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installer/README.md
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ci(bundle): compose and publish the bundle manifest
Phase 0 item 3 of docs/installer/PLAN.md (§7.1-§7.3). The installer resolves
what to install *from* the bundle, so this has to exist before Phase 1 code is
useful. Both components it composes now have releases, which is what unblocked
it.

Adds .gitea/workflows/bundle.yml — resolve both components' latest releases,
run the two compose-time gates, and publish bundles/current.json — plus the
first real bundle (2026.08.04: link v1.1.0 + overlay v0.1.1, protocol 3).

Bundles are COMMITTED under bundles/, not published as releases. This repo's own
releases are the installer binaries, and /releases/latest returns whichever
release is newest regardless of kind, so interleaving bundle releases would make
"latest" intermittently resolve to a release carrying no installer binary. The
push to main needs no new branch-protection exception: release.yml's version-bump
commit already requires it.

Gate 1 (protocol agreement) reads the sidecar's PROTOCOL_VERSION from
sidecar/src/main.rs at the release tag, not from the binary. --print-config
would answer, but only for releases from v1.1.0 on, and --bundle <tag> has to be
able to recompose an older bundle. It also avoids executing a downloaded
artifact and provisioning a throwaway config whose auth token would land in a CI
log. The overlay half comes from manifest.json inside the tarball, which is the
only statement of that version that exists.

Gate 2 (assets) downloads every asset and verifies it against the SHA256SUMS its
publishing repo shipped, then records the hash it computed itself. These
artifacts are deliberately unsigned, so a hash copied from a file nobody checked
would make the whole chain decorative. An asset with no SHA256SUMS entry is
caught separately, since `sha256sum -c` passes right over it.

Release reads are ANONYMOUS on purpose: they are exactly the requests the shipped
installer makes on a host with no Gitea credentials, so a repo flipped to private
fails here rather than on an operator's machine.

Stale components (§7.3) are dispatched, never awaited — Gitea's dispatch endpoint
returns no run handle. "Ahead of its release" counts only releasable commits and
excludes merge commits, whose subject quotes the feat/fix title and would
otherwise re-dispatch a workflow that correctly declines to run, every night.

A run that finds nothing changed writes nothing, comparing everything except
`bundle` and `generated` — that is what makes the nightly cron free rather than a
dated duplicate every morning.

Verified by running the workflow's exact compose steps in a Linux container
against the live releases: both gates pass, the composed bundle is the file
committed here, a re-run reports changed=false, and the stale-detection filter
scores 1 releasable commit for link v1.0.0..main (excluding the merge that quotes
it) and 0 for a docs-only range.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 11:10:51 -05:00

6.1 KiB

Runic Gateway installer

A single-binary deployment tool that takes a stock ServUO installation and configures it for Runic Gateway: deploys the shard plugin overlay, optionally applies the stock-file patch tier, installs the uo-link sidecar and registers it as a service, records what it deployed, and hands the operator the four values that connect the website to the shard.

        ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
        │   Runic Gateway installer  (>>> HERE <<<)│
        └───────────────┬──────────────────────────┘
                        │ deploys
        ┌───────────────┴────────────────┐
        ▼                                ▼
  ServUO integration                  uo-link sidecar
  overlay sync + opt-in patch tier    binary + config + service
  (RunicGateway/servuo-plugins)       (RunicGateway/link)

It is a deployment tool, not a hosted bootstrapper — no curl | bash, no installer service. Artifacts are downloaded from a Gitea release page and run.

It also does not replace ServUO startup behavior. ServUO keeps running through its existing release/start scripts; the installer never writes a launcher and never restarts the shard.

Status

Planning — no installer code exists yet.

The design of record is installer/PLAN.md in the docs repo: phases, locked decisions, and the Phase 0 prerequisites in other repos (a servuo-plugins release workflow, a non-interactive config read-back in link, and the bundle-manifest CI here) that must land before Phase 1 is useful.

All three Phase 0 prerequisites have now landed, so what the installer will install already exists and is published, ahead of the binary that installs it: bundles/current.json names the current protocol-checked sidecar + overlay combination, recomposed on every component release and nightly. See bundles/README.md.

Besides that, this repo currently holds its governance documents and issue/PR templates.

Repo What
thisRunicGateway/installer The installer (Rust, one binary per OS).
RunicGateway/link The uo-link sidecar — the network-facing half of the game bridge. Installed and service-registered by this tool.
RunicGateway/servuo-plugins The C# ServUO plugin — deployed as source (overlay/) and compiled by ServUO at boot. Synced into the server tree by this tool.
RunicGateway/website The public site and admin panel. The installer never contacts it — it prints values for Admin → Shard.
RunicGateway/docs All project documentation, including the installer plan.

Planned commands

Command What it does
install Detect and validate the ServUO root, sync the overlay, optionally apply patches, install uo-link + service, write install.json, print the token handoff.
doctor Diagnose an installed deployment end to end — through to "has a shard actually dialed in?", the only check that distinguishes a working bridge from copied files.
update Resolve the current bundle manifest, then update the sidecar (replace + restart) and the overlay (re-sync + tell the operator to restart ServUO).
uninstall Remove only what the installer exclusively owns. It never edits the ServUO tree — it prints the overlay files to delete and the patch hunks to revert, and leaves that call to the operator.

Design constraints worth knowing up front

  • Releases are unsigned. SHA256SUMS is the trust anchor; SmartScreen and Gatekeeper warnings are expected and documented. The installer nonetheless verifies the SHA256 of everything it downloads and refuses on mismatch.
  • Composition comes from a published bundle manifest, not from "latest of each". CI names an exact, protocol-checked combination of sidecar and overlay versions; --bundle <tag> pins one for a reproducible install. A new component release regenerates JSON, not this binary.
  • The base install must complete without the patch tier. The patch tier edits stock ServUO files, most real shards are hand-modified, and unverified ServUO versions skip it with a warning rather than being patched blind.
  • A successful copy is not a working bridge. ServUO ignores the script build's exit code and silently reloads the previous Scripts.dll, so diagnostics verify post-boot state rather than trusting a clean boot.
  • The audience is public — any ServUO operator, not only shards we run.

Build & run

Once the crate exists it will be a standard cargo project:

cargo build --release
cargo run -- --help

See CONTRIBUTING.md for the development setup, the local checks CI will run, and the branch/PR workflow.


License

Runic Gateway is free software, licensed under the GNU General Public License v3.0 or later — see LICENSE.md.

Copyright (C) 2026 Runic Gateway

This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it under
the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software
Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later
version. It is distributed WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied
warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
General Public License for more details.

Contributions are welcome — please read CONTRIBUTING.md (note the AI-usage disclosure requirement) and our Code of Conduct. Report vulnerabilities privately per SECURITY.md.