docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md

# Website API — router domain split + CSP hardening

Status: **in progress** — PR 0 (route manifest), CSP report-only, and split PR 1 of 5 have landed ·
Target repo: `website/` · Docs owner: this file + `BACKEND_DESIGN.md`

> **This file replaces the earlier "API v2" plan** (auth merge → CSP → domain split, with a parallel
> `/api/v2` mount and an `/api/mobile` facade). Three of those four pieces are **not being built**:
> the auth merge and the mobile facade are deferred with their reasoning recorded below, and the
> parallel-version scaffold in [API_V2_SKELETON.md](./API_V2_SKELETON.md) is superseded. The filename
> is kept so existing links resolve. What remains is genuinely useful work:
>
> 1. **CSP hardening** — small, independent, ships on its own cadence.
> 2. **The domain split** — `admin.routes.js` (1552 lines, 110 routes) broken into one router file per
>    business capability, **in place, with every URL unchanged**. This is the actual driver.

---

## Why the auth merge is out

The original plan replaced httpOnly session cookies with a bearer JWT + rotating refresh token for
every client, so web and mobile would share one session model. Reasons that no longer hold up:

1. **The current model is the more secure one.** httpOnly + SameSite cookies are unreadable from JS
   and carry CSRF protection by default. Every migration target is a sideways or backwards move:
   - Refresh token in `localStorage` → any XSS becomes **persistent full account takeover**, not a
     bounded access-token window. A short access TTL does not help; the attacker mints new pairs.
   - Refresh token in an httpOnly cookie scoped to the refresh endpoint → safe, but that is
     *cookies with extra steps*. It concedes the premise.
2. **"One session model everywhere" is already true where it matters.** `auth/session.service.js`
   unifies cookie and bearer into a single session, and `auth/token.js` already extracts from either
   `Cookie` or `Authorization: Bearer`. That abstraction is written, working, and paid for. The merge
   would move complexity *out* of `extractToken` and *into* the SPA.
3. **The cookie codepath survives the merge anyway.** The SSO / email-connect redirect flow must keep
   its short-lived httpOnly tx / PKCE-verifier / pending-TOTP cookies — the browser leaves for the
   IdP and returns with no JS context. So the merge never actually delivered "cookies are gone."
4. **It carried the plan's most bug-prone work as a dependency.** The admin SSE rewrite
   (`EventSource` → hand-rolled `fetch` + `ReadableStream` + SSE frame parser + reconnect/backoff +
   refresh-on-401) existed *only* to serve the bearer model. Without the merge, the admin stream stays
   on `EventSource` with `withCredentials` and that code is never written.
5. **It is a contract change with no user-visible payoff**, competing for the same review attention as
   the domain split, which is the thing that actually hurts today.

### Dropped with it

- v2 bearer auth routes (`/api/v2/auth/{login,refresh,logout,login/totp}`).
- Deletion of the `setAuthCookie` / `clearAuthCookie` path.
- `rg_trust` cookie → `X-Trust-Token` header migration for web (the header stays available for native
  clients via `extractTrustToken`, unchanged).
- `api/client.js` bearer + silent-refresh rewrite.
- `lib/useShardFeed.js` admin-stream fetch rewrite. **The admin SSE stream stays as-is.**

### Kept from it

- **CSP hardening** — now its own phase (below). It was justified as a compensating control for a
  JS-held token; it is worth doing regardless, just no longer urgent.
- **The public/admin SSE allowlist split** — unchanged security boundary, unrelated to session model.
- **The tx-cookie carve-out reasoning** — recorded here so a future merge attempt doesn't rediscover it.

