-owner foreign key** between the two
databases, so the reference is validated in application code (same pattern as
the rest of the uo-link / bot integration, where the two services never share a
live FK).
- **Eligibility** — the appellant must be a **logged-in player** whose linked
Discord identity (`user_identities`, `provider = 'discord'`) matches the
`mod_actions` row's target. A player cannot open an appeal for someone else's
action, and an unlinked player has nothing eligible to appeal.
- **One active appeal per action** — only one `pending` / `under_review` appeal is
allowed for a given `mod_action_id` at a time; a second attempt while one is
already open is rejected.
## 3. Appeal lifecycle
```
pending ──▶ under_review ──▶ approved
└─▶ denied
pending ──▶ withdrawn
under_review ──▶ withdrawn
```
- **`pending`** — submitted by the player, not yet claimed.
- **`under_review`** — claimed by a staffer (the claiming admin/moderator is
stamped on the row).
- **`approved`** / **`denied`** — resolved by staff with an optional
`staff_response`. Approving a ban/mute appeal triggers the Phase 6d reversal
(§5).
- **`withdrawn`** — the player pulled the appeal back before it was resolved.
`reversal_status` (only meaningful on an approved ban/mute appeal) is one of
`none` (not attempted / not applicable), `done`, or `failed`. No new
`mod_actions` row is written for a reversal — it modifies the *original* action's
standing rather than logging a new one.
## 4. API — player (role: `player`)
Base `/api/v1/player/appeals`.
| Method | Path | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| GET | `/player/appeals` | The caller's own appeals. |
| GET | `/player/appeals/eligible` | The caller's ban/mute actions with no active appeal (empty if they have no linked Discord identity). |
| POST | `/player/appeals` | Open an appeal — `{ mod_action_id, submitted_text }`. `403` if the action isn't the caller's, `400` if the action isn't a ban/mute, `409` if one is already open for it. |
| POST | `/player/appeals/:id/withdraw` | Withdraw an appeal that hasn't been resolved yet. |
## 5. API — staff (role: `admin` or `moderator`)
Base `/api/v1/admin/moderation/appeals`, alongside the existing moderation
section.
| Method | Path | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| GET | `/admin/moderation/appeals?status=&limit=&offset=` | The queue. Defaults to `pending` + `under_review`; pass `status=all` or a specific status to filter. |
| GET | `/admin/moderation/appeals/:id` | One appeal. |
| POST | `/admin/moderation/appeals/:id/claim` | `pending` → `under_review`, stamping the claiming staffer. |
| POST | `/admin/moderation/appeals/:id/resolve` | `{ status: 'approved' \| 'denied', staff_response? }`. On an approved ban/mute, triggers the Discord reversal (§6). |
| GET | `/admin/moderation/user/:discordId/appeals` | A user's appeals — shown as a tab on the per-user moderation history page. |
`resolve` returns a `reversal` object describing what happened:
```jsonc
{
"reversal": {
"attempted": true,
"ok": true,
"reversal_status": "done", // "none" | "done" | "failed"
"bot_status": 200,
"error": null
}
}
```
## 6. Auto-reversal (Phase 6d)
On `resolve` with `status: 'approved'` against a ban/mute appeal, the website
calls the Discord bot's internal API:
```
POST /internal/mod-reverse
```
— gated by the same shared-secret scheme as the existing `/internal/announce`
call. The bot lifts the ban / clears the timeout for the target and posts an
"Appeal approved" embed to its mod log.
The call is **best-effort**: the appeal resolution itself always completes
(the appeal is marked `approved` and the staff response is saved) regardless of
whether the bot answers. If the bot is down or the call otherwise fails,
`reversal_status` is recorded as `failed` and staff are expected to reverse the
sanction by hand in Discord; the `reversal` object in the `resolve` response
surfaces `ok: false` and an `error` so the UI can flag it. Denied appeals never
attempt a reversal.
---
See [website-README.md](website-README.md) for the moderation dashboard's place
in the wider site, and [BACKEND_DESIGN.md](BACKEND_DESIGN.md) for the base API
conventions (auth, error shapes, response codes) these endpoints follow.

555
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@@ -1,555 +0,0 @@
# Website — Project Tree
> **Auto-generated.** This file is maintained by the `sync-project-tree` CI workflow in
> the [`RunicGateway/website`](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/website) repository, which
> opens a pull request here whenever the tracked file layout on `main` changes. Do not edit
> by hand — changes will be overwritten by the next sync.
A snapshot of the tracked files in the repository (build output, dependencies, and other
git-ignored paths are excluded).
```text
website/
├── .claude/
│ └── launch.json
├── .gitea/
│ ├── ISSUE_TEMPLATE/
│ │ ├── bug_report.md
│ │ ├── config.yaml
│ │ └── feature_request.md
│ ├── scripts/
│ │ └── gen_tree.py
│ ├── workflows/
│ │ ├── build-images.yml
│ │ ├── pr-checks.yml
│ │ ├── sonarqube.yml
│ │ └── sync-project-tree.yml
│ └── PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md
├── bot/
│ ├── src/
│ │ ├── discord/
│ │ │ ├── commands/
│ │ │ │ ├── announce.command.js
│ │ │ │ ├── autorole.command.js
│ │ │ │ ├── ban.command.js
│ │ │ │ ├── filter.command.js
│ │ │ │ ├── filterallow.command.js
│ │ │ │ ├── index.js
│ │ │ │ ├── invite.command.js
│ │ │ │ ├── kick.command.js
│ │ │ │ ├── modlog.command.js
│ │ │ │ ├── mute.command.js
│ │ │ │ ├── news.command.js
│ │ │ │ ├── ping.command.js
│ │ │ │ ├── role.command.js
│ │ │ │ ├── rolemenu.command.js
│ │ │ │ ├── roles.command.js
│ │ │ │ ├── schedule.command.js
│ │ │ │ ├── warn.command.js
│ │ │ │ ├── warnings.command.js
│ │ │ │ └── wiki.command.js
│ │ │ ├── discordManager.js
│ │ │ ├── guildMemberAdd.js
│ │ │ ├── guildMemberRemove.js
│ │ │ ├── inviteTracker.js
│ │ │ ├── messageFilter.js
│ │ │ ├── modLog.js
│ │ │ ├── newsAnnounce.js
│ │ │ └── roleMenuHandler.js
│ │ ├── filter/
│ │ │ ├── filterCache.js
│ │ │ ├── inviteFilter.js
│ │ │ ├── normalize.js
│ │ │ └── spamFilter.js
│ │ ├── internal/
│ │ │ ├── internal.controller.js
│ │ │ ├── internal.routes.js
│ │ │ └── requireInternalKey.js
│ │ ├── invites/
│ │ │ ├── inviteRotator.js
│ │ │ └── inviteScheduler.js
│ │ ├── model/
│ │ │ ├── filterAllowlist.js
│ │ │ ├── filterHits.js
│ │ │ ├── filterWords.js
│ │ │ ├── guildConfig.js
│ │ │ ├── inviteLog.js
│ │ │ ├── memberEvents.js
│ │ │ ├── roleMenus.js
│ │ │ ├── scheduledMessages.js
│ │ │ ├── spamHits.js
│ │ │ ├── tempRoles.js
│ │ │ └── warnings.js
│ │ ├── roles/
│ │ │ └── tempRoleSweeper.js
│ │ ├── scheduler/
│ │ │ └── scheduler.js
│ │ ├── site/
│ │ │ └── siteApiClient.js
│ │ ├── utils/
│ │ │ ├── duration.js
│ │ │ └── logger.js
│ │ ├── app.js
│ │ ├── bootstrap.js
│ │ ├── brand.js
│ │ ├── db.js
│ │ └── server.js
│ ├── .env.example
│ ├── .gitignore
│ ├── Dockerfile
│ ├── package-lock.json
│ └── package.json
├── brand/
│ └── README.md
├── client/
│ ├── public/
│ │ ├── assets/
│ │ │ └── img/
│ │ │ ├── favicon.ico
│ │ │ ├── hero-moon.png
│ │ │ ├── runic-emblem.png
│ │ │ └── uomysticmoon-main-hero.png
│ │ └── robots.txt
│ ├── src/
│ │ ├── api/
│ │ │ └── client.js
│ │ ├── blocks/
│ │ │ ├── types/
│ │ │ │ ├── cta.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── divider.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── heading.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── image.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── quote.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── richText.jsx
│ │ │ │ └── twoColumn.jsx
│ │ │ ├── BlockRenderer.jsx
│ │ │ ├── editorKit.jsx
│ │ │ ├── index.js
│ │ │ └── registry.js
│ │ ├── components/
│ │ │ ├── security/
│ │ │ │ ├── RecoveryCodesDisplay.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── RecoveryCodesPanel.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── TrustedDevicesPanel.jsx
│ │ │ │ └── TrustLimitModal.jsx
│ │ │ ├── CharacterSheet.jsx
│ │ │ ├── CharacterStats.jsx
│ │ │ ├── CreateGameAccountForm.jsx
│ │ │ ├── GameAccounts.jsx
│ │ │ ├── HeroElement.jsx
│ │ │ ├── MaintenanceGate.jsx
│ │ │ ├── Modal.jsx
│ │ │ ├── MoonDot.jsx
│ │ │ ├── PageHeader.jsx
│ │ │ ├── PageState.jsx
│ │ │ ├── PlayersOnline.jsx
│ │ │ ├── ProviderIcon.jsx
│ │ │ ├── PublicLayout.jsx
│ │ │ ├── RequireAuth.jsx
│ │ │ ├── RequirePlayer.jsx
│ │ │ ├── RichTextEditor.jsx
│ │ │ ├── RoleGate.jsx
│ │ │ ├── ShardAccountActions.jsx
│ │ │ ├── SiteFooter.jsx
│ │ │ ├── SiteHeader.jsx
│ │ │ └── VendorSales.jsx
│ │ ├── contexts/
│ │ │ ├── AuthContext.jsx
│ │ │ └── SiteContext.jsx
│ │ ├── data/
│ │ │ ├── cityCrests.js
│ │ │ └── regionBuckets.js
│ │ ├── lib/
│ │ │ ├── format.js
│ │ │ ├── heroLayout.js
│ │ │ ├── shardEvents.js
│ │ │ ├── useAsync.js
│ │ │ └── useShardFeed.js
│ │ ├── routes/
│ │ │ ├── admin/
│ │ │ │ ├── views/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── AccountAdmin.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ActivityAdmin.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── AdminCharacter.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── AdminCharacters.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── Appeals.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── AuthProvidersAdmin.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── BotActivityAdmin.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── Dashboard.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── DiscordBotAdmin.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── EmailDelivery.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── HeroEditor.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── HousesAdmin.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── InvitesAdmin.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── Moderation.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ModerationUser.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── PageBuilder.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── PagesAdmin.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── PostEditor.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── PostsAdmin.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── SettingsAdmin.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ShardAdmin.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── ShardOps.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── UserDetail.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── UserEditor.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── UsersAdmin.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── WikiAdmin.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── WikiCategories.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ ├── WikiEditor.jsx
│ │ │ │ │ └── WikiHistory.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── AdminLayout.jsx
│ │ │ │ └── AdminLogin.jsx
│ │ │ ├── player/
│ │ │ │ ├── AcceptInvite.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── ForgotPassword.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── PlayerAccount.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── PlayerAppeals.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── PlayerCharacter.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── PlayerCharacters.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── PlayerLogin.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── PlayerPortalLayout.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── PlayerRegister.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── PlayerShell.jsx
│ │ │ │ └── ResetPassword.jsx
│ │ │ ├── public/
