Commit Graph

108 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
01a559792c fix(shard): answer with the instance name when the shard is unnamed
ServUO ships Server.cfg with `Name=My Shard`. An operator who never edited it
publishes that verbatim, so the rules page read "My Shard" under a header
carrying the real name. That value is the shard saying *unnamed* rather than
naming anything, so the site now answers with its own.

`settings.getInstanceName()` resolves `site_title || BRAND_NAME` — the same
resolution `getPublic().brand.name` already uses, so an install that set only
the site title can never show two different names on two pages. Bare
`brand.name` would have been wrong for exactly that case.

Substituted at INGEST rather than on read: world.ruleset is also broadcast
live, and the same object is handed to the SSE fan-out, so a read-time fix
would be undone by the next reconnect's frame. Matched case- and
padding-insensitively but only as a whole value, so a shard genuinely called
"My Shard Reborn" keeps its name.

Fixes a second ruleset writer found on the way: uoLinkSocket.backfill() called
shardState.setRuleset directly instead of going through the dispatcher as
ingestEach does, so the boot/reconnect snapshot silently skipped this
normalization. The two arrival orders have to produce the same stored frame.

Also renders a placeholder row on an unscored leaderboard — the instance name
with an em dash where a score goes, deliberately not shaped like an entry (no
medal, no bar) because a placeholder that looked like a real standing would be
a fabricated one. Presentation only; the API still sends an empty `top`.

Verified live against the shard + sidecar: rules page and leaderboards on web
and Android both correct.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U7CBg11prhLimL9iHSX1bP
2026-08-01 00:58:21 -05:00
779a304173 feat(shard)!: declare wire protocol 3
The site's declared version is the admin-set uo_link_config.protocol column, so
the sidecar's PROTOCOL_VERSION 2 -> 3 bump has to be matched here or every REST
call 409s and uoLinkSocket closes the WS on the ws.hello mismatch. Five places
carry the number and all five move together: the column default, the model's
DEFAULT_PROTOCOL (what a site with nothing saved yet declares), the two
`config.protocol || 1` fallbacks in uoLinkClient/uoLinkSocket -- unreachable
today, but an unset value quietly sending 1 is exactly the confusing 409 the
version check exists to prevent -- the admin form's initial value, and the
documented env default.

The boot migration is the only subtle part. schema.sql is re-run on EVERY boot,
and `protocol` is admin-editable, so a bare UPDATE would silently un-pin an
operator who had deliberately pinned an older sidecar in Admin -> Shard. It is
therefore gated on a marker row in `settings`, written after the UPDATE: the
first boot on this build migrates, every later boot is a no-op. `protocol < 3`
rather than `= 2` picks up an install still on the old default of 1, which could
not have been talking to a v2 sidecar anyway. A fresh install has no row to
update and just gets the marker plus the new column default.

Verified against the local MariaDB through ensureSchema (the production path):
2 -> 3 with the marker written and the column default now 3; pinned back to 2 by
hand, re-ran, and it STAYED 2 -- the one-shot property holds. 673 server tests,
47 client tests, client build green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 18:03:48 -05:00
8771a1cf6c feat(shard): the player-vendor marketplace
Protocol 3.0 §8, the website half. Ingests vendor.listing / vendor.listing.remove
into shard_vendors + shard_vendor_items, serves a searchable public API over
them, and ships /site/market and /site/market/vendors/:serial.

Three things the pages have to say out loud, all consequences of how the data is
gathered:

- The prices are NOT live. The shard sweeps vendors round-robin, so a shop can be
  a full cycle behind. The banner is driven by the OLDEST vendor row, not the
  newest — the one stale shop is the one that wastes somebody's trip.
- A shop can be truncated. `total` exceeding `count` means the shop holds more
  than the shard publishes per frame; the vendor page says "showing 250 of 3,104"
  rather than presenting a partial shop as complete.
- An item may have no name. On a shard with no cliloc table the honest render is
  the item id, never an invented label.

## The pre-wired visibility rules, re-checked

Part A pre-wired market.ownerName and market.location before the frame existed,
and the sibling rule it pre-wired for leaderboards (`characterName`) turned out
to be INERT because projectValue matches literal JSON keys. Both market rules
were checked against the real frame this time:

- `ownerName` is a real key. Kept.
- `location` is a real key ONLY because the frame nests it. Flat map/x/y/region
  would have made the rule match nothing — the same failure, one part later. It
  is nested on the wire and on the read model so one rule hides the facet, the
  coordinates, the region and the house together; five flat keys would be five
  rules that drift apart.
- `ownerSerial` was ADDED. An admin who hides the owner's name and leaves a
  serial that the leaderboards and guild boards resolve back to that same name
  has not hidden anything.

Tests assert all three bite, on the stored read model AND on the raw frame —
the market's SSE stream is off by default but an admin can turn it on, and a rule
that worked on only one path is exactly the leak §3.6.1 records.

## Notable

- **No payload column on shard_vendors**, unlike shard_points_boards next door.
  The board's top-N is a fixed-size list read whole; here the items ARE the
  searchable rows, so they are normalized and nothing is left worth duplicating.
- **display_name is denormalized at ingest** (literal name preferred over the
  cliloc — a player set it, so it is more specific). Resolving at query time
  would put the cliloc table on the hot path and make search-by-name impossible.
  Because the shard's diff sweep will not re-send an unchanged shop just because
  the site learned what its items are called, a cliloc import now triggers a bulk
  re-resolution — 50 ms per thousand rows, never throws.
- **updated_at is written explicitly** on every upsert. MariaDB does not fire ON
  UPDATE CURRENT_TIMESTAMP when every column is written back unchanged, and a
  shop re-published identically is still freshly confirmed — without this the
  staleness banner would age a perfectly current shop forever.
- **LIKE wildcards in `q` are escaped.** `%` and `_` are LIKE metacharacters, not
  SQL ones, so parameterization does not neutralize them: `?q=%` would otherwise
  match every listing on the shard.
- **Rate-limited** (60/min/IP), the only limited public read. Every other public
  GET is an indexed lookup of bounded size; this is a LIKE scan plus a COUNT over
  the largest shard_* table, anonymous by default.
- Reconnect backfill pages /market, bounded by MARKET_SNAPSHOT_MAX = 5000 and
  stopping on a short page as well as on `total`, so a concurrent sweep shrinking
  the index cannot spin the walk.

## How it was tested

673 server tests pass (27 new). Client builds clean; swagger-output.json,
routes.manifest.json and routes.guards.json regenerated.

Verified full-stack against the live MariaDB and a real shard, not only units:

- 27 real vendors / 1,040 listings swept off the ServUO tree, through the Rust
  sidecar, into the site — names resolving through the cliloc table ("longsword",
  "katana"), real facets and regions in the filters.
- `?q=sword` 682, `?q=%` and `?q=_` **0** (the escape), map/region/price/sort
  filters, paging, and the vendor detail route.
- Visibility live: fields gated to staff vanish for an anonymous caller while
  shopName and price survive; audience=player 403s; enabled=0 404s; and
  /shard/features correctly drops `market` so the nav hides it.
- Re-publishing a shop smaller leaves no orphan items; an identical re-publish
  moves updated_at.
- The limiter fires (38x200 then 32x429 on a 70-request burst).

Not covered by an automated test: the two React pages are presentational and this
repo's client suite covers pure-logic modules only. They were driven against the
live API above, but not rendered in a DOM harness.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 09:51:50 -05:00
bda031566a feat(shard): read clilocs from a source SET so shard items get names
Shards edit items and add new ones, and those carry cliloc ids no stock client
table has. Reading exactly one converted file meant an operator had to
re-export 5 MB every time they added one item — friction enough that the table
would simply go stale, which is the failure the spawn atlas was redesigned to
avoid in the first place.

So this mirrors spawnAtlasSource.readSources(): a BASE (the converted client
table) plus every operator-maintained overlay under `custom/`, all re-read on
every boot and hash-gated as a SET. Later sources win, so an overlay both adds
ids the client never had and overrides stock ones the shard re-purposed.
Adding, editing or removing any overlay counts as drift.

`custom/` is the one convention here that is ours rather than the shard's, and
deliberately so: ServUO has no server-side notion of a custom cliloc — they
live in the patched client a shard distributes, and nothing in the tree
declares them. There is nothing to discover. (An operator who does patch their
client cliloc needs no overlay: convert the patched file and the edits are in
the base.) Scale, measured on the live shard: its script tree references 16,434
cliloc ids and only 37 are absent from stock — tens against a 67k base, which
is why this is an overlay and not a second table.

The set brings back a hazard a single file did not have, and it gets the
atlas's answer. A corrupt source fails the parse loudly, but a source that has
VANISHED parses perfectly and imports a table quietly missing everything it
contributed — an unmounted volume is indistinguishable from a deliberate
deletion. So it is staged, not applied (`needsReview`), reported by both the
import and status(), and accepted with `{approve:true}`. That is a flag rather
than the atlas's approve/reject pair because the atlas stores a pending
decision SO THAT approving re-parses; here nothing is stored, so re-reading at
approval time is automatic.

Also reports a per-source breakdown (entries/added/overrode) on import and in
status, which is how an operator confirms an overlay took effect — "overrode: 0"
on a file meant to re-label stock items says it did not.

Two bugs this surfaced, both found by running a shard-style overlay rather than
by another stock-table fixture:

- displayText tidied punctuation unconditionally, so a custom
  "Runic Gateway Sigil (v2)" rendered as "(v2". Stripping leftover brackets is
  right after a placeholder is removed and wrong otherwise — the same condition
  the `%` rule already had.
- CANDIDATE_NAMES did not include `clilocs.plain`, which is the exact filename
  CLILOCS.md and the export tool's README tell operators to write. Pointing at
  the directory they were told to create failed with NO_FILE.

Verified end to end against the live MariaDB and a real server boot: base-only
import, overlay adding one id and overriding another (per-source breakdown
correct), unchanged set as a no-op, an edited overlay re-importing and
withdrawing its override, a vanished overlay refused with the table intact,
status reporting missingSources, approve applying it, and a file-path
configuration still finding overlays beside it. All three resolve correctly
through the running server: shard-added, overridden and stock. 646 server tests
pass (16 new in clilocSource.test.js, 3 new in clilocParse.test.js); swagger,
routes.manifest.json and routes.guards.json regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 06:46:12 -05:00
b61a4d6721 feat(shard): resolve cliloc names for items and reward titles
Protocol 3.0 §8.6 (docs/link/v3.md), the dependency order 5 was sequenced
behind. Items on the wire carry a LabelNumber, not a name — the bridge has
always sent it (char.profile.equipment.cliloc, reward titles as a cliloc
number in string form, and one per marketplace listing) but the site had no
table to resolve it against, so a character sheet could only render
`id 1023721` where the game renders "quarter staff".

