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docs/website/BACKEND_DESIGN.md
wtclaude 42867d7ef8 docs(modules): close Phase 4 — de-UO the backend reference, record the acceptance run 
Phase 4 slice 4. BACKEND_DESIGN.md had never been de-UO'd: Phase 3 rewrote core's
code and README, but §5.2's identifier check reads code, not prose, so nothing
ever looked at the design document. It still described 27 shard_* tables, 20 UO
route rows and the shard visibility ladder as core's, a phase after core stopped
being able to serve any of them.

Moved, text unchanged:

  BACKEND_DESIGN §3   six shard_* schema sections (226 lines) → modules/uo/SCHEMA.md
  BACKEND_DESIGN §4   13 public + 7 admin UO route rows       → modules/uo/API.md
  BACKEND_DESIGN §6.5 the audience ladder (70 lines)          → modules/uo/API.md §4

Core keeps the seam and gains the eight /admin/modules routes it had never
documented. §6.5 becomes "Module-owned audience boundaries": core's security
boundary ends at authentication, roles and the session, and a module that serves
game data brings its own.

Also fixed on the way: users.router.js was still listed as 15 routes (it is 9 —
six went to the extension slot), and the push section still promised
config/shardStreams.js "moves out with it" four slices after it left.

The acceptance table now carries results. Criterion 2 was proved for real against
module-uo v0.3.0 on an empty database, which turned up the uninstall ordering
defect fixed in website#146.

AI disclosure: this contribution was AI-assisted (Claude Code).

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 09:16:29 -05:00

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# UOMysticmoon Website — Backend Design
> Phase 1 of 3: **backend design** → Claude Design (frontend mockup) → coding.
> This document is the contract the later phases build against.
Public contact email: **UOMysticmoon@gmail.com**
---
## 1. Stack & top-level decisions
| Concern | Decision | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Runtime | Node.js + Express | serverlinkr pattern |
| Database | MariaDB (own container) | spec; `mariadb` pool, parameterized SQL, no ORM (keeps the lightweight `model`/`db` split from serverlinkr) |
| Auth | JWT in an **httpOnly cookie** | spec says "JWT auth" + "secure cookies when HTTPS"; httpOnly keeps the token out of JS (XSS-safe), `SameSite=Strict` covers CSRF for a same-origin admin panel |
| Frontend | React + Vite, same repo, served by Express in prod | spec |
| Hashing | bcrypt (`bcryptjs`) | spec; matches serverlinkr |
| Deploy | Docker Compose (app + db) behind Pangolin | spec |
**Adapting serverlinkr → this project**
- `*.mongo.js` (mongoose) → `*.db.js` (MariaDB queries), exactly as the spec names them.
- Drop the session/passport hybrid (`express-session`, `passport`, `passport-local`, `connect-mongo`). Pure stateless JWT instead — simpler and matches "JWT auth".
- Routes grouped by **access level** (auth / public / admin) per spec, instead of serverlinkr's per-entity routers. Models stay grouped by **entity**.
---
## 2. Folder structure
Skeleton from the spec, with a small number of justified additions marked **(+)**.
> **Complete.** The monolithic route files (`admin.routes.js` especially, originally 1552 lines /
> 110 routes) have been split into one router file per business capability — **in place, with every
> URL unchanged**. See [API_V2_PLAN.md](./API_V2_PLAN.md) § Phase 2.
>
> `users`, `account`, `invites`, `auth/providers` (PR 1, 28 routes), `moderation`, `bot-activity`,
> `activity` (PR 2, 18 routes), `posts`, `uploads`, `wiki`, `pages` (PR 3, 31 routes) and `shard`,
> `uo-link`, `email`, `discord-bot`, `settings`, `dashboard`/`site-mode` (PR 4, 33 routes) each live
> in their own router under `admin/`, behind `admin/index.js`. PR 5 did the same for `public/` (24),
> `player/` (20) and the residual `auth/` (10). **`admin.routes.js`, `public.routes.js`,
> `player.routes.js` and `auth.routes.js` are all deleted**; each group is now a directory whose
> `index.js` owns the group gate and the mount table and declares no routes of its own.
>
> "Every URL unchanged" is enforced mechanically, not by review: `server/scripts/routeManifest.js`
> (`npm run routes:manifest`) walks the live Express stack and writes the sorted
> `{ method, path }` freeze to `server/routes.manifest.json`, mirrored here as
> [api-route-inventory.json](./api-route-inventory.json). PR checks regenerate it and fail on any
> diff, so a split PR that moves a URL cannot merge silently. See § 4.0.
```
server/
.env.example
package.json
db/
schema.sql (+) DDL, also auto-run by the MariaDB container
seed.js (+) seed wiki pages, default settings, first admin
src/
server.js bootstrap: core schema, seed, resolve MODULES, require app, module
schema fragments, module onBoot, then listen on 0.0.0.0
app.js express app + middleware wiring
router/
api.router.js mounts /v1
v1/
v1.router.js mounts /auth /public /admin /player
auth/ index.js mounts the routers below; no group gate — /auth
is where an anonymous caller becomes
authenticated, so the authenticated parts gate
themselves. Mount order is load-bearing (see
session.router.js)
login.router.js (2) /auth/login + /login/totp — shared
loginGuards stack
register.router.js (1) /auth/register — honours the
player_registration setting
invite.router.js (2) /auth/invite/:token[/accept] — the
token is its own authority, so it
bypasses player_registration
password.router.js (3) /auth/password/forgot + reset/:token
session.router.js (2) POST /logout and GET /me — the two
singletons owning no path segment, so
mounted at the group root, LAST: the
/me sub-routers below also match the
bare /me and supply its noindex header
me.routes.js (23) /auth/me/account*, sessions, trusted
devices — router-level requireAuth
notifications.routes.js (3) /auth/me/devices*, notifications/*
mobile.routes.js + /auth/mobile/* — native bearer login
mobileSso.routes.js (5)
sso.routes.js (4) mounted PATHLESS: owns two prefixes,
/auth/providers and /auth/sso/*
loginGuards.js shared backoff/slow/limiter stack for
every credential-guessing surface
(not a router)
auth.controller.js + invite/passwordReset/sso/mobile controllers
public/ index.js mounts the routers below; **no group gate** —
this surface is anonymous by design (SPA
logged-out, Discord bot, Android ShardStream)
posts.router.js (2) /public/posts/:category[/:idOrSlug]
wiki.router.js (4) /public/wiki — /categories and /tags
MUST precede /:slug
pages.router.js (2) /public/pages — the draft-preview
route precedes /:slug and is
deliberately not site-mode gated
modules.router.js (1) /public/modules — the installed-module
list a client feature-detects against.
A real prefix and not a fifth singleton
below, so the module loader's
collision probe (which skips
root-mounted layers) sees it
site.router.js (4) /settings /status /version /contact —
the group-root singletons; declares no
router-level middleware
public.controller.js
(/public/shard and /public/atlas are module-uo's — see
../modules/uo/API.md)
player/ index.js owns the shared `noindex, requireAuth` gate
(authenticated, ANY role — staff are a superset
of players) and the mount table
account.router.js (8) /player/account — credentials, TOTP,
linked identities; handlers shared
with /admin/account and /auth/me
appeals.router.js (4) /player/appeals
appeals.controller.js
(/player/shard is module-uo's)
settings/ index.js owns the shared `noindex, requireAuth` gate
(authenticated, ANY role) and the mount table.
A fifth group, for site-wide settings that
need a login but no particular role — /public
is anonymous, /admin/settings is adminOnly
while AdminLayout renders for editors and
moderators, and /player is self-scoped data
nav.router.js (1) /settings/nav — the nav_admin and
nav_player overrides, read by the
layouts that render them
theme.router.js (1) /settings/theme/options — the closed
sets the admin appearance form is
built from. Static; no DB read
nav.controller.js + theme.controller.js
admin/ index.js mounts the capability routers below at their
own prefixes; owns the shared
`noindex, isLoggedIn, staffOnly` gate and
declares no routes itself
account.router.js (6) /admin/account — self-service, no adminOnly
users.router.js (9) /admin/users — adminOnly. The six
/users/:id/shard/* routes are a
MODULE's, reached through the
admin.users.detail extension slot
invites.router.js (3) /admin/invites — adminOnly
authProviders.router.js (4) /admin/auth — adminOnly
moderation.router.js (15) /admin/moderation — modAccess
(admin+moderator) at router level
botActivity.router.js (2) /admin/bot-activity — adminOnly
activity.router.js (1) /admin/activity — staff-wide
audit log, no extra gate
posts.router.js (9) /admin/posts — editor tier, no
gate beyond staffOnly
uploads.router.js (1) /admin/uploads — rich-text editor
image upload
wiki.router.js (14) /admin/wiki — pages, revisions,
categories, tags
pages.router.js (7) /admin/pages — CMS page builder
imageUpload.js shared multer config for the two
upload routes above (not a router)
modules.router.js (8) /admin/modules — adminOnly, the
module delivery surface: install
from a manifest URL, enable,
disable, uninstall, purge, restart
and the source allowlist
email.router.js (6) /admin/email — Gmail OAuth2
delivery — adminOnly
discordBot.router.js (2) /admin/discord-bot — adminOnly
settings.router.js (4) /admin/settings — adminOnly. The
DELETE /:key is "reset to default"
and carries its own key allowlist
(theming/nav keys + the hero draft)
so it can never drop site_mode or
a module's own seeded row; POST
/brand-asset/:slot uploads a
logo/hero/favicon and writes the
brand_assets row in the same call
dashboard.router.js (2) GET /dashboard (staff-wide) and
PUT /site-mode (adminOnly) — the
two singletons owning no path
segment, so mounted at the group
root; declares no router-level
middleware, which is what makes a
root mount safe
admin.controller.js + the per-capability controllers
(already domain-split; the split PRs re-wire
routes, not logic)
(/admin/shard and /admin/uo-link are module-uo's)
model/
users/ users.model.js + users.db.js
posts/ posts.model.js + posts.db.js (news/five-on-friday/newsletter/screenshots)
wiki/ wiki.model.js + wiki.db.js
settings/ settings.model.js + settings.db.js
activity/ activity.model.js + activity.db.js (+) admin activity log
middleware/ (+)
siteMode.js LIVE/MAINTENANCE gate for public content
noindex.js X-Robots-Tag: noindex,nofollow on admin
rateLimit.js login limiter
validate.js express-validator error handler
utils/
auth.js JWT sign/verify, isLoggedIn middleware
db.js MariaDB pool + ensureSchema()
mailer.js (+) nodemailer; mailto fallback if SMTP unset
client/ built in Phase 2/3 (React + Vite)
Dockerfile
docker-compose.yml
.env.example
.gitignore
```
**Why the additions:** the spec's feature list requires an activity log, a maintenance-mode
gate, login rate limiting, admin `noindex`, and SMTP email — none fit cleanly in the four
listed models/two utils. They're isolated in `middleware/` + one `activity` model +
`utils/mailer.js`, and the spec explicitly says the layout is "expandable."