│ │ │ │ ├── About.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── ChampSpawns.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── CmsPage.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── FiveOnFriday.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── Governors.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── Guilds.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── Houses.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── Maintenance.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── News.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── Newsletter.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── NewsletterIssue.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── Portal.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── Screenshots.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── Shard.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── ShardActivity.jsx
│ │ │ │ ├── Status.jsx
│ │ │ │ └── Website.jsx
│ │ │ └── wiki/
│ │ │ ├── Wiki.jsx
│ │ │ └── WikiArticle.jsx
│ │ ├── styles/
│ │ │ └── theme.css
│ │ ├── App.jsx
│ │ └── main.jsx
│ ├── test/
│ │ ├── apiClient.test.js
│ │ ├── format.test.js
│ │ ├── heroLayout.test.js
│ │ ├── regionBuckets.test.js
│ │ └── shardEvents.test.js
│ ├── index.html
│ ├── package-lock.json
│ ├── package.json
│ └── vite.config.js
├── ntfy/
│ └── server.yml
├── scripts/
│ ├── dev/
│ │ ├── README.md
│ │ ├── seed-sso-provider.js
│ │ ├── sso-bridge-smoketest.js
│ │ └── stub-idp.js
│ └── sonar-test-reporter.mjs
├── server/
│ ├── db/
│ │ ├── schema.sql
│ │ └── seed.js
│ ├── scripts/
│ │ └── routeManifest.js
│ ├── src/
│ │ ├── auth/
│ │ │ ├── providers/
│ │ │ │ ├── base.provider.js
│ │ │ │ ├── discord.provider.js
│ │ │ │ ├── genericOidc.provider.js
│ │ │ │ ├── google.provider.js
│ │ │ │ ├── local.provider.js
│ │ │ │ ├── oauth2.provider.js
│ │ │ │ └── registry.js
│ │ │ ├── session.middleware.js
│ │ │ ├── session.service.js
│ │ │ ├── ssoState.js
│ │ │ ├── token.js
│ │ │ └── usernamePolicy.js
│ │ ├── blocks/
│ │ │ ├── types/
│ │ │ │ ├── cta.js
│ │ │ │ ├── divider.js
│ │ │ │ ├── heading.js
│ │ │ │ ├── image.js
│ │ │ │ ├── quote.js
│ │ │ │ ├── richText.js
│ │ │ │ └── twoColumn.js
│ │ │ ├── index.js
│ │ │ ├── propHelpers.js
│ │ │ ├── registry.js
│ │ │ ├── sanitizeBlocks.js
│ │ │ └── validateBlocks.js
│ │ ├── config/
│ │ │ ├── brand.js
│ │ │ ├── csp.js
│ │ │ ├── notificationStreams.js
│ │ │ └── version.js
│ │ ├── middleware/
│ │ │ ├── botScore.js
│ │ │ ├── loginProtection.js
│ │ │ ├── noindex.js
│ │ │ ├── rateLimit.js
│ │ │ ├── requireInternalKey.js
│ │ │ ├── siteMode.js
│ │ │ └── validate.js
│ │ ├── model/
│ │ │ ├── activity/
│ │ │ │ ├── activity.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── activity.model.js
│ │ │ ├── announceJobs/
│ │ │ │ ├── announceJobs.db.js
│ │ │ │ ├── announceJobs.logic.js
│ │ │ │ └── announceJobs.model.js
│ │ │ ├── appeals/
│ │ │ │ ├── appeals.db.js
│ │ │ │ ├── appeals.model.js
│ │ │ │ └── appeals.pure.js
│ │ │ ├── authProviders/
│ │ │ │ ├── authProviders.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── authProviders.model.js
│ │ │ ├── botConfig/
│ │ │ │ ├── botConfig.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── botConfig.model.js
│ │ │ ├── emailConfig/
│ │ │ │ ├── emailConfig.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── emailConfig.model.js
│ │ │ ├── invites/
│ │ │ │ ├── invites.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── invites.model.js
│ │ │ ├── mobileAuthBridge/
│ │ │ │ ├── mobileAuthBridge.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── mobileAuthBridge.model.js
│ │ │ ├── mobileSessions/
│ │ │ │ ├── mobileSessions.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── mobileSessions.model.js
│ │ │ ├── moderation/
│ │ │ │ ├── moderation.db.js
│ │ │ │ ├── moderation.model.js
│ │ │ │ └── moderation.pure.js
│ │ │ ├── modNotes/
│ │ │ │ ├── modNotes.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── modNotes.model.js
│ │ │ ├── notificationSubs/
│ │ │ │ ├── notificationSubs.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── notificationSubs.model.js
│ │ │ ├── pages/
│ │ │ │ ├── pages.db.js
│ │ │ │ ├── pages.model.js
│ │ │ │ └── reservedSlugs.js
│ │ │ ├── passwordResets/
│ │ │ │ ├── passwordResets.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── passwordResets.model.js
│ │ │ ├── posts/
│ │ │ │ ├── posts.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── posts.model.js
│ │ │ ├── pushDevices/
│ │ │ │ ├── pushDevices.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── pushDevices.model.js
│ │ │ ├── recoveryCodes/
│ │ │ │ ├── recoveryCodes.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── recoveryCodes.model.js
│ │ │ ├── revokedSessions/
│ │ │ │ ├── revokedSessions.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── revokedSessions.model.js
│ │ │ ├── settings/
│ │ │ │ ├── settings.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── settings.model.js
│ │ │ ├── shardEvents/
│ │ │ │ ├── shardEvents.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── shardEvents.model.js
│ │ │ ├── shardLinks/
│ │ │ │ ├── shardLinks.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── shardLinks.model.js
│ │ │ ├── shardState/
│ │ │ │ ├── shardState.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── shardState.model.js
│ │ │ ├── trustedDevices/
│ │ │ │ ├── trustedDevices.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── trustedDevices.model.js
│ │ │ ├── uoLinkConfig/
│ │ │ │ ├── uoLinkConfig.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── uoLinkConfig.model.js
│ │ │ ├── userIdentities/
│ │ │ │ ├── userIdentities.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── userIdentities.model.js
│ │ │ ├── users/
│ │ │ │ ├── users.db.js
│ │ │ │ └── users.model.js
│ │ │ ├── wiki/
│ │ │ │ ├── wiki.db.js
│ │ │ │ ├── wiki.links.js
│ │ │ │ └── wiki.model.js
│ │ │ └── singletonConfigDb.js
│ │ ├── router/
│ │ │ ├── v1/
│ │ │ │ ├── admin/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── account.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── account.router.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── activity.router.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── admin.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── admin.routes.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── authProviders.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── authProviders.router.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── botActivity.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── botActivity.router.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── discordBot.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── emailConfig.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── imageUpload.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── index.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── invites.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── invites.router.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── moderation.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── moderation.router.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── pages.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── pages.router.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── posts.router.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── shardOps.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── uoLink.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── uploads.router.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── users.router.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── usersShard.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ └── wiki.router.js
│ │ │ │ ├── auth/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── auth.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── auth.routes.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── invite.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── me.routes.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── mobile.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── mobile.routes.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── mobileSso.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── mobileSso.routes.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── notifications.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── notifications.routes.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── passwordReset.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── sso.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── sso.routes.js
│ │ │ │ │ └── trustDevice.helper.js
│ │ │ │ ├── internal/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── internal.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ └── internal.routes.js
│ │ │ │ ├── player/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── appeals.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── player.routes.js
│ │ │ │ │ └── shard.controller.js
│ │ │ │ ├── public/
│ │ │ │ │ ├── public.controller.js
│ │ │ │ │ ├── public.routes.js
│ │ │ │ │ └── shard.controller.js
│ │ │ │ └── v1.router.js
│ │ │ ├── api.router.js
│ │ │ ├── cspReport.controller.js
│ │ │ └── wellKnown.controller.js
│ │ ├── utils/
│ │ │ ├── announceWorker.js
│ │ │ ├── auth.js
│ │ │ ├── botInternalClient.js
│ │ │ ├── botInternalKey.js
│ │ │ ├── db.js
│ │ │ ├── logger.js
│ │ │ ├── mailer.js
│ │ │ ├── newsGump.js
│ │ │ ├── pushDispatch.js
│ │ │ ├── sanitizeHtml.js
│ │ │ ├── secretBox.js
│ │ │ ├── shardBroadcast.js
│ │ │ ├── shardIngest.js
│ │ │ ├── shardSales.js
│ │ │ ├── totp.js
│ │ │ ├── trustProxy.js
│ │ │ ├── uoLinkClient.js
│ │ │ └── uoLinkSocket.js
│ │ ├── app.js
│ │ ├── internalApp.js
│ │ └── server.js
│ ├── swagger/
│ │ ├── swagger-output.json
│ │ └── swagger.js
│ ├── test/
│ │ ├── _helper.js
│ │ ├── adminTrustedDevices.test.js
│ │ ├── adminUserShard.test.js
│ │ ├── announceJobs.test.js
│ │ ├── appeals.pure.test.js
│ │ ├── appeals.test.js
│ │ ├── appLinks.test.js
│ │ ├── authController.test.js
│ │ ├── authMe.test.js
│ │ ├── authTrustedDevice.test.js
│ │ ├── botInternalKey.test.js
│ │ ├── botScore.test.js
│ │ ├── csp.test.js
│ │ ├── emailConfig.model.test.js
│ │ ├── honeypot.test.js
│ │ ├── inviteController.test.js
│ │ ├── invites.test.js
│ │ ├── loginProtection.test.js
│ │ ├── mailer.test.js
│ │ ├── mobileAuthBridge.model.test.js
│ │ ├── mobileDeviceSessions.test.js
│ │ ├── mobileSession.test.js
│ │ ├── mobileSsoBridge.test.js
│ │ ├── moderation.model.test.js
│ │ ├── moderation.test.js
│ │ ├── newsGump.test.js
│ │ ├── notificationsRoutes.test.js
│ │ ├── pages.model.test.js
│ │ ├── passwordResetController.test.js
│ │ ├── passwordResets.test.js
│ │ ├── playerAccounts.test.js
│ │ ├── playerRouteAccess.test.js
│ │ ├── providers.test.js
│ │ ├── publicBrand.test.js
│ │ ├── publicController.test.js
│ │ ├── publicShardOnline.test.js
│ │ ├── publicVersion.test.js
│ │ ├── pushDispatch.test.js
│ │ ├── recoveryCodes.test.js
│ │ ├── registry.test.js
│ │ ├── requireInternalKey.test.js
│ │ ├── routeManifest.test.js
│ │ ├── secretBox.test.js
│ │ ├── selfTrustedDevices.test.js
│ │ ├── session.test.js
│ │ ├── shardControllerPublic.test.js
│ │ ├── shardIngest.champsPages.test.js
│ │ ├── shardIngest.protocol2.test.js
│ │ ├── shardState.governorTerms.test.js
│ │ ├── shardState.model.test.js
│ │ ├── ssoCallback.test.js
│ │ ├── ssoState.test.js
│ │ ├── totp.test.js
│ │ ├── trustedDevices.test.js
│ │ ├── trustProxy.test.js
│ │ └── usernamePolicy.test.js
│ ├── .env.example
│ ├── package-lock.json
│ ├── package.json
│ ├── routes.guards.json
│ └── routes.manifest.json
├── .dockerignore
├── .env.example
├── .env.uomysticmoon.example
├── .gitignore
├── CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
├── CONTRIBUTING.md
├── CONTRIBUTORS.md
├── docker-compose.dev.yml
├── docker-compose.yml
├── Dockerfile
├── LICENSE.md
├── package.json
├── README.md
├── SECURITY.md
└── sonar-project.properties
```

138
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@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