The number was never the missing piece. The table was.

Sourced from a file the operator converts once from their own client, at a
path from the `cliloc_client_path` setting falling back to UO_CLIENT_PATH.
Nothing client-derived is committed: UO's strings are EA's, exactly as the
creature sprites are. A shard with nothing configured is fully supported —
names render as ids, as they did before.

The conversion step is not avoidable, and that is the substantive finding
here: every current client ships its cliloc files COMPRESSED (first DWORD's
high byte 0x8E, the Mythic container), and ServUO's own bundled
Ultima.StringList cannot read that either — so VendorSearch.GetItemName is
already inert on such a shard and the plugin could not supply names instead.
v3.md's original "read the client's Cliloc.enu" recommendation was therefore
not implementable as written, and its committed db/data/clilocs.json artifact
also predates the Part C corrections (no committed derived snapshots, nothing
EA-derived shipped). Replaced with the spawn-atlas pattern: parse on boot from
an operator-configured path, hash-gated, output gitignored.

- utils/clilocParse.js — pure parsers, fs-free so the suite runs in CI.
  Accepts the plain binary layout and delimited text, sniffed by header rather
  than extension. Rejects a compressed file BY NAME: without that check the
  plain parser reads it as ~19k records of negative ids and 60 KB "strings"
  before dying mid-file, and the resulting error names the wrong problem.
  displayText() drops the ~1_val~ arguments the bridge never sends.
- utils/clilocSource.js — the fs layer. hashSource reports `compressed` so the
  admin panel can flag an unconverted file WITHOUT parsing 5 MB per poll;
  otherwise pointing at a client directory reports a healthy file with pending
  drift ("ready to import") and the operator only finds out on failure.
- model/shardClilocs — refresh/status/lookup. All-or-nothing replace (DELETE,
  not TRUNCATE — TRUNCATE is DDL in MariaDB and implicitly commits). Batched
  server-side resolution behind a capped cache; never throws, because a cliloc
  lookup is decoration on a character sheet.
- Deliberately NO staged-approval flow, unlike the atlas: the atlas escalates
  facet loss because a half-copied tree and a real map change are
  indistinguishable from inside the process, whereas a partial cliloc copy
  makes the parser fail on a truncated record. The ambiguity the atlas must
  escalate is one this parser simply detects.
- No public route. The table is never served AS a table: 67k rows would dwarf
  any page using them, and the Android client consumes the same resolved JSON.

Two parser bugs found by building it, both now covered by tests: trimming a
text line before splitting ate the trailing separator on empty-text entries
and silently dropped 55,994 of 123,490 while still reporting success; and
Number('') is 0, not NaN, so a line starting with a separator imported as a
bogus cliloc 0.

Verified against the real client table (123,490 entries) and the live MariaDB:
import 663 ms, hash-gated boot no-op 14 ms, cold resolve 4.2 ms / warm 0.015 ms.
Binary and TSV imports converge on the same 67,496 rows with identical keys
(blank entries — half the table — are dropped at import). A file truncated to
half its length is refused with TRUNCATED and leaves the previous table
serving. Boot logs verified for both the import and the compressed-file
warning; neither blocks startup. All three admin routes exercised over HTTP
with a real session. 629 server tests pass; client builds clean; swagger,
routes.manifest.json and routes.guards.json regenerated.

Not covered by an automated test: the character sheet renders resolved names
in presentational React with no DOM test harness in this repo, and was not
rendered against a live linked-player profile — that needs a logged-in player
with a linked game account and a shard answering a profile RPC.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 04:21:38 -05:00
26094459ae feat(shard): ingest points.board and publish the leaderboards
Protocol 3.0 §7 (docs/link/v3.md). The shard publishes ~25 points/loyalty
leaderboards — Queen's Loyalty, Void Pool, the nine city loyalties, Clean Up
Britannia — and the site renders them, plus each character's own standings on
their sheet.

Server
  - shard_points_boards: one row per system, keyed by the shard's PointsType
    name. The top-N list stays inside `payload` — a fixed-size list read whole,
    exactly like shard_governors.candidates. Normalizing into an entries table
    buys nothing until something needs a per-character reverse lookup, and a
    character's own standings already ride inside char.profile.
  - shardIngest routes points.board to upsertPointsBoard and deliberately does
    NOT log it: this is board state like guild.update, and the shard emits a
    frame every time anyone's score moves a top ten.
  - uoLinkSocket backfills /points through snapshot() with ingestEach rather
    than a replace*: there is no points.remove and the system set is fixed, so
    upserting IS the reconciliation, and a system the operator later excludes
    keeps its last-known board rather than vanishing.
  - GET /public/shard/points and /points/:system behind
    requireFeature('leaderboards'), both projected per §3.6.1. :system is
    constrained to an identifier before any query runs; 404 for a system never
    published, distinct from a published board nobody has scored in (200, empty
    top).

The leaderboards field rule now keys on `name`, not `characterName`
  Part A pre-wired FEATURES.leaderboards.fields = { characterName: ... }, but
  projectValue matches on the LITERAL JSON key and the wire key is `name`. As
  written the rule was inert: an admin tightening character names would have got
  no enforcement and no error — precisely the failure §3.6.1 records for the
  flattened `ownerAcct` spelling. Fixed, with a test that fails if it is renamed
  back, and the admin panel's FIELD_LABEL carries the meaning instead.

Client
  - routes/public/Leaderboards.jsx at /site/leaderboards. A points.board frame
    describes ONE system, so live frames merge over the fetched set by system
    key rather than replacing it wholesale the way the ruleset does. Filter
    matches board name, system key, or any ranked player — the last is what
    makes it useful ("where do I appear?").
  - A "Loyalty & Points" section in CharacterSheet.jsx, one edit serving both
    PlayerCharacter and AdminCharacter.
  - Both treat maxPoints: 0 as UNCAPPED and both fall back to humanising the
    system key when nameString is null. Neither is defensive padding: on a real
    shard uncapped and cliloc-only names are the majority case.

Verified end to end against the local MariaDB, the Rust sidecar, and the real
ServUO shard: backfill from /points, live SSE delivery (a board absent from the
initial fetch appearing without a reload, and an existing one updating in
place), REST reflecting the overwrite, and the gate at every rung — 200 by
default with names, names stripped but points kept at fieldRules name=staff, 403
plus dropped from /features at audience=staff, 404 when disabled. Page rendered
clean, no console errors beyond the pre-existing React Router v7 warnings.

605 server tests pass; routes.manifest.json, routes.guards.json and the OpenAPI
spec regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 21:04:44 -05:00
7c769ea8fd feat(atlas): serve the spawn atlas and give operators a panel for it
Protocol 3.0 order 3 (Part C), second of two website PRs. #112 built the data
pipeline; this makes it reachable — six public routes, five admin ones, two
public pages and an admin panel. Still website-only: no plugin, no sidecar, no
new event kinds, no wire change.

The API sits at /api/v1/public/atlas, not under /public/shard. Nothing here
touches the sidecar, so the pages stay complete while the shard is down, and a
/shard prefix would imply a dependency the atlas does not have. Unlike /shard/*
it IS site-mode gated, like /posts and /wiki: a bestiary is site content.

Every route carries requireFeature('atlas') and projects its response. The atlas
feature declares no sensitive fields, so the projection is a no-op today — the
call is there because v3.md 3.6.1's rule is that the FIRST field needing a gate
should be covered by construction rather than by a retrofit.

Two bugs the UI surfaced, both fixed here:

Respawn delays were stored in the wrong unit, sometimes. XmlSpawner writes
MinDelay/MaxDelay in minutes and switches to seconds only when a delay does not
divide into whole minutes, flagging it per record with DelayInSec. A `5` means
five minutes on one spawner and five seconds on the next, both plausible, and
the pipeline stored the raw number. 170 of 6,455 stock spawners are second
flagged. The parser normalises to seconds; the API and UI carry seconds.

That exposed the hash gate as a trap. "Has the tree changed?" is the wrong
question on its own: an install whose maps never change would have kept serving
the old readings forever, because the only thing compared was the tree.
PARSER_VERSION is now stored beside the source hashes and a mismatch counts as
drift, so any future parse correction lands on the next boot.

Also renamed the detail route's spawn-point array to `spawners` — it was
`points`, which is the COUNT on the search route, so one key meant a number in
one place and an array in the other.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U7CBg11prhLimL9iHSX1bP
2026-07-28 19:51:22 -05:00
a4ef9d676d Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/edge' into feat/spawn-atlas-parse 2026-07-28 16:45:56 -05:00
2801ec8f4d refactor(atlas): derive the atlas from the shard's tree on every boot
Replaces the committed-artifact design from the first commit. Two problems with
it, both raised in review:

**Facets are not a fixed list.** The first pass carried a hardcoded table of the
six stock UO facets to reconcile the spelling drift between sources. That is
wrong: a shard may add facets, replace them outright, or rename them when its
maps are updated, and a built-in list quietly mishandles all three. Nothing in
the atlas names a facet any more. The facet set is discovered from the tree —
spawn records and region definitions are the authority — and the loose spellings
in Data/Locations are matched against it by key and prefix. Custom facets get
identical treatment; the tests use `Sosaria` and `Underdark` precisely so a
stock-facet assumption cannot creep back in.

**A snapshot goes stale.** Maps change over a server's life, so a build-once
artifact silently drifts from the world players actually see. The tree is now
the single source of truth and the atlas is re-derived on every boot.

## What that changed

- **The committed artifact is gone** — 1.41 MB of generated JSON removed, along
  with `scripts/buildSpawnAtlas.js` and the whole encode/decode seam it needed
  (`encodePoint`/`readPoint`, the tuple encoding, the omitted-defaults scheme and
  their round-trip tests). Nothing to keep in sync, nothing to go stale.
- **NEW `src/utils/spawnAtlasSource.js`** — the only thing that touches a ServUO
  tree; shared by the boot path and the CLI. Parsers stay pure and fs-free.
- **NEW `src/model/shardAtlas/`** — `.db.js` (the one-transaction replace) and
  `.model.js` (the refresh decision).
- **`scripts/importSpawnAtlas.js`** is now a thin CLI over the model:
  `--servuo`, `--force`, `--approve`, `--reject`, `--status`. `atlas:build` is
  gone; `atlas:import` remains.
- Path comes from the `spawn_atlas_servuo_path` admin setting, falling back to
  `SERVUO_PATH`. The setting wins, matching how the rest of the shard
  integration is admin-managed rather than env-configured.

