Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
b818f6cf37 feat(bridge): protocol 5 — decay schedule, vendor fee state, and a login result
Three emitter changes and the overlay's protocol declaration, in one PR because
"The bridge is a contract": overlay.toml must be bumped in the same change as the
emitters or the next bundle silently fails to compose.

BridgeSweeps — house.decay gains ownerName and a nested `schedule`
{dynamicDecay, nextStage, decayPeriodSec, estimatedCollapse}.

estimatedCollapse is emitted only where ServUO can actually know it. Dynamic decay
(Core.ML) draws each stage's duration at RANDOM when the stage is entered, so
NextDecayStage is exact for the next transition and nothing beyond it is known —
collapse becomes exact only at IDOC, where the next transition IS the collapse.
Static decay is a pure function of LastRefreshed and DecayPeriod, so it is exact at
every stage. Emitting it anywhere else would publish a guess as a fact, and on the
website's side that becomes a dated promise in someone's mail.

BridgeMarket — vendor.listing gains ownerAcct and a nested `fees` block.

ownerAcct is the one that matters structurally: the frame has carried ownerName
since v3, but a character name joins to nothing — only the game account is the
website's link key. The fees block resolves PlayerVendor.PayTimer's dismissal rule
(pay > totalGold => Destroy) on the shard, because both halves of that comparison
differ between ServUO's two vendor systems and re-deriving them downstream would be
a second implementation of a rule that lives in core.

No daysRemaining: under the old vendor system a pay period is a UO day
(Clock.MinutesPerUODay, about two real hours), so the obvious name would be wrong
by a factor of twelve on exactly the shards least likely to notice. periodsRemaining
plus the interval, and dismissalAt as an instant. A commission vendor has no pay
timer at all and reports exempt with no schedule — "never dismissed" is not the same
as "dismissed in 400 days".

BridgeEvents — a new account.login.result kind.

EventSink.AccountLogin is a veto hook that fires BEFORE the auth decision, and
AccountLoginEventArgs constructs with Accepted = true, so the existing
account.login.attempt fires on successful logins too and cannot carry a verdict. A
security rule built on it would have mailed "someone tried to get into your account"
every time the player logged in.

The verdict is read one Core slice later via DelayCall(Zero). That needs no core
patch AND does not depend on handler subscription order, which ServUO does not define
and a shard's own scripts can change. reason is omitted on an accept, because
ALRReason's zero value is Invalid and would read as a failure reason. The address is
resolved inside the handler, since AccountLogin_ReplyRej disposes the NetState before
the deferred read runs. The password is never read, logged or emitted.

tools/scaffolding/BridgeProtocol5Probe.cs drives all three on a live shard, and the
README records the two traps it took to get there — both of which produce SILENCE
rather than an error, so each looks exactly like a broken emitter:

  * An in-process login probe can never produce accepted:true. AccountHandler calls
    acct.HasAccess(e.State) BEFORE it checks the password, and a null NetState fails
    that. Only a real socket proves the accepted half — and it is the better test
    anyway, since it also produces the real ip.
  * Forcing a decay stage on a house that cannot decay emits nothing at all. Only
    Condemned and ManualRefresh houses decay; an AutoRefresh one — and the owner's
    NEWEST house is always AutoRefresh — has a DecayLevel getter that calls
    ResetDynamicDecay() and reports Ageless, wiping the forced stage before the sweep
    reads it.

Verified on the local rig against the release sidecar: a house walked
Fairly -> Greatly -> IDOC carried estimatedCollapse on the IDOC frame and only there;
every vendor's periodsRemaining matched funds/chargePerPeriod, including one at 0
whose dismissalAt equals its next tick; a real socket login gave
accepted:false reason:BadPass and then accepted:true. Compiles clean against ServUO
57.4 reference assemblies.

Docs: RunicGateway/docs link/v5.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-31 19:19:34 -05:00
feeb904bfe Phase 5: [link account linking
BridgeAccountLink ties a game account to a website account. [link mints a
one-time, 5-minute code from an unambiguous alphabet (no O/0/I/1), holds it in a
Core-thread dict keyed to the account, and emits link.request. The website
relays the code back through the sidecar as link.confirm; the shard validates,
writes the WebsiteUserId account tag, and replies link.ok. A bad or expired code
gets link.error.

The tag persists to accounts.xml in ServUO's standard <tags> format, read by
LoadTags at boot, so a link survives restarts with no new persistence layer.
mob.login now carries webId when the account is linked, so the sidecar can
attribute a session to a site user without a lookup.

Safeguards: one-time codes; only the newest code per account is valid; per-account
30s rate limit against code spam; a 1-minute purge bounds the code table; the
websiteUserId is trusted only because the socket is loopback-only. The tag reaches
memory on confirm but disk only on the next save — a hard crash between loses it,
and the player just re-runs [link.

Verified end to end with a smart stub that reads the emitted code and confirms
it: link.request -> link.confirm -> link.ok, a bad code -> link.error, and the
tag observed in accounts.xml after a save. Evidence in docs/PLAN.md §15.

The [link command body is exposed as RequestLink(Mobile) so it can be driven in
tests without a client. Adds tools/stub_sidecar_link.ps1 and
tools/scaffolding/BridgeLinkProbe.cs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 11:47:17 -05:00
261ae6bc5c Phase 2: cheap event streams
BridgeEvents subscribes the streams selected for tracking, economy, and cheat
detection: Login/Logout/AccountLogin, AccountGoldChange, ValidVendorPurchase/
Sell, PlacePlayerVendor, SkillGain, FameChange, KarmaChange, QuestComplete,
PlayerDeath, PlayerMurdered, OnKilledBy, FastWalk, OnPropertyChanged, Command,
and Before/AfterWorldSave.

Every handler runs on the Core thread inside the path that raised it, so each is
wrapped to never throw, does only Emit (which enqueues and returns), and never
mutates the args. Three of these are veto hooks and are read strictly:
AccountLogin (Accepted/RejectReason, and a plaintext Password we never emit),
FastWalk (Blocked), and the login decision path generally.

Testing on the live shard found that SkillGain fires for NPCs, hard: the first
boot emitted 115 skill.gain events in four seconds, all spawned creatures
grinding Meditation, zero players. That is the general rule here — most "player"
events also fire for NPCs — so SkillGain, FameChange, KarmaChange, and OnKilledBy
all filter to players on the Core thread before the socket. Gold, fame, karma,
and the save boundaries were fired through their real code paths and observed at
the stub sidecar; gold.change round-trips the platinum->gold conversion and
persists across restarts. Evidence in docs/PLAN.md §12.

Adds tools/scaffolding/BridgeEventProbe.cs (never deployed) which triggers those
events through real world mutations rather than synthetic Invoke calls.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 10:46:41 -05:00