# Shard visibility — who sees which shard data
**Status:** Built (Protocol 3.0 Part A). Admin → Shard Visibility.
**Audience:** shard owners and admins.
**Companion to** [`../link/v3.md`](../link/v3.md) §3 (the design) and
[`BACKEND_DESIGN.md`](BACKEND_DESIGN.md) §6 (the security contract).
The website surfaces a lot of live shard data. What your players, your staff and the anonymous
internet may each see is **yours to decide**, per feature, from Admin → Shard Visibility.
Nothing changes until you change it: every setting ships at the value that reproduces how the site
behaved before this panel existed.
---
## 1. The audience ladder
Five rungs. Each one includes everyone below it.
| Rung | In the UI | Who that is |
|---|---|---|
| `anonymous` | **Everyone** | Anyone at all, signed in or not. |
| `logged_in` | **Signed in** | Any registered account, whether or not they've linked a game account. |
| `player` | **Linked players** | Accounts with a linked in-game account. **Staff always qualify**, linked or not. |
| `staff` | **Staff** | Admins and moderators. |
| `admin` | **Admins only** | Admins. |
Two notes that surprise people:
- **`editor` is a content role, not a shard role.** Editors write news and wiki pages; they get no
shard privilege from that. An editor is treated by link status like any other member. This matches
the rest of the site, where shard staff powers are admin-or-moderator.
- **Staff satisfy `player` without linking.** Otherwise an admin would be locked out of surfaces
they'd gated to players, which is how the `/player/*` routes already behave.
## 2. What you can set per feature
**Enabled.** Off means gone. The feature's pages return “not found”, not “forbidden” — a disabled
feature doesn't advertise that it exists.
**Who can see it.** The minimum rung, from the ladder above.
**Live updates.** Whether this feature pushes changes to open pages in real time. Turning it off
doesn't break the page; it just refreshes on load instead of updating in place.
**Sensitive fields.** Some features expose a field that deserves its own rung — you can publish the
board while holding back one column. See the table in §3.
## 3. The features, and their defaults
| Feature | What it exposes | Default | Sensitive fields |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Shard status** | Connection state, online count, gold-supply series | Everyone | — |
| **Activity feed** | Deaths, kills, skill gains, quests, logins | Everyone | — |
| **Champion spawns** | The live champion / mini-champ / sea-boss board | Everyone | — |
| **Guilds** | Guild rosters, alliances, leaders | Everyone | — |
| **Town governors** | City Loyalty governors, elections, term history | Everyone | — |
| **Houses / IDOC** | Houses in danger | Everyone | House owner → Staff · House price → Staff |
| **Players online** | Population aggregate, staff-online widget | Everyone | In-game location → Staff |
| **Shard rules** | Skill/stat caps, house limits, vet rewards, the ruleset | Everyone | Connect address → Everyone |
| **Spawn atlas** | Bestiary and spawn locations (static content) | Everyone | — |
| **Leaderboards** | Point and loyalty standings | Everyone | Character names → Everyone |
| **Marketplace** | The shard-wide player-vendor index | Everyone, **live updates off** | Vendor owner name → Everyone · Location → Everyone |
**Why the marketplace ships with live updates off.** A live feed of every vendor's full inventory
would be the single largest thing the site sends. No page needs it — the marketplace is a search over
stored data with a “prices last refreshed N minutes ago” stamp. Turn it on only if you want it.
**Why house owner/price default to Staff.** The public Houses page has always been a "where are the
falling houses" board — location only. Owner and price are the staff view. That split is preserved.
## 4. What you cannot change
Two rules are enforced in code and are not settings. Attempting to set them returns an error rather
than silently ignoring you.
**1. Game account names and website user ids are admin-only, always.**
`acct` and `webId` never appear below the admin rung on any surface. A character *name* is visible in
game to anyone standing next to them; the **account** behind it is not, and neither is the website
user it's linked to. Publishing those would disclose something the shard itself doesn't, and would
tie a player's in-game identity to their forum identity without their consent.
This rule matches the *meaning* of a field, not one spelling of it. Some responses nest the player
who owns a record (`leader.acct`); others flatten it into the row (`ownerAcct`, `leaderWebId`,
`governorAcct`). Every one of those is locked, and the admin API refuses to configure any of them —
so a new response shape can't quietly reopen the hole by naming the field differently.
**2. Unknown event kinds are never broadcast below admin.**
The live stream maps each event kind to a feature. A kind with no mapping — a new event from a shard
plugin the site doesn't know yet, say — goes to admins only. It fails closed. This is what keeps the
stream safe by default when the shard starts sending something new: the worst case is that staff see
it and players don't, never the reverse.
## 5. How it's enforced
Three places, one config:
- **Page and API requests** are checked before the handler runs, and the response is then stripped of
any field above the caller's rung.
- **The live stream** resolves a viewer's rung once, when they connect, and freezes it for that
connection — a long-open page can't gain privilege because something changed underneath it. Each
event is then gated and stripped per viewer, so two people watching the same page can legitimately
receive different versions of the same event, or one of them nothing.
- **Navigation** hides links a viewer can't follow, so they don't hit a wall. This is presentation
only — the gate is server-side either way.
**Stored history answers the same way the live stream does.** The activity feed reads from the event
log rather than the live stream, but it resolves the *same* question against the *same* config: which
kinds you may read, and which fields survive. So moving a feature up a rung hides it from the history
as well as the stream — there is no back door where yesterday's copy of an event is more revealing
than today's.
One deliberate asymmetry: turning **live updates** off for a feature stops the push, not the reading.
The marketplace ships this way — its history and its pages are public, only the firehose is off.
Changes take effect within about five seconds, **including on streams that are already open**. You
don't need to restart anything.
If the database is briefly unreachable, the site falls back to the built-in defaults — the pre-v3
behavior — rather than to "everything is public".
## 6. Worked examples
**"I want a private shard — nothing public until people register."**
Set every feature to **Signed in**. Anonymous visitors still get the site itself; the shard data
disappears from the nav.
**"Publish the market, but don't tie vendors to players."**
Marketplace → Everyone, with **Vendor owner name** → Staff. Prices, items and locations stay public;
who owns each vendor doesn't.
**"Leaderboards for members only."**
Leaderboards → **Linked players**. Anyone who's linked a game account sees the standings; drive-by
visitors don't.
**"Let players see house owners."**
Houses → Everyone, **House owner** → Linked players. Note this is a real disclosure: house ownership
is visible in game, but the website makes it searchable in a way the game doesn't.

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# Spawn atlas
**Status:** Data pipeline landed on `edge` (website [#112](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/website/pulls/112)); API and client pages follow in a second PR.
**Design:** [`docs/link/v3.md` §6](../link/v3.md) — Protocol 3.0 Part C.
The spawn atlas is a browsable catalogue of what the shard *contains*: which
creatures spawn, where, how many, and which champion altars are configured. It
answers "where do I find a lizardman?" with **"Shrines, Yew, Isamu-Jima"** rather
than with a list of raw coordinates.
## Two things that shape the whole design
**The shard's ServUO tree is the single source of truth.** Nothing is
precomputed and committed to the repository. A shard's maps change over its
lifetime — facets get added, replaced, or renamed — and a snapshot in the repo
would silently drift from the world players actually see. The atlas is therefore
re-derived from the tree **on every server boot**.
**Facets are not a fixed list.** Nothing in the codebase names Felucca, Trammel,
or any other stock facet. The facet set is whatever the shard's own files
declare, discovered at parse time. A shard running entirely custom maps gets
exactly the same treatment as a stock one, with no code change.