---

## Deferred: the auth merge

Not cancelled — parked behind trigger conditions. Revisit if **any** of these become true:

| Trigger | Why it changes the answer |
|---|---|
| The API becomes genuinely cross-origin (separate API host) | `SameSite` cookies stop being the easy path; bearer becomes the natural model. |
| Third-party or OAuth clients are introduced | Cookies don't serve clients you don't control. |
| Mobile and web session behavior diverge enough to cause real bugs | The unification argument gets teeth it currently lacks. |

If it is ever revived, two specs the original plan lacked must be written **first**:

- **Refresh-token reuse detection.** Rotation is only useful with it: replay of an already-consumed
  refresh must revoke the entire token family, not just fail the one request.
- **Rollback procedure.** Once web clients have discarded their cookies, a bad deploy locks everyone
  out. Needs a documented path back.

---

## Why there is no `/api/v2`

The domain split reorganizes router *files*. It does not need to move a single URL — because the URL
surface is **already grouped by capability**. Inventory taken from the live Express stack — 196
`/api/v1` routes, plus three outside it (`GET /api/health`, `GET /api/docs.json`,
`GET /.well-known/assetlinks.json`) and 2 on the internal port. Full machine-readable list:
[`api-route-inventory.json`](./api-route-inventory.json).

| Group | Routes | Second segment → capability |
|---|---|---|
| `/admin` | 110 | `shard` 16 · `moderation` 15 · `users` 15 · `wiki` 14 · `posts` 9 · `pages` 7 · `account` 6 · `email` 6 · `uo-link` 5 · `auth` 4 · `invites` 3 · `bot-activity` 2 · `discord-bot` 2 · `settings` 2 · `activity` 1 · `dashboard` 1 · `site-mode` 1 · `uploads` 1 |
| `/auth` | 42 | `me` 23 · `mobile` 5 · `sso` 4 · `password` 3 · `invite` 2 · `login` 2 · `logout` 1 · `providers` 1 · `register` 1 |
| `/public` | 24 | `shard` 12 · `wiki` 4 · `pages` 2 · `posts` 2 · `contact` 1 · `settings` 1 · `status` 1 · `version` 1 |
| `/player` | 20 | `account` 8 · `shard` 8 · `appeals` 4 |

Every capability already owns a URL prefix, so each new router file mounts at the prefix it already
owns and the emitted paths are **byte-identical**. No URL change means no contract change, and no
contract change means no reason to mount a parallel version.

Consequences of doing it in place:

- No `/api/v2`, no dual mount, no route-by-route migration, no v1-usage telemetry project, and no
  v1-retirement sequence.
- `BASE = /api/v1` in `client/src/api/client.js` never changes. The Discord bot's `SITE_PUBLIC_URL`
  never changes. The Android app is untouched.
- [API_V2_SKELETON.md](./API_V2_SKELETON.md) (the `router/v2/` scaffold) is **superseded and not
  scheduled**. It is kept as the concrete recipe if a real contract break ever forces a versioned API.

**Tripwire:** if any endpoint turns out to *need* a new URL, that is a contract change, not a
refactor. List it explicitly, and reopen the versioning question before writing the code — do not
smuggle a URL change into a "mechanical" PR.

---

## Deferred: the `/api/mobile` facade and the app-version floor

The earlier plan's Phase 0 stood up a version-agnostic `/api/mobile` namespace and migrated the
Android app onto it, plus an app-version header and a server-side min-version floor.

**Why it was proposed:** the app hardcodes **69** distinct `api/v1/…` paths (`data/api/*.kt`,
`core/net/ShardStreamClient.kt`, `core/net/HostSelectionInterceptor.kt`,
`core/auth/sso/SsoAuthManager.kt`), has no version negotiation and no force-update, and installs in
the wild cannot be forced forward. Under a parallel-`/api/v2` plan that made the app the load-bearing
coupling: v1 could not be retired until the fleet aged out.

**Why it is deferred:** with the split done in place, no URL moves and nothing is being deleted — so
there is no fleet to sunset and no coupling to break. A facade would add ~70 permanently maintained
delegate routes plus a contract-test suite to solve a problem that does not currently exist. The
version floor was scoped to sunsetting the pre-facade fleet, so it goes with it.