---
## 3. Database schema (MariaDB)
`utf8mb4` throughout. Created idempotently on boot (`ensureSchema()`) **and** shipped as
`db/schema.sql` for the container's `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d`.
### users
| col | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
| id | INT PK AUTO_INCREMENT | |
| username | VARCHAR(32) UNIQUE NOT NULL | |
| password_hash | VARCHAR(72) NOT NULL | bcrypt; **never** returned by the API |
| role | ENUM('admin','editor') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'admin' | room to grow |
| created_at | DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP | |
| last_login_at | DATETIME NULL | shown in user management |
### posts — one table, four categories
| col | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
| id | INT PK AUTO_INCREMENT | |
| category | ENUM('news','five_on_friday','newsletter','screenshot') NOT NULL | |
| title | VARCHAR(200) NOT NULL | |
| slug | VARCHAR(220) NULL | optional clean URL |
| excerpt | VARCHAR(400) NULL | list teaser |
| body | MEDIUMTEXT NULL | markdown/HTML; main text for news/5oF/newsletter |
| image_url | VARCHAR(500) NULL | required for `screenshot`, optional hero elsewhere |
| published | TINYINT(1) NOT NULL DEFAULT 0 | publish/unpublish toggle |
| author_id | INT NULL FK→users(id) | ON DELETE SET NULL |
| created_at | DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP | |
| updated_at | DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP ON UPDATE CURRENT_TIMESTAMP | |
| published_at | DATETIME NULL | set when first published; list order |
Index: `(category, published, published_at DESC)`.
### wiki_pages
| col | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
| id | INT PK AUTO_INCREMENT | |
| slug | VARCHAR(120) UNIQUE NOT NULL | e.g. `new-player-guide` |
| title | VARCHAR(200) NOT NULL | |
| body | MEDIUMTEXT NULL | markdown/HTML |
| updated_by | INT NULL FK→users(id) | |
| created_at / updated_at | DATETIME | |
Seeded with the 8 spec categories: `new-player-guide, maps-atlas, systems, items, monsters, crafting, lore, rules`.
### settings — key/value, expandable
| col | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
| `key` | VARCHAR(64) PK | |
| value | TEXT NULL | |
| updated_by | INT NULL FK→users(id) | |
| updated_at | DATETIME ON UPDATE CURRENT_TIMESTAMP | |
Seeded keys: `site_mode` (default `maintenance`), `site_mode_changed_at`,
`site_mode_changed_by`, `maintenance_message`, `status_message`, `homepage_teaser`,
`contact_email` (=UOMysticmoon@gmail.com), `site_title`, `player_registration`
(default `disabled`), `mobile_app_links_enabled`, `module_source_hosts`.
`module_source_hosts` is the allowlist of hostnames a module may be installed from
(MODULE_SYSTEM.md §2.7.2 decision 6), edited in Admin → Modules and audited as
`module.sources`. It is **bootstrapped** from `MODULE_SOURCE_HOSTS` and not owned by
it: `seedDefault` is an `INSERT IGNORE`, so the environment supplies a default on a
fresh install and changing the variable later cannot reach back in and overwrite what
an operator chose. Installs are `https`-only, every redirect hop is re-checked against
this list, and an empty value forbids every install rather than allowing every host.
The **`MODULES`** environment variable (MODULE_SYSTEM.md §2.7.2 decision 4) installs through the same
allowlist and the same verification, without a request: each `<id>@<version>=<manifest URL>` entry is
resolved onto the modules volume during boot, between `seedDefaults()` and the `require` of `app.js`
that scans it. It is not a settings row and is not editable from the panel — a deployment declares
what it runs, the panel shows that it did, and neither owns the other: the variable decides what is
on the volume and `installed_modules.state` decides whether a module answers.
**Keys a MODULE seeds into this table.** `settings` is core's, but a module's
schema fragment may `INSERT IGNORE` its own rows into it, and module-uo seeds two:
`game_account_signup` (default `disabled`) and the one-shot migration marker
`uo_link_protocol_3_migrated`. Core seeded both until Phase 3 slice 4, which is
worth knowing for one reason beyond tidiness — a fragment runs **after** core's
schema is replayed in full, so a marker in core guarding a statement in a fragment
fires before the statement reads it. That exact ordering silently disabled the
protocol-3 migration between slices 1 and 4; see MODULE_SYSTEM.md §2.7.1.
**Deliberately unseeded keys** — the theming & navigation overrides
(`theme_visual`, `brand_assets`, `nav_public`, `nav_admin`, `nav_player`). All
five are JSON strings, and **the absence of the row is the "use the default"
state**: colors/fonts/radii fall back to `theme.css`, assets to `BRAND_*`, navs
to the hardcoded `NAV` arrays. No migration writes defaults into them, because a
stored copy of a default would stop tracking the default. Resetting one is
therefore a `DELETE`, not a write — see `DELETABLE_KEYS` in `settings.model.js`
and [THEMING_AND_NAV.md](THEMING_AND_NAV.md) §2.
Values are `TEXT`, so a JSON-valued key arrives as a **string** and every
consumer parses it. Server side that is `utils/settingsJson.js`
(`parseJsonSetting`), client side `client/src/lib/settingsJson.js` and
`parseLayout`; both treat a malformed or wrong-shaped value as **absent** rather
than as an error, so a hand-edited row degrades to the default instead of
rendering something broken.
**The three `nav_*` rows are presentation, never authorization.** An entry is
keyed by an item's existing `to` and may carry only `label`, `order`, `hidden`
and — admin nav only — `group`; `utils/navOverrides.js` rejects anything else on
write, naming the key. It deliberately does **not** check that a `to` exists: the
base `NAV` arrays are client constants, and duplicating them server-side would
create a second source of truth for navigation that drifts the first time a route
is added. `client/src/lib/navOverrides.js` drops an unknown `to` at merge time
instead, which is also what makes deleting a route in code safe. The merge runs
*before* the role and feature filters in `SiteHeader.jsx` / `AdminLayout.jsx` —
a `feature` on a nav row is resolved by the module that **registered** the row
(`client/src/modules/featureGate.js`), so no flag string carries a parsed prefix
and core learns nothing about a game — and those filters remain the boundary: a stored
`hidden: false` on a gated item shows nobody anything. `hidden: false` is
accepted (the editor sends it mid-edit) but never stored, so hiding stays
subtractive. `hidden` on `/admin/navigation` is dropped for `nav_admin`, because
that screen is the only UI that can un-hide anything.
**`nav_public` may also carry dropdown sections and admin-authored links**, as
`{ items, sections, links }` — a bare map still reads as `items`, and a nav with
no sections still stores one. A **section** has a label and a position and no
route at all: it only opens, so it adds no reachable surface. A **link** is the
one place a path may be named that the code does not declare, and is therefore
the one place the path rule applies: same-origin only, no scheme and no
protocol-relative `//host`. A link carries no gate of its own and needs none —
the page behind it enforces its own access, so an added link advertises a route
and never grants one. Coded entries stay in `items`, keyed by a route the base
array must declare, which is what keeps "an override cannot introduce a route"
structurally true. Sections and links are dropped for `nav_admin` / `nav_player`,
whose layouts cannot render them.
**`theme_visual` is resolved server-side, not shipped raw to the browser.**
`utils/themeResolve.js` layers `:root` ← preset ← custom, field by field, into
the CSS custom properties `getPublic()` returns as `theme`; the SPA's only job
is to write them onto `<html>` and take back what it wrote last time
(`client/src/lib/themeVars.js`). One authority for the merge means the effective
accent in `brand.accent` — the cross-repo contract the Android app and the
Discord bot theme themselves from — always agrees with what the website paints.
Values reaching a CSS variable are checked against closed sets on both paths:
strictly on write (400, naming the field) and forgivingly on read (drop the bad
field, keep its neighbours).