## What it is not
The atlas is **static shard content, not live shard state.**
- It does **not** come from the sidecar. Nothing here touches the bridge, and
there is no event kind, no wire change and no `PROTOCOL_VERSION` bump for it.
Part C is website-only.
- It stays fully populated while the shard is down.
- Its champion table (`shard_champion_spawns`) is the *configured roster* —
"there is an Unholy Terror altar in Deceit". The live `champ.update` feed in
`shard_champs` is the separate, sidecar-fed answer to "it is on level 3 right
now". Both exist; do not conflate them.
Routes live at `/api/v1/public/atlas`, deliberately **not** under `/shard`,
because `/shard/*` means sidecar-dependent.
## Configuring the tree
The website needs to be able to *read* the ServUO tree — same host, a bind mount,
or a shared volume. Two ways to point at it, the setting winning over the
environment:
| Source | Notes |
|---|---|
| `spawn_atlas_servuo_path` setting | Admin-editable; changes take effect on the next refresh without a redeploy |
| `SERVUO_PATH` env var | The deploy-time default, since the path usually describes a mount the deployment sets up |
With neither set the atlas is simply skipped — the site runs normally without
one.
## The boot path
On every start the server hashes the source files and compares them against what
is loaded. Unchanged (the normal case on a restart) costs one read pass, ~120 ms,
and no database write. A real change costs a ~400 ms parse and a reload.
Two contracts govern it:
**1. It never blocks startup.** No configured path, an unreadable mount, a
malformed file, a database error — every one is caught and logged, and the site
comes up serving whatever atlas it already had.
**2. A facet disappearing is never applied automatically.** Losing a facet looks
exactly like a half-copied or mid-update tree, and boot cannot tell that apart
from a real map change. That refresh is *staged* for a human instead. Everything
else — new facets, renamed regions, changed spawns — applies immediately, since
none of it can destroy something an operator would miss.
```
boot
└─ path configured? no ──▶ skip
└─ tree readable? no ──▶ warn, carry on
└─ hashes changed? no ──▶ done (nothing parsed)
└─ parse
└─ a facet would be removed?
no ──▶ import
yes ──▶ stage for admin review; atlas unchanged
```
### Approving or rejecting a staged refresh
Only the *decision* is stored, never the parsed world — a few KB of source hashes
plus the facet diff. Approving **re-parses** the tree, so what lands matches the
tree at approval time rather than at boot, and a multi-megabyte blob never sits
in the database.
A rejection is remembered against those exact source hashes, so a declined
refresh does not re-prompt on every restart. Change the tree and the hashes
differ, which asks again.
From the admin panel (second PR), or from the CLI:
```bash
cd website/server
npm run atlas:import -- --status # what is loaded, and what is pending
npm run atlas:import -- --approve # apply the staged refresh
npm run atlas:import -- --reject # keep the current atlas, dismiss it
```
## The CLI
The server refreshes itself on boot, so this is for applying a map change
*without* a restart, and for the approve/reject flow above.
```bash
npm run atlas:import # import if the tree differs
npm run atlas:import -- --servuo <path> # override the path for this run
npm run atlas:import -- --force # reimport even if unchanged
```
`--servuo` is a per-run override and deliberately does **not** persist — changing
where the atlas permanently reads from is an admin action, not a side effect of a
one-off import.
## Sources
| File | Count (stock ServUO 57.4) | Used for |
|---|---|---|
| `Spawns/*.xml` | 13 files, ~10.5 MB | Every spawner: location, size, delays, time-of-day, creature types |
| `Data/Regions.xml` | 129 KB, nested | Named regions and their rectangles |
| `Data/Locations/*.xml` | 6 files | Landmarks (dungeon levels, town markers) |
| `Config/ChampionSpawns.xml` | 4.8 KB | Configured champion altars |
**A stock tree has 13 spawn files but only 6 facets.** `Eodon.xml`,
`GravewaterLake.xml`, `TreasuresOfKotl.xml` and the other named-area files hold
TerMur/Trammel points. The facet always comes from each record's own `<Map>`,
never from the file name.
## How a coordinate becomes a place name
This is the transform the atlas exists for, in `resolveRegion()`:
1. The highest-`priority` named region whose rectangle contains the point. Ties
break toward the **smallest** rect, so a specific room wins over the
dungeon-wide rect enclosing it.
2. Otherwise the nearest landmark within the landmark radius (200 tiles by
default), labelled by its **group** ("Covetous"), not its individual marker
("Level 1").
3. Otherwise `"Wilderness"`.
The radius cap in step 2 is what keeps step 3 reachable. Without it the nearest
landmark is always *some* landmark however far away, and open countryside gets
labelled with a dungeon on the far side of the map.
Against stock ServUO this resolves **83.2%** of points (5,369 of 6,455): 3,681 by
region, 1,688 by landmark, 1,086 Wilderness.
## Three quirks in the source data
Each of these is silent if unhandled — the atlas still builds, it is just wrong.
**Facet names disagree between sources.** `Data/Locations/*.xml` spells them
`Ter Mur` and `Tokuno Islands`, while `<Map>` and `<Facet name>` say `TerMur` and
`Tokuno`. Unreconciled, the landmark bucket is keyed differently from the points
looking it up, so the fallback never fires and every unregioned spawn on those
facets reads "Wilderness".
This is reconciled **by matching, not by a lookup table** — there is no list of
facet names anywhere. `facetKey()` collapses spelling differences (lowercase,
alphanumerics only), and `resolveFacetName()` matches a loose spelling against
the canonical set discovered from the shard's own spawn and region data, by exact
key then by prefix in either direction. A name matching nothing keeps its own
name: forcing a wrong match would file a real custom facet's landmarks under the
wrong facet, which is worse than leaving it alone.
**Spawn type tokens carry XmlSpawner directives.** The `<Objects2>` type is not
always a bare class name:
```
Fairy,{RND,4,8} alchemist/z/-50 Agralem/Name/Agralem
GargishRouser,1 greatape,true GargishRefugee/hue/34532
```
Taken literally these invent creatures that do not exist *and* split real ones in
two, because `Fairy` and `Fairy,{RND,4,8}` slug apart into separate entries. 71 of
845 were affected. Everything from the first `/` or `,` is stripped, leaving 800
real creatures.
**Case is inconsistent across files.** The same creature is `Lizardman` in one
file and `lizardman` in another. Slugging collapses them correctly, but the
display name is chosen deterministically — most common spelling wins, ties break
to the more capitalised form, then alphabetically — because otherwise it would
depend on file read order and change on an unrelated restart.
## Tables
All are **import-owned**: a refresh empties and reloads them in one transaction,
so a failed reload leaves the previous atlas intact rather than a half-loaded
world. Nothing else writes to them and nothing holds a foreign key to them — no
FKs at all, consistent with every other `shard_*` table. Full column listings in
[`BACKEND_DESIGN.md`](BACKEND_DESIGN.md).
| Table | Rows (stock) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `shard_spawn_creatures` | 800 | `slug` PK; `total` = sum of each type's own max; nullable `art` |
| `shard_spawn_points` | 6,455 | `spawn_range`, since `range` is reserved in MariaDB |
| `shard_spawn_point_types` | 23,927 | The many-to-many; one spawner commonly carries six types |
| `shard_regions` | 387 | Flattened out of the nesting; `rects` JSON |
| `shard_landmarks` | 558 | `grp`, since `group` is reserved in SQL |
| `shard_champion_spawns` | 25 | Configured altars, not the live feed |
| `shard_atlas_meta` | 1 | Singleton; source hashes, for the change check |
| `shard_atlas_pending` | 0–1 | Singleton; a staged refresh awaiting admin review |
`shard_spawn_creatures.name` carries a plain `INDEX`, deliberately **not
`FULLTEXT`**: ~800 rows makes a `LIKE` scan free, and FULLTEXT's minimum token
length would break searches for names like "orc".
The reload uses `DELETE`, not `TRUNCATE` — `TRUNCATE` is DDL in MariaDB and would
implicitly commit, defeating the all-or-nothing guarantee. Point ids are assigned
explicitly rather than left to `AUTO_INCREMENT`, because the join rows need them
and `conn.batch()` reports no usable `insertId`.
## Artwork — operator-supplied, never shipped
**This project ships no creature art and no extraction tooling, and never will.**
UO sprites live in the operator's own client `.mul`/`.uop` files. They are the
operator's, not ours to redistribute.
The atlas is fully functional as text. `shard_spawn_creatures.art` is nullable
and is NULL on every fresh import; pages render without images, which is the
normal and supported state, not a degraded one.
An operator who wants art:
1. Extracts it from **their own** client files (UOFiddler, ClassicUO tooling, or
any art extractor).
2. Drops the images under `server/uploads/atlas/`.
3. Copies `server/db/data/spawnAtlas.art.example.json` to `spawnAtlas.art.json`
and maps creature slugs to file names.
4. Restarts, or runs `npm run atlas:import -- --force`.
Both `spawnAtlas.art.json` and `server/uploads/` are gitignored, so neither the
map nor the images can be committed by accident.
## Code layout
| File | Role |
|---|---|
| `src/utils/spawnAtlasParse.js` | **Pure and fs-free** parsers, so CI covers them with no ServUO tree. Zero dependencies. |
| `src/utils/spawnAtlasSource.js` | The only thing that reads a ServUO tree; shared by the boot path and the CLI |
| `src/model/shardAtlas/shardAtlas.db.js` | The one-transaction replace |
| `src/model/shardAtlas/shardAtlas.model.js` | The refresh decision, staging, approve/reject |
| `scripts/importSpawnAtlas.js` | Thin CLI over the model |
Parsing notes:
- `Regions.xml`, `Locations/*.xml` and `ChampionSpawns.xml` genuinely nest, and
get a small hand-rolled **subset** tokenizer — elements, attributes,
self-closing tags, comments, the XML declaration, CDATA, and the five
predefined entities plus numeric refs. It is not a general-purpose XML parser
and must not be reused as one.