**If it is ever revived** (the trigger is the mobile contract genuinely needing to diverge from web —
different response shapes, a mobile-only aggregation endpoint, a real breaking change):

- **Start with the alias mount, not a delegate layer:** `apiRouter.use('/mobile', v1Router)` gives the
  app a stable, version-agnostic namespace with identical wiring, identical middleware and zero
  per-route maintenance. Build hand-written delegates only for the routes that actually diverge.
- **A facade is a security surface, not a convenience alias.** Any hand-written route must carry the
  *same* middleware chain as the route it mirrors (`requireAuth`, `staffOnly`/`adminOnly`, validators,
  the public/admin SSE allowlist split). A re-exposed admin route missing `adminOnly` is privilege
  escalation.
- **It needs contract tests.** The moment the app pins a namespace, its response shapes are a
  committed contract; an internal refactor that changes a shape must fail a test before it ships to
  installed apps.
- **The mobile SSE stream stays anonymous** under whatever path it gets — the app sends no
  `Authorization` header.

---

## Phase 1 — CSP hardening (independent)

Previously bundled with the auth merge as a compensating control for a JS-held token. With no token in
JS, this is **defense in depth on its own merits** — cheap, worth doing, blocking nothing. It has no
dependency on the domain split and can ship at any time.

**Sequencing fix from the original plan:** the old version both "ships with the auth merge" and called
for a one-release report-only soak. Those contradict. Correct order is **report-only first, observe one
release, then enforce** — now trivially satisfiable since nothing waits on it.

The app already ships a tuned policy (`server/src/app.js`). Two directives are load-bearing and are
**already correct** — the job is to keep them that way:

- `script-src 'self'` — no `'unsafe-inline'` / `'unsafe-eval'`. Primary defense.
- `connect-src 'self'` — the exfiltration channel. Don't widen it unless the API genuinely becomes
  cross-origin (which would also reopen the auth-merge question — see the trigger table).

`style-src 'unsafe-inline'` stays — it permits inline styling, not script execution, and React's
pervasive `style={{…}}` attributes can't be nonce'd. Not a meaningful hole. The `/api/docs` route keeps
its deliberately looser policy (swagger-ui injects an inline bootstrap script); that carve-out is
scoped to the one route and stays scoped.

Target enforced policy:

```
default-src 'self';
script-src 'self';
connect-src 'self';
img-src 'self' data: https:;
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';          /* + fonts.googleapis.com only until fonts are self-hosted */
font-src 'self';                            /* + fonts.gstatic.com only until fonts are self-hosted */
object-src 'none';
base-uri 'self';
form-action 'self';
frame-ancestors 'none';
```

Delta vs. the policy in `server/src/app.js` today. This was written as two directives; on
implementation it turned out to be **one**:

- ~~**Add `form-action 'self'`** (currently absent)~~ — **it was not absent.** The directives object in
  `app.js` does not list it, but the middleware is configured `useDefaults: true`, and helmet's default
  set already supplies `form-action 'self'` — so the header served in production has carried it all
  along. Verified by capturing the live `Content-Security-Policy` header from the running app rather
  than reading the config, which is how the plan got this wrong. **No behavioural change here.** It is
  now written out explicitly in `config/csp.js` anyway: a security directive should not depend on a
  third-party library's defaults surviving its next major version.
- **Tighten `frame-ancestors`** `'self'` → `'none'` — nothing legitimately frames the site. **This is
  the entire behavioural delta of the phase.**
- Unchanged: `default-src`, `script-src`, `connect-src`, `object-src 'none'`, `base-uri 'self'`, and
  `img-src … https:` (external `BRAND_*` logo/hero and `<img>` in sanitized wiki/news bodies rely on
  `https:`).