### activity_log — append-only
| col | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
| id | INT PK AUTO_INCREMENT | |
| user_id | INT NULL FK→users(id) | |
| action | VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL | e.g. `auth.login`, `site_mode.change`, `post.create` |
| detail | TEXT NULL | JSON string of what changed |
| ip | VARCHAR(45) NULL | from `req.ip` (needs `trust proxy`) |
| created_at | DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP | |
### password_resets — self-service reset links
| col | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
| id | INT PK AUTO_INCREMENT | |
| token_hash | CHAR(64) UNIQUE NOT NULL | sha256 hex of the opaque token; **plaintext never stored** |
| user_id | INT NOT NULL FK→users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE | the account this reset targets |
| status | ENUM('pending','used') DEFAULT 'pending' | single-use (atomic `markUsed`) |
| requested_ip | VARCHAR(64) NULL | who asked (audit only) |
| expires_at | DATETIME NOT NULL | ~1h TTL, enforced in the model on top of this |
| created_at / used_at | DATETIME | |
Same "store only the hash of an opaque token" pattern as `user_invites` / `mobile_refresh_tokens`.
A DB read never yields a usable reset link. See §4 `/auth/password/*`.
### push_devices — opt-in push endpoints (M7)
| col | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
| id | INT PK AUTO_INCREMENT | |
| user_id | INT NOT NULL FK→users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE | owner |
| transport | ENUM('unifiedpush','fcm') DEFAULT 'unifiedpush' | UnifiedPush for the sideloaded APK; FCM reserved for a later Play flavor |
| endpoint | VARCHAR(512) NOT NULL | the distributor URL the app's ntfy topic was handed (or an FCM token). Unguessable but **not a secret** — stored in the clear (unlike refresh tokens), because pushes are content-free tickles |
| platform | VARCHAR(40) NULL | free-form label, e.g. `android` |
| created_at / last_seen_at | DATETIME | |
`UNIQUE(user_id, endpoint)` — re-registering the same endpoint is an idempotent upsert.
### notification_subscriptions — which streams a user opted into (M7)
| col | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
| user_id | INT NOT NULL FK→users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE | |
| stream_id | VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL | an id from the catalog (`modules/registries.js` — core's plus every installed module's), validated on write |
| created_at | DATETIME | |
`PRIMARY KEY(user_id, stream_id)`. Subscriptions are per-user (applied to every device); a PUT
replaces the whole set. Nothing is pushed unless the user subscribed.
### mobile_auth_sessions / mobile_auth_codes — mobile SSO bridge (M9)
Two short-lived, self-pruning tables that bridge a browser SSO redirect flow to a native client. They
carry the **app ↔ website** PKCE + CSRF state (a *second* PKCE layer, distinct from the website ↔ IdP
PKCE the `sso_tx` cookie already carries) and the one-time authorization code the app exchanges for
bearer tokens. Neither holds a secret in the clear — the PKCE `code_challenge` is a hash by
construction, and the authorization code is stored as a **sha256 hash only** (same pattern as
`user_invites` / `password_resets` / `mobile_refresh_tokens`).
`mobile_auth_sessions` — one row per `/auth/mobile/sso/start`:
| col | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
| id | INT PK AUTO_INCREMENT | |
| session_id | CHAR(36) UNIQUE | opaque uuid; carried inside the signed `sso_tx` (mode `mobile`) so the callback can find this row |
| provider | VARCHAR(40) NOT NULL | provider id validated enabled at `/start` |
| code_challenge | VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL | app-supplied PKCE S256 challenge (base64url); verified at `/exchange` |
| redirect_uri | VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL | the requested app callback — **exact-match** against the allowlist (never prefix) |
| state | VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL | app-generated opaque CSRF value, echoed on the callback for the app to verify |
| status | ENUM('pending','completed','consumed') DEFAULT 'pending' | `pending`→`completed` when the code is minted; `consumed` after a successful exchange |
| user_id | INT NULL FK→users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE | set once SSO resolves the account |
| trust_device | TINYINT(1) NOT NULL DEFAULT 0 | user ticked "trust this device" on the Custom Tab TOTP form. A **boolean only** — it tells `/exchange` to mint the app's own trust token; the token never rests here (only its sha256 reaches `trusted_devices`) |
| expires_at | DATETIME NOT NULL | short (~10 min — one redirect round-trip incl. TOTP) |
| created_at / used_at | DATETIME | `used_at` stamped at exchange |
`mobile_auth_codes` — one row per completed SSO callback (the code the app redeems):
| col | type | notes |
|---|---|---|
| id | INT PK AUTO_INCREMENT | |
| code_hash | CHAR(64) UNIQUE | sha256 hex of the opaque ≥128-bit code; the raw code never touches the DB |
| user_id | INT NOT NULL FK→users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE | the authenticated account |
| session_id | CHAR(36) NOT NULL | the owning `mobile_auth_sessions.session_id` (ties the code to its PKCE challenge) |
| expires_at | DATETIME NOT NULL | very short (~5 min) |
| used_at | DATETIME NULL | set on first successful exchange — **single use** (a reused code fails) |
| created_at | DATETIME | |
Both self-prune (indexed `expires_at`): a best-effort sweep runs at boot beside the existing
`revoked_sessions` prune, and each bridge write opportunistically deletes expired rows — so no cron
infra is added (same approach as `revoked_sessions`).
**`mobile_refresh_tokens` additions (M9).** Two nullable columns are added to support the device
list/revoke surface: `device_name VARCHAR(100) NULL` (a friendly label) and `last_used_at DATETIME
NULL` (bumped on each refresh). Existing rows get them via the schema's ALTER section; the token model
is otherwise unchanged.
### trusted_devices — MFA "Trust this device"
Lets a browser/app **skip the TOTP step** at login (never the password) for 30 days. Pattern-identical
to `mobile_refresh_tokens`: the opaque trust token lives client-side (the `rg_trust` httpOnly cookie on
web, `X-Trust-Token` / EncryptedSharedPreferences on native) and only its **sha256** hash is stored
(`token_hash CHAR(64) UNIQUE`) — sha256, not bcrypt, because a 256-bit random token is looked up **by
its hash** via the unique index (a per-row salt would break that). Columns mirror the mobile table
(`platform`, `device_name`, `device_hash`, `user_agent`, `created_at`, `last_used_at`, `expires_at`,
`revoked_at`). Capped at 10 rows/user **in application code — no silent pruning** (an over-cap trust is
refused so the client can prompt the user to revoke one first). Consulted only at the login/password
step, never at token refresh, and revoked wholesale on untrust / password change / password reset /
TOTP disable. See `docs/website/TRUSTED_DEVICES_MFA.md`.
### recovery_codes — single-use MFA backup codes
Generated at TOTP enrollment (10 at a time, shown to the user **once**) so a user who loses their
authenticator can complete login without an admin reset. `code_hash VARCHAR(72)` is a **bcrypt** hash
(not sha256): a recovery code is a human-typed, lower-entropy fallback credential — the closest
analogue to a password — and there is no hash-lookup constraint (verification fetches the user's ≤10
unused rows and `bcrypt.compare`s each, like password verification). `used_at` is the single-use
marker. Cleared wholesale on TOTP disable / password change / password reset.
### The 27 shard tables — module-owned (module system)
`shard_*` and `uo_link_config` are **not core's**. They are created and dropped by `module-uo`'s own
schema fragment, and a core running without that module has none of them. Their shapes and the
reasoning behind them live with the module:
[`../modules/uo/SCHEMA.md`](../modules/uo/SCHEMA.md).
The prefixes are grandfathered ([`MODULE_API.md`](MODULE_API.md) §6.5) — a new module prefixes its
tables with its own id.
### installed_modules — what is installed, and what happened to it (module system)
One row per installed module, keyed by the `id` from its `module.json` — the same id that names its
directory on the modules volume and its URL segment.
| Column | Shape |
|---|---|
| `id` | VARCHAR(32) PK — the module id |
| `name`, `version` | the manifest's label and semver, for the admin Modules screen |
| `state` | ENUM `installed` / `enabled` / `disabled` / `started` / `startup_failed` |
| `failure_stage`, `failure_reason` | the stage a failure happened at (`manifest`, `core_api`, `mounts`, `extensions`, `schema`, `require`, `register`, `boot`) and its recorded reason |
| `source`, `sha256` | the release the bundle came from and the digest verified before unpacking; both NULL for a directory placed on the volume by hand. **Written only by an admin-panel install, and `COALESCE`d on upsert** — see below |
| `installed_at`, `started_at`, `updated_at` | `started_at` is the last **successful** start |
**This table never decides which routes exist.** The module loader scans the filesystem at require
time, before the database is reachable, so the URL surface is a property of the volume — which is what
lets `routes.manifest.json` be generated against a dead database. A disabled module stays mounted and
is guarded; the row decides whether it *answers*, not whether it is there.
**Every boot resets each non-disabled row to `enabled`** and clears its recorded failure, then the load
writes that boot's outcome. So a `startup_failed` module is retried on the next restart (an operator
who fixes the cause needs no admin-panel visit), a running module can never display a stale reason,
and `disabled` — the one operator *decision* rather than outcome — survives untouched. A re-install or
upgrade refreshes the metadata and leaves `state` alone.
The write happens in one place, `src/modules/lifecycle.js`, on the boot path after `ensureSchema()`
and before the listener binds: it resets the last boot's outcomes, writes a row for every module found
on the volume (with NULL provenance for a hand-placed directory), marks any row whose directory is
**gone** `startup_failed`, and then runs each surviving module's `onBoot` and records what happened. A
`disabled` row is guarded, not booted, and never has its failure re-recorded — an outcome must not
overwrite the operator's decision. Every one of those writes is individually caught: a row that will
not update is worse reporting, never a failed boot.
**Provenance is `COALESCE`d on upsert, and that is load-bearing.** The boot write above passes NULL
for `source` and `sha256` — honestly, since a scan finds a directory and never where it came from —
so a plain `source = VALUES(source)` overwrites both columns on *every* boot, and an admin-panel
install's provenance survives only until the restart that install asks for. The statement is
`source = COALESCE(VALUES(source), source)`: a value overwrites, a NULL leaves what is there. The cost
is that hand-placing a different bundle over a row installed from a URL keeps the old provenance,
which is stale rather than blank. Found in Phase 4 by installing a module and restarting; it could not
have been found earlier, because until then no caller had ever passed a non-null value.
