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PLAN.md §13 phase 12, the last one. Four decisions of record, D54–D57, taking the count to fifty-seven; recorded in §6, "How phase 12 delivered it". A two-stage Dockerfile, a pull-only docker-compose.yml carrying both bind mounts, .env.example, the workflow that publishes and deploys, CONTRIBUTING.md, the community-health files this was the only repository of the ten to lack, and DEPLOY.md. D54 — a merge deploys, amending D6. build-image.yml pushes runicgateway-site:latest and :sha-<7>, then rolls the container over on the `rgcom` runner out of /opt/runicgateway.com, and waits for the container's own healthcheck rather than for `up -d` to return. D55 — the site runs on its own host behind a generic reverse proxy, so DEPLOY.md states the four requirements rather than one worked example, and the container binds 127.0.0.1 so the safe configuration is the default. D56 — @astrojs/node derives the request protocol from req.socket.encrypted and never reads x-forwarded-proto, so behind a TLS-terminating proxy the browser sends Origin: https://… while the container computes http://… and Astro's CSRF check compares them for equality. Every beta signup, from every visitor, was answered 403. serve.mjs now normalises both forwarded headers, unconditionally — the image should deploy and work. Two assertions in test/headers.test.mjs hold both halves. D57 — DEPLOY.md rather than a README section; SECURITY.md and CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md are pointers to the org's copies rather than copies, because a copy would hard-code the contact address D13 confines to brand.json. Verified: npm run verify green (eleven checks, 36 unit tests, 7 served tests, astro check 0 errors). The image was built and run with both mounts — a mounted brand reached 51 files and all 50 search pages, /brand/* fell back per file, a proxy-shaped signup reached the store, and the export CLI wrote both Play files to the host mount. docker compose config caught a YAML trap in the healthcheck: a block sequence reads the `: ` in `r.ok ? 0 : 1` as a mapping. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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2.5 KiB
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44 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown
# Security Policy
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**Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public issues, pull requests or the wiki.**
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A public report tips off attackers before a fix is available.
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Report privately, using the contact route in the organisation's security policy:
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**[RunicGateway/docs → SECURITY.md](https://gitea.whitlocktech.com/RunicGateway/docs/src/branch/main/SECURITY.md)**
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That document is the single copy for all ten repositories, and it carries the address, what to
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include in a report and what to expect back.
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## Why this file is a pointer rather than a copy
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Every other repository in the organisation states the reporting address inline. This one does not,
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and the reason is a decision of record rather than an oversight: **D13** (`PLAN.md` §5) confines the
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published contact address to `brand.json`, a bind-mounted file, so that changing it is a file copy
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and a container restart rather than a commit. `scripts/checkFacts.mjs` fails the build if an address
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appears anywhere in `src/` or `scripts/`, and this file honours the same rule voluntarily — a
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hard-coded address in the repository root would be one more place to forget when the address moves.
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## What is worth reporting here
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This site holds one thing of value and has one writing endpoint.
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- **The closed-beta signup** (`/beta`, `PLAN.md` §8) is the only route that writes. It stores an
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email address, a consent record and a **salted hash of the IP address** — never the address
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itself. Anything that lets a caller read rows, bypass the rate limit or the total cap, forge the
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signed form token, or recover an IP from a hash is in scope and worth reporting.
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- **The branding mount** (`GET /brand/*`, §7) reads files from a directory an operator controls.
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Path traversal out of that directory, or reaching a file type outside the route's allowlist, is in
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scope.
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- **The Content-Security-Policy** is a real response header written by `scripts/serve.mjs`. A page
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that is served no policy, or another page's policy, is a defect worth reporting — that exact bug
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has happened here once already (`PLAN.md` D48).
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The site has **no authenticated surface at all**, by design: the tester list is managed from a shell
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against the bind mount, not from an admin page. There is no session, no cookie and no login to
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attack.
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Vulnerabilities in the **platform itself** — the website, the sidecar, the shard plugin, the
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installer or the Android app — belong in the organisation's policy linked above, not here. This
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repository only describes them.
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