The soak is still worth running for that one directive, and arguably it is the directive that most
needs one: a `frame-ancestors` report is generated by the browser of *whoever framed the site*, so it
is the only way to discover that something legitimately embeds us before the enforcing policy breaks
it. Nothing else can tell us that.

**Rollout:** ship via `Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only` with `report-to` for one release, watch for
violations, then flip to enforce.

Before trusting `script-src 'self'`: Vite's build injects an inline modulepreload-polyfill `<script>`
into `dist/index.html`, which that directive blocks (harmless, but throws a violation).
**Already handled** — `client/vite.config.js` sets `modulePreload: { polyfill: false }`, so the build
emits no inline bootstrap script. (The `renderIndexHtml` branding injection adds only `<meta>`/`<link>`
tags — no inline script, no nonce needed.)

### Where reports go

`report-to` needs somewhere to point, so the report-only PR stands up a same-origin sink:
**`POST /api/csp-report`** (`server/src/router/cspReport.controller.js`, wired in `app.js`). Same-origin
on purpose — violation reports describe attacks against this site and are not handed to a third-party
collector. It writes to the `csp` log tag and stores nothing.

It is mounted outside `/api/v1`, alongside `/api/health`: the browser learns the path from the policy
header, never from a client build, so it is not part of the versioned client contract. This is the
`+1` in the route manifest that made PR 0 go first (see § Sequencing).

Necessary properties, since it is an unauthenticated public `POST` (browsers send reports with no
session, and gating it would silence exactly the anonymous visitors worth hearing about):

- **Both wire formats.** `report-uri` (Firefox, Safari) sends `application/csp-report` with a single
  hyphenated-key object; `report-to` (Chrome) sends `application/reports+json` with an array of
  camelCase envelopes. Handling one silently drops half the browsers. Both directives are emitted, and
  `report-to` additionally needs a `Reporting-Endpoints` response header or it is inert.
- **Always 204, even for junk.** A 4xx would make the global error handler write an ERROR line quoting
  the attacker-supplied body — turning an open endpoint into a log-flood primitive. A browser cannot
  act on an error from a report sink anyway.
- **Bounded everywhere:** 16 KB body cap, a per-IP rate limit, a fixed field allowlist, and every
  logged field truncated (`script-sample` is attacker-influenced and can carry a whole inline script).

**Retiring it:** the sink exists for the soak. When the tightened policy flips to enforced and the
report-only twin is deleted, this endpoint goes with it — *unless* a `report-to` group is deliberately
kept on the enforced policy, which is a reasonable thing to want. Decide that in the enforce PR rather
than leaving an orphan route behind.

Tracked follow-ups (own PRs):

- **Self-host the Cinzel font** → drop `fonts.googleapis.com` from `style-src` and `fonts.gstatic.com`
  from `font-src`, removing two third-party origins from the trust surface.
- **Trusted Types** — `require-trusted-types-for 'script'` + a `trusted-types` policy, report-only
  first. Audit `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` + the `sanitizeHtml` render path first.

---

## Phase 2 — The domain split

**This is the reason the plan exists.** Everything else is supporting work.

**Rule:** one router file = one business capability; the URL names the domain; related endpoints live
together regardless of HTTP method; no generic `admin.routes.js` catch-all. Controllers are **already**
domain-split — this re-wires routes, not logic.

**Invariant:** each capability router mounts at the prefix it already owns, so the emitted URL set does
not change. Proved per PR by the route manifest (§ PR 0).