Design of record: [`MODULE_SYSTEM.md`](MODULE_SYSTEM.md) §2.4; the loader's obligations are
[`MODULE_API.md`](MODULE_API.md) Part 4.
---
## 4. API contract
Base path `/api/v1`. JSON in/out. Auth via httpOnly cookie (`isLoggedIn` reads it; also
accepts `Authorization: Bearer` for API testing).
### 4.0 The authoritative route list
The prose tables below are **orientation for a human reader** and can drift. Two generated artifacts
are authoritative, and they answer different questions:
| Artifact | Source of truth for | Generated by |
|---|---|---|
| `server/routes.manifest.json` — mirrored as [api-route-inventory.json](./api-route-inventory.json) | **What URLs CORE serves.** 166 public routes + 2 on the internal listener, sorted, method + path only. | `npm run routes:manifest`, by walking the live Express stack |
| `server/swagger/swagger-output.json` — merged into `/api/docs` | **What each core route means.** Parameters, bodies, response codes, security. | `npm run swagger`, from `#swagger.*` annotations |
Both are **core's**. An installed module's routes are in neither: they are in that module's own
frozen manifest and its `swagger-fragment.json`, in its own repo, and core merges the fragment into
`/api/docs.json` at request time (§4.0.1). So on a running instance the served document describes
more than the committed one does, which is the intended arrangement rather than a drift —
`swagger-output.json` has to regenerate identically on any machine, whatever happens to be
installed on it.
The split is deliberate: Swagger is annotation-derived, so an unannotated route is invisible in it and
it churns whenever a description is reworded — it documents *intent*. The manifest is introspection-
derived and records *reality*, which is why it, not Swagger, is the thing PR checks freeze
(`npm run routes:manifest -- --check`).
Both artifacts are emitted with **sorted** keys, so a diff in either is proportional to the change
rather than to how the routers happen to be traversed. `swagger.js` additionally strips trailing
slashes from generated path keys — see *Regenerating the spec* in the website README for why the
domain split makes that necessary.
Scope: the manifest keeps `/api/**` and `/.well-known/**` from the public app plus everything on the
internal listener. The SPA catch-all, `/uploads`, `/brand` and `/modules` are filesystem-conditional
static mounts — not API contract, and including them would make the output depend on whether CI had
built the client, or on which modules happened to be on the volume of the machine that generated it.
`/modules/<id>/` is the last of those and the newest: an installed module's prebuilt client chunk,
served from the directory its `client.entry` sits in and never from the module root, behind the
module's own state guard (`503` when it failed to start, `404` when disabled) and with
`Cache-Control: no-cache`, because Vite's library build emits an unhashed `entry.js`. Anything else
under `/modules` is a `404` rather than the SPA shell. The full contract is
[`MODULE_API.md`](MODULE_API.md) §3.1.
A third generated file, `server/routes.guards.json`, is a **review aid and not a contract**: per route,
the middleware handler count plus the *named* middleware on its mount chain. It exists because a
router-level `router.use(noindex, isLoggedIn, staffOnly)` gate never appears in an individual route's
own stack, so a capability router extracted without re-applying the gate would otherwise publish
authenticated endpoints silently. Names are a hint only — `requireRole(...)` returns an anonymous
arrow and cannot be observed — but a *missing* `requireAuth` is unambiguous, and the server test suite
asserts every `/admin/**` and `/player/**` route still carries it.
#### 4.0.1 `/api/docs.json` is assembled per request
`GET /api/docs.json` and the Swagger UI at `/api/docs` do not serve `swagger-output.json` directly.
`swagger/docsSpec.js` merges the `swagger-fragment.json` of every **started** module over it first,
cached on the module loader's state version and rebuilt when a module's state moves.
It exists because swagger-autogen is static analysis: it parses `src/app.js` as text and follows the
literal `app.use(…)` chain, which reaches neither an installed module (required by a filesystem loop,
from a volume that had nothing on it when the image was built) nor an extension slot (whose router is
created empty by `declareSlot()` and filled later). Slots are handled at generation time by
`swagger/slotSpecs.js` and are therefore *in* the committed file; modules cannot be, because core
never has their sources.
Three rules, all from [`MODULE_API.md`](MODULE_API.md) §6.1a:
- **`started` only.** A `registered`, `disabled` or `startup_failed` module's paths are absent —
documenting a route that answers 503 or 404 sends a client somewhere it cannot go.
- **Core wins every key collision**, in all three merged sections (`paths`, `tags`,
`components.schemas`); the collision is logged and the module's version dropped. This is what makes
the naming rule work: a module namespaces the schemas it *defines* (`UoShardStatus`) and references
core's shared ones (`Error`, `ValidationError`) by core's name, and both resolve in the merged
document.
- **A bad fragment costs that module its paths and nothing else.** Missing, unreadable or not JSON is
logged and skipped; `/api/docs.json` still answers with everything else.
The committed spec is never mutated — it is a `require()`d JSON module, so an in-place merge would be
permanent for the life of the process *and* cumulative across rebuilds.
### /auth (auth/index.js → the capability routers in §2)
No group gate — `/auth` is where an anonymous caller becomes authenticated. The authenticated parts
gate themselves: `me.routes.js` and `notifications.routes.js` each apply `noindex, requireAuth` at
their own router level, and `/sso/:provider/link` carries `requireAuth` per route.
| Method | Path | Auth | Body | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| POST | `/login` | — (rate-limited) | `{username,password}` | verify, set cookie, log `auth.login`, update `last_login_at`. If the account has TOTP **and this browser is a trusted device** (a valid `rg_trust` cookie bound to the user), the TOTP step is **skipped** and a session is issued directly (logs `auth.login.trusted_device`). Otherwise a 2FA account returns `{totpRequired, challenge}`. |
| POST | `/login/totp` | — (rate-limited) | `{challenge, code? \| recoveryCode?, trustDevice?, deviceName?}` | complete 2FA with a TOTP **or** single-use recovery code. `trustDevice` sets the `rg_trust` cookie so future logins skip TOTP; at the device cap the session is still issued and the body carries `{trustLimitReached, devices}`. |
| POST | `/logout` | cookie | — | clear cookie (the `rg_trust` trust cookie deliberately **survives** logout) |
| GET | `/me` | cookie / bearer | — | current user (no hash) or 401 — client bootstraps auth state |
| POST | `/password/forgot` | — (rate-limited) | `{email}` | email a single-use, ~1h reset link to **every active account** on the address; **always** returns the same generic 200 (no account enumeration). Email is non-unique, so several accounts may each get a link naming their username. Logs `account.password.reset.request`. |
| GET | `/password/reset/:token` | — | — | validate a link → `{username}` for the form, else 404 (never distinguishes expired/used/never-existed) |
| POST | `/password/reset/:token` | — (rate-limited) | `{password}` | consume the single-use link, rotate the hash, and revoke **all** sessions (web cutoff + mobile refresh tokens). Does **not** sign the user in — they log in fresh (so a 2FA account still passes TOTP). Logs `account.password.reset.complete`. |
| GET | `/me/account` | cookie / bearer | — | full self account (`id, username, role, email, status, totp_enabled, has_password`) |
| PATCH | `/me/account/username` | cookie / bearer (rate-limited) | `{username}` | change own username; re-issues the caller's session |
| PATCH | `/me/account/password` | cookie / bearer (rate-limited) | `{newPassword, currentPassword?}` | change/set own password (current required unless the account has none); revokes other sessions, keeps the caller's |
| POST | `/me/account/totp/setup` · `…/enable` · `…/disable` | cookie / bearer | `{code}` on enable/disable | self 2FA enrollment (disable needs a valid current code, not a password). **enable** returns the one-time `recoveryCodes`; **disable** clears the user's trusted devices + recovery codes |
| GET | `/me/account/identities` · DELETE `…/:provider` | cookie / bearer | — | list / unlink own SSO identities |
| GET | `/me/trusted-devices` | cookie / bearer | — | list own active trusted devices (never tokens) |
| POST | `/me/trusted-devices` | cookie / bearer (rate-limited) | `{deviceName?}` | trust the current device; web gets an httpOnly `rg_trust` cookie, native gets `{trustToken}`. **409 `{error:'trusted_device_limit', devices}`** at the cap |
| DELETE | `/me/trusted-devices` · `…/:id` | cookie / bearer | — | untrust all / one (ownership-scoped) |
| GET | `/me/account/recovery-codes/status` | cookie / bearer | — | remaining unused code count (never the codes) |
| POST | `/me/account/recovery-codes/generate` | cookie / bearer (rate-limited, **password step-up**) | `{currentPassword?}` | regenerate the one-time recovery codes (returned once); refused when 2FA is off |
| POST | `/me/devices` | cookie / bearer | `{endpoint, transport?, platform?}` | register a push endpoint; **rejects a disallowed endpoint 400** (SSRF guard). Idempotent per (user, endpoint) |
| GET | `/me/devices` · DELETE `…/:id` | cookie / bearer | — | list / unregister own push devices |
| GET | `/me/notifications/streams` | cookie / bearer | — | the subscribable catalog (`personal`/`requiresLinkedAccount` flags) |
| GET · PUT | `/me/notifications/subscriptions` | cookie / bearer | `{streams:[id]}` on PUT | get / replace own opted-in streams (unknown ids dropped) |
**Role-agnostic self-service (`/auth/me/*`).** The canonical "me" surface for **every** authenticated
role. It reuses the exact `account.controller` handlers as `/player/account/*` and `/admin/account/*`
(no logic duplication) behind `requireAuth` **only** — any active account, never a specific role. This
lets a client (the Android app) manage its own account through one surface without ever touching
`/admin` (docs/android/PLAN.md §6.4). The older `/player/account/*` + `/admin/account/*` routes stay
for web back-compat.
