Merge branch 'main' into feature/moderation-dashboard

Light up the moderation dashboard's previously-empty widgets by persisting the
event streams the bot only reacted to in-memory before.

Schema (bot-owned)
- member_events: join/leave, with invite_code/inviter_* for best-effort invite
  attribution on joins
- filter_hits: word / foreign-invite filter deletions (matched + action_taken)
- spam_hits: rate_limit / mass_mention / mass_emoji detections

Bot
- new models memberEvents/filterHits/spamHits
- guildMemberAdd records the join with invite attribution; new inviteTracker.js
  keeps an invite-use cache (GuildInvites intent + inviteCreate/inviteDelete) and
  diffs it on join to find which invite was used — best-effort, never blocks
  auto-role
- new guildMemberRemove records leaves
- messageFilter records filter/spam hits alongside the existing warn/mute;
  inviteFilter now returns the offending code; detectSpam identifies which spam
  rule tripped (preserving the rate-limit-first side-effect order)
- mod_actions still logs the resulting warn/mute — the new tables are additive

Server
- summary extended with joins/leaves/invite_joins/filter_hits/spam_hits per window
- new feeds: /api/v1/admin/moderation/{members,filter-hits,spam-hits}

Client
- overview now shows 8 tiles (mod actions + joins/leaves/filter/spam, joins tile
  notes "N via invite") plus an Events panel with Members/Filter/Spam tabs;
  removed the coming-soon note

Verified: 119 server unit tests, client build, 14-check DB-backed smoke, and a
browser click-through of every tile and events tab (incl. invite attribution).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019rao86n5cXpwAyjdBFEshV

.env.example

@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
 # App
 NODE_ENV=production
 PORT=3000
+# Separate, UNPUBLISHED port for server<->bot internal traffic (the decrypted
+# bot-token route). Must match the port in the bot's SITE_INTERNAL_URL
+# (docker-compose.yml) and must NEVER be published/proxied. See issue #33.
+INTERNAL_PORT=3001
 UPLOAD_DIR=/app/uploads
 # Logging — written to BOTH the console and a log file.
 LOG_LEVEL=info          # console verbosity: error | warn | info | debug
@@ -64,7 +68,14 @@ CLIENT_ORIGIN=http://localhost:5173
 # service). BOT_INTERNAL_KEY MUST be byte-for-byte identical to the same
 # variable in bot/.env.example — it is the only auth on both sides' /internal/*
 # routes, so a mismatch silently breaks every server<->bot call with 401s.
-# The Discord bot TOKEN itself is not an env var — it's entered in the admin
-# panel (Discord Bot page) and stored encrypted in the DB (see bot_config table).
+# It also guards the server's /internal/bot-config route, which returns the
+# DECRYPTED Discord token; with NODE_ENV=production the app REFUSES TO START if
+# this is left blank, at this placeholder, or shorter than 16 chars. Generate a
+# long random string. The Discord bot TOKEN itself is not an env var — it's
+# entered in the admin panel (Discord Bot page) and stored encrypted in the DB.
+#
+# Defense in depth: even with a strong key, configure Pangolin/your reverse
+# proxy to DENY /api/v1/internal (and never forward INTERNAL_PORT). The route no
+# longer rides the public listener, but an explicit deny rule is belt-and-braces.
 BOT_INTERNAL_URL=http://bot:4100
 BOT_INTERNAL_KEY=change-me-to-a-long-random-string

bot/.env.example

@@ -24,9 +24,10 @@ LOG_TO_FILE=true        # set false for console-only
 BOT_INTERNAL_KEY=dev-only-change-me-bot-key
 
 # Where this bot calls back to the main site to fetch its config on boot
-# (GET .../api/v1/internal/bot-config), so a restart self-reconnects without
-# needing the admin panel to push config again.
-SITE_INTERNAL_URL=http://localhost:3000/api/v1/internal/bot-config
+# (GET .../internal/bot-config), so a restart self-reconnects without needing
+# the admin panel to push config again. This targets the site's UNPUBLISHED
+# internal port (INTERNAL_PORT, default 3001) — NOT the public 3000. See #33.
+SITE_INTERNAL_URL=http://localhost:3001/internal/bot-config
 
 # Read-only PUBLIC API base (Phase 7) — no shared secret, same data any
 # visitor's browser can fetch. Used by /wiki (search) and /announce

bot/src/discord/discordManager.js

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ const messageFilter = require('./messageFilter')
 const scheduler = require('../scheduler/scheduler')
 const roleMenuHandler = require('./roleMenuHandler')
 const { handleGuildMemberAdd } = require('./guildMemberAdd')
+const { handleGuildMemberRemove } = require('./guildMemberRemove')
+const inviteTracker = require('./inviteTracker')
 const tempRoleSweeper = require('../roles/tempRoleSweeper')
 const inviteScheduler = require('../invites/inviteScheduler')
 