## Two contracts on the boot path

**It never blocks startup.** No path, an unreadable mount, a malformed file, a
database error — every one is caught and logged, and the site comes up serving
whatever atlas it already had. Verified by booting the real server with no path,
a broken path, and a good path.

**A facet disappearing is never applied automatically.** Losing a facet is the
signature of a half-copied or mid-update tree as much as of a real map change,
and boot cannot tell them apart. The refresh is staged in `shard_atlas_pending`
for an admin to approve or reject, and startup continues regardless. Additions
and every other change apply immediately, since none of them can destroy
something an operator would miss.

Only the decision is stored, not the parsed world: a few KB of source hashes and
the facet diff. Approving re-parses, so what gets applied matches the tree at
approval time rather than at boot. A rejection is remembered against those exact
hashes, so a declined refresh does not re-prompt on every restart — changing the
tree changes the hashes and asks again.

Hash-gated, so the common case (restart, maps unchanged) reads and hashes the
tree (~120 ms) and writes nothing. A real change costs a ~400 ms parse.

The admin approve/reject UI is part of the second PR, with the rest of the
routes and pages. Until then the CLI covers it.

## Verification

- **564 server tests pass**, 28 new in `spawnAtlas.source.test.js` covering the
  custom-facet build, the spelling reconciliation, hash gating, and every branch
  of the refresh decision — including that `refreshOnBoot` survives a database
  that throws on every call.
- End-to-end against the local MariaDB and the real ServUO tree: 6,455 points,
  800 creatures, 23,927 point/type rows, 387 regions, 558 landmarks, 25 altars,
  83.2% of points resolved to a place name.
- The facet gate exercised against a real tree copy with `malas.xml` removed:
  staged rather than applied, atlas untouched with all 293 Malas points intact,
  reject then stays quiet on re-run, approve applies and drops the facet.
- Booted the real server under all three source conditions; none blocked.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U7CBg11prhLimL9iHSX1bP
2026-07-28 16:41:33 -05:00
353cce9f26 feat(atlas): parse a ServUO tree into a committed spawn atlas artifact
Protocol 3.0 order 3 (Part C), first of two website PRs. This half is the data
pipeline only — parsers, the build/import CLI, and the tables. No routes and no
client, so nothing is user-visible yet; the API and pages follow in PR 2.

Part C is website-only: no plugin, no sidecar, no new event kinds, no wire
change.

## Parsing

`src/utils/spawnAtlasParse.js` is pure and fs-free so CI covers it with no
ServUO tree. Zero new dependencies — `Regions.xml` genuinely nests, so it gets a
small hand-rolled subset tokenizer rather than a new XML package. The 10.5 MB of
`Spawns/*.xml` never touches it: those records are flat and get a streaming
regex sweep instead.

The high-value transform is point-in-rect placement — highest region priority
wins, ties break to the smaller rect, then a nearest-landmark fallback within
200 tiles, else "Wilderness". That is what turns "lizardman at 5411,1234" into
"Despise, Felucca", and it resolves 83.2% of points (5,369 of 6,455).

Three things the real data forced, none of which were in the design:

- **Only 6 facets, not 13.** `Eodon.xml`, `GravewaterLake.xml` and the other
  named-area files carry TerMur/Trammel points, so the facet comes from each
  record's own `<Map>` and the artifact shards 6 ways.
- **Facet names disagree across sources.** `Data/Locations/*.xml` spells them
  `Ter Mur` and `Tokuno Islands`; `<Map>` and `<Facet name>` say `TerMur` and
  `Tokuno`. Unreconciled this is silent — the landmark fallback simply never
  fires on those facets and every unregioned spawn there reads "Wilderness".
- **Spawn type tokens carry XmlSpawner directives**: `Fairy,{RND,4,8}`,
  `alchemist/z/-50`, `Agralem/Name/Agralem`. Taken literally these invent
  creatures that do not exist AND split real ones in two, since `Fairy` and
  `Fairy,{RND,4,8}` slug apart. 71 of 845 entries were affected; stripping at
  the first `/` or `,` leaves 800 clean ones.

## Artifact

`npm run atlas:build -- --servuo <path>` writes `db/data/spawnAtlas.*.json`:
6 facet shards + a compact index + a small indented `meta`. 1.41 MB committed,
down from 4.40 MB by dropping `facet` per record, omitting defaulted fields, and
tuple-encoding the ~24,000 type entries. `encodePoint()` and the importer's
`readPoint()` are exact inverses and are round-tripped in tests.

Display spelling is chosen deterministically (most common, ties to the
capitalised form) because the spawn files are inconsistent about case and the
name would otherwise depend on file read order — a spurious diff on every
unrelated rebuild.

## Import

`npm run atlas:import` needs no ServUO tree, which is the whole reason build and
import are separate: the container has the artifact but not the tree. It
reloads all six tables in one transaction (DELETE, not TRUNCATE, which is DDL
and would implicitly commit), so a failed import leaves the previous atlas
intact.

## No artwork, by design

The repo ships no creature art and no extraction tooling. Sprites live in the
operator's own client `.mul`/`.uop` files and are theirs, not ours to
redistribute. `shard_spawn_creatures.art` is nullable and NULL on every fresh
import; an operator who wants art extracts it themselves, drops it under
`server/uploads/atlas/` (already gitignored) and maps slugs in a gitignored
`spawnAtlas.art.json`. Text-only is the normal, fully supported state.

## Verification

- **544 server tests pass**, 57 new across `spawnAtlas.parse.test.js` (the
  `:OBJ=` split, directive stripping, nested-region priority inheritance,
  half-open rects, the facet reconciliation, tokenizer edge cases) and
  `spawnAtlas.build.test.js` (aggregation, deterministic naming, and the
  encode/decode round trip).
- Built and imported for real against the local MariaDB and the ServUO tree at
  `C:\Users\colby\Desktop\ServUO`: 6,455 points, 800 creatures, 23,927
  point/type rows, 387 regions, 558 landmarks, 25 champion altars.
- "Where does a lizardman spawn?" answers Shrines / Isamu-Jima / Yew across
  Felucca, Trammel and Tokuno.

No routes changed, so the OpenAPI spec and route manifest are untouched.

---

- [x] AI-assisted: written with **Claude Code** (Claude Opus 5), reviewed before opening.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U7CBg11prhLimL9iHSX1bP
2026-07-28 16:07:30 -05:00
61d6bfaca2 feat(shard): ingest world.ruleset and publish it at /site/rules
Protocol 3.0 §5 (docs/link/v3.md). The shard publishes its own ruleset —
expansion, which optional systems are on, skill/stat caps, account and house
limits, champion scroll rules, the save/restart schedule — and the site renders
it, so the rules page cannot drift from how the shard actually plays.

Server
  - shard_ruleset: a singleton table (id = 1) holding the whole frame in
    `payload`, with `rev` and `expansion` hoisted. Nothing is normalized out:
    the frame is a flat description of config read as one page, and splitting it
    into columns would mean a schema change every time the shard grows a block.
  - shardIngest routes world.ruleset to setRuleset and deliberately does NOT
    log it — the shard re-emits the whole ruleset on every sidecar connect, so
    logging would append a duplicate row per reconnect, and server.hello already
    marks each of those.
  - uoLinkSocket backfills GET /ruleset explicitly rather than via snapshot(),
    which asserts an array; this covers the order where the sidecar was already
    up and holding the ruleset when we reconnected.
  - GET /public/shard/ruleset behind requireFeature('ruleset') and projected,
    per §3.6.1's rule that a shard read which doesn't project is a bug. `null`
    means the shard has never published one — a real answer, distinct from a
    published ruleset, and the page says so.

Client
  - routes/public/Rules.jsx at /site/rules, live via world.ruleset (a frame is a
    complete ruleset, not a delta, so the newest one wins outright). Caps are
    rendered from tenths — 7000 is 700.0, and showing the raw number would
    mislead. A systems key this build doesn't know still renders, humanised, so
    a newer plugin can't go invisible against an older client.
  - Nav entry gated on the `ruleset` feature, so it hides rather than 403s.

Verified end to end against the local MariaDB and a sidecar fed by a fake shard:
backfill snapshot, live SSE delivery of a changed ruleset, REST reflecting the
overwrite, an empty /feed (not logged), and the gate — 200 by default, 403 at
audience=staff (and dropped from /features so nav hides it), 404 when disabled.
Page rendered clean at all breakpoints checked, no console errors.

497 server tests pass; routes.manifest.json, routes.guards.json and the OpenAPI
spec regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 14:35:24 -05:00
f30ea66fce fix(shard): enforce visibility on the REST reads that bypassed it
Protocol 3.0 Part A follow-up, found by the live five-rung smoke test.

Part A implemented the visibility framework correctly on the SSE path
and on /guilds + /governors, but the remaining public REST reads never
called into it. The result was that one event was projected live and
served verbatim from history:

  * GET /public/shard/feed returned the stored payload as-is, so
    actor.acct and actor.webId were readable ANONYMOUSLY for every
    logged kind - player.death, player.murdered, mob.killed,
    quest.complete, skill.gain, fame/karma.change, mob.login/logout,
    guild.join. Broader than the guild-leader leak Part A set out to
    close, since it covers every player rather than board holders.

  * GET /public/shard/idoc returned ownerAcct - the house owner's game
    account - to anonymous callers.

  * The `houses` field rules (owner/price -> staff) were dead config:
    neither getIdoc nor getHouses projected, so an admin could set them
    in the panel and nothing happened.

  * /feed filtered on PUBLIC_KINDS, a module-load constant derived from
    the compiled DEFAULTS, so live audience changes did not reach it.
    With `guilds` moved to staff, /guilds 403'd while /feed happily
    served guild.join to anonymous.

Four fixes, all at the root rather than per-route:

1. Rule 1 now matches a field's MEANING, not one spelling. The wire
   nests actors (leader.acct) but the read models flatten them
   (shapeHouse -> ownerAcct, shapeGuild -> leaderWebId), and an
   exact-key check missed every flattened one. isLockedField() locks a
   key that is or ends in acct/webId, case-insensitively, so it fails
   closed for shapes not yet written. The admin PUT rejects those
   spellings too - `ownerAcct` is no longer configurable.