- The ~10.5 MB of `Spawns/*.xml` never touches that tokenizer. Those records are
flat, so they get a streaming regex sweep instead; a DOM would allocate a node
per element across ~40 fields on every record to keep 14 of them. **Do not put
the Points files through a DOM parser.**
- `<Objects2>` is `Type:MX=n:SB=…` segments joined by `:OBJ=`. Split on `:OBJ=`
*first* — a naive `split(':')` shreds it. A single Trammel point carries six
types.

259
website/TRUSTED_DEVICES_MFA.md
View File

@@ -1,259 +0,0 @@
# Trusted Devices & MFA Improvements — Design & Implementation Plan
> Reference plan for the trusted-device + MFA hardening work. Approved 2026-07-21.
> This document is the contract the implementation builds against; keep it in sync
> with `BACKEND_DESIGN.md` (§3 schema, §4 API, §6 security) as code lands.
## 1. Goal & scope
Reduce 2FA friction without weakening the second-factor boundary, and close the
2FA-lockout gap. Four deliverables:
1. **Trusted devices** — an opt-in "Trust this device" that lets a browser or the
Android app **skip the TOTP step** (never the password) on future logins for a
fixed window.
2. **Recovery / backup codes** — single-use codes generated at 2FA enrollment so a
user who loses their authenticator can self-recover instead of needing an admin
reset.
3. **Admin-managed revocation** — staff can view and revoke a user's trusted
devices and reset their MFA, with full audit logging (**backend endpoints _and_
admin front-end screens**).
4. **Step-up (password) for sensitive operations** — reusing the existing
`currentPassword`-verification pattern; disabling TOTP keeps its stronger
current-TOTP-code requirement.
Touches `website/` (server + client), `docs/`, and `android-app/` (plan only in
this pass). **No** `link/` or `servuo-plugins/` change — no wire-protocol impact.
### Approved decisions
| Decision | Value |
|---|---|
| Trust duration | **30 days** (matches mobile refresh-token lifetime) |
| Roles eligible | **All roles** (no staff carve-out) |
| Opt-in model | **Explicit "Trust this device" checkbox, default off** |
| Recovery codes | **10 codes**, shown **once**, single-use |
| Trusted-device cap | **10 per user, no silent pruning** (see §5) |
| Trust-token hashing | **sha256** |
| Recovery-code hashing | **bcrypt** (cost 10) |
## 2. Current state (starting point)
- **One session service** (`server/src/auth/session.service.js`) backs web (JWT
`httpOnly` cookie, 1d) and mobile (15m access JWT + 30d opaque refresh token).
`requireAuth` accepts either via `token.extractToken()`.
- **TOTP** is opt-in per user (`users.totp_secret` / `totp_enabled`), demanded on
**every** login. Web uses a staged 5-min `stage:'totp'` challenge; mobile uses a
single-request `401 { totpRequired }`. **No recovery codes** exist today.
- **Device tracking exists only on mobile** (`mobile_refresh_tokens` rows with
`device_name` / `device_hash` / `user_agent` / `last_used_at`). Web JWTs are
stateless with no per-session row.
- **Revocation is mature:** `revoked_sessions` (jti denylist) + `tokens_valid_after`
(per-user cutoff) for web; per-token rows + `revokeAllForUser` for mobile.
- **No trusted-device or step-up concept exists anywhere.**
## 3. Hashing rationale
The repo already splits hashing by secret entropy, and this plan follows it:
- **sha256** — every high-entropy machine-generated opaque token
(`mobile_refresh_tokens`, `mobile_auth_codes`, `user_invites`, `password_resets`,
SSO PKCE). **Trusted-device tokens use sha256:** they are 256-bit random values
(nothing to brute-force) looked up **by a `token_hash UNIQUE` index**, which
requires a deterministic hash — bcrypt's per-row salt would break the lookup and
truncates input at 72 bytes.
- **bcrypt (`bcryptjs`, cost 10)** — the repo uses it only for **passwords**, the
one human-chosen low-entropy secret. **Recovery codes use bcrypt:** they are a
human-typed, lower-entropy fallback credential that grants a login (the closest
analogue to a password), and there is no hash-lookup constraint — we fetch the
identified user's ≤10 code rows and `bcrypt.compare` each, exactly like password
verification.
## 4. Database (additive, idempotent — matches `schema.sql` style)
### `trusted_devices`
Pattern-identical to `mobile_refresh_tokens`; stores only the token hash.
| Column | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| id | INT PK AUTO_INCREMENT | |
| user_id | INT NOT NULL | FK → users, `ON DELETE CASCADE` |
| token_hash | CHAR(64) NOT NULL UNIQUE | sha256 hex of the opaque trust token |
| platform | ENUM('web','mobile') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'web' | |
| device_name | VARCHAR(100) NULL | friendly label |
| device_hash | VARCHAR(32) NULL | best-effort UA+IP, **display only** |
| user_agent | VARCHAR(255) NULL | |
| created_at | DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP | |
| last_used_at | DATETIME NULL | stamped when trust is honored at login |
| expires_at | DATETIME NOT NULL | created_at + 30d |
| revoked_at | DATETIME NULL | |
Indices: `idx_td_user (user_id)`, `idx_td_expires (expires_at)`.
### `mobile_auth_sessions.trust_device` (SSO bridge)
| Column | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| trust_device | TINYINT(1) NOT NULL DEFAULT 0 | user ticked "trust this device" on the Custom Tab TOTP form |
A **boolean only**. It records the user's choice so `POST /auth/mobile/sso/exchange`
knows to mint the app's own trust token over that authenticated app→server call; the
token itself is never written here (only its sha256 reaches `trusted_devices`). Set
only while the session is still `pending` and unexpired, for the same reason
`completeSession` is guarded — a replayed TOTP post must not re-arm a consumed
session.
### `recovery_codes`
| Column | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| id | INT PK AUTO_INCREMENT | |
| user_id | INT NOT NULL | FK → users, `ON DELETE CASCADE` |
| code_hash | VARCHAR(72) NOT NULL | **bcrypt** hash of one code |
| used_at | DATETIME NULL | single-use marker |
| created_at | DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP | |
Index: `idx_rc_user (user_id)`.
No new `users` column: password change/reset and TOTP-disable **bulk-revoke**
`trusted_devices` rows and **delete** `recovery_codes` (consistent with
`revokeAllForUser`), so no "trust epoch" column is needed.
## 5. Trusted-device cap — no silent pruning
Cap = **10**. A shared `assertUnderTrustCap(userId)` guards both entry points (the
login/TOTP trust path and the authenticated "trust this device" path). On the 11th
attempt the backend **refuses to create the row** and returns
`409 { error: 'trusted_device_limit', devices: [...] }`. Login itself still
succeeds — only the trust marker is withheld. The web client then renders a modal
**in the same visual pattern as the TOTP entry flow** that:
1. shows the existing trusted devices,
2. requires revoking ≥1 before continuing,
3. completes via `POST /auth/me/trusted-devices` (trust current device), and
4. offers **Cancel**, which returns without creating any trust entry.
## 6. API additions
### Auth (login paths)
- `POST /auth/login` — after password verify, if a valid unrevoked `rg_trust`
cookie matches a live `trusted_devices` row for this user → **skip TOTP**, issue
the session, log `auth.login.trusted_device`, stamp `last_used_at`. Otherwise
unchanged (`{ totpRequired, challenge }`).
- `POST /auth/login/totp` — gains optional `trustDevice` + `deviceName`, and
accepts a **recovery code** as an alternative to the TOTP code (single-use). On
success with `trustDevice`, mint the opaque trust token, set the `rg_trust`
cookie, insert the row (subject to the cap → `409` signal).
- `POST /auth/mobile/login` — gains `trustDevice` / `recoveryCode`; returns a
`trustToken` the app stores in EncryptedSharedPreferences and replays on a later
login to skip TOTP. Same cap behavior.
#### SSO login paths
SSO is **not** exempt: an account with TOTP on is asked for a code after a
Google/Discord sign-in exactly as it is after a password one, and a trusted device
skips that code exactly the same way. (Originally SSO consulted trust nowhere, so a
user who signed in with an external identity was asked for a code on *every* sign-in
no matter how many times they had ticked "trust this device".)
- `GET /auth/sso/:provider/callback` — once the account is resolved and before a
TOTP challenge is staged, resolve the presented trust (cookie, or `X-Trust-Token`)
and, if it belongs to **this** user, skip the code, stamp `last_used_at`, and log
`auth.login.trusted_device`. The first factor is the IdP authentication that just
succeeded, so this is the same posture as the password path. A store error falls
through to the challenge — fail **closed** to asking for the code.
- `POST /auth/sso/totp` — gains optional `trustDevice` + `deviceName`, mints the
trust and sets the `rg_trust` cookie on success. At the cap the sign-in still
completes and the response carries `{ trustLimitReached, devices }`, matching
`POST /auth/login/totp`. Recovery codes remain password-login only: this step
verifies an authenticator code against the staged challenge.
**How this reaches the Android app.** The app's SSO runs in a Custom Tab, which
shares the system browser's cookie jar, so both halves land in the same place: the
`rg_trust` cookie set on the Custom Tab TOTP form is presented back on the *next*
app SSO sign-in and skips the code — no app change, and no trust token smuggled
through a start URL where it would leak into query strings and logs.
To cover the app's **native** password login on the same device as well, ticking
the box also sets `mobile_auth_sessions.trust_device` (a boolean — never the
token), and `POST /auth/mobile/sso/exchange` then mints a `platform: 'mobile'`
trust and returns `{ trustToken }` in its JSON body. Minting at exchange time is
deliberate: it is an authenticated app→server call, so the raw token never travels
in the deep link and never rests in the bridge row. One tick therefore produces two
independently-revocable rows (the browser and the app) — which is honest, since they
are two distinct credentials on one device. If the user is at the cap, the exchange
simply returns no token; it never turns a successful sign-in into an error.
### Self-service (`/auth/me/*`, `requireAuth`, any role)
- `GET /auth/me/trusted-devices` — list active trusted devices (never tokens).
- `POST /auth/me/trusted-devices` — trust the current browser/device (cap-checked).
- `DELETE /auth/me/trusted-devices/:id` — revoke one (ownership-scoped).
- `DELETE /auth/me/trusted-devices` — revoke all ("untrust everywhere").
- `POST /auth/me/account/recovery-codes/generate` — **password step-up required**;
returns the codes **once**.