Target tree — derived from the inventory above, **inside `router/v1/`** (no `v2/` directory):

```
router/v1/
  admin/
    index.js            # mounts the capability routers below under /admin, keeps the
                        # shared `noindex, isLoggedIn, staffOnly` gate in one place
    users.router.js         account.router.js       invites.router.js
    authProviders.router.js moderation.router.js    botActivity.router.js
    posts.router.js         pages.router.js         wiki.router.js
    uploads.router.js       shard.router.js         uoLink.router.js
    email.router.js         discordBot.router.js    settings.router.js
    dashboard.router.js     # + the /activity and /site-mode singletons
  auth/
    login.router.js  register.router.js  password.router.js  invite.router.js
    sso.router.js    mobile.router.js    me.routes.js (already split, 23 routes)
  public/
    news.router.js (posts) pages.router.js  wiki.router.js  shard.router.js
    site.router.js         # status, settings, version, contact
  player/
    account.router.js  shard.router.js  appeals.router.js
  internal/            (unchanged — stays on the unpublished port, never mounted publicly)
```

Steps:

1. **Land PR 0 (route manifest) first** — the mechanical proof that later PRs move no URL.
2. Carve `admin.routes.js` into the per-capability files above, each requiring its already-existing
   controller. `admin/index.js` keeps the shared gate (`noindex, isLoggedIn, staffOnly`) and mounts
   each capability router at its existing prefix; the `adminOnly` / `modAccess` gates move with the
   routes that use them.
3. Split `public.routes.js`, `player.routes.js`, and the remaining `auth.routes.js` groups the same
   way. `auth/me.routes.js` is already a separate file and stays.
4. Keep `/internal` off the public listener exactly as today (separate `internalApp.js` port).
5. Move each route's `#swagger.*` annotations **with** the route, then regenerate
   (`cd website/server && npm run swagger`).
6. Update `BACKEND_DESIGN.md` §2 (folder structure) and §4 (API contract — it names
   `admin.routes.js → admin.controller.js` and friends) as routers move, plus `PROJECT_TREE.md`.

Because the auth model is untouched and the URLs are frozen, each PR is a **pure mechanical refactor
with a green test suite and a zero-diff route manifest as its acceptance criteria** — which is what
makes grouped PRs actually reviewable.

> **Step 6 correction:** `PROJECT_TREE.md` is no longer hand-edited. Since website#98 it is
> auto-generated by the `sync-project-tree` CI workflow, which opens its own docs PR after a merge to
> `main`. Leave it alone in split PRs. `BACKEND_DESIGN.md` §2/§4 are still manual.

### PR 1 — as landed

`admin/index.js` owns the shared `noindex, isLoggedIn, staffOnly` gate and the mount table, and
declares no routes itself. The gate sits **ahead of every mount**, so a capability router extracted in
a later PR cannot silently ship without it. Route counts:

| Router | Routes | Prefix | Extra gate |
|---|---|---|---|
| `account.router.js` | 6 | `/admin/account` | none — self-service, an editor manages their own 2FA |
| `users.router.js` | 15 | `/admin/users` | `adminOnly` at router level |
| `invites.router.js` | 3 | `/admin/invites` | `adminOnly` per route |
| `authProviders.router.js` | 4 | `/admin/auth` (routes are `/providers[/:id]`) | `adminOnly` per route |
| `admin.routes.js` (residual) | 82 | group root, mounted last | unchanged |

6 + 15 + 3 + 4 + 82 = the 110 inventoried admin routes. None of the four prefixes appears in the
residual file, so nothing depends on mount ordering.

Three findings worth carrying into PRs 2–5:

- **The self-service `/shard/*` routes stay with `shard` (PR 4), despite their `Admin · Account`
  swagger tag.** The invariant is *prefix ownership*, not tag agreement: one router owns `/shard`, so
  splitting six routes off it by capability would mean two routers mounting under the same prefix and
  an ordering hazard for no gain. Retag them in PR 4 if the tag still grates.
- **`usersRouter.use(adminOnly)` is exactly equivalent to the old `adminRouter.use('/users', adminOnly)`**
  now that the router is mounted at `/users` — but only because it is mounted at a prefix. Under a
  *pathless* mount, a bare `use(gate)` would run for every request passing through en route to a later
  mount, 403-ing an editor on `/admin/posts`. Do not "simplify" a prefix mount away.
- **`routes.guards.json` came back zero-diff too**, not just the manifest — no route lost or gained a
  gate. Worth checking both every time; the guards file is the one that would catch a dropped
  `adminOnly` that the method+path freeze cannot see.