2. visibleKinds(level, config) resolves readable kinds from the LIVE
   config; getFeed uses it and projects each row against its own kind's
   feature. Deliberately independent of the `stream` flag, which governs
   SSE fan-out only - so market history stays readable with its firehose
   off. This makes the set a superset of PUBLIC_KINDS by exactly the two
   vendor kinds.

3. getIdoc/getHouses/getChamps/getPresence project, so every shard
   surface honours the same config.

4. shardEvents.db.list treats an EMPTY kinds array as "serve nothing".
   It previously fell through to the unfiltered query, so a fully-gated
   config would have dumped the whole event log, staff audit included.

Also fixes a bug introduced while wiring this up: projectValue recursed
into any object, so a Date column came back as {}. It now walks arrays
and plain objects only. The unit tests used JSON fixtures and could not
have caught it - the live /idoc read did.

Verified live against MariaDB + a stub sidecar, all five rungs: 13
routes x 5 rungs, defaults reproducing pre-v3 access exactly, zero
acct/webId below admin on any read, unmapped kinds (staff.command,
cheat.detect, login.attempt) reaching only admin on SSE, and audience /
enabled / stream changes taking effect live on an already-open stream.

Tests: 487 server (+9). Swagger regenerated; route manifest unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 10:49:55 -05:00
f3450686e0 feat(shard): admin-configurable visibility for every shard surface
Protocol 3.0 Part A. Replaces the static PUBLIC_KINDS allowlist - which
was the entire public/admin boundary - with per-feature, per-field
audience control an admin owns from Admin -> Shard Visibility.

Closes a live leak. BridgeJson.Actor() writes acct and webId;
shapeGuild() returned the stored payload verbatim; GET
/api/v1/public/shard/guilds is anonymous. Guild leaders' game account
names and website user ids were readable by anyone, and the same path
existed for governors. Both are now projected.

The ladder is anonymous < logged_in < player < staff < admin, each rung
implying the ones below. Staff satisfy `player` without a linked account
(as /player/* already does); `editor` is a content role and gets no
shard privilege, since mapping it to staff would silently widen what
editors see.

Two invariants are code, not configuration, and both reject rather than
silently ignore:

  1. acct/webId are admin-only always - not configurable, discarded on
     read as well as rejected on write.
  2. A kind absent from KIND_FEATURE never reaches anyone below admin.
     Fail closed, so a shard emitting a new event degrades to staff-only
     rather than to public.

Enforcement is three points over one config: requireFeature() on routes
(404 disabled, 403 out-of-rung) plus field projection; per-connection
filtering on SSE, where a subscriber's rung is resolved once at subscribe
time and frozen so a long-open stream cannot gain privilege; and
/public/shard/features so the SPA hides links it cannot follow.

PUBLIC_KINDS still exists and is still exported (/feed filtering,
notificationStreams) but is now derived from the kind map, so the two
can no longer drift. Defaults reproduce pre-3.0 behavior exactly - a
test pins the derived set against the old allowlist.

Also fixes an SSE resource leak found while testing: a client dropped
because its write threw was removed from the bucket but its keepalive
interval was never cleared, firing forever on a dead socket. Both paths
now go through one drop().

Tests: 478 server (33 new across shardVisibility + shardBroadcast),
43 client. Route manifest and OpenAPI spec regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 10:04:48 -05:00
620781b7bc feat(auth): honor and establish trusted devices on the SSO login paths
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"Trust this device" did nothing for anyone who signs in with Google or Discord.
sso.controller went straight from needsTotp(user) to staging a pending-TOTP
challenge and never consulted resolveTrustedDevice, so an SSO user was asked for
a code on EVERY sign-in no matter how many times they had ticked the box — and
POST /auth/sso/totp accepted only `code`, so that step could not establish a
trust either. The password paths (web + native) were unaffected and already
worked; this closes the gap for SSO, on the website AND in the Android app.

Server:
- finishLogin and finishMobileLogin now run the same trusted-device check as
  auth.controller.login, via one shared helper: honor a trust that belongs to
  THIS user, stamp last_used_at, log auth.login.trusted_device. A store error
  falls through to the challenge — fail closed to asking for the code.
- POST /auth/sso/totp gains optional trustDevice + deviceName, sets the rg_trust
  cookie, and mirrors the password path's { trustLimitReached, devices } response
  at the cap (the sign-in still completes). Recovery codes stay password-only.

Android coverage, without leaking a secret into a URL:
- The app opens SSO in a Custom Tab, which shares the system browser's cookie
  jar, so the rg_trust cookie set on that TOTP form is presented back on the next
  app sign-in. That alone makes native SSO skip the code. Passing the app's token
  into the start URL was rejected — it would put a 256-bit secret in query
  strings, Referer headers and access logs.
- To also cover the app's NATIVE password login, ticking the box sets
  mobile_auth_sessions.trust_device (a boolean; never the token), and
  /auth/mobile/sso/exchange mints a platform:'mobile' trust and returns
  { trustToken }. Minting there keeps the raw token on an authenticated
  app→server call, out of the deep link and out of the bridge row. Best-effort:
  at the cap the response just omits it rather than failing a good sign-in.

Client: the trust checkbox is no longer hidden on the SSO second step, on both
the admin and player login screens. On the mobile bridge the deep-link redirect
takes priority over the cap prompt — the sign-in succeeded and the link is
single-use, so stalling there would strand the app.

Tests: 8 new cases in server/test/ssoTrustedDevice.test.js (verified to fail
against the pre-fix controller). Full suites green — server 445, client 43 —
and routes.manifest.json is a zero-line diff: no URL moved, only +2 handlers on
/auth/sso/totp in routes.guards.json for the two new validators. Swagger
regenerated. Verified live against the running server and real MariaDB: the TOTP
step issues rg_trust and persists the row, a subsequent SSO callback carrying it
skips the code, and an invalid trust is still challenged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 01:01:12 -05:00
a6fd5659c4 fix(shard): stop an undecryptable uo-link token 500ing every live-shard route
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`uoLinkClient.call()` resolved the uo-link config OUTSIDE its try/catch.
resolveConfig() decrypts the stored auth token, and secretBox.decrypt throws
when the ciphertext can't be authenticated — SECRET_ENC_KEY rotated, or a DB
dump restored into an environment keyed differently. That throw escaped the
client entirely, breaking its documented "never throws / always returns
{ ok, data, status }" contract and turning a misconfiguration into a 500 on
every route that does a live sidecar round-trip:

  GET /admin/uo-link/config
  GET /{admin,player}/shard/char/:serial
  GET /{admin,player}/shard/roster/:account
  GET /{admin,player}/shard/vendors/:account

Found by a live smoke test of all 200 routes at every access level. Public
shard routes were unaffected because they read the DB via getSafe(), which
never decrypts.

Move resolveConfig() inside the try so the failure returns the standard
{ ok: false } shape, and log it at ERROR with a distinct message: a wrong key
previously looked identical to "the shard is offline", with no clue why.
Those routes now degrade to 503, and GET /admin/uo-link/config returns 200
again — it is the screen an admin needs to re-enter the token and recover, so
having it 500 locked them out of the fix.

Also gate the admin Dashboard's site-mode toggle. PUT /admin/site-mode is
adminOnly, but the button rendered for every staff role, and toggle() had a
try/finally with no catch — so an editor clicking it got an unhandled promise
rejection and zero UI feedback. Gate the control on role === 'admin' (the rule
AdminLayout already documents: never show a non-admin a control that would 403)
and surface a message if the call is refused anyway.

Adds server/test/uoLinkClient.test.js, which fails against the unfixed client.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 00:22:40 -05:00
565a7d2c20 refactor(server): split public, player and residual auth into capability routers (PR 5)
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The last split PR of docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md § Phase 2. public.routes.js,
player.routes.js and auth.routes.js are deleted; each group is now a directory
whose index.js owns the group gate and the mount table and declares no routes.
Every one of the 200 manifest routes is now in a capability router.

  public/  posts (2) wiki (4) pages (2) shard (12) site (4, group root)
  player/  account (8) shard (8) appeals (4), behind noindex + requireAuth
  auth/    login (2) register (1) invite (2) password (3) session (2, root)

No URL moves. All four gates zero-diff: routes.manifest.json (200 public + 2
internal), routes.guards.json, swagger-output.json (198 operations), and
docs/website/api-route-inventory.json was already in sync. 434 tests green.

Notes on the non-mechanical parts:

- public/index.js and auth/index.js carry no group gate, deliberately, and say
  so. The public surface is anonymous by contract (logged-out SPA, Discord bot,
  Android ShardStreamClient on /public/shard/stream); /auth is where a caller
  becomes authenticated. player/index.js gates on requireAuth only, never
  requireRole('player') — staff are a superset of players.
- GET /auth/me has a mount-order dependency: use('/me', meRouter) matches the
  bare /me, so the request runs meRouter's noindex + requireAuth and falls
  through. session.router.js must stay mounted last. Verified by the
  counterfactual — mounting it first still 401s but drops X-Robots-Tag, which
  no manifest or guards file can see.
- loginGuards moved to auth/loginGuards.js (frozen) rather than being copied
  into the three routers that spread it; sso.routes.js drops its duplicate.
- The :param shadowing check was re-run in dispatch order against the built
  stack: 86 routes, 64 literal, none shadowed. /public/wiki/{categories,tags}
  ahead of /:slug is the only ordering-sensitive pair.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 20:52:14 -05:00
8fd0d82580 refactor(server): split admin shard, uo-link, email, discord-bot, settings and dashboard into capability routers
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PR 4 of the in-place admin router split (docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md § Phase 2),
and the last admin one: it moves the entire residual 33 and DELETES
admin.routes.js. Every one of the 110 admin routes is now declared in a
capability router. No URL, gate or handler changes.

  shard.router.js      (16)  /admin/shard
  uoLink.router.js     ( 5)  /admin/uo-link
  email.router.js      ( 6)  /admin/email
  discordBot.router.js ( 2)  /admin/discord-bot
  settings.router.js   ( 2)  /admin/settings
  dashboard.router.js  ( 2)  GET /dashboard + PUT /site-mode, at the group root
  admin.routes.js            deleted, was 33

No gate moved to router level. Every adminOnly in the residual file was
per-route, and modAccess on /shard must stay per-route because half that router
must not have it — which keeps the per-route handler count intact, the one
number routes.guards.json can actually check.