- `GET /auth/me/account/recovery-codes/status` — remaining count only.
### Admin (`requireRole('admin')`)
- `GET /admin/users/:id/trusted-devices` — list a user's trusted devices.
- `DELETE /admin/users/:id/trusted-devices/:deviceId` — revoke one.
- `DELETE /admin/users/:id/trusted-devices` — revoke all.
- MFA reset control (revoke trust + disable TOTP + clear recovery codes).
## 7. Cookie / refresh / JWT interaction
- New **`rg_trust`** cookie: `httpOnly`, `sameSite=Lax`, `secure` per-request
(reuse `cookieSecure`), `path=/`, `maxAge` 30d, opaque 256-bit base64url,
sha256-hashed server-side. **Separate from the session cookie and deliberately
survives logout** (so the next login skips 2FA); only untrust / password-change /
TOTP-disable revoke it.
- **JWTs stay stateless and unchanged** — trust is a server-side cookie+row, never
a JWT claim, so it remains revocable.
- **Refresh flow untouched** — trust is consulted only at the login/password step,
never at token refresh; the two stores stay independent.
## 8. Security & invalidation
- Trust **only ever gates the second factor**; password is always required.
- Recovery-code entry reuses the login brute-force stack (backoff + bot scoring +
rate limits); recovery codes are single-use.
- **Password change/reset and TOTP-disable clear trust and recovery codes.**
- **Audit logging** via existing `activity.log` / `activity_log`:
`auth.login.trusted_device`, `account.trusted_device.add` / `.revoke` /
`.revoke_all`, `account.recovery_codes.generate`, `account.recovery_code.consume`,
and admin `admin.trusted_device.revoke` / `.revoke_all`, `admin.user.totp.reset`
— each with actor, target user, and device id in `detail`.
## 9. Backwards compatibility
Fully additive. With no `rg_trust` cookie the behavior is exactly today's (TOTP
every login). Recovery codes exist only for users who generate them. No existing
session or login flow changes shape. New tables via `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS`
and columns via `ALTER TABLE … ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`.
## 10. Implementation roadmap
1. **Schema + models** — `trusted_devices` (sha256, cap-checked) + `recovery_codes`
(bcrypt); `.db.js` / `.model.js` pairs mirroring `mobileSessions`.
2. **Session service** — trust-token mint/sha256/verify + recovery-code
generate/bcrypt-verify/consume helpers (pure, DB-free); shared
`assertUnderTrustCap()`.
3. **Web login** — trust-cookie skip in `/auth/login`; `trustDevice` / recovery
handling + cap `409` in `/auth/login/totp`; set/clear `rg_trust`.
4. **Mobile login** — `trustDevice` / `trustToken` / `recoveryCode`, same cap.
5. **Self-service + admin backend** — `/auth/me/trusted-devices*` + recovery-code
endpoints; `/admin/users/:id/trusted-devices*` + MFA reset (all admin-gated).
6. **Invalidation wiring** — password change/reset & TOTP-disable revoke trust +
delete recovery codes.
7. **Web client UI** — "Trust this device" checkbox; cap-reached TOTP-styled modal
(revoke-to-continue / cancel); user Trusted Devices + Recovery Codes screens.
8. **Admin front-end UI** — admin Trusted Devices management & revocation screens
(per-user list, revoke one / revoke all, MFA reset), wired to step 5.
9. **Android** — record the app-side trust/recovery flow in
`docs/android/PLAN.md`; app implementation sequenced after the backend lands.
10. **OpenAPI + docs** — `#swagger.*` on every new/modified route + regenerate
`server/swagger/swagger-output.json`; update `BACKEND_DESIGN.md` §3/§4/§6.
11. **Automated tests** — trusted-device login skip (valid / missing / expired /
revoked), token mint+hash, recovery-code single-use consume + wrong-code
backoff, cap `409` behavior, revocation (self + admin), invalidation on
password-change / TOTP-disable, and permission checks (admin routes reject
non-admins; self routes ownership-scoped); web client pure-logic tests; Android
JVM DTO/repository tests.

4
website/WIKI_UPGRADE.md
View File

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ auth model (admin/editor — no new roles, no public contributions).
| Schema | flat `wiki_pages(slug,title,body,updated_by,timestamps)` | [server/db/schema.sql:31](server/db/schema.sql) |
| Model | thin CRUD by slug | [server/src/model/wiki/wiki.db.js](server/src/model/wiki/wiki.db.js), [wiki.model.js](server/src/model/wiki/wiki.model.js) |
| Public API | `GET /public/wiki`, `GET /public/wiki/:slug` | [public.controller.js:53](server/src/router/v1/public/public.controller.js) |
| Admin API | `GET/POST/PUT/DELETE /admin/wiki[...]` | [admin.controller.js:163](server/src/router/v1/admin/admin.controller.js), [wiki.router.js](server/src/router/v1/admin/wiki.router.js) |
| Admin API | `GET/POST/PUT/DELETE /admin/wiki[...]` | [admin.controller.js:163](server/src/router/v1/admin/admin.controller.js), [admin.routes.js:68](server/src/router/v1/admin/admin.routes.js) |
| Public UI | card grid (hardcoded blurbs + Roman numerals), article w/ auto-TOC | [Wiki.jsx](client/src/routes/wiki/Wiki.jsx), [WikiArticle.jsx](client/src/routes/wiki/WikiArticle.jsx) |
| Admin UI | raw-HTML `<textarea>` modal | [WikiAdmin.jsx](client/src/routes/admin/views/WikiAdmin.jsx), [WikiEditor.jsx](client/src/routes/admin/views/WikiEditor.jsx) |
| API client | `api.wiki`, `api.admin.*Wiki` | [client/src/api/client.js:52](client/src/api/client.js) |
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ centralized error handler unchanged. **Every write logs to `activity_log`**
### 4.4 Image uploads
Generalize the existing screenshot upload (multer config now in [admin/imageUpload.js](server/src/router/v1/admin/imageUpload.js))
Generalize the existing screenshot upload (multer config in [admin.routes.js:17](server/src/router/v1/admin/admin.routes.js))
into a shared `POST /admin/uploads` returning `{ url: "/uploads/<file>" }`, reused by both
the post editor and the wiki editor. Same size/mime limits. No new storage —
served from the existing `uploads/` volume.

815
website/api-route-inventory.json
View File

@@ -1,815 +0,0 @@
{
"$comment": "Generated route inventory - the authoritative freeze of the URL surface. Regenerate with `npm run routes:manifest` in website/server; a domain-split PR must produce a zero-line diff here.",
"public": [
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/.well-known/assetlinks.json"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/csp-report"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/docs.json"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/health"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/account"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/account/identities"
},
{
"method": "DELETE",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/account/identities/:provider"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/account/totp/disable"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/account/totp/enable"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/account/totp/setup"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/activity"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/auth/providers"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/auth/providers"
},
{
"method": "DELETE",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/auth/providers/:id"
},
{
"method": "PUT",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/auth/providers/:id"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/bot-activity"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/bot-activity/unban"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/dashboard"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/discord-bot/config"
},
{
"method": "PUT",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/discord-bot/config"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/email/config"
},
{
"method": "PUT",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/email/config"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/email/connect/callback"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/email/connect/start"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/email/disconnect"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/email/test"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/invites"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/invites"
},
{
"method": "DELETE",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/invites/:id"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/moderation/appeals"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/moderation/appeals/:id"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/moderation/appeals/:id/claim"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/moderation/appeals/:id/resolve"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/moderation/filter-hits"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/moderation/members"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/moderation/recent"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/moderation/search"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/moderation/spam-hits"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/moderation/stats/summary"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/moderation/user/:discordId"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/moderation/user/:discordId/actions"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/moderation/user/:discordId/appeals"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/moderation/user/:discordId/notes"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/moderation/user/:discordId/notes"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/pages"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/pages"
},
{
"method": "DELETE",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/pages/:id"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/pages/:id"
},
{
"method": "PATCH",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/pages/:id"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/pages/:id/preview"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/pages/:id/unprotect"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/posts"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/posts"
},
{
"method": "DELETE",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/posts/:id"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/posts/:id"
},
{
"method": "PUT",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/posts/:id"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/posts/:id/announce"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/posts/:id/announce/retry"
},
{
"method": "PATCH",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/posts/:id/publish"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/posts/upload"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/settings"
},
{
"method": "PUT",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/settings"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/shard/account"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/shard/accounts"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/shard/audit"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/shard/ban"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/shard/broadcast"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/shard/char/:serial"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/shard/houses"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/shard/kick"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/shard/link"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/shard/pages"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/shard/pages/:id/close"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/shard/pages/:id/respond"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/shard/roster/:account"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/shard/sales"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/shard/unban"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/shard/vendors/:account"
},
{
"method": "PUT",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/site-mode"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/uo-link/config"
},
{
"method": "PUT",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/uo-link/config"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/uo-link/stream"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/uo-link/towncrier"
},
{
"method": "DELETE",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/uo-link/towncrier/:id"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/uploads"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/users"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/users"
},
{
"method": "DELETE",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/users/:id"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/users/:id"
},
{
"method": "PUT",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/users/:id"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/users/:id/mfa/reset"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/users/:id/shard/accounts"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/users/:id/shard/houses"
},
{
"method": "DELETE",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/users/:id/shard/link/:account"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/users/:id/shard/online"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/users/:id/shard/sales"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/users/:id/shard/standing"
},
{
"method": "DELETE",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/users/:id/trusted-devices"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/users/:id/trusted-devices"
},
{
"method": "DELETE",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/users/:id/trusted-devices/:deviceId"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/wiki"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/wiki"
},
{
"method": "DELETE",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/wiki/:slug"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/wiki/:slug"
},
{
"method": "PUT",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/wiki/:slug"
},
{
"method": "PATCH",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/wiki/:slug/publish"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/wiki/:slug/revisions"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/wiki/:slug/revisions/:id"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/wiki/:slug/revisions/:id/restore"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/wiki/categories"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/wiki/categories"
},
{
"method": "DELETE",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/wiki/categories/:id"
},
{
"method": "PUT",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/wiki/categories/:id"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/admin/wiki/tags"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/invite/:token"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/invite/:token/accept"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/login"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/login/totp"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/logout"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/account"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/account/identities"
},
{
"method": "DELETE",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/account/identities/:provider"
},
{
"method": "PATCH",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/account/password"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/account/recovery-codes/generate"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/account/recovery-codes/status"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/account/totp/disable"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/account/totp/enable"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/account/totp/setup"
},
{
"method": "PATCH",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/account/username"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/devices"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/devices"
},
{
"method": "DELETE",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/devices/:id"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/notifications/streams"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/notifications/subscriptions"
},
{
"method": "PUT",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/notifications/subscriptions"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/sessions"
},
{
"method": "DELETE",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/sessions/:id"
},
{
"method": "DELETE",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/trusted-devices"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/trusted-devices"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/trusted-devices"
},
{
"method": "DELETE",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/me/trusted-devices/:id"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/mobile/login"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/mobile/logout"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/mobile/refresh"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/mobile/sso/exchange"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/mobile/sso/start"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/password/forgot"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/password/reset/:token"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/password/reset/:token"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/providers"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/register"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/sso/:provider/callback"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/sso/:provider/link"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/sso/:provider/start"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/auth/sso/totp"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/player/account"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/player/account/identities"
},
{
"method": "DELETE",
"path": "/api/v1/player/account/identities/:provider"
},
{
"method": "PATCH",
"path": "/api/v1/player/account/password"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/player/account/totp/disable"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/player/account/totp/enable"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/player/account/totp/setup"
},
{
"method": "PATCH",
"path": "/api/v1/player/account/username"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/player/appeals"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/player/appeals"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/player/appeals/:id/withdraw"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/player/appeals/eligible"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/player/shard/account"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/player/shard/accounts"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/player/shard/char/:serial"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/player/shard/houses"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/player/shard/link"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/player/shard/roster/:account"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/player/shard/sales"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/player/shard/vendors/:account"
},
{
"method": "POST",
"path": "/api/v1/public/contact"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/pages/:id/preview/:token"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/pages/:slug"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/posts/:category"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/posts/:category/:idOrSlug"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/settings"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/shard/champs"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/shard/economy"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/shard/feed"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/shard/governors"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/shard/governors/:city/history"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/shard/guilds"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/shard/houses"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/shard/idoc"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/shard/online"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/shard/presence"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/shard/status"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/shard/stream"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/status"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/version"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/wiki"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/wiki/:slug"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/wiki/categories"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/api/v1/public/wiki/tags"
}
],
"internal": [
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/health"
},
{
"method": "GET",
"path": "/internal/bot-config"
}
]
}

154
website/test-plan.md
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@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
# Runic Gateway Website — Test Plan (Discord bot)
> Companion to [website-README.md](website-README.md) (overview) and
> [BACKEND_DESIGN.md](BACKEND_DESIGN.md) (server API/schema/security contract).