**The `/player/*` group is self-service, not player-only.** Staff are a **superset** of players — every
player ability plus their staff tools on top — so the whole group (`account.router.js`,
`appeals.router.js`, mounted by `player/index.js`, plus whatever a module mounts here) sits behind
the shared `noindex, requireAuth` gate **only**, never `requireRole('player')`. Every handler is self-scoped to the caller by `req.user.id`, so an admin/editor/
moderator using it sees only their **own** linked accounts and characters (with the pre-existing
`isAdmin` bypass still letting a genuine admin read *any* character). `module-uo` inherits the rule
and relies on it: its `/player/shard/*` handlers are the identical self-scoped ones it also serves
under `/admin/shard/*`, so the two are interchangeable. This is why a staff account with linked game characters gets its "My characters" and
personal notification streams on the mobile client — the group no longer 403s a non-`player` role.
**Password reset.** Uses the same audited pattern as `user_invites`: an opaque 32-byte token
whose **sha256 hash only** is stored in `password_resets`, single-use and short-lived (~1h). It
also serves SSO-only accounts (null `password_hash`) as their "set an initial password" path. The
reset link points at the web front end (`/account/reset/:token`); the Android app hands off here
rather than shipping its own reset screen (docs/android/PLAN.md §4.2). First admin is bootstrapped
by `seed.js` from env (see §6); further staff are created under `/admin/users` or via email invites.
**Push notifications (M7, opt-in).** The app subscribes per stream (`/auth/me/notifications/*`) and
registers device endpoints (`/auth/me/devices`); nothing is pushed unless subscribed. Delivery is a
**content-free tickle** — `{ stream, ref }`, no sensitive data — POSTed to each subscribed device's
self-hosted **ntfy** endpoint (`utils/pushDispatch`); the app wakes and pulls the real, ownership-
checked content over the authenticated API. Two producers fan out through the one publisher: the shard
ingest dispatcher (`utils/shardIngest`, beside the SSE broadcast) for shard-derived streams, and the
create/publish-post path for `news.post`. The catalog is assembled at boot by
`modules/registries.js` from core's own streams (`config/coreStreams.js` — just `news.post`) plus
each installed module's. The seven shard streams and their event→stream mapping left with
`module-uo` in Phase 3 and are registered by it; their ids are grandfathered to that module
([`MODULE_API.md`](MODULE_API.md) §6.5) because they are stored in `notification_subs` and read by
the shipped Android app. Security invariants:
- **Whether a stream is safe to publish is the registering module's decision, and it stays inside
that module.** `module-uo` applies the same public/admin split as its SSE feed — public streams are
drawn only from its own allowlist, so a sensitive kind (audit/cheat/IP/login-attempt) can never
produce a public push — and resolves personal streams (`vendor.sale`, `house.idoc`,
`account.login`) to the *owning* user's devices through its own ownership check. Core never sees a
shard event. **`utils/pushDispatch.js` publishes to a stream id someone else resolved** and knows
nothing about what produced it, which is what lets a second game's module reuse the whole pipe.
- **SSRF guard.** A device `endpoint` is a client-supplied URL the server POSTs to, so registration and
every publish validate it is HTTPS, non-private/loopback, and (when configured) on the shard's ntfy
allow-set (`NTFY_BASE_URL` / `NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`).
- ntfy is treated as an **untrusted relay** — no per-user accounts, unguessable topics; an optional
`NTFY_PUBLISH_TOKEN` hardens backend→ntfy publishes but is not required. See docs/android/PLAN.md §11.
### Mobile SSO Authorization Bridge (`/auth/mobile/sso/*`, M9)
Native "Sign in with Google/Discord" for the Android app **without shipping any OAuth secret in the
app**. The website stays the identity authority: each shard owner's provider credentials live in
`auth_providers` (encrypted at rest) and are only ever used server-side. The bridge is a **new
consumer of the existing SSO + mobile-bearer machinery**, not a parallel auth path — it reuses the
`/auth/sso/:provider/*` redirect flow, the link-only + opt-in-provisioning policy, the TOTP gate, and
issues the **same** token pair as `/auth/mobile/login`.
The TOTP gate it reuses includes the **trusted-device skip** (see
`TRUSTED_DEVICES_MFA.md` §6). Because the app opens this flow in a Custom Tab, which shares the
system browser's cookie jar, the `rg_trust` cookie set on the TOTP form is presented back on the next
app sign-in — so "don't ask me again" works for native SSO without the app injecting a header into a
tab it does not control, and without a trust token ever appearing in a start URL.
| Method | Path | Auth | Body / Query | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GET | `/auth/providers` | — | — | **reused** discovery; the app renders provider buttons from this (never exposes secrets) |
| GET | `/auth/mobile/sso/start` | — (rate-limited per-IP + per-provider) | `?provider&code_challenge&state&redirect_uri` | validate provider enabled + `redirect_uri` **exact-match** allowlist; insert a `mobile_auth_sessions` row; create the existing `sso_tx` tagged `mode:'mobile'` carrying `session_id`; **302 to the IdP** (existing authorize URL) |
| GET | `/auth/sso/:provider/callback` | — (signed `sso_tx`) | `?code&state` | **existing** endpoint; a new branch when `tx.mode==='mobile'`: resolve the account (same policy as web login incl. TOTP), mint a single-use hashed authorization code into `mobile_auth_codes`, mark the session `completed`, and **302 to `redirect_uri?code=…&state=…`** (the app's original `state`) — **no cookie is set** |
| POST | `/auth/mobile/sso/exchange` | — (rate-limited per-IP) | `{code, code_verifier}` | validate the code exists / unexpired / unused (mark used) and `sha256(code_verifier)` matches the stored challenge → issue the existing mobile access + refresh pair (`createMobileSession`) → `{accessToken, refreshToken, expiresIn, user}`. When the session carries `trust_device`, also mint a `platform:'mobile'` trusted device and add `trustToken` — minted here, on an authenticated app→server call, so it never travels in the deep link. Best-effort: at the trusted-device cap the response simply omits it rather than failing the sign-in |
| POST | `/auth/mobile/refresh` | — | `{refreshToken}` | **reused** unchanged — rotate the pair |
| POST | `/auth/mobile/logout` | bearer | `{refreshToken?, all?}` | **reused** unchanged — revoke this (or all) refresh token(s) |
| GET | `/auth/me/sessions` · DELETE `…/:id` | cookie / bearer | — | list / revoke own **mobile sessions** (device_name, last_used_at, created_at) — the "Active Devices" surface (distinct from `/auth/me/devices`, which is push endpoints) |
**Two PKCE layers (do not conflate).**
- *Layer A (existing):* website ↔ IdP. The `code_verifier` is generated at `/start`, kept only in the
httpOnly `sso_tx` cookie, sent to the IdP token endpoint at the callback. Unchanged.
- *Layer B (new):* app ↔ website. The **app** generates `code_verifier`/`code_challenge`; the
challenge is stored in `mobile_auth_sessions` at `/start`; the verifier is presented at `/exchange`.
This is what stops an intercepted callback code from being redeemed by anyone but the real app.
**State / CSRF.** The app-generated `state` is stored at `/start`, echoed on the callback redirect,
and **verified by the app** before it calls `/exchange` — a CSRF guard independent of both PKCE
layers (a different app instance triggering `/start` cannot complete someone else's flow).
**Redirect-URI allowlist.** `/start` and the callback validate `redirect_uri` by **exact match**
against a configured allowlist (`MOBILE_AUTH_REDIRECT_URIS`, default the one fixed application-owned
callback `runicgateway://auth/callback`) — **never prefix match** (prefix matching on custom schemes
is a known open-redirect vector). Tokens are **never** placed in the callback URL — only the
short-lived authorization code.
*App Links (implemented).* When the admin toggle `mobile_app_links_enabled` is **on**, `/start` also
accepts the self-origin HTTPS callback `https://<request-host>/mobile/callback` — one *additive*
exact-match entry, derived from the request/`APP_BASE_URL` and never from client input; the
custom-scheme allowlist is never narrowed. The shard then auto-serves `GET
/.well-known/assetlinks.json` (fixed package `com.runicgateway.app` + `MOBILE_APP_CERT_SHA256`
fingerprints; 404 when the toggle is off or no fingerprint is configured), and
`settings.getPublic()` advertises `mobileAppLinks: <bool>`. These two things — one static file route
and one more allowlist entry — are the *entire* server surface App Links require. See
docs/android/APP_LINKS.md.
**TOTP through the bridge.** A 2FA account keeps full parity: the callback stages the existing
pending-TOTP cookie (now also carrying the bridge `session_id`) and bounces the Custom Tab through the
web TOTP form; on a correct code the completion mints the authorization code and deep-links back to
the app — it never mints a session cookie for a mobile flow.
**Revocation latency (documented tradeoff).** Revoking a refresh token (device revoke / logout) stops
future renewals but does **not** invalidate an already-issued access token until it expires — up to
the access-token lifetime (`MOBILE_ACCESS_TTL`, default 15 min) of continued access. This is an
accepted tradeoff given the short lifetime. If instant revocation is ever required, add an
access-token (jti) blocklist check on the `requireAuth` path — the same `revoked_sessions` mechanism
web sessions already use.