/shard is the first prefix where two tiers share one router: 7 self-service
account-linking routes (no extra gate, served by the same player/shard
controller handlers, tagged `Admin · Account`) alongside 9 in-game staff ops on
modAccess. Prefix ownership beats tag grouping — splitting by tag would put two
routers under one prefix for no gain. The tag mismatch stays; retagging is a
real spec diff and belongs in a PR about tags.

dashboard.router.js is the one router mounted at the group root rather than a
prefix: GET /dashboard and PUT /site-mode share no path segment. That is safe
only because the file declares no router-level middleware — a bare use(gate) in
a root-mounted router would run for every request passing through toward
another mount. The file carries a comment saying so.

Acceptance — all four gates zero-diff:
  routes.manifest.json    unchanged (200 public + 2 internal)
  routes.guards.json      unchanged (no route lost or gained a gate)
  swagger-output.json     unchanged (198 operations)
  api-route-inventory.json already in sync
plus 434 server tests green.

Verified separately, because no gate can catch it: introspecting the built
stack, all 59 literal admin paths still dispatch to their own layer — nothing
is captured first by a /:param sibling. The manifest sorts its entries, so
declaration order is invisible to it.

Also repoints the comments that referenced admin.routes.js by name
(botActivity/moderation controllers, the town-crier cap mirror in
announceJobs.logic.js) and generalizes the "the path is on the line after
router.get(" rationale in routeManifest.js, README.md and pr-checks.yml, which
was never about that one file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 20:02:28 -05:00
00ad16858a refactor(server): split admin posts, uploads, wiki and pages into capability routers
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PR 3 of the in-place admin router split (docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md § Phase 2).
Moves the content tier out of the residual admin.routes.js into one router file
per capability, each mounted at the prefix it already owned. No URL, gate or
handler changes.

  posts.router.js     ( 9)  /admin/posts
  uploads.router.js   ( 1)  /admin/uploads
  wiki.router.js      (14)  /admin/wiki
  pages.router.js     ( 7)  /admin/pages
  admin.routes.js     (33)  residual, was 64

All four capabilities are editor tier, so no gate moved: the shared
`noindex, isLoggedIn, staffOnly` in admin/index.js is their whole gate.

The multer config moved to admin/imageUpload.js because the two routes that
share it (POST /posts/upload and POST /uploads) now live in different files;
duplicating a mimetype allowlist is how the two copies drift. It stays in
admin/ because UPLOAD_DIR is resolved relative to __dirname.

Acceptance — all four gates zero-diff:
  routes.manifest.json    unchanged (200 public + 2 internal)
  routes.guards.json      unchanged (no route lost or gained a gate)
  swagger-output.json     unchanged (198 operations)
  api-route-inventory.json already in sync
plus 434 server tests green.

Verified separately, because no gate can catch it: the wiki router's literal
/categories and /tags paths still precede /:slug in declaration order. The
manifest sorts its entries, so a reordering there would be invisible.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 19:24:07 -05:00
bd53a0b8a4 refactor(server): split admin moderation, bot-activity and activity into capability routers
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PR 2 of the domain split (docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md § Phase 2). Carves 18 more
routes out of admin.routes.js into one router file per business capability,
in place, with every URL unchanged:

  moderation.router.js   (15)  /admin/moderation    modAccess at router level
  botActivity.router.js   (2)  /admin/bot-activity  adminOnly per route
  activity.router.js      (1)  /admin/activity      staff-wide, no extra gate

The residual admin.routes.js drops from 82 routes to 64.

Moderation was already gated by a prefix mount (adminRouter.use('/moderation',
modAccess)), so moderationRouter.use(modAccess) is the exact equivalent now that
the router is mounted at a prefix. Bot-activity's adminOnly was per-route and is
deliberately kept per-route: that is what holds the per-route handler count in
routes.guards.json, the only signal that would catch a dropped gate, since
requireRole(...) returns an anonymous arrow and never appears by name.

/activity gets its own file rather than waiting for dashboard.router.js in PR 4
— it is the staff audit log, a different capability from the dashboard's stats
overview and from the botScore middleware's in-memory ban state.

Acceptance:
  - routes.manifest.json  zero-diff (200 public + 2 internal)
  - routes.guards.json    zero-diff
  - swagger-output.json   zero-diff (198 operations)
  - api-route-inventory.json already in sync
  - 434 server tests green
  - role gates verified identical to main by reading the requireRole role sets
    off the live Express stack for every moved route plus untouched controls

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 18:53:15 -05:00
8ad892725f refactor(server): split admin users, account, invites and auth providers into capability routers
First of the five domain-split PRs in docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md § Phase 2. Pure
mechanical re-wiring: routes move between files, no handler, gate, validator or
annotation changes, and not one URL moves.

New src/router/v1/admin/index.js owns the two things the group shares — the
`noindex, isLoggedIn, staffOnly` gate and the mount table — and declares no routes
itself. The gate sits ahead of every mount so a capability router extracted in a
later PR cannot silently ship without it. Four capability routers mount at the
prefix they already owned inside the monolith:

  account.router.js        6 routes  -> /admin/account   (self-service, no adminOnly)
  users.router.js         15 routes  -> /admin/users     (adminOnly, router-level)
  invites.router.js        3 routes  -> /admin/invites   (adminOnly, per-route)
  authProviders.router.js  4 routes  -> /admin/auth      (adminOnly, per-route)

admin.routes.js keeps the other 82 (6+15+3+4+82 = the 110 inventoried admin
routes) and is mounted last at the group root; none of the four prefixes appears
in it, so nothing depends on mount ordering. It disappears when PR 5 lands.

Handlers still live in admin.controller.js and usersShard.controller.js — this
re-wires routes, not logic. `adminOnly` moves with the routes that use it, and
`usersRouter.use(adminOnly)` is exactly equivalent to the old
`adminRouter.use('/users', adminOnly)` now that the router is mounted at /users.

All three generated gates are zero-diff:

  routes.manifest.json    unchanged (200 public + 2 internal)
  routes.guards.json      unchanged — no route lost or gained a gate
  swagger-output.json     unchanged, byte-for-byte

The spec staying byte-identical depends on the path normalization landed in the
preceding commit; without it the four collection routes would have documented as
/api/v1/admin/{users,invites,account}/ with a trailing slash.

Server tests green (434/434).

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 15:54:00 -05:00
1a61cd1638 build(swagger): normalize and sort generated OpenAPI path keys
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Prepares the committed spec for the admin router domain split
(docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md § Phase 2) by post-processing swagger-autogen's
output in swagger/swagger.js. No route, handler or annotation changes.

Trailing slashes are stripped from path keys. swagger-autogen builds a path by
string-concatenating the mount prefix with the route argument, so a capability
router mounted at /users whose collection route is router.get('/') documents as
/api/v1/admin/users/ — advertising a URL no client calls while dropping the one
the SPA, the Android app and the Discord bot all do. Express is indifferent
(non-strict routing treats the two as one route, and routes.manifest.json records
the canonical slash-less form), but the published spec is a contract. The split
creates one of these per capability router, so it is fixed once here rather than
by contorting the route declarations in every router file.

Path keys are also sorted. The generator emits them in router-traversal order, so
moving a route between files rewrites most of this ~5k-line committed artifact
even when the API is provably unchanged, burying the one line a reviewer needs to
see. OpenAPI attaches no meaning to path order, and scripts/routeManifest.js
already sorts for the same reason.

Verified inert: the regenerated spec is byte-for-byte the sorted form of the
previously committed one — same 198 operations, zero added or removed, and no
trailing-slash keys (there were none to strip yet; the guard is for the split).
A collision after normalization throws rather than silently dropping an
operation. Server tests green (434/434).

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 15:49:31 -05:00
9b74999610 feat(security): soak the tightened CSP on report-only, with a same-origin sink
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Phase 1 of docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md. The tightened policy ships on
Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only alongside the unchanged enforced one for a
release; a follow-up PR flips it after the soak comes back clean.

The plan expected a two-directive delta. It is one. `form-action 'self'` was
described as absent because it is not in the directives object in app.js — but
the middleware runs with `useDefaults: true` and helmet's defaults already
supply it, so the header served in production has carried it all along. Caught
by capturing the live header from the running app instead of reading the config.
It is now written out explicitly in config/csp.js regardless: a security
directive should not depend on a third-party library's default surviving its
next major version. The enforced header's contents do not change at all, and a
test pins it verbatim.

So the whole behavioural delta is `frame-ancestors 'self'` -> `'none'`. That is
still the directive most worth soaking: a frame-ancestors report is generated by
the browser of whoever framed the site, which is the only way to find out that
something legitimately embeds us before an enforcing policy breaks it.

The policies move to config/csp.js, with the report-only one derived by spread
from the enforced one so the two cannot drift and the object reads as a diff.

`report-to` needs somewhere to point, so this adds POST /api/csp-report --
same-origin on purpose, since reports describe attacks against this site and
should not go to a third-party collector. It is mounted outside /api/v1 next to
/api/health: the browser learns the path from the policy header, never from a
client build, so it is not versioned client contract.

It is necessarily unauthenticated -- browsers send reports with no session, and
gating it would silence exactly the anonymous visitors worth hearing about -- so
it is bounded on every axis:

  * both wire formats, since report-uri (Firefox/Safari) sends hyphenated keys
    in application/csp-report and report-to (Chrome) sends camelCase envelopes
    in application/reports+json; handling one silently drops half the browsers,
  * report-to also needs the Reporting-Endpoints response header or it is inert,
  * 16 KB body cap, per-IP rate limit, fixed field allowlist, every logged field
    truncated (script-sample is attacker-influenced and can carry a whole inline
    script),
  * always 204, even for malformed input: a 4xx would reach the global error
    handler, which logs the offending body -- turning an open endpoint into a
    log-flood primitive.

Nothing is persisted; reports go to the `csp` log tag.

routes.manifest.json moves 199 -> 200, which is the freeze from PR 0 working as
designed: the one new URL is visible as a reviewed +1 rather than slipping
through. Swagger regenerated to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 15:19:26 -05:00
1079b3fc05 chore(server): freeze the URL surface with a generated route manifest
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PR 0 of the router domain split (docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md § Phase 2). The
split promises that admin.routes.js can be carved into one router file per
business capability without moving a single URL. That promise has to be proved
by a diff, not asserted in review — this lands the tool that proves it, with no
router file moved.

scripts/routeManifest.js walks the live Express stack (runtime introspection,
not source parsing: route paths in admin.routes.js sit on the line *after*
`adminRouter.get(`, which defeats greps) and writes a sorted { method, path }
list to routes.manifest.json. It reproduces the frozen baseline in
docs/website/api-route-inventory.json byte-for-byte — 199 public routes plus 2
on the internal listener — so the freeze is confirmed accurate, not just
claimed.