The OpenAPI spec was also byte-for-byte unchanged, which required a prerequisite fix — see below.

### The swagger path-normalization prerequisite (landed before PR 1)

swagger-autogen builds a path by string-concatenating the mount prefix with the route argument, so a
capability router mounted at `/users` whose collection route is `router.get('/')` documents as
`/api/v1/admin/users/` — advertising a URL no client calls while dropping the one the SPA, the Android
app and the Discord bot all do. Express is indifferent; the published spec is not. It also emits path
keys in *router-traversal order*, so moving a route between files rewrote most of the ~5k-line
committed artifact even when the API was provably unchanged — burying the one line a reviewer needs.

Both are fixed once in `server/swagger/swagger.js`, which post-processes the generator's output to
strip trailing slashes and sort path keys (throwing on a collision rather than silently dropping an
operation). It shipped as its own PR ahead of PR 1, verified inert by the regenerated spec being
byte-for-byte the sorted form of the previously committed one — 198 operations, none added or removed.
`#swagger.path` was rejected as the fix: it bypasses the mount prefix, so every route would hardcode
its absolute path in a comment that silently lies the moment a mount moves.

**Consequence for PRs 2–5: the swagger diff is now a signal.** With sorting in place, a pure route
move produces *no* spec diff at all, so any diff there means an annotation actually changed. Treat
`swagger-output.json`, `routes.manifest.json` and `routes.guards.json` as three zero-diff gates.

### PR 0 — the route manifest (prerequisite of the first split PR) — **landed**

> **Status: shipped.** `server/scripts/routeManifest.js` + `npm run routes:manifest`,
> `server/routes.manifest.json` (199 public + 2 internal), `server/routes.guards.json`,
> `server/test/routeManifest.test.js`, and a `routes:manifest -- --check` step in
> `.gitea/workflows/pr-checks.yml`. No router file moved. **The generator reproduced
> `api-route-inventory.json` byte-for-byte on first run**, so the freeze is in effect and the
> committed baseline is confirmed accurate rather than merely asserted.
>
> Two deviations from the design below, both deliberate:
>
> - **The unauthenticated-status snapshot was tried and dropped**, exactly as this section allowed.
>   Firing unauthenticated GETs at every manifest path against the dead-port mariadb pool the tests
>   use does not fail fast — the pool sits on its acquire timeout, and a partial sweep had not
>   finished after two minutes. A flaky two-minute gate is worse than none. What replaced it is
>   cheap and deterministic: the test suite asserts from the introspected stack that every
>   `/api/v1/admin/**` and `/api/v1/player/**` route still carries `requireAuth`.
> - **`routes.guards.json` is committed and staleness-checked**, though a diff in it is explicitly
>   *not* a contract change. Left ungenerated it would rot into a misleading review aid within a
>   release. The gate is on freshness; the meaning of a guards diff is still "read this", not
>   "justify this". The generator drops app-level plumbing (helmet, morgan, the JSON parser, the bot
>   guard) since it applies uniformly to all 199 routes and would bury the per-route gates.



"Every URL is unchanged" must be *proved by a diff*, not asserted in review. PR 0 lands the tool that
proves it, with no router file moved.