> Establishes the test plan for the **`bot/` workspace** (the Discord bot), the
> last of the three `website` npm workspaces without a suite. The server and
> client suites already exist (website PR #86); this doc closes the bot gap and
> records the shared conventions so all three stay consistent.
## 1. Goal & philosophy
Cover **meaningful bot behavior** — the moderation/filter decisions a future
change could silently break — not a coverage number. The bot's value is in *what
it decides to delete, warn, mute, or let through*; a good test reads "given this
message + config, what action does the bot take?", never "did this function call
that function?".
The whole `website` repo tests on **Node's built-in runner (`node --test`)** with
**zero external test dependencies** — no jest, no vitest, no jsdom. Unit tests
run without a database or a live Discord gateway: the DB pool is pointed at a dead
port and every collaborator (`db.query`, a model, a Discord `message`/`client`) is
replaced with an in-memory fake. This mirrors the server suite exactly (the bot is
CommonJS, like the server — `require`/`module.exports` — so the same patterns
apply verbatim).
## 2. Current state
| Workspace | Runner | Status |
|---|---|---|
| `server/` | `node --test` | **Exists** — models, controllers, auth/session, shard ingest. |
| `client/` | `node --test` (pure-logic ESM) | **Exists** (PR #86) — `lib/`, `api/`, `data/`. |
| `bot/` | — | **This plan** — no runner or tests yet. |
The 46% SonarQube aggregate is dragged down by the bot (and the client's
un-unit-testable React components) reading as 0% covered. Standing up the bot
suite lifts the real number and, more importantly, locks the filter/moderation
rules.
## 3. Harness
Add a test script to `bot/package.json` (mirrors server/client):
```json
"scripts": { "test": "node --test" }
```
Conventions, identical to `server/test/`:
- **No DB.** Set `process.env.DB_HOST = '127.0.0.1'` / `DB_PORT = '59999'` at the
top of any test whose module transitively `require`s `../db`, so the pool is
built against a dead port and a stray query fails fast instead of hanging.
Models are exercised by monkeypatching `db.query` (or the model method the unit
under test calls) with an in-memory fake; restore it in `afterEach`.
- **No Discord.** The `discord.js` `Client`, `Message`, `GuildMember`, and
`Interaction` objects are hand-rolled fakes carrying only the fields the unit
reads (e.g. `message.mentions.users.size`, `message.member.roles.cache`,
`message.client.fetchInvite`). Never construct a real client or open a gateway
connection.
- **Tests live in `bot/test/*.test.js`.** One file per module under test.
## 4. Units to cover
Ordered high-value first. Each row names the module, the behavior worth locking,
and the seam a test drives it through.
### 4.1 Pure logic (no mocks beyond inputs)
| Module | Behaviors to lock | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `filter/normalize.js` | leetspeak folding (`b4d`→`bad`, `@ss`→`ass`), 3+-repeat collapse (`sooooo`→`so`), case-fold; `matches()` is word-boundary anchored (so `bad` does not fire inside `badminton`); `findMatch()` returns the first `{word, severity}` row or `null`; the *documented gaps* stay gaps (spaced-out `b a d` is **not** caught). | The core obfuscation-resistance contract. Pin the gaps too, so a future tightening is a deliberate, test-visible change. |
| `utils/duration.js` | `"30s"/"10m"/"2h"/"1d"` → correct ms; whitespace tolerated; garbage/empty/unknown-unit → `null`; `MAX_TIMEOUT_MS` is 28 days (the Discord cap callers clamp to). | Feeds `/mute` and temp-role expiry — a wrong parse mutes for the wrong span. |
| `filter/spamFilter.js` | `isRateLimited` trips on the 6th message inside the 5 s window and is per-`guild:user`; it has a **side effect** (records the timestamp) so it must be called once; `isMassMention` counts users **+** roles against the threshold; `isMassEmoji` counts custom `<:name:id>` and unicode pictographs. | Drive time with a stubbed `Date.now` (or accept the real clock and use tight windows). The module-load `setInterval(...).unref()` sweep must not keep the runner alive — `.unref()` already handles this; assert no leak by letting the suite exit. |
### 4.2 Logic with a single mocked collaborator
| Module | Behaviors to lock | Seam / mock |
|---|---|---|
| `filter/inviteFilter.js` | returns the **code** (not a bool) of the first *foreign* invite; an invite resolving to the current guild is allowed; an invite that **fails to resolve** (expired/invalid) is treated as foreign (fail-closed); no invite in the message → `null`. | Fake `message.client.fetchInvite(code)` — resolve with `{ guild: { id } }` for local/foreign, or throw for unresolvable. Set `message.guildId` + `message.content`. |
| `site/siteApiClient.js` | never throws on a network/timeout/HTTP failure — always returns the `{ ok, ... }` shape so a command never breaks when the site is down: `{ ok: true, data }` on success, `{ ok: false, error }` on failure, and the distinct `{ ok: false, maintenance: true, message }` for the site's 503 maintenance response. (Public read client — **no** shared secret; the keyed channel is `botInternalClient.js`.) | Stub `global.fetch` (resolve various statuses/bodies, reject/timeout via `AbortController`). Same non-throwing contract the server's `uoLinkClient` follows. |
| `internal/requireInternalKey.js` | `401` on a missing/wrong key; `next()` on the configured key; **fail-closed** when `BOT_INTERNAL_KEY` is empty (never matches); timing-safe compare (equal-length + `crypto.timingSafeEqual`, no early-exit length leak). | Call the middleware with a fake `req` (`req.get('X-Internal-Key')`) + `res`/`next` spies; mirrors `server/test/requireInternalKey.test.js`. |
### 4.3 The filter pipeline (orchestration)
`discord/messageFilter.js` is the highest-value integration seam — it composes
all of §4.1–4.2. Lock the **decision order and the actions**, with every
collaborator faked:
- **Bypass wins first:** an allow-listed channel, or a member holding an
allow-listed role, short-circuits the whole pipeline (`isBypassed`) — no
delete, no hit recorded.
- **Order:** invite link → banned word → spam (rate-limit → mass-mention →
mass-emoji). `detectSpam` must evaluate `isRateLimited` **first and exactly
once** (it has the timestamp side effect).
- **Actions:** invite/spam always delete + warn (no severity tiers); a
word-filter hit applies the action for its severity; filter-triggered mutes use
the fixed `FILTER_MUTE_SECONDS` (600 s).
- **Best-effort recording never breaks moderation:** `recordFilterHit` /
`recordSpamHit` throwing must be swallowed — the delete/warn still happens.
Mocks: `filterCache` (in-memory `allowChannels`/`allowRoles` Sets + words), a fake
`message` (content, author, member roles, `delete()`, `guildId`), and spies on
`warnings`/`filterHits`/`spamHits`/`modLog` to assert what was called.
### 4.4 Models (`bot/model/*.js`)
Thin `db.query` wrappers (e.g. `warnings.js`, `filterWords.js`, `filterHits.js`,
`spamHits.js`, `memberEvents.js`, `guildConfig.js`, `scheduledMessages.js`,
`tempRoles.js`). Cover only those with **shaping/branching logic** (a query that
maps rows, applies an "active/not-expired" predicate, or upserts) by asserting the
**SQL params** passed to a fake `db.query` and the shape returned. Skip pure
one-line inserts with no logic — testing those only proves the mock.
## 5. Explicitly out of scope
- **`discord.js` internals / the live gateway** — not ours to test; never open a
real connection.
- **Thin command wrappers** (`discord/commands/*.command.js`) that only validate
args and call a Discord API + a model — cover their *logic* (arg parsing,
duration clamping) if any, but not the Discord round-trip.