Scope is /api/** and /.well-known/** plus the internal app. The SPA catch-all,
/uploads and /brand are filesystem-conditional static mounts, so including them
would make the output depend on whether CI had built the client. Static mounts
are not API contract.

Also emits routes.guards.json — a review aid, not a contract: per route, the
handler count and the *named* middleware on its mount chain. Router-level
`use(noindex, isLoggedIn, staffOnly)` gates never appear in an individual
route's own stack, so an extracted capability router that forgot to re-apply
one would otherwise publish authenticated endpoints silently. Names are a hint
only (requireRole(...) returns an anonymous arrow), but a vanished requireAuth
is unambiguous — and the test suite asserts every /admin/** and /player/**
route still carries it.

The plan's optional unauthenticated-status snapshot was tried and dropped, as
it allowed: against the dead-port mariadb pool the tests use, the sweep sits on
the pool's acquire timeout and had not finished after two minutes. A flaky
two-minute gate is worse than none; the requireAuth assertion covers the same
regression deterministically.

CI runs `npm run routes:manifest -- --check` on every PR, so a URL change can
only merge by deliberately committing the new manifest.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 14:55:38 -05:00
c075ab981c fix(moderation): windowValue must not fall back to the 30d total on a null column
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windowValue mapped only the 24h/7d keys and used `?? row.d30` as the fallback:

    const col = { '24h': row.d1, '7d': row.d7 }[key] ?? row.d30

so a null d1/d7 (which the function is documented to tolerate) returned the
30-day count instead of 0, inflating the 24h/7d moderation tiles. It happens to
be masked today because `SUM(created_at >= ?)` nulls d1/d7/d30 only in unison,
but the contract is wrong and the existing test used an all-null row that hid it.

Map all three window keys explicitly so each reads its own column and a null
coerces to 0 via `Number(col) || 0`. Add a regression test with a null narrow
column and a non-null d30.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-22 13:14:02 -05:00
e08c0c9736 fix(admin): restore digit match in discordId route validation
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The `:discordId` param validator on the five admin moderation routes used
`/^d{1,32}$/`, which matches 1-32 literal `d` characters instead of digits.
A real numeric Discord snowflake failed validation, so every
`/moderation/user/:discordId*` endpoint returned a 400 for valid input.

The backslash was dropped in a prior code-smell cleanup (12d50fd) that
intended `[0-9]` -> `\d`. Restore `\d` so the regex matches digits again.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-22 13:01:12 -05:00
14dfc122ba fix(player): open the player self-service surface to staff
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Staff are a superset of players — every player ability plus their staff
tools on top — but the /player/* group ran requireRole('player'), so a
signed-in admin/editor/moderator got 403 on their own linked game
accounts (e.g. GET /player/shard/accounts). On the Android client this
hid "My characters" and greyed the personal notification streams for
staff accounts, even when they had linked characters.

Drop the role gate: the group is now requireAuth-only. Every handler is
already self-scoped to the caller by req.user.id (with the pre-existing
isAdmin bypass still letting a genuine admin read any character), so this
only ever widens access to the caller's OWN data. Staff also reach the
identical self-scoped handlers under /admin/shard/* (same controller).

- player.routes.js: requireRole('player') -> requireAuth; corrected the
  five stale "Player role required" 403 descriptions and regenerated
  swagger-output.json.
- New test/playerRouteAccess.test.js mounts the router and asserts
  player/admin/editor/moderator all reach the handler, anon still 401s,
  and a disabled account still 403s. Suite: 420 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-22 02:17:29 -05:00
60ebacff2c feat(auth): trusted devices, recovery codes, and admin MFA management
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Add opt-in "Trust this device" so a browser/app skips the TOTP step (never
the password) for 30 days, single-use bcrypt recovery codes as a 2FA-lockout
fallback, and admin trusted-device/MFA-reset management — backend, web UI,
OpenAPI spec, and tests.

- Schema: trusted_devices (sha256 token hash, looked up by unique index) and
  recovery_codes (bcrypt, single-use). Both additive/idempotent.
- Session service: trust-token mint/hash/resolve + cap helpers; new rg_trust
  httpOnly cookie (survives logout, revoked on untrust/password change/reset/
  TOTP disable). JWTs stay stateless — trust is a server-side row, not a claim.
- Web + mobile login accept a trusted-device token / recovery code; login/totp
  gains trustDevice + recoveryCode. Cap of 10/user with NO silent pruning — an
  over-cap trust returns 409/trustLimitReached and the client prompts to revoke.
- Self-service /auth/me/trusted-devices* + recovery-codes*; admin
  /admin/users/:id/trusted-devices* + /mfa/reset. All actions audit-logged.
- Client: "Trust this device" + recovery-code login options, one-time recovery
  code display, Trusted Devices + Recovery Codes account panels, a TOTP-styled
  revoke-to-continue cap modal, and admin per-user security controls.
- OpenAPI regenerated; 33 new server tests (all suites green).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-21 23:38:48 -05:00
401db8f75c refactor(server): dedupe shard-state shaping, upsert builder, and config DB models
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Address the SonarQube copy-paste findings that reflect real duplication (as
opposed to the intentional cross-package / admin-player mirror copies, which
are by-design and left as-is):

- shardState.model.js: listOnline() re-inlined the exact field mapping that
  shapeOnline() already provides (used by listOnlineLinked). Collapse it onto
  shapeOnline so the two can no longer drift.
- shardState.db.js: extract a single upsertRow(table, pkCol, pk, fields,
  {coalesce}) builder for the five near-identical INSERT ... ON DUPLICATE KEY
  UPDATE bodies (online/houses/champs/guilds/governors). shard_online keeps its
  COALESCE-on-NULL semantics via the coalesce flag.
- botConfig/emailConfig/uoLinkConfig .db.js: generate get()/upsert() from a
  shared singletonConfigDb(table, cols) factory instead of three byte-identical
  copies.

Behavior unchanged; full server suite (381 tests) passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-21 12:35:56 -05:00
12d50fd615 chore(quality): resolve SonarQube code smells across website
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Clears the 124 CODE_SMELL findings from the SonarQube scan (server, client,
and bot). All changes are behaviour-preserving refactors — no route, protocol,
schema, or config changes — verified against the full server (381) and client
(43) test suites plus a clean client build.

By rule:
- S3776 (20, cognitive complexity): extract helpers/handlers so each function
  drops under the threshold — shard model upsert builders, page/wiki update,
  block validation, notification stream mapping (dispatch table), SSO mobile
  login, shard ingest deps, uo-link socket backfill/connect, the bot slash-
  command dispatchers + discord manager, and the Shard/UserDetail/HeroEditor/
  CharacterStats React components.
- S4624 (34, nested template literals): pull inner templates into locals /
  a withQs() helper; rewrite shardEvents.describe() as a formatter table.
- S3358 (35, nested ternaries): lift to if/else vars, lookup maps, small
  components, or guarded JSX expressions.
- S6479 (12, array-index React keys): key by stable content instead of index
  (two in-editor lists left as-is; index matches their by-index edit model).
- S6353 (6): [0-9]/[^0-9] -> \d/\D.  S125 (5): reword state-shape comments that
  parsed as code.  S3800/S3782 (botScore): JSDoc-type PATH_WEIGHTS tuples.
- S6481 (2): memoize Auth/Site context values (and SiteContext brand).
- S4144: dedupe HeroEditor upload handler into useImageUpload().
- S1126 (2), S6035, S5869 (redundant A-Z under /i), S5843 (town-name regex ->
  prefix list): assorted one-liners.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-21 04:35:39 -05:00
35e5269ec5 test(server): unit-test auth, invite, password-reset, and public controllers
Add controller-level unit tests (mock req/res, monkeypatched collaborators)
focused on security boundaries and decision logic the API must not regress:

- auth.controller: honeypot handling, non-enumerating generic-fail for every
  credential failure, inactive-account refusal, the TOTP challenge branch that
  must NOT issue a session, register-mode gating + dup-username 409, and logout
  that always clears the cookie and revokes the session (even on error).
- invite.controller: user created at the invite's PRESET role, and the lost
  double-accept race rolling back the just-created user.
- passwordReset.controller: identical generic 200 whether or not the email
  matched (incl. internal errors), per-account mail-failure isolation, the
  single-use consume race, and revoke-everywhere-on-reset with no auto-login.
- public.controller: staff-only draft visibility, token-gated page preview,
  wiki search precedence + unknown-filter handling, contact 502.
- shard.controller (public): the PUBLIC_KINDS feed allowlist and the public
  house view stripping owner/price — both leak-prevention boundaries.

Lifts: auth.controller 46%→94%, passwordReset 33%→93%,
public.controller 28%→65%, shard.controller 45%→68% line coverage;
server aggregate 63.5%→70.4%.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-21 00:33:01 -05:00
99fd9acddb test(server): unit-test pages, shardState, and moderation model logic
Add meaningful unit tests for three server models with untested business
logic, each against an in-memory fake db (no DB required):

- pages.model: slug validation + reserved-name guard, slug immutability,
  the protected ON-via-update / OFF-only-via-unprotect asymmetry, publish
  stamping, draft invisibility to public reads, dup-slug → 409, block gate.
- shardState.model: partial-refresh field dropping (vitals must not clobber
  login fields), is_idoc derivation, economy clamp/ordering/Number coercion,
  presence zero-snapshot defaults, payload-fallback shaping, and the
  camelCase read-shaping contract the site + Android client depend on.
- moderation.model: five-feed window merge, userSummary count/total
  semantics (total sums unknown types too), and graceful degradation when
  bot config is missing.