- **Generator:** `server/scripts/routeManifest.js`, wired as `npm run routes:manifest`. It requires
  `src/app.js` (which exports the app and neither listens nor connects to the DB — `server.js` owns
  those), walks `app._router.stack` recursively through mounted routers, reconstructs each full path
  from the layer regexps, and writes a **sorted** array of
  `{ "method": "GET", "path": "/api/v1/admin/users/:id" }` to `server/routes.manifest.json`.
  `internalApp.js` is walked into a separate `internal` section so the unpublished port is inventoried
  without being confused for public surface.
- **Scope it to the API surface, or it won't be deterministic.** Three mounts are *filesystem*
  conditional: the SPA catch-all `GET *` (only when `client/dist/index.html` exists), the `/brand`
  static mount, and `/api/docs*` (only when `swagger-output.json` is present — it is committed, so it
  is stable). The manifest keeps only `/api/**`, `/.well-known/**`, and the internal app's routes, so
  it does not change depending on whether CI built the client. Static mounts are not API contract.
- **The baseline already exists:** [`api-route-inventory.json`](./api-route-inventory.json) in this
  directory is the frozen surface — **199 API routes** (110 of them `/api/v1/admin`) plus 2
  internal at the time PR 0 was written. PR 0's generator must **reproduce this file byte-for-byte**;
  that is PR 0's own acceptance test, and it means the freeze is already in effect before the first
  router moves. *(It did, on first run. The file has since moved to **200** — the CSP report-only PR
  added `POST /api/csp-report`, the first deliberate, reviewed manifest diff.)*
- **Runtime introspection, not source parsing.** It is authoritative about mounts, and the route paths
  in `admin.routes.js` sit on the line *after* `adminRouter.get(`, which defeats naive greps.
- **Not `swagger-output.json`.** That is annotation-derived (only annotated routes appear) and churns
  for unrelated reasons; it documents intent, the manifest records reality.
- **Frozen key: method + path only.** That is exactly the contract being preserved. Handler names are
  useless as a guard check here — `requireRole(...)` returns an anonymous arrow, and router-level gates
  like `adminRouter.use(noindex, isLoggedIn, staffOnly)` never appear in a route's own stack.
- **Guard coverage, separately.** The generator also emits a non-gated review aid: per route, the
  handler count plus any *named* middleware collected along the mount chain. If a stable behavioral
  check proves cheap, prefer it — a test that fires an **unauthenticated** request at every manifest
  path and snapshots the status code catches a dropped `adminOnly` (403 → 200) in a way names cannot.
  Try it in PR 0; if DB-touching public routes make it slow or noisy against the dead-port pool the
  tests use, drop it rather than ship a flaky gate.
- **CI:** `.gitea/workflows/pr-checks.yml` runs `npm run routes:manifest` and
  `git diff --exit-code server/routes.manifest.json`. A PR that moves a URL fails unless it
  deliberately commits the new manifest — which puts the URL change in front of a reviewer instead of
  letting it pass silently.
- **Published copy:** `docs/website/api-route-inventory.json` mirrors `server/routes.manifest.json` and
  is refreshed in each split PR's mandatory docs edit. The markdown table above is orientation for a
  human reader; **the manifest is the authoritative freeze.**

---

## Sequencing & PR breakdown

CSP and the split are independent; the only hard ordering is PR 0 before the first split PR.

**Resequenced during implementation: PR 0 ships first, before the CSP pair.** The CSP report-only PR
has to stand up a violation collector (`POST /api/csp-report`) for `report-to` to point at — which is
a new URL under `/api/**`. Landing it first would mean PR 0's generator emitting 200 routes against a
199-route committed baseline, so PR 0 could no longer prove itself by reproducing
`api-route-inventory.json` byte-for-byte. With PR 0 first, the collector shows up as a reviewed,
deliberate `+1` in the manifest — which is exactly the mechanism working as designed.

1. **PR 0 — route manifest.** Generator + CI check + committed baseline of today's surface. No routers moved. ✅ landed
2. **PR — CSP report-only.** Tightened policy behind `Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only` + `report-to`,
   plus the report collector (manifest `+1` — the first deliberate, reviewed manifest diff). ✅ landed
3. **PR — CSP enforce.** One release later, assuming a clean violation report. **Blocked on real soak
   data**, not on code: watch the `csp` log tag for `frame-ancestors` reports across one release before
   flipping. Also decide there whether `/api/csp-report` is retired with the report-only twin or kept
   as a `report-to` group on the enforced policy.
4. **PR 1 — admin:** `users`, `account`, `invites`, `auth` (providers). ✅ landed
5. **PR 2 — admin:** `moderation`, `bot-activity`, `activity`.
6. **PR 3 — admin (content):** `posts`, `pages`, `wiki`, `uploads`.
7. **PR 4 — admin (ops/config):** `shard`, `uo-link`, `email`, `discord-bot`, `settings`, `site-mode`,
   `dashboard`.
8. **PR 5 — `public/*` + `player/*`** (and the residual `auth/*` grouping).