- **`node-cron` scheduling itself** — test the job's callback logic, not that cron
fires.
## 6. CI & coverage wiring
Mirror what PR #86 did for the client:
- **`.gitea/workflows/pr-checks.yml`** — add a `bot-tests` job (or a
`Run bot tests` step) that runs `npm test --prefix bot`, gating PRs into `main`.
- **`.gitea/workflows/sonarqube.yml`** — generate a bot LCOV from the repo root so
`SF:` paths resolve to `bot/src/...`:
```
node --test --experimental-test-coverage \
--test-reporter=lcov --test-reporter-destination=bot/coverage/lcov.info \
bot/test/*.test.js
```
- **`sonar-project.properties`** — add `bot/test` to `sonar.tests`, the glob to
`sonar.test.inclusions`, `bot/coverage/lcov.info` to
`sonar.javascript.lcov.reportPaths`, and `bot/coverage/**` to `sonar.exclusions`.
(`bot/src` is already in `sonar.sources`.)
Bot units need no `npm ci` to run when they import only relative files + Node
built-ins; a test that stubs `global.fetch` or fakes `db` needs no `discord.js`
either. Keep the pool pointed at a dead port so the run is hermetic.
## 7. Suggested phasing
1. **Harness + pure logic** — `test` script, then `normalize`, `duration`,
`spamFilter`. Fast, zero mocks, immediate value.
2. **Single-collaborator units** — `inviteFilter`, `siteApiClient`,
`requireInternalKey`.
3. **Pipeline** — `messageFilter` decision order + actions (the payoff test).
4. **Models with logic**, then the **CI/Sonar wiring** so it all counts.

115
website/website-README.md
View File

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ A full-stack app in one repo:
- **Frontend** — React + Vite single-page app (public site, wiki, and the admin panel), dark "gothic" theme (Cinzel + Georgia).
- **Deploy** — Docker Compose (app + MariaDB) behind a Pangolin reverse proxy. Express serves the built SPA in production.
- **Shard link** — a live bridge to the in-game ServUO shard through the **uo-link** sidecar ([RunicGateway/link](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/link)): the site ingests a live event feed and makes server-side REST calls to show shard status, economy, staff presence, IDOCs, live activity, and per-character sheets. See [Shard integration (uo-link)](#shard-integration-uo-link).
- **Moderation appeals** — a player whose linked Discord identity was banned or muted (per the bot's `mod_actions` log) can open an appeal from the player portal; staff claim and resolve appeals from an admin queue, and approving a ban/mute appeal best-effort reverses it in Discord automatically. See [MODERATION_APPEALS.md](MODERATION_APPEALS.md).
The design reference is [BACKEND_DESIGN.md](BACKEND_DESIGN.md) (API contract, schema, security).
@@ -18,7 +17,6 @@ The design reference is [BACKEND_DESIGN.md](BACKEND_DESIGN.md) (API contract, sc
## Contents
- [Architecture](#architecture)
- [Tech stack](#tech-stack)
- [Project structure](#project-structure)
- [Prerequisites](#prerequisites)
@@ -38,103 +36,6 @@ The design reference is [BACKEND_DESIGN.md](BACKEND_DESIGN.md) (API contract, sc
---
## Architecture
How the pieces fit together — the React SPA and native app talk to one Express backend
(`router → controller → model → db`), which persists to MariaDB and bridges to the live
game world only through the **uo-link** sidecar. The shard itself is never internet-facing.
See [ARCHITECTURE.md](ARCHITECTURE.md) for the fuller write-up.
```mermaid
flowchart TB
%% ---------- Clients ----------
subgraph clients["Clients"]
browser["Browser<br/>React + Vite SPA<br/>(public · wiki · admin)"]
mobile["Native mobile app<br/>(bearer tokens)"]
end
idp["SSO providers<br/>Google · Discord · custom OIDC"]
discord["Discord"]
%% ---------- Website (one repo) ----------
subgraph website["website/ &nbsp;— Node app (one repo)"]
direction TB
subgraph backend["server/ — Express backend"]
direction TB
mw["Middleware<br/>helmet · siteMode · noindex<br/>rateLimit · loginProtection · botScore · validate"]
router["Router /api/v1<br/>auth (web · mobile · sso) · public · admin"]
ctrl["Controllers"]
auth["Session layer (auth/)<br/>sessionService · JWT/cookie · bearer · SSO+PKCE"]
model["Models (.model + .db)<br/>raw parameterized SQL — no ORM"]
sse["SSE fan-out<br/>public stream (allowlist) · admin stream (sensitive)"]
subgraph shardutil["Shard integration (utils/)"]
ingest["shardIngest.js<br/>WS ingest dispatcher"]
restcli["uoLinkClient.js<br/>REST client (never throws)"]
end
secret["secretBox.js<br/>AES-256-GCM secrets at rest"]
end
bot["bot/<br/>Discord bot"]
end
db[("MariaDB<br/>users · posts · wiki · settings · activity<br/>mobileSessions · authProviders · userIdentities<br/>uoLinkConfig · shard_online/economy/houses/events")]
%% ---------- Shard side ----------
subgraph shardside["Game shard (never internet-facing)"]
direction TB
sidecar["uo-link sidecar<br/>(Rust) — the only bridge exposed"]
servuo["ServUO shard<br/>(C# plugin)"]
end
%% ---------- Edges ----------
browser <-->|"same-origin JSON + SSE (cookie)"| mw
mobile -->|"REST (bearer access/refresh)"| mw
browser -.->|"OAuth redirect + PKCE"| idp
auth -.->|"token exchange"| idp
mw --> router --> ctrl
ctrl --> auth
ctrl --> model
ctrl --> restcli
ctrl --> sse
auth --> model
model <--> db
auth -. reads/writes secrets .-> secret
restcli -. reads config/token .-> secret
ingest --> model
ingest --> sse
sse -->|"live events"| browser
bot -->|"messages"| discord
bot <--> db
restcli -->|"REST: /char /roster /economy /history · /link/confirm · /towncrier"| sidecar
sidecar -->|"WebSocket live event feed (bearer + X-UOLink-Version)"| ingest
servuo -->|"loopback TCP 127.0.0.1:7788<br/>newline-delimited JSON (shard dials out)"| sidecar
%% ---------- Styling ----------
classDef ext fill:#2d2233,stroke:#7a5c94,color:#e8dff0;
classDef store fill:#1f2d2a,stroke:#4c8c7d,color:#dff0ea;
classDef bridge fill:#2d2620,stroke:#94764c,color:#f0e6d8;
class idp,discord ext;
class db store;
class sidecar,servuo bridge;
```
- **One backend, layered.** Every request flows `middleware → router → controller → model → db`.
Web browsers authenticate with an httpOnly JWT cookie; the native app uses short-lived bearer
access tokens plus rotated refresh tokens; SSO (Google/Discord/OIDC) is link-only and PKCE-guarded.
All three surfaces produce the *same* session via the session layer.
- **The shard is never reachable.** The ServUO shard *dials out* over loopback TCP to the uo-link
sidecar; only the sidecar is exposed, and only the backend talks to it. The REST client
(`uoLinkClient.js`) never throws, so the site degrades gracefully when the shard is down.
- **Sensitive events stay private.** Ingested game events fan out to browsers over two SSE channels —
a public allowlist stream and an admin-only stream that adds staff audit / cheat / login events.
---
## Tech stack
| Layer | Tech |
@@ -152,7 +53,7 @@ flowchart TB
## Project structure
```
UOMSITE/
website/
├─ server/ Express API
│ ├─ src/
│ │ ├─ server.js bootstrap: ensure schema → seed → listen (0.0.0.0)
@@ -367,18 +268,6 @@ cd server
npm run swagger # → server/swagger/swagger-output.json
```
`swagger.js` post-processes the generator's output in two ways before writing it:
- **Trailing slashes are stripped from path keys.** swagger-autogen builds a path by
string-concatenating the mount prefix with the route argument, so a capability router mounted at
`/users` whose collection route is `router.get('/')` would document as `/api/v1/admin/users/` —
a URL no client calls, while dropping the one they all do. Express is indifferent (non-strict
routing treats the two as one route), but the published spec is a contract.
- **Path keys are sorted.** The generator emits them in router-traversal order, so moving a route
between files rewrote most of this ~5k-line committed artifact even when the API was provably
unchanged. Sorting keeps the diff proportional to the change. OpenAPI attaches no meaning to path
order, and `scripts/routeManifest.js` already sorts for the same reason.
If the generated spec is missing, the server logs a warning and simply disables `/api/docs` (it does
not crash).
@@ -442,7 +331,7 @@ character**; players and editor/moderator staff are limited to their own linked
| Surface | Endpoints | Who | Data |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Public** | `/api/v1/public/shard/*` (`status`, `feed`, `economy`, `online`, `idoc`, `stream`) | anyone | Shard up/down, gold-supply series, IDOC houses, a curated live feed, and **"Staff online"** — only players whose account is linked to a **staff** user (admin/editor/moderator), shown by name. Their in-game **map location is only included for admin/moderator viewers** — for players and the public it is stripped from the payload entirely (server-enforced, not just hidden in the UI). Linked *players* are never listed publicly; no vitals or account are exposed. |
| **Public** | `/api/v1/public/shard/*` (`status`, `feed`, `economy`, `online`, `idoc`, `stream`) | anyone | Shard up/down, gold-supply series, IDOC houses, a curated live feed, and **"Staff online"** — only players whose account is linked to a **staff** user (admin/editor/moderator), shown with name + map location. Linked *players* are never listed publicly; no vitals or account are exposed. |
| **Player** | `/api/v1/player/shard/*` (`link`, `accounts`, `roster/:account`, `vendors/:account`, `char/:serial`, `sales`) | logged-in player | Their own linked accounts: character rosters, character sheets, player-vendor snapshots, and recent vendor sales. |
| **Admin** | `/api/v1/admin/shard/*` (self-linking, same as player) · `/api/v1/admin/uo-link/*` (`config`, `towncrier`, `stream`) | staff / admin | Staff link their own accounts like players; **admins** additionally read *any* character's data, edit the sidecar connection config, publish/remove **town-crier** messages, and subscribe to the full event stream (incl. audit/cheat). |