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installer/bundles/README.md
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ci(bundle): compose and publish the bundle manifest
Phase 0 item 3 of docs/installer/PLAN.md (§7.1-§7.3). The installer resolves
what to install *from* the bundle, so this has to exist before Phase 1 code is
useful. Both components it composes now have releases, which is what unblocked
it.

Adds .gitea/workflows/bundle.yml — resolve both components' latest releases,
run the two compose-time gates, and publish bundles/current.json — plus the
first real bundle (2026.08.04: link v1.1.0 + overlay v0.1.1, protocol 3).

Bundles are COMMITTED under bundles/, not published as releases. This repo's own
releases are the installer binaries, and /releases/latest returns whichever
release is newest regardless of kind, so interleaving bundle releases would make
"latest" intermittently resolve to a release carrying no installer binary. The
push to main needs no new branch-protection exception: release.yml's version-bump
commit already requires it.

Gate 1 (protocol agreement) reads the sidecar's PROTOCOL_VERSION from
sidecar/src/main.rs at the release tag, not from the binary. --print-config
would answer, but only for releases from v1.1.0 on, and --bundle <tag> has to be
able to recompose an older bundle. It also avoids executing a downloaded
artifact and provisioning a throwaway config whose auth token would land in a CI
log. The overlay half comes from manifest.json inside the tarball, which is the
only statement of that version that exists.

Gate 2 (assets) downloads every asset and verifies it against the SHA256SUMS its
publishing repo shipped, then records the hash it computed itself. These
artifacts are deliberately unsigned, so a hash copied from a file nobody checked
would make the whole chain decorative. An asset with no SHA256SUMS entry is
caught separately, since `sha256sum -c` passes right over it.

Release reads are ANONYMOUS on purpose: they are exactly the requests the shipped
installer makes on a host with no Gitea credentials, so a repo flipped to private
fails here rather than on an operator's machine.

Stale components (§7.3) are dispatched, never awaited — Gitea's dispatch endpoint
returns no run handle. "Ahead of its release" counts only releasable commits and
excludes merge commits, whose subject quotes the feat/fix title and would
otherwise re-dispatch a workflow that correctly declines to run, every night.

A run that finds nothing changed writes nothing, comparing everything except
`bundle` and `generated` — that is what makes the nightly cron free rather than a
dated duplicate every morning.

Verified by running the workflow's exact compose steps in a Linux container
against the live releases: both gates pass, the composed bundle is the file
committed here, a re-run reports changed=false, and the stale-detection filter
scores 1 releasable commit for link v1.0.0..main (excluding the merge that quotes
it) and 0 for a docs-only range.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 11:10:51 -05:00

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Markdown

# Bundles
**These files are generated. Do not edit them by hand.**
A *bundle* names one exact, protocol-checked combination of the two components the installer
deploys — a `uo-link` sidecar release and a `servuo-plugins` overlay release. The installer does not
hardcode versions and does not resolve "latest" at run time; it fetches one of these documents and
installs what it names. **The bundle is the compat matrix.**
They are written by [`.gitea/workflows/bundle.yml`](../.gitea/workflows/bundle.yml), which composes
one whenever a component publishes a release (dispatched by that release's own workflow) and
nightly, so a missed dispatch self-heals. A run that finds nothing changed writes nothing.
See `docs/installer/PLAN.md` §7 for the design.
## Layout
| File | What it is |
|---|---|
| `current.json` | The bundle the installer uses by default. Always a copy of the newest `bundle-*.json`. |
| `bundle-<tag>.json` | Every bundle ever published, kept forever so `--bundle <tag>` stays reproducible. |
Tags are UTC dates — `2026.08.04`. A second bundle on the same day (a sidecar release in the
morning, an overlay release in the afternoon) becomes `2026.08.04.2`, so one tag always names
exactly one matrix.
## How the installer fetches these
Plain anonymous `GET`s against a public repo. The shard host gets no git and no Gitea credentials
(`PLAN.md` §1), so nothing here may require auth:
```
https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/installer/raw/branch/main/bundles/current.json
https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/installer/raw/branch/main/bundles/bundle-2026.08.04.json
```
Bundles are committed rather than published as Gitea releases because this repo's *own* releases are
the installer binaries, and `/releases/latest` returns whichever release is newest regardless of
kind — interleaving the two would make "latest" intermittently resolve to a release containing no
installer binary.
## Schema
`schema` is the version of *this document's* shape, and is unrelated to `protocol` (the uo-link wire
protocol) or to either component's release version. All three move independently.
```jsonc
{
"schema": 1,
"bundle": "2026.08.04", // this bundle's tag; what --bundle takes
"generated": "2026-08-04T16:07:13Z",
"protocol": 3, // the wire protocol both halves speak (gate 1 proved it)
"link": {
"repo": "RunicGateway/link",
"tag": "v1.1.0",
"version": "1.1.0",
"protocol": 3,
"assets": { // per-platform: the installer runs on both
"linux-x86_64": { "name": "…", "url": "…", "sha256": "…" },
"windows-x86_64": { "name": "…", "url": "…", "sha256": "…" }
}
},
"overlay": {
"repo": "RunicGateway/servuo-plugins",
"tag": "v0.1.1",
"version": "0.1.1",
"commit": "3a52abb…", // recorded into install.json at deploy time
"protocol": 3,
"servuo": {
"min_version": "57.4", // base overlay: only adds files
"patches_verified_against": "57.4" // patch tier: skipped with a warning elsewhere
},
"asset": { "name": "runicgateway-overlay-0.1.1.tar.gz", "url": "…", "sha256": "…" }
}
}
```
### The two things worth knowing
**`sha256` is load-bearing, not decorative.** Every artifact Runic Gateway publishes is deliberately
**unsigned** (`PLAN.md` §3) — the checksum is the entire trust anchor. Each hash here was computed by
CI from the asset it actually downloaded, *after* verifying it against the `SHA256SUMS` the
publishing repo shipped beside it. The installer must verify every download against these values and
refuse on a mismatch. A bundle whose hashes are trusted but never checked buys nothing.
**`link.protocol` and `overlay.protocol` are always equal, and that is the point.** The sidecar
rejects a protocol mismatch with `409` rather than mis-parsing, so a mismatched pair is a shard
emitting into a void. CI refuses to publish one: it reads `PROTOCOL_VERSION` from the sidecar's
source at its release tag and the declared `protocol` from the overlay tarball's `manifest.json`, and
fails if they differ. The top-level `protocol` is that agreed value.