Each PR: **zero-line diff in `routes.manifest.json`**, server tests green
(`cd website/server && npm test`), Swagger regenerated, matching `docs/` edit, Conventional Commit,
AI-disclosure trailer, branch from a freshly-pulled `main`.

---

## Cross-component blast radius

Three independent clients consume the site's HTTP/SSE API, two of them in separate repos on separate
release cadences. **With the auth merge and the version bump both gone, the blast radius is empty** —
no client's URLs or authentication change at all.

| Consumer | Repo (cadence) | Pinning | Impact under this plan |
|---|---|---|---|
| Browser SPA | `website/client` (lockstep) | `BASE = /api/v1` in `client/src/api/client.js` | **None.** Same URLs, same cookie session. |
| Android app | `android-app` (app-store cadence, un-updatable installs in the wild) | 69 hardcoded `api/v1/…` paths; SSE path in `ShardStreamClient.kt`; SSO in `SsoAuthManager.kt` | **None.** No repoint, no release required. |
| Discord bot | `website/bot` (separate deploy, env-configured) | `SITE_PUBLIC_URL` env → `/api/v1/public` | **None.** Anonymous public reads on unchanged paths. |

Standing constraints, unchanged:

- **The public SSE stream stays anonymous.** Consumed by logged-out browser visitors *and* the Android
  `ShardStreamClient`, neither of which sends an `Authorization` header. Adding `requireAuth` blacks
  out the public live boards on web and mobile. The single most likely regression in a careless
  refactor is reflexively wrapping *both* shard streams in auth.
- **The admin SSE stream keeps its current cookie-based gating** (`isLoggedIn`, `EventSource` +
  `withCredentials`) — the rewrite that would have changed this went out with the auth merge.
- **The public/admin allowlist split is a security boundary**, not an implementation detail. Preserve
  it verbatim in `utils/shardBroadcast.js` / `utils/shardIngest.js` as routes move.
- **SSO / email-connect transaction cookies are load-bearing for web *and* native.** The Android SSO
  flow opens a Custom Tab to the website's `/auth/…/sso/start` and rides the same server-side redirect
  transaction and the same tx cookies. Nothing in this plan touches them; don't let a future "cookies
  go away" push delete them.
- **`link/` is out of scope.** The sidecar contract (`uoLinkConfig`, `utils/uoLinkClient.js`,
  `utils/shardIngest.js`, `X-UOLink-Version`) is a separate versioning axis. `PROTOCOL_VERSION` does
  **not** bump for this work.

---

## Appendix: mapping from the previous plan

| Previous | Now |
|---|---|
| Phase 0 — `/api/mobile` facade + app-version floor | **Deferred.** See § Deferred: the `/api/mobile` facade |
| Phase 1 — auth merge | **Removed.** See § Why the auth merge is out and § Deferred: the auth merge |
| Phase 1b — CSP hardening (shipped with the auth merge) | **Phase 1**, standalone; report-only-first ordering fixed |
| Phase 2 — domain split under `router/v2/` | **Phase 2**, in place under `router/v1/`; now the primary driver |
| PR 1 — `/api/v2` scaffold ([API_V2_SKELETON.md](./API_V2_SKELETON.md)) | **Superseded**, kept as the recipe if a versioned API is ever forced |
| PR final — retire v1 | **Not applicable** — v1 is never replaced |