**Authorization code.** Cryptographically random, ≥128 bits, stored **hash-only**, single-use, short
expiry (~5 min); `/exchange` is rate-limited per-IP. The bridge tables self-prune (§3).
### /public (public/index.js → the capability routers in §2) — all GET except `/contact`, no auth
**No group gate, deliberately.** This surface is anonymous by design: the SPA renders it logged-out,
the Discord bot reads it with no credentials, and the Android `ShardStreamClient` consumes
module-uo's `/public/shard/stream` without an `Authorization` header — a module mounting here
inherits the same "no gate" and owns whatever gate it adds. Content visibility during maintenance comes
from the per-route **siteMode** middleware (§5), never from an auth gate.
| Method | Path | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| GET | `/settings` | whitelisted public keys, the derived `registration` flags (`gameAccountSignup` was one of these until the module extraction moved game-account policy to module-uo — it is on that module's `GET /public/shard/features` now, and the `game_account_signup` settings row is unchanged), the per-shard **`brand`** block (name, `accent` color, logo/hero/favicon) a client themes itself from — one image runs as any shard, asset fields may be site-relative paths (resolve against the base URL); these are **effective** values, so an admin theme (`theme_visual`) beats `BRAND_ACCENT_COLOR` and an uploaded `brand_assets` asset beats its `BRAND_*` path — an optional **`theme`** block, the resolved CSS custom properties for that admin theme (absent when the instance was never themed, which is what makes it render from the shipped stylesheet unchanged) — and a **`push`** block `{ ntfyUrl }` (M7): the client-facing ntfy relay URL the app's embedded distributor registers its device topic against, from `NTFY_PUBLIC_URL` / first `NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` (never the internal `NTFY_BASE_URL`); `null` when push isn't configured for the shard. |
| GET | `/status` | status message + current mode, **plus a `version` block** (`{ service:'runic-gateway', api, server }`) so a client first-run probe recognizes the backend and can run a version-mismatch guard |
| GET | `/version` | lightweight, **DB-free** backend identity/version (`{ service, api, server }`) — the canonical target for the version guard and a cheap liveness check |
| GET | `/modules` | `{ modules: [{ id, name, version, capabilities }] }` — the modules this backend is currently **serving**, in scan order (module system, `MODULE_API.md` §2.9). A module that is disabled or failed to load is **absent**, not listed with a state: its routes and nav are absent too, so the client renders a site without that capability rather than advertising one that 503s. The recorded failure stage and reason are admin-panel detail and are never published here. `capabilities` are opaque strings the module declares — feature-detect against them and treat an unknown one as absent. Like `/status` and `/version` it is **DB-free and not site-mode gated**, so a client can still feature-detect during maintenance. It is *not* how a module's client chunk loads — `htmlShell` injects a `<script type="module">` per started module. |
| GET | `/posts/:category` | published only; `category` ∈ news\|five-on-friday\|newsletter\|screenshots |
| GET | `/posts/:category/:idOrSlug` | single published post |
| GET | `/wiki` | list of pages (slug + title) |
| GET | `/wiki/:slug` | single page |
| POST | `/contact` | (rate-limited) send mail via SMTP; if unconfigured, respond `{fallback:"mailto", email}` |
| — | `/shard/*` · `/atlas/*` | **Served by `module-uo`, not by core** (25 routes). Documented in [`../modules/uo/API.md`](../modules/uo/API.md); absent entirely when the module is not installed, which is a 404 and not an error. |
Public content GETs pass through the **siteMode** gate (§5).
### /settings (settings/index.js → §2) — behind `requireAuth` + `noindex`, no role gate
Site-wide settings that need a login but no particular role. It exists because the
other four groups each answer a different question: `/public` is anonymous,
`/admin/settings` is `adminOnly`, and `/player` is data scoped to `req.user.id`.
These rows are configuration that happens to need a login.
| Method | Path | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| GET | `/settings/nav` | `{ nav_admin, nav_player }` — the stored nav overrides as raw JSON strings (or `null`), for the two authenticated layouts that render them. Deliberately not public: an anonymous visitor has no use for either, and the admin nav's labels describe the shape of the admin surface. Open to **any** role because `AdminLayout` renders for editors and moderators and `PlayerPortalLayout` for players, none of whom can read `GET /admin/settings`. Presentation-only — the role/feature filters in those layouts still decide what is shown, and an override can never un-hide a gated item (see [THEMING_AND_NAV.md](THEMING_AND_NAV.md) §7) |
| GET | `/settings/theme/options` | The closed sets an admin may pick from when theming the site: the presets (each with its **full token map**, so a form can show what an unset field currently resolves to), the curated Google Fonts shortlist per role, the shadow depths, the editable color/radius field names paired with the CSS variable each drives, and `shippedTokens` (what `theme.css`'s `:root` declares). Static — derived from `config/themePresets.js`, no DB read. Served rather than duplicated in client code so the options the form **offers** can never drift from the ones `PUT /admin/settings` **accepts** |
### /admin (admin/index.js → the capability routers in §2) — all behind `isLoggedIn` + `noindex` + `staffOnly`
`admin/index.js` applies the shared gate and mounts each capability router at the prefix it owns;
`users`, `invites`, `auth/providers` and `bot-activity` add `adminOnly` on top, and `moderation` adds
`modAccess` (admin + moderator, so editors are excluded). The content capabilities — `posts`,
`uploads`, `wiki`, `pages` — add nothing: managing content is the editor tier's job, so `staffOnly` is
the whole gate. The ops/config capabilities — `modules`, `email`, `discord-bot`, `settings`, and
`PUT /site-mode` — are `adminOnly`. There is no residual file: every admin route is declared in a
capability router.
**A module mounts into this group as a peer**, at a prefix it claims and core has verified nothing
else owns; the shared gate above applies to it, and any gate beyond that is the module's own. So the
mixed-tier prefixes here are `module-uo`'s `/admin/shard` and `/admin/uo-link`, documented in
[`../modules/uo/API.md`](../modules/uo/API.md) — not core's, and absent from this table.
`/admin/modules` is `adminOnly` rather than `staffOnly` for the reason the endpoint exists: it
installs code that will run inside the server process at the next boot. An editor or a moderator has
no business doing that, and the group gate alone would let them.
`GET /dashboard` and `PUT /site-mode` are the one place where a **single screen spans two tiers**: the
dashboard is staff-wide, but the site-mode toggle on it is `adminOnly`. The client must therefore gate
that control on its own (`Dashboard.jsx` renders it only for `role === 'admin'`) rather than relying on
the route gate that admitted them to the page — the same rule the sidebar follows, so a non-admin is
never shown a control that would 403. The URLs below are unaffected by which
file a route sits in — that is the property the route manifest freezes.
| Method | Path | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| GET | `/dashboard` | current mode, last change time + who, content counts, recent activity |
| PUT | `/site-mode` | `{mode}` → update settings, stamp who/when, log `site_mode.change` |
| GET | `/posts?category=` | all posts incl. unpublished |
| POST | `/posts` | create |
| GET | `/posts/:id` | one |
| PUT | `/posts/:id` | edit |
| DELETE | `/posts/:id` | delete |
| PATCH | `/posts/:id/publish` | `{published}` toggle (sets `published_at`) |
| POST | `/posts/upload` | multipart image upload (multer) → `{image_url}` for screenshots |
| GET | `/wiki` · GET `/wiki/:slug` | read incl. unpublished |
| POST | `/wiki` · PUT `/wiki/:slug` · DELETE `/wiki/:slug` | manage pages |
| GET | `/settings` · PUT `/settings` | read all / update `{key:value,...}`. Enum-constrained keys are validated on the way in; `theme_visual` additionally has every value checked against the closed sets in `config/themePresets.js` (hex color, shortlisted font stack, bounded px radius, listed shadow) and is stored stringified, and `brand_assets` has every slot checked against `utils/brandAssets.js` — a same-origin path under `/uploads/`, `/brand/` or `/assets/`, never an off-origin or protocol-relative URL, since these values are written straight into the page as an `<img src>` / `<link rel=icon>` / `og:image`. Cleared slots are dropped rather than stored as `null`. The three `nav_*` keys go through `utils/navOverrides.js` on the same path — shape only (`label`/`order`/`hidden`/`group` keyed by an app path), since whether a key names a route the nav declares is settled client-side at merge time; without this they would reach the store as `"[object Object]"` and read as absent for ever. A write to `brand_assets` or `theme_visual` invalidates the cached HTML shell (a nav write does not — nav is not in the shell). The read path drops bad fields anyway, so the `400` is about **feedback** — a save that appears to succeed and then does nothing is worse than a rejection |
| DELETE | `/settings/:key` | reset one setting to its default by deleting the row. Allowlisted to the keys whose default lives outside the store (`theme_visual`, `brand_assets`, `nav_public`, `nav_admin`, `nav_player`, `hero_layout_draft`) — anything else is `400`. Idempotent: resetting a key that was never set succeeds |
| POST | `/settings/brand-asset/:slot` | upload one brand asset (`logo` · `hero` · `favicon`) **and** point `brand_assets` at it, in one call → `{ url, brand_assets }`. One call rather than "upload, then PUT" so a half-completed save never leaves an unreferenced file in `/uploads`. Uses the shared `imageUpload.js` multer config — the mimetype allowlist is never widened, only tightened per slot: favicons are **PNG only** (§4.10 of [THEMING_AND_NAV.md](THEMING_AND_NAV.md)) and capped at 512 KB, logos at 1 MB, heroes at the shared 8 MB. A refused file is unlinked before the response. Merges into the existing overrides, so uploading a logo never clears a hero. `adminOnly` — tighter than the generic `POST /admin/uploads`, which editors may reach |
| GET | `/activity?limit=&offset=` | paginated activity log |
| GET | `/users` · POST `/users` · PUT `/users/:id` · DELETE `/users/:id` | user mgmt (can't delete self / last admin; password hashed on write) |
| GET | `/users/:id/trusted-devices` | list a user's active trusted devices (never tokens) |
| DELETE | `/users/:id/trusted-devices` · `…/:deviceId` | revoke all / one of a user's trusted devices (logs `admin.trusted_device.revoke[_all]`) |
| POST | `/users/:id/mfa/reset` | recover a locked-out user: disable TOTP + revoke all trusted devices + clear recovery codes (logs `admin.user.totp.reset`) |
| GET | `/modules` | installed modules reconciled across all four sources of truth — the `installed_modules` row, the live loader record, the modules volume, and the `MODULES` declaration — plus the install-source allowlist. They are allowed to disagree, and the screen renders the disagreement rather than picking one (module system, [`MODULE_SYSTEM.md`](MODULE_SYSTEM.md) §2.4) |
| POST | `/modules` | install or upgrade from a release **install-manifest URL**: allowlisted `https` host, declared `sha256`, whole-archive inspection, unpack into a scratch dir, move into place last. Takes effect at the next restart. `adminOnly`, rate-limited, audit-logged — this endpoint installs code that will run in the server process |
| PUT | `/modules/sources` | replace the host allowlist. Seeded from `MODULE_SOURCE_HOSTS` on a fresh install and DB-owned from then on, so changing the variable never overwrites an operator's choice. An **empty list forbids every install**, never permits all |
| POST | `/modules/restart` | graceful shutdown so module changes take effect; the supervisor brings the process back (`restart: unless-stopped` on the shipped compose). Emits `SIGTERM` **as an event** rather than signalling the pid — `process.kill` is unconditional termination on Windows |
| POST | `/modules/:id/enable` | move the row to `enabled`. Deliberately does **not** touch the loader: there is no `onBoot` re-dispatch, so the screen asks for a restart |
| POST | `/modules/:id/disable` | the one module action that takes effect immediately — dispatches that module's `onShutdown`, then its routes, nav and client chunk answer 404. A real kill switch, not a visibility flag |
| POST | `/modules/:id/purge` | run a **disabled** module's `purge.sql`, dropping its tables and data. `409` while it is still running; `400` if it ships no `purge.sql` |
| DELETE | `/modules/:id[?purge=true]` | uninstall: stop, then (with `purge=true`) drop its data, then delete its directory. Non-destructive by default — the row stays `disabled` and the data is left for a reinstall to pick up. The purge option lives here because it cannot live after: `purge.sql` is a file inside the directory being deleted |
| — | `/shard/*` · `/uo-link/*` | **Served by `module-uo`, not by core** (33 routes). Documented in [`../modules/uo/API.md`](../modules/uo/API.md) |
Every admin write logs to `activity_log`.