Lifts: pages.model 23%→82%, moderation.model 27%→85%,
shardState.model 33%→62% line coverage.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-21 00:26:01 -05:00
e1461d9161 fix(security): add SPA CSP, drop x-powered-by, strengthen dedupe hash
Address SonarQube security hotspots on the website:

- server/src/app.js: replace `contentSecurityPolicy: false` with a helmet CSP
  tuned for the built React SPA (script-src 'self'; style-src adds 'unsafe-inline'
  for React inline styles + the Google Fonts stylesheet; font-src gstatic; img-src
  allows data:/https: for uploads, embedded body images and BRAND_* assets;
  connect-src 'self' for REST+SSE). upgrade-insecure-requests is intentionally
  omitted (TLS terminates at the proxy; keeps local `npm start` over http working).
  The /api/docs Swagger UI route gets a scoped looser policy (inline script/style)
  since swagger-ui-express injects an inline bootstrap.
- client/vite.config.js: disable the inline module-preload polyfill so code-split
  builds keep `script-src 'self'` valid (RichTextEditor is a separate chunk).
- bot/src/app.js, server/src/internalApp.js: disable x-powered-by on the two
  internal-only listeners (the public app already strips it via helmet).
- shardEvents dedupe key: SHA-1 -> SHA-256 truncated to 40 hex chars (fits the
  existing CHAR(40) column, no migration; it is a content fingerprint, not a
  security value). schema.sql comment updated to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
2026-07-20 23:02:11 -05:00
d1b3351360 fix(db): strip inline -- comments before splitting schema statements
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The schema loader stripped only full-line -- comments, then split the
file on ';'. A trailing comment containing a semicolon (e.g. the
mobile_auth_sessions.session_id column: `-- uuid; carried inside...`)
chopped the CREATE TABLE in half, so MariaDB got the fragment and failed
with `error ... near '' at line 3`, crash-looping the server on boot.

Strip -- comments on every line (full-line and trailing) before the ';'
split. Safe because the schema never places -- inside a string literal.

Verified by running ensureSchema() against a fresh MariaDB: all 49 tables
create cleanly and mobile_auth_sessions has all 11 columns.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 19:10:53 -05:00
bcc96e7cfb feat(mobile-sso): serve assetlinks.json + App Links redirect allowlist
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Add the server side of Android App Links (M9 follow-up, docs/android/APP_LINKS.md):

- GET /.well-known/assetlinks.json at the web root, gated by the new admin
  setting `mobile_app_links_enabled` (default off -> 404; on-but-no-fingerprint
  -> 404). Emits the Digital Asset Links statement for the fixed published
  package (MOBILE_APP_PACKAGE) + MOBILE_APP_CERT_SHA256 fingerprint(s).
- mobileSso `/start` additionally accepts this shard's own self-origin
  https://<host>/mobile/callback when App Links are enabled — one additive
  exact-match entry, derived from APP_BASE_URL/request origin, never client
  input; the custom-scheme allowlist is never narrowed. The settings lookup is
  short-circuited for non-https redirects so custom-scheme rejections stay fast.
- settings.isMobileAppLinksEnabled() (fail-closed) + getPublic().mobileAppLinks;
  admin updateSettings validates the boolean; seed default off.

Tests: test/appLinks.test.js (route gating + allowlist). Full suite 284 pass.
Swagger unchanged (web-root verification file is #swagger.ignore'd).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
2026-07-20 18:37:17 -05:00
e3dd5358b6 feat(auth): Active Devices — view/revoke mobile sessions
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Adds the self-service device-session surface the mobile-SSO spec requires, on
top of the existing mobile_refresh_tokens store.

- Schema: device_name + last_used_at columns on mobile_refresh_tokens (nullable,
  additive via the ALTER section; seeded to now on insert). With single-use
  rotation each login/refresh inserts a fresh row, so the active row's timestamp
  is the session's last activity, and the label is carried forward on refresh.
- Model: listActiveForUser (one row per live device, no token hash) +
  revokeByIdForUser (ownership-scoped, idempotent).
- GET /auth/me/sessions + DELETE /auth/me/sessions/:id (role-agnostic, behind
  requireAuth). Named distinctly from /auth/me/devices (push endpoints).
- device_name is an optional field on /auth/mobile/login and
  /auth/mobile/sso/exchange so the app can label a device.
- Client: an "Active Devices" panel on the player account page (list + sign a
  device out), plus the PlayerLogin change to honor the mobile SSO bridge's
  { redirect } deep link on a 2FA completion.
- Swagger DeviceSession schema + regenerated spec; 3 controller tests. Full
  server suite green (274); client builds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 17:01:47 -05:00
61f4591a6b feat(auth): native SSO authorization bridge for the Android app
Add a Mobile SSO Authorization Bridge so the native app can "Sign in with
Google/Discord" without shipping any OAuth secret. It EXTENDS the existing
/auth/sso/* redirect flow (same PKCE-vs-IdP, link-only + opt-in provisioning,
TOTP gate) and terminates in the existing mobile bearer tokens — not a parallel
auth path.

- Schema: mobile_auth_sessions + mobile_auth_codes (short-lived, self-pruning;
  authorization code stored hash-only, PKCE challenge is a hash by construction).
- GET /auth/mobile/sso/start: validate provider enabled + redirect_uri by EXACT
  allowlist match (never prefix), seed a bridge session, reuse the SSO redirect
  tagged mode:'mobile' (new redirectToIdp helper extracted from beginFlow).
- SSO callback + finishSsoTotp gain a mode:'mobile' branch: mint a single-use,
  hashed, PKCE-bound code and redirect to the fixed app callback (code + echoed
  state, never a token) instead of setting a cookie. 2FA keeps full parity via
  the existing web TOTP form (now carrying the bridge session).
- POST /auth/mobile/sso/exchange: verify Layer-B PKCE (before burning the code),
  single-use consume, then issue the SAME pair as /auth/mobile/login.
- Discovery reuses GET /auth/providers; refresh/logout reuse /auth/mobile/*.
- Rate limits: /start per-IP+provider, /exchange per-IP. Boot-time +
  opportunistic prune of both tables (no cron, mirrors revoked_sessions).
- Redirect allowlist is MOBILE_AUTH_REDIRECT_URIS (default the one fixed
  runicgateway://auth/callback); App Link URIs can be appended per shard later.
- Swagger regenerated; 39 tests (model single-use/gating + full controller
  matrix: bad/expired/reused code, PKCE mismatch, disabled provider, redirect
  allowlist, TOTP-through-bridge). Full suite green (271).

Refs docs/website/BACKEND_DESIGN.md, docs/android/PLAN.md §9 (M9).

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 16:55:06 -05:00
a789ee3ac9 feat(settings): surface push.ntfyUrl in /public/settings for the app
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The Android app's embedded push distributor (M7 Part 2) needs the shard's
client-facing ntfy relay URL to build its device topic endpoint, but the M7
Part 1 backend only used the NTFY_* vars server-side and never surfaced them.

Add a `push: { ntfyUrl }` block to settings.getPublic(), sourced from
NTFY_PUBLIC_URL or the first NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS entry (never the possibly
internal NTFY_BASE_URL); null when unconfigured, so the app shows push as
unavailable for that shard. Additive, non-sensitive, forward-compatible.

- Extend the PublicSettings swagger schema; regenerate swagger-output.json.
- publicBrand.test.js: cover null / NTFY_PUBLIC_URL / NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS.
- Document NTFY_PUBLIC_URL in .env.example and (docs PR) BACKEND_DESIGN.md.

Full server suite green (250 pass).

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 15:25:40 -05:00
416761f8f7 feat(push): M7 backend — opt-in push notifications via self-hosted ntfy
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Additive, v1-only backend contract for the Android app's opt-in push (Part 1 of
M7; docs/android/PLAN.md §11). The app is a pure consumer — this lands the
endpoints, fan-out, and relay it needs.

- Schema: push_devices (per-device endpoint) + notification_subscriptions
  (per-user opted-in streams), FK→users ON DELETE CASCADE.
- Stream catalog + event→stream mapping (config/notificationStreams.js): public
  streams (news.post, server.status, idoc.warning, champ.start, governor.election)
  drawn ONLY from the SSE PUBLIC_KINDS allowlist; personal owner-keyed streams
  (vendor.sale, house.idoc, account.login). Full-state upserts (champ/city) fire
  only on a real transition via an injectable tracker.
- Fan-out (utils/pushDispatch.js): content-free tickles ({ stream, ref }) POSTed
  to each subscribed device; never throws. Two producers — shardIngest.ingest
  (beside the SSE broadcast) and the create/publish-post path (news.post).
  Personal events resolve to the owner via shardLinks. SSRF guard: endpoints must
  be HTTPS, non-private, and on the NTFY_BASE_URL/NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS allow-set —
  enforced at registration and every publish.
- Routes under the role-agnostic self surface (never /admin): POST|GET
  /auth/me/devices, DELETE /auth/me/devices/:id, GET
  /auth/me/notifications/streams, GET|PUT /auth/me/notifications/subscriptions.
  Swagger regenerated (4 paths, PushDevice/NotificationStreams/etc. schemas).
- ntfy service in docker-compose.yml: pinned image, declarative ./ntfy/server.yml,
  no published host port, anonymous unguessable topics (no accounts) — zero
  interactive setup. No publish token required (content-free design); optional
  NTFY_PUBLISH_TOKEN honored.
- Tests: pushDispatch (mapping, PUBLIC_KINDS gate, owner-keying, SSRF guard,
  content-free payload) + notifications route auth gate. Full suite green (247).

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 05:13:48 -05:00
c35509e8b3 feat(public): type the brand block so mobile clients get typed theming
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Branding is already returned by GET /public/settings (the `brand` block:
name/colors/logo/hero/favicon, per-shard from BRAND_*). §8.6 of the Android
plan asks to confirm it — this makes it a first-class part of the contract so
the app's OpenAPI codegen produces typed branding instead of an untyped map.

- Swagger: add Brand + PublicSettings schemas; /public/settings now references
  PublicSettings (was additionalProperties:true). Brand documents that asset
  fields may be site-relative paths (resolve against the base URL).
- test/publicBrand.test.js locks the brand theming contract the app depends on
  (all fields present; BRAND_* defaults; admin site_title/contact_email
  overrides; accentInt never leaked).

No behavior change to the response — it already carried `brand`; this types and
guards it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
2026-07-19 11:58:01 -05:00
90c8eae20f feat(public): version/health surfacing for the app first-run probe
Expose a small backend identity/version descriptor (§8.4 of the Android plan)
so a client can positively recognize a Runic Gateway backend on first-run and
run a version-mismatch guard, instead of inferring from an incidental shape.