@@ -58,13 +60,15 @@ async function start({ token, guildId: gid }) {
 
   // GuildMessages + MessageContent (Phase 3, filter) and GuildMembers
   // (Phase 5, auto-role + bulk role ops) are all privileged — must be enabled
-  // in the Discord Developer Portal, see the Phase 1 setup notes.
+  // in the Discord Developer Portal, see the Phase 1 setup notes. GuildInvites
+  // (Phase 6b, invite-usage attribution) is NOT privileged — no portal toggle.
   client = new Client({
     intents: [
       GatewayIntentBits.Guilds,
       GatewayIntentBits.GuildMessages,
       GatewayIntentBits.MessageContent,
       GatewayIntentBits.GuildMembers,
+      GatewayIntentBits.GuildInvites,
     ],
   })
 
@@ -74,6 +78,7 @@ async function start({ token, guildId: gid }) {
       await scheduler.start(client)
       tempRoleSweeper.start(client)
       inviteScheduler.start(client, guildId)
+      await inviteTracker.prime(client, guildId)
       status = 'connected'
       statusDetail = null
       lastConnectedAt = new Date()
@@ -102,6 +107,10 @@ async function start({ token, guildId: gid }) {
 
   client.on('messageCreate', messageFilter.handleMessageCreate)
   client.on('guildMemberAdd', handleGuildMemberAdd)
+  client.on('guildMemberRemove', handleGuildMemberRemove)
+  // Keep the invite-use cache fresh so guildMemberAdd can attribute joins.
+  client.on('inviteCreate', inviteTracker.onInviteCreate)
+  client.on('inviteDelete', inviteTracker.onInviteDelete)
 
   client.on('error', (err) => {
     status = 'error'

bot/src/discord/guildMemberAdd.js

@@ -1,11 +1,37 @@
-// Auto-role on join. Requires the Server Members privileged intent (already
-// enabled in the Discord Developer Portal per the Phase 1 setup notes).
+// Member join handling: record the join event (with best-effort invite
+// attribution, Phase 6b) then apply the configured auto-role. Requires the
+// Server Members privileged intent (already enabled per the Phase 1 setup notes)
+// and, for invite attribution, the GuildInvites intent.
 const guildConfig = require('../model/guildConfig')
+const memberEvents = require('../model/memberEvents')
+const inviteTracker = require('./inviteTracker')
 const createLogger = require('../utils/logger')
 
-const log = createLogger('autorole')
+const log = createLogger('members')
 
 async function handleGuildMemberAdd(member) {
+  // Attribute the invite first (diffs the invite-use cache), then record the join.
+  // Both are best-effort — a failure here must never block the auto-role below.
+  let invite = { code: null, inviterId: null, inviterTag: null }
+  try {
+    invite = await inviteTracker.attribute(member)
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.warn('invite attribution threw', { userId: member.id, message: err.message })
+  }
+  try {
+    await memberEvents.record({
+      guildId: member.guild.id,
+      eventType: 'join',
+      discordUserId: member.id,
+      username: member.user?.tag,
+      inviteCode: invite.code,
+      inviterId: invite.inviterId,
+      inviterTag: invite.inviterTag,
+    })
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.warn('member join record failed', { userId: member.id, message: err.message })
+  }
+
   try {
     const roleId = await guildConfig.getAutoRoleId(member.guild.id)
     if (!roleId) return

bot/src/discord/guildMemberRemove.js

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+// Member leave handling (Phase 6b): record a leave event for the dashboard's
+// members feed. Fires on both voluntary leaves and kicks/bans — Discord doesn't
+// distinguish them on this event, and the mod-action (if any) is logged
+// separately via mod_actions, so a leave row here is purely the lifecycle fact.
+const memberEvents = require('../model/memberEvents')
+const createLogger = require('../utils/logger')
+
+const log = createLogger('members')
+
+async function handleGuildMemberRemove(member) {
+  try {
+    await memberEvents.record({
+      guildId: member.guild.id,
+      eventType: 'leave',
+      discordUserId: member.id,
+      username: member.user?.tag,
+    })
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.warn('member leave record failed', { userId: member.id, message: err.message })
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = { handleGuildMemberRemove }