### The SPA HTML shell (`app.js` → `utils/htmlShell.js`)
The SPA catch-all serves `client/dist/index.html` with this instance's branding templated into the
`<head>` — title, meta description, Open Graph / Twitter tags, `<link rel="icon">` — so one prebuilt
image serves per-instance metadata to a crawler that never runs the JavaScript.
That used to be a single render at module load, from `BRAND_*` env only. It cannot be, now that the
favicon and OG image can come from the admin's `brand_assets` row: the shell depends on state that
changes while the process runs. `utils/htmlShell.js` owns the lifecycle, and three properties are
deliberate:
- **A cached string in the steady state.** The shell is rendered lazily on first request and reused;
a settings read per page view would put the database on the critical path of every SPA route,
including during an outage where the API is already degraded. Concurrent first requests share one
render.
- **A DB fault never fails the page.** A failed read renders the env-only shell — exactly the
pre-feature behavior — and that result is cached like any other, so an outage does not become a
failing query per page view.
- **Byte-identical with no rows.** An instance that has never been themed and has uploaded nothing
gets the same bytes it got before the feature existed. Locked by `test/htmlShell.test.js`, which
keeps a verbatim copy of the old renderer as its reference.
Invalidation is explicit — the settings controller calls `htmlShell.invalidate()` after a successful
write to `brand_assets` or `theme_visual` — with a **5-minute TTL as a safety net**, because the cache
is per process: in a scaled deployment the worker that handled the write is the only one that learns
of it, and without the TTL every other worker would serve the old favicon until the next restart.
The shell also carries the resolved theme as a `<style id="theme-boot">:root{…}</style>` block, last
in `<head>` so it follows the built stylesheet and wins the equal-specificity tie. It exists only to
stop a themed instance painting the shipped palette for one frame; `SiteContext` removes it once the
`/public/settings` payload has arrived and applied — gated on a **successful** fetch, since dropping
it after a failed one would strip a themed instance back to the shipped colors. Token names and
values are re-checked against conservative patterns on the way into the block: everything there comes
from a closed set already, and this keeps that a property of the HTML writer rather than of a
validator three modules away.
---
## 5. Site mode (LIVE / MAINTENANCE)
State in `settings.site_mode` (`live`|`maintenance`), default **maintenance**.
`middleware/siteMode.js`, applied only to **public content** routes:
- `live` → pass through.
- `maintenance` → respond **503** with `{mode:"maintenance", message}` **unless** the request
carries a valid admin cookie (admin preview). This hides content server-side, not just in
the UI.
Always reachable regardless of mode: static assets / SPA shell, `/api/v1/auth/*`, all
`/api/v1/admin/*`. So admin login + panel + the maintenance "coming soon" page always load.
**Client behavior (Phase 3):** reads `GET /public/settings`; if `maintenance` and not an
admin previewing, render the polished dark coming-soon page (message + contact email).
Admin "preview live" simply hits the content APIs with the admin cookie, which bypass the gate.
Dashboard reads `site_mode` + `site_mode_changed_at`/`_by` for "current mode + last change +
who"; `activity_log` provides the history feed.
---
## 6. Auth & security
- **JWT** signed with `JWT_SECRET`, `expiresIn=JWT_EXPIRES_IN` (default `1d`); payload `{id,username,role}`.
- **Cookie**: `httpOnly`, `sameSite=Lax`, `path=/`, and **`secure` decided per-request** (`COOKIE_SECURE=auto` → `secure: req.secure`).
- **Trusted-device MFA.** A second, separate httpOnly cookie (`rg_trust`, default 30d) — opaque, sha256-hashed server-side in `trusted_devices` — lets a browser/app **skip the TOTP step** (never the password) on future logins. It is a server-side, per-row-revocable record (never a JWT claim), so the stateless session JWT is unchanged and trust stays revocable. It only ever gates the **second factor**; it deliberately outlives logout, and is cleared on untrust / password change / password reset / TOTP disable. **Recovery codes** (bcrypt, single-use) are the 2FA-lockout fallback. All admin trusted-device/MFA actions and the self actions (`auth.login.trusted_device`, `account.trusted_device.*`, `account.recovery_code*`, `admin.trusted_device.*`, `admin.user.totp.reset`) are audit-logged. See `docs/website/TRUSTED_DEVICES_MFA.md`. This is the key to dual access: the cookie is `Secure` when reached through Pangolin (HTTPS, `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`) but **not** `Secure` when reached directly over the LAN IP on plain HTTP — so login works in both. `COOKIE_SECURE=true|false` can force it. Requires `trust proxy` (below). `localhost:5173` (Vite) and `localhost:3000` are same-site, so the cookie flows in dev too.
- **bcrypt** hashing (cost 10+); plaintext passwords never stored, logged, or returned.
- **Rate limiting** (`express-rate-limit`) on `/auth/login`, `/public/contact`, and the account-change
routes. Every core public read is an indexed lookup of bounded size, so none is limited. A module
gets the same factory through `ctx.middleware.rateLimit` and is expected to use it on any read that
is expensive to serve — `module-uo` limits its marketplace search (60/min/IP), the one public GET
in the system that costs real money to answer.
- **Validation** (`express-validator`) on all writes; centralized error handler.
- **helmet** with a Content-Security-Policy tuned for the built React SPA. The policies now live in
**`server/src/config/csp.js`** (`app.js` only wires them up):
`default-src 'self'`; `script-src 'self'` (the Vite build emits only external module chunks — the
inline module-preload polyfill is disabled in `client/vite.config.js` to keep this valid);
`style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com` (React's pervasive inline
`style={{…}}` attributes can't be nonce'd, plus the Google Fonts stylesheet); `font-src 'self'
https://fonts.gstatic.com` (Cinzel); `img-src 'self' data: https:` (same-origin uploads, plus
external https images embedded in wiki/news bodies or `BRAND_*` logo/hero/favicon); `connect-src
'self'` (REST + SSE are same-origin); `frame-ancestors 'self'`; `object-src 'none'`; `base-uri
'self'`; `form-action 'self'` (blocks an injected `<form action="https://evil">` from POSTing
credentials off-origin — an exfil path `connect-src` does not cover; it was always emitted via
helmet's `useDefaults` and is now pinned explicitly so it cannot vanish under a helmet upgrade).
`upgrade-insecure-requests` is intentionally **not** set (TLS terminates at the proxy, there
are no mixed-content subresources, and it would break a local `npm start` over plain http). The
`/api/docs` Swagger UI route gets a **looser** policy that additionally allows inline script/style,
since swagger-ui-express injects an inline bootstrap. helmet also strips `X-Powered-By`; the two
internal-only listeners (`internalApp.js`, `bot/src/app.js`) disable it explicitly too.
