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feat(sidecar): start as a real Windows service
`sc.exe start RunicGatewayLink` failed with 1053 on every Windows install:
"a timeout was reached (30000 milliseconds) while waiting for the service to
connect", with SERVICE_EXIT_CODE 0. Nothing had crashed. The sidecar was a
plain console program, and the Windows service control manager only supervises
a process that calls StartServiceCtrlDispatcher and identifies itself within
~30 seconds.

The installer's design assumed symmetry with systemd, which supervises any
foreground process. Windows has no equivalent: it is a service-aware binary or
a shim, and a shim was already rejected as a third binary to keep current.

Split the entry point so the platform only owns starting and stopping:

  systemd --> main --> unix::run ---------------+
                                                +--> app::run
  SCM ------> main --> windows::run --> ServiceMain
                                    \-> console fallback

- app.rs is the whole sidecar, unchanged and shared. No #[cfg] on the data path.
- windows.rs speaks the SCM handshake. The dispatcher is tried first and failing
  is expected: ERROR_FAILED_SERVICE_CONTROLLER_CONNECT (1063) means "not started
  by the SCM" and falls through to a normal foreground run, so one binary does
  both with no --service flag to forget.
- Running is reported only once the shard port is bound and the store is open, so
  a bad config fails the start instead of flapping Running -> Stopped, and a
  failed run leaves a nonzero SERVICE_EXIT_CODE instead of the misleading 0.
- A service has no stdout, so service mode logs to uo-link-sidecar.log.<date>
  beside its config, rolled daily, seven kept.
- unix.rs additionally handles SIGTERM, which is what systemctl stop sends and
  which previously took the default disposition mid-write.

The Windows crates are declared under [target.'cfg(windows)'.dependencies].
Verified: a Linux build in rust:1-slim-bookworm succeeds and resolves neither
windows-service nor tracing-appender.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 13:37:28 -05:00

126 lines
6.2 KiB
Markdown

# uo-link — Rust sidecar
The **Rust sidecar** half of the Runic Gateway bridge. The ServUO shard dials out to this sidecar
over a loopback TCP socket (newline-delimited JSON); the sidecar owns the WebSocket + REST API the
website consumes, along with auth, buffering, and fan-out.
```
ServUO plugin (C#, net48) ──loopback TCP, newline-JSON──► Rust sidecar ──WebSocket/JSON──► website
(RunicGateway/servuo-plugins) >>> THIS REPO <<<
```
The shard never speaks WebSocket and exposes no port of its own — the sidecar is the only
network-facing component, which is what keeps the game unreachable from the internet.
## Related repos
| Repo | What |
|------|------|
| **this**`RunicGateway/link` | The Rust sidecar (`sidecar/`). |
| [RunicGateway/servuo-plugins](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/servuo-plugins) | The **C# ServUO plugin** — the shard side of the bridge (`overlay/`, `patches/`, `deploy.ps1`, test scaffolding). |
| [RunicGateway/docs](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/docs) | All project documentation — design docs, protocol spec, integration guide, research. |
## Layout
| Path | What |
|------|------|
| `sidecar/` | The Rust sidecar crate — terminates the loopback link to the shard, exposes WS + REST to the website. See [`sidecar/README.md`](sidecar/README.md). |
| `.gitea/workflows/pr-checks.yml` | Gates every PR into `main` on `cargo fmt --check`, `cargo clippy -D warnings`, and `cargo test`. |
| `.gitea/workflows/release.yml` | Builds + releases the sidecar binary (Linux + Windows) on every merge to `main`. |
## Build & run
The sidecar is a standard cargo crate:
```bash
cd sidecar
cargo build --release # binary at target/release/uo-link-sidecar
cp sidecar.toml.example sidecar.toml # then edit
cargo run --release
```
Deploying it rather than developing on it: `--config <PATH>` names the config file (as does
`$UOLINK_CONFIG`), and `--print-config` prints the resolved settings — **including the auth token
the website needs** — as JSON, provisioning the config file on first run. That is the supported way
to read the token back; it is not meant to be scraped from the log.
```bash
uo-link-sidecar --print-config --config /etc/runicgateway/sidecar.toml
```
### Running as a service
The same binary runs in the foreground and as a system service — there is no `--service` flag to
remember, because the process can tell how it was started.
- **Linux/systemd** supervises any foreground process, so the unit just runs the binary. `SIGTERM`
(what `systemctl stop` sends) and `SIGINT` both unwind it cleanly; logs go to the journal.
- **Windows** cannot. The service control manager only supervises a process that connects back to
it within ~30 seconds via `StartServiceCtrlDispatcher`; a plain console program registered with
`sc.exe create` is killed with **error 1053** despite running perfectly. So on Windows the sidecar
speaks that handshake: started by the SCM it runs as a service, started from a shell the connect
fails with `ERROR_FAILED_SERVICE_CONTROLLER_CONNECT` and it falls through to an ordinary
foreground run. It reports `Running` only once the shard port is bound and the store is open, and
— having no console — logs to `uo-link-sidecar.<date>.log` beside its config, rolled daily.
Only the starting and stopping is platform-specific: `src/app.rs` is the entire sidecar and is
shared, while `src/windows.rs` and `src/unix.rs` do nothing but start it and tell it when to stop.
The Windows crates are declared under `[target.'cfg(windows)'.dependencies]`, so Cargo neither
resolves nor builds them for a Linux target.
Registering the service is the installer's job; to do it by hand see
[INSTALL.md Appendix A4](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/docs/src/branch/main/installer/INSTALL.md).
`.gitea/workflows/release.yml` cross-compiles Linux + Windows binaries and cuts a Gitea release on
every merge to `main` (conventional-commit versioning). See [`sidecar/README.md`](sidecar/README.md)
for configuration and the wire protocol.
Before that, `.gitea/workflows/pr-checks.yml` runs the same gates on every pull request into `main`
`cargo fmt --check`, `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings`, then `cargo test --locked`. Run them
locally before pushing and the PR will be green:
```bash
cd sidecar
cargo fmt # or --check to just report
cargo clippy --locked --all-targets -- -D warnings
cargo test --locked
```
## Deployment & compatibility
The plugin ([RunicGateway/servuo-plugins](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/servuo-plugins))
and this sidecar are deployed **together** but built **independently**:
- The **plugin** is deployed as source into the ServUO server root and compiled by ServUO at boot —
no build artifact, no CI build.
- The **sidecar** is a standalone Rust binary released from this repo.
The only coupling is the **loopback JSON protocol** (the shard dials `127.0.0.1`). Compatibility is a
protocol concern, not a build-order one — keep the event/command catalog in sync across the two
repos. Canonical spec:
[PLAN.md](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/docs/src/branch/main/link/PLAN.md) §5/§7 and
[INTEGRATION.md](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/docs/src/branch/main/link/INTEGRATION.md).
Because a wedged or absent sidecar cannot stall the shard, either side can be deployed or restarted
independently.
---
## License
Runic Gateway is free software, licensed under the **GNU General Public License
v3.0 or later** — see [LICENSE.md](LICENSE.md).
Copyright (C) 2026 Runic Gateway
This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it under
the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software
Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later
version. It is distributed WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied
warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
General Public License for more details.
Contributions are welcome — please read [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) (note
the **AI-usage disclosure** requirement) and our
[Code of Conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md). Report vulnerabilities privately per
[SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md).