Retire env-var SMTP basic-auth and send the contact form through Gmail over
OAuth2 (SMTP XOAUTH2), configured in Admin -> Settings -> Email via an in-app
"Connect Gmail" consent flow. Reuses the existing google SSO OAuth client; the
captured refresh token is stored AES-GCM-encrypted (write-only over the API,
never returned), mirroring the auth-provider and Discord-bot secret patterns.
- schema: new email_config singleton table (mirrors bot_config)
- model: emailConfig.{db,model} with encrypted refresh token + getSafe/getWithSecret
- mailer: nodemailer OAuth2 transport (client id/secret from the google provider
row), contact recipient = contact_email setting, mailto: fallback preserved,
plus sendTest()
- routes/controller: /admin/email config, connect start+callback (ssoState CSRF
+ PKCE), test, disconnect
- client: EmailDelivery section on the Settings page + api methods; Settings copy
now spells out that contact_email is the delivery recipient
- docs/env: drop SMTP_*/CONTACT_TO from env examples; update README/BACKEND_DESIGN
- tests: emailConfig.model + mailer suites (8 new; full suite 142 pass)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XKeCQEJZr1AFJN4Bgcmvh3
The GET /internal/bot-config route returns the DECRYPTED Discord bot
token and was mounted on the same Express app / port 3000 that Pangolin
proxies publicly. Its only guard was the BOT_INTERNAL_KEY shared secret,
and .env.example shipped a placeholder default — so a forwarded path or a
weak/unrotated key would expose the plaintext token to the internet.
Move server<->bot internal traffic onto its own listener and fail fast on
a weak key:
- Add server/src/internalApp.js: a standalone Express app mounting
requireInternalKey + /internal (and a no-secret /health), mirroring the
bot's unpublished port-4100 pattern.
- server.js starts a second listener on INTERNAL_PORT (default 3001),
closed on graceful shutdown.
- Remove the /internal mount from the public v1.router; the public app now
404s /api/v1/internal/bot-config even with a valid key.
- Fail fast: new utils/botInternalKey.js rejects an empty, placeholder, or
<16-char BOT_INTERNAL_KEY — fatal in production (exit 1), warning in dev.
- docker-compose: bot SITE_INTERNAL_URL -> app:3001/internal/bot-config;
document that INTERNAL_PORT stays unpublished.
- .env.example (root/server/bot): document INTERNAL_PORT, the fail-fast
behavior, and a defense-in-depth Pangolin deny rule for /api/v1/internal.
Tests: add requireInternalKey.test.js and botInternalKey.test.js
(node --test: 93 pass).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019rao86n5cXpwAyjdBFEshV
Standalone bot/ service (its own package.json/Dockerfile) managed entirely
through a new admin-only Discord Bot panel — token stored encrypted in the
DB and pushed to the bot process in-memory, never an env var. Built in
phases, each independently verified against a live Discord guild:
- Bot skeleton: gateway connection, internal shared-secret API, self-heals
on its own restart by pulling config from the site
- Moderation core: /ban /kick /mute /warn /warnings + mod-log channel
- Word/invite/spam filtering with leetspeak-resistant normalization and a
staff role/channel allowlist
- Scheduled messages: recurring (cron) and one-off channel posts
- Role assignment: button role menus, auto-role on join, temp roles,
bulk role ops
- Auto-rotating primary invite with an audit log
- Site integration: news-publish -> Discord announce webhook, manual
/announce, read-only /wiki search
Also fixes a pre-existing bug in both DB pools (server + bot): the mariadb
driver defaulted to timezone 'local', silently mis-serializing bound Date
params by the host's local offset instead of the DB's UTC session.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a layered set of protections around the admin login and the app edge.
Trust proxy (server/src/utils/trustProxy.js)
- Configurable via TRUST_PROXY; pin to the newt agent ("ptero") LAN IP so
X-Forwarded-For is trusted ONLY from that peer. A blanket "true" is
rejected (coerced to 1) to prevent XFF spoofing that would dodge every
IP-based control. DEBUG_TRUST_PROXY logs peer/XFF/req.ip to re-verify the
proxy IP without a redeploy. Documents the Omada static-reservation
assumption.
Login throttling (server/src/middleware/loginProtection.js, rateLimit.js)
- express-slow-down progressive delay + the existing hard rate cap + a
separate per-IP exponential backoff that persists across the rate window.
All failures return one generic message (no user/pass disclosure).
Honeypot (login form + auth.controller)
- Hidden, plausibly-named field ("company"); a filled value fails
generically and is scored as an unambiguous bot.
Optional per-user TOTP 2FA (speakeasy/qrcode)
- totp_secret/totp_enabled columns (+ idempotent migration). Self-service
Account page: enroll via QR, confirm a code to enable, code-gated disable.
- Login is two-step for enrolled users: after the password, a short-lived
signed challenge (stage:'totp', not a session) is required before the
real session is issued.
Bot / scanner scoring + IP ban (server/src/middleware/botScore.js)
- Weighted CMS-scanner paths (this app uses none). Junk paths 404 FIRST,
unconditionally — independent of score/ban state, so a scanner rotating
through fresh Cloudflare IPs gets no free pass. /wp-admin/install.php is
the top-weighted near-1-hit ban (worst offender in prod logs). Per-IP
score with quiet-period decay temp-bans an IP from ALL routes once past a
(deliberately low) threshold, to protect /admin from credential stuffing.
Failed logins and honeypot hits feed the same score.
- Periodic sweep evicts stale, unbanned, quiet entries so the in-memory
store can't grow unbounded; the interval is unref'd and cleared on
graceful shutdown.
Tests: node --test suite (40) covering trust-proxy parsing + live req.ip
(incl. pinned-IP), rate limiter + exponential backoff, honeypot rejection,
TOTP verify (enabled/disabled) + challenge-isn't-a-session, bot-score
threshold/decay/ban + junk-404-independence + install.php + store sweep.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