- **A second, tightened policy ships alongside on `Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only`** for one
release before it replaces the enforced one (`docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md` § Phase 1). It is derived
from the enforced policy so the two cannot drift, and differs by exactly one directive:
`frame-ancestors 'self'` → **`'none'`**. Serving both headers at once means the live policy keeps
protecting users while anything the tightened version would break arrives as a report rather than as
a broken page — and for `frame-ancestors` specifically, a report from the browser of whoever framed
the site is the only way to learn that something does.
- **`POST /api/csp-report`** is the same-origin violation sink that `report-to` / `report-uri` point at
(`report-to` additionally requires the `Reporting-Endpoints` response header, which is set alongside).
Same-origin on purpose: reports describe attacks against this site and are not handed to a
third-party collector. It parses **both** wire formats (`application/csp-report` from Firefox/Safari,
`application/reports+json` from Chrome's Reporting API — handling one drops half the browsers),
writes to the `csp` log tag and **stores nothing**. Necessarily unauthenticated (browsers send
reports with no session), so it is bounded on every axis: 16 KB body cap, per-IP rate limit, fixed
field allowlist, every logged field truncated, and **always 204 — even for malformed input**, since a
4xx would make the global error handler log the attacker-supplied body and turn an open endpoint into
a log-flood primitive. Mounted outside `/api/v1` next to `/api/health`: the browser learns the path
from the policy header, never from a client build, so it is not part of the versioned client
contract.
- **Admin not indexed**: `X-Robots-Tag: noindex, nofollow` on `/api/v1/admin` and the admin SPA routes; `robots.txt` disallows `/admin`.
- **No directory browsing** (express.static doesn't list; no `serve-index`).
- **No hardcoded credentials**: first admin via `seed.js` reading `ADMIN_USERNAME`/`ADMIN_PASSWORD` from env (created only if no users exist); `.env` git-ignored, `.env.example` committed.
- **`app.set('trust proxy', 1)`** so secure cookies, `req.ip`, and rate-limiting work behind Pangolin.
- **CORS**: same-origin in prod (SPA served by Express). Dev only: allow `CLIENT_ORIGIN` (Vite, `http://localhost:5173`) with `credentials:true`.
### 6.5 Module-owned audience boundaries
Core's security boundaries end at authentication, roles and the session. A module that serves
game data brings its own audience rules, and core does not police them beyond the gates it hands
over (`requireAuth`, `requireRole`, the tier group gates).
`module-uo`'s is the worked example, and it is a real boundary rather than a convenience filter: an
admin-configurable, per-feature and per-field audience ladder with fail-closed defaults, applied at
routes, at SSE subscribe time and at the nav. It used to be documented here as core's; it moved to
[`../modules/uo/API.md`](../modules/uo/API.md) §4 when Phase 4 closed, with the admin-facing guide
still at [`SHARD_VISIBILITY.md`](SHARD_VISIBILITY.md).
---
## 7. Email
`utils/mailer.js` (nodemailer) sends through **Gmail over OAuth2 (SMTP XOAUTH2)**, configured in
Admin → Settings → Email — not env. The mailbox is authorized by an in-app "Connect Gmail" consent
flow (`/admin/email/*`) that captures a refresh token, stored AES-GCM-encrypted in the `email_config`
singleton (never returned over the API). The OAuth client id/secret are reused from the `google`
auth-providers row. Recipient is the `contact_email` site setting. If email is unconfigured/disabled,
`POST /public/contact` returns `{fallback:"mailto", email}` so the client renders a `mailto:` link
instead. Errors never leak credentials.
---
## 7.5 Logging & observability
`utils/logger.js` — a small dependency-free logger with **two transports, console + file**,
and four levels (`error`/`warn`/`info`/`debug`). Each line is timestamped and tagged by
subsystem (`[server]`, `[http]`, `[db]`, `[auth]`, `[admin]`, `[ratelimit]`, `[csp]`, …).
> During the CSP report-only soak, `[csp]` is the tag to watch: a `csp violation` warn line with
> `directive: frame-ancestors` means something really does frame the site and the enforce PR would
> break it. Silence across one release is the green light to flip.
- **Console**: color on a TTY, plain in Docker; verbosity = `LOG_LEVEL` (default `info`).
- **File**: plain text appended to `LOG_DIR/LOG_FILE` (default `<server>/logs/app.log`,
`/app/logs/app.log` in Docker, bind-mounted to `./logs`); verbosity = `FILE_LOG_LEVEL`
(default `debug`, so the file keeps a complete record while the console stays readable).
Toggle with `LOG_TO_FILE`. The stream is flushed on graceful shutdown.
- **HTTP access logs** via morgan piped into the logger: real client IP (`trust proxy`),
authenticated admin username, method, URL, status, response time, size.
- **Captured events**: startup config banner, schema/seed steps, login success/failure,
rate-limit hits, site-mode changes, maintenance-gate blocks (debug), all errors with
stack traces (5xx), and SIGINT/SIGTERM shutdown. Passwords and request bodies are never
logged. `unhandledRejection`/`uncaughtException` are caught and logged.
## 8. Deployment
**docker-compose.yml** — two services on a private network:
- `db`: `mariadb:11`, env `MARIADB_DATABASE/USER/PASSWORD/ROOT_PASSWORD`, volume
`dbdata:/var/lib/mysql`, mounts `schema.sql` into `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d`, healthcheck.
- `app`: builds the Dockerfile (installs client+server, builds Vite, serves via Express),
`env_file: .env`, `DB_HOST=db`, `depends_on: db (healthy)`, volume `uploads:/app/uploads`,
`ports: "3000:3000"` — **binds 0.0.0.0** (no `127.0.0.1:` prefix) so Pangolin reaches it.
- `ntfy` (M7): pinned upstream `binwiederhier/ntfy` image, declarative config only
(`./ntfy/server.yml` mounted `:ro` + `NTFY_BASE_URL`), volume `ntfydata:/var/lib/ntfy`,
**publishes `:80` on a host port** (`${NTFY_HOST_PORT:-2586}:80`, binds 0.0.0.0) so Pangolin — which
runs outside the compose network — can forward the notification subdomain to it, the same reason
`app` publishes `3000`. Both devices (SSE subscribe) and the backend publisher (POSTing tickles to
registered device endpoints) reach ntfy on that public origin. Anonymous read-write to unguessable
topics (no accounts to provision) — safe because pushes are content-free tickles. Bringing the stack
up provisions a working push relay with **zero interactive setup**.
- Volumes: `dbdata`, `uploads`, `ntfydata`.
Express listens on `0.0.0.0:${PORT||3000}`. Pangolin terminates TLS and proxies to `app`.
**.env.example** (committed; real `.env` ignored):
```
NODE_ENV=production
PORT=3000
DB_HOST=db
DB_PORT=3306
DB_NAME=uomysticmoon
DB_USER=uomm
DB_PASSWORD=
DB_ROOT_PASSWORD=
JWT_SECRET=
JWT_EXPIRES_IN=1d
COOKIE_SECURE=true
COOKIE_NAME=uomm_token
ADMIN_USERNAME=
ADMIN_PASSWORD=
# Email: configured in Admin → Settings → Email (Gmail OAuth2), not via env
CLIENT_ORIGIN=http://localhost:5173
# Push (M7): the ntfy relay URL — also the backend's SSRF allow-set for device
# endpoints. NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS / NTFY_PUBLISH_TOKEN are optional.
NTFY_BASE_URL=https://ntfy.example.com
# The client-facing ntfy URL surfaced to the app via /public/settings.push.ntfyUrl
# (the app registers its topic endpoint here). Defaults to the first
# NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS entry; set explicitly when the public URL differs from the
# internal NTFY_BASE_URL. Without it (and without NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS) the app
# shows push as unavailable for the shard.
NTFY_PUBLIC_URL=https://ntfy.example.com
NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://ntfy.example.com
# Host port the ntfy container publishes :80 on (default 2586); the reverse proxy
# forwards the notification subdomain to host:NTFY_HOST_PORT. Change on a conflict.
NTFY_HOST_PORT=2586
```
`.gitignore`: `node_modules/`, `.env`, `_reference/`, `client/dist/`, `uploads/`.
---
## 9. Dependencies (server)
`express, cors, helmet, morgan, dotenv, mariadb, jsonwebtoken, bcryptjs, cookie-parser,
express-rate-limit, express-validator, multer, nodemailer` · dev: `nodemon`.
Removed vs serverlinkr: `mongoose, mongodb, connect-mongo, express-session, passport,
passport-local`.
---
## 10. Spec coverage
| Spec requirement | Covered by |
|---|---|
| Public pages (`/`, `/site/*`, `/wiki/*`) | `/public/*` API + Phase-3 SPA routes; content from `posts`/`wiki`/`settings` |
| News / 5-on-Friday / Newsletter / Screenshots | `posts` table, `category` column; admin CRUD + publish |
| Wiki 8 categories, editable later | `wiki_pages` seeded with 8 slugs; admin CRUD |
| Status page | `settings.status_message` + mode via `/public/status` |
| Admin dashboard (mode, last change, who) | `/admin/dashboard` + settings stamps + activity log |
| Site mode toggle | `PUT /admin/site-mode` + `siteMode` middleware |
| Admin activity log | `activity_log` + `/admin/activity` |
| Admin user management | `/admin/users` CRUD |
| Site settings editing | `/admin/settings` |
| JWT, bcrypt, rate limit, secure cookies, noindex, no dir browsing, no hardcoded creds, .env | §6 |
| Maintenance page, admin always in, static always loads, admin preview | §5 |
| SMTP via env, mailto fallback | §7 |
| Docker Compose + MariaDB + Pangolin, 0.0.0.0 bind | §8 |
| Design tokens / hero | reused from existing `assets/css/mysticmoon.css` + hero PNG in Phase 2/3 |
| Expandable | key/value settings, role enum, modular routers/models |
```
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