- New config/version.js: { service: 'runic-gateway', api: 'v1', server: <pkg> }.
- GET /public/status now includes a `version` block (the app already calls this
  on first-run, so it gets identity + version in one round trip).
- New GET /public/version: a lightweight, DB-free identity endpoint — the
  canonical target for the version guard and a cheap liveness check.
- Swagger: PublicVersion schema + version on PublicStatus; /version annotated.
- test/publicVersion.test.js covers the config shape and the DB-free 200.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
2026-07-19 11:47:26 -05:00
fc5255da99 feat(auth): role-agnostic self-service surface under /auth/me
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Add /auth/me/account* — the canonical "me" endpoints for every authenticated
role (Android app §6.4/§8.1). Reuses the existing account.controller handlers
(getAccount, changeUsername, changePassword, TOTP setup/enable/disable, list/
unlink identities) verbatim behind requireAuth (any role) — no logic
duplication. The app gets one self surface and never has to touch /admin; the
old /player/account/* and /admin/account/* routes stay for web back-compat.

New routes (all bearer- or cookie-auth, any active role):
- GET    /auth/me/account
- PATCH  /auth/me/account/username
- PATCH  /auth/me/account/password
- POST   /auth/me/account/totp/setup|enable|disable
- GET    /auth/me/account/identities
- DELETE /auth/me/account/identities/:provider

Mounted as a sub-router; the bare GET /auth/me is unchanged. Swagger
regenerated with #swagger annotations. Adds test/authMe.test.js (the group
gate rejects unauthenticated callers with 401).

Verified end-to-end against MariaDB: a player and an editor both drive the
same surface (role-agnostic), username/password changes work, a password
change revokes the caller's old bearer token, and validation/401 paths behave.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
2026-07-19 04:55:01 -05:00
250cb1e2d3 Merge branch 'main' into feat/password-reset
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2026-07-19 09:04:43 +00:00
10aed49bb6 feat(auth): self-service password reset (backend + web)
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Add a full password-reset flow — the prerequisite for the Android app
(docs/android/PLAN.md §8.2), which hands off to the website for reset
rather than shipping a native screen.

Backend:
- password_resets table: stores only the sha256 hash of an opaque 32-byte
  token (mirrors user_invites / mobile_refresh_tokens), single-use, ~1h TTL.
- model/passwordResets + users.getActiveByEmail (email is non-unique, so a
  request can match several accounts, each emailed its own link).
- mailer.sendPasswordReset (fails soft when email is unconfigured).
- Endpoints: POST /auth/password/forgot (always a generic 200 — no account
  enumeration), GET|POST /auth/password/reset/:token. Confirming rotates the
  hash and revokes every session (web cutoff + mobile refresh tokens); it does
  not auto-login, so a 2FA account still passes TOTP next sign-in. Also serves
  SSO-only accounts (null hash) as their set-initial-password path.
- Dedicated request/confirm rate limiters. Swagger regenerated.

Web:
- ForgotPassword + ResetPassword pages, routes /account/forgot and
  /account/reset/:token, and a "Forgot your password?" link on the login page.

Tests: test/passwordResets.test.js (5). All server tests pass; client builds;
end-to-end smoketest against MariaDB passes (no-enumeration, single-use, hash
rotation, session revoke, login with the new password).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
2026-07-19 03:57:13 -05:00
028ba8c5e4 feat(moderation): appeals (6c) + Discord reversal on approve (6d)
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Players whose linked Discord identity was banned or muted can now submit
an appeal from the portal and track it; staff get a queue in the admin
moderation section to claim and resolve (approve/deny) appeals. Approving
a ban/mute appeal best-effort asks the Discord bot to reverse the action
(unban / clear timeout) via the internal API and posts a mod-log embed; a
down bot never fails the resolution (reversal_status is recorded).

- Schema: new server-owned `appeals` table (no cross-owner FK to
  mod_actions; existence validated in app code).
- Server: model/appeals/* + player appeals controller (submit/mine/
  eligible/withdraw) and admin queue handlers (list/claim/resolve/
  per-user) under the existing admin+moderator gate; one-active-appeal
  enforced app-side; eligibility keyed on the caller's linked Discord id.
- 6d: bot POST /internal/mod-reverse (+ modLog.postReversal) and
  server botInternalClient.reverseModAction, wired into resolve().
- Client: admin Appeals queue + resolve modal, ModerationUser appeals
  tab, player Appeals page (submit/withdraw), nav + routes + api methods.
- Docs: swagger annotations + component schemas, regenerated output.
- Tests: appeals controller + pure suites (server npm test 224 green).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XmHdsbnLzDMAVQkAoTQSBe
2026-07-18 22:01:06 -05:00
aa2177715e fix(shard): restrict staff in-game location to admins/moderators
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The public "Staff online" list on the Shard page exposed each staff
member's in-game location (map + coordinates) to everyone, including
logged-in players and unauthenticated visitors.

Location is now privileged data:
- Server: getOnline inspects the caller's role via getUserFromRequest
  (the same non-rejecting helper siteMode uses on public routes) and
  only includes map/x/y/z for admin/moderator callers. For everyone
  else the fields are omitted from the JSON entirely, so they can't be
  read from the network tab. serial + name (online status) still shown.
- Client: Shard.jsx gates the location span on the viewer's role from
  useAuth() (same pattern as RoleGate); non-privileged viewers see who
  is online but no location field is rendered.

Tests: publicShardOnline.test.js covers admin + moderator (location
included), player + unauthenticated + editor (location omitted).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XmHdsbnLzDMAVQkAoTQSBe
2026-07-18 21:18:52 -05:00
526160721a feat(brand): emblem behind hero text + Powered By footer with logo
Address review: the SVG footer badge rendered too small, and the default
hero should feature the Runic Gateway emblem rather than the moon.

- Footer: drop powered-by.svg; render the emblem PNG beside a "Powered by
  Runic Gateway" label (left-justified, info text stays centered).
- Default hero: brand.hero (and the client fallbacks) now default to the
  emblem PNG. The untouched default hero centers the square emblem behind
  the text as a medallion with a symmetric legibility overlay (per-layer
  background-size so the overlay stays full-bleed). BRAND_HERO still
  overrides.
- Admin login / player shell / maintenance backgrounds center the emblem
  as a capped medallion instead of a cropped full-bleed cover.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XmHdsbnLzDMAVQkAoTQSBe
2026-07-18 16:56:22 -05:00
352ae4f256 feat(brand): default favicon emblem + Powered By footer badge
Ship the Runic Gateway emblem as the baked-in default favicon so an
instance renders a tab icon with no BRAND_FAVICON set, and place a
left-justified "Powered By" badge in the site footer.

- brand.favicon now defaults to /assets/img/favicon.ico (was empty).
  BRAND_FAVICON still overrides per-instance.
- Add favicon.ico + powered-by.svg under client/public/assets/img.
- SiteFooter: badge pinned to the left of the centered content column
  (absolute on >=641px, stacked on mobile); info text stays centered.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XmHdsbnLzDMAVQkAoTQSBe
2026-07-18 16:40:09 -05:00
7a08546da6 feat(brand): BRAND_* env scheme — instance branding without a rebuild
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Replace baked-in UOM/MysticMoon/UOMysticmoon branding with a BRAND_* env
scheme so one prebuilt image runs as any shard; UOMysticmoon becomes the
first tenant that sets these vars rather than a special case in the code.

Architecture (chosen because the app ships as a prebuilt image):
- server/src/config/brand.js + bot/src/brand.js read BRAND_* once at boot,
  with Runic Gateway defaults.
- Text/colors reach the SPA at RUNTIME through the existing public settings
  API (settings.model.getPublic -> SiteContext), so no client rebuild. The
  admin-editable site title + contact email still override BRAND_NAME/email.
- SiteContext applies BRAND_ACCENT_COLOR to the --accent CSS var at runtime.
- Express templates the built index.html <title>/description/OG/favicon at
  serve time from BRAND_* (renderIndexHtml in app.js).
- Server-side consumers read brand directly: emails, TOTP issuer, API docs,
  boot logs, HTML error page. Bot uses it for embed color + logs.

Assets: logo/hero/favicon delivered from a ./brand:/app/brand bind-mount
(BRAND_LOGO/HERO/FAVICON), with neutral defaults baked in; hero falls back
to a built-in image when unset.

Scope: also genericized package.json names (uomysticmoon-* -> runic-gateway-*)
and the DB_NAME/DB_USER/COOKIE_NAME code defaults (runic_gateway/runic/
rg_token). Production keeps its real values by pinning them in .env — see
.env.uomysticmoon.example, which reproduces the exact UOMysticmoon identity
(proof the substitution works). Changing a deployed COOKIE_NAME invalidates
existing sessions, so UOMysticmoon pins uomm_token.

Verified: 193 server tests pass, client builds, app.js loads + templates the
built index.html, brand transform injects title/description/OG/favicon.
2026-07-18 02:20:04 -05:00
3ef1c8e438 feat(provisioning): admin game-signup mode setting, invite link option, staff self-create
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Follow-ups from live testing:

- Game-account creation is now an admin Settings control (disabled / website /
  hybrid / game) instead of a hidden on/off flag. The site offers creation for
  website+hybrid; help text notes the shard's SignupMode (Bridge.cfg) has the final
  say. game_account_signup setting widened to a 4-value enum + validated on save.
- Invites: the accept link is ALWAYS returned and shown with a Copy button, and a
  "Email the invitation" toggle lets an admin create a link-only invite (no email)
  or email it. Backend takes sendEmail (default true) and always returns acceptUrl.
- Staff can create a game account from their own /admin/characters page too
  (POST /admin/shard/account → the shared createGameAccount controller), so the
  form is reachable in both the player and admin portals.

Note: the admin Houses view (/admin/houses) already worked; the earlier failure
was a stale Vite HMR state for the new route (needs a hard refresh).

Client build clean; server routes load; swagger regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 21:08:59 -05:00
1629796235 feat(houses): tier house visibility — public IDOC-only, staff full, player own
Per request, split the single public house registry into three role-scoped views:

- Public /site/houses → only houses in DANGER (IDOC), by LOCATION (region + map/
  coords). No owner, price, co-owners or decay detail. Renamed "Houses in danger";
  kept live via the public house.decay feed. The full-registry deltas
  (house.update / house.remove — which carry owner/price) are REMOVED from the
  public SSE allowlist so they never reach the public channel.
- Staff full registry → new /admin/houses (admin + moderator, RoleGate + MOD_PATHS)
  backed by GET /admin/shard/houses (modAccess), with owner/price/co-owners/decay
  and search, kept live on the admin SSE channel.
- Player portal → "My houses" home-status section (own houses only, with decay/
  IDOC status) via GET /player/shard/houses, scoped to the caller's linked accounts.

Server tests green, client build clean, swagger regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 16:50:37 -05:00