bot/src/discord/inviteTracker.js

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+// Best-effort invite-usage attribution (Phase 6b). Discord doesn't tell you
+// which invite a member used, so the standard approach is to keep a cache of
+// each invite's use-count and, on guildMemberAdd, re-fetch and find the one
+// whose count went up. Requires the GuildInvites intent + Manage Guild (the bot
+// already creates/deletes invites, so it has the permission). All calls are
+// best-effort: any failure just yields a null attribution and the join is still
+// recorded. Vanity-URL and bot-added joins are inherently unattributable.
+const createLogger = require('../utils/logger')
+
+const log = createLogger('invites')
+
+// guildId -> Map<inviteCode, uses>
+const cache = new Map()
+
+async function snapshot(guild) {
+  const map = new Map()
+  const invites = await guild.invites.fetch()
+  for (const inv of invites.values()) map.set(inv.code, inv.uses || 0)
+  return map
+}
+
+// Populate the cache for a guild (call once the client is ready).
+async function prime(client, guildId) {
+  try {
+    const guild = client.guilds.cache.get(guildId) || (await client.guilds.fetch(guildId))
+    cache.set(guildId, await snapshot(guild))
+    log.info('invite cache primed', { guildId, count: cache.get(guildId).size })
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.warn('invite cache prime failed (missing Manage Guild / GuildInvites?)', { message: err.message })
+  }
+}
+
+function onInviteCreate(invite) {
+  if (!invite.guild) return
+  const g = cache.get(invite.guild.id) || new Map()
+  g.set(invite.code, invite.uses || 0)
+  cache.set(invite.guild.id, g)
+}
+
+function onInviteDelete(invite) {
+  if (!invite.guild) return
+  const g = cache.get(invite.guild.id)
+  if (g) g.delete(invite.code)
+}
+
+// Diff current invite uses against the cached snapshot to find which invite the
+// joining member used, then refresh the cache. Returns { code, inviterId,
+// inviterTag } with nulls when it can't be determined.
+async function attribute(member) {
+  const empty = { code: null, inviterId: null, inviterTag: null }
+  try {
+    const guild = member.guild
+    const before = cache.get(guild.id) || new Map()
+    const current = await guild.invites.fetch()
+
+    let found = empty
+    for (const inv of current.values()) {
+      const prev = before.get(inv.code) || 0
+      if ((inv.uses || 0) > prev && found === empty) {
+        found = { code: inv.code, inviterId: inv.inviter?.id || null, inviterTag: inv.inviter?.tag || null }
+      }
+    }
+
+    const next = new Map()
+    for (const inv of current.values()) next.set(inv.code, inv.uses || 0)
+    cache.set(guild.id, next)
+    return found
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.warn('invite attribution failed', { message: err.message })
+    return empty
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = { prime, onInviteCreate, onInviteDelete, attribute }

bot/src/discord/messageFilter.js

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ const { findMatch } = require('../filter/normalize')
 const inviteFilter = require('../filter/inviteFilter')
 const spamFilter = require('../filter/spamFilter')
 const warnings = require('../model/warnings')
+const filterHits = require('../model/filterHits')
+const spamHits = require('../model/spamHits')
 const modLog = require('./modLog')
 const createLogger = require('../utils/logger')
 
@@ -19,6 +21,48 @@ function botActor(client) {
   return { id: client.user.id, tag: client.user.tag }
 }
 
+// Dashboard event capture (Phase 6b). Best-effort — recording a hit must never
+// break the moderation action it accompanies, so failures are swallowed+logged.
+async function recordFilterHit(message, hitType, matched, actionTaken) {
+  try {
+    await filterHits.record({
+      guildId: message.guildId,
+      hitType,
+      discordUserId: message.author.id,
+      username: message.author.tag,
+      channelId: message.channelId,
+      matched,
+      actionTaken,
+    })
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.warn('filter hit record failed', { message: err.message })
+  }
+}
+
+async function recordSpamHit(message, spamType) {
+  try {
+    await spamHits.record({
+      guildId: message.guildId,
+      spamType,
+      discordUserId: message.author.id,
+      username: message.author.tag,
+      channelId: message.channelId,
+    })
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.warn('spam hit record failed', { message: err.message })
+  }
+}
+
+// Which spam rule tripped (for the spam_hits row). isRateLimited has a side
+// effect (records this message's timestamp) so it must be evaluated first, and
+// exactly once — mirroring the original OR-order.
+function detectSpam(message) {
+  if (spamFilter.isRateLimited(message.guildId, message.author.id)) return 'rate_limit'
+  if (spamFilter.isMassMention(message)) return 'mass_mention'
+  if (spamFilter.isMassEmoji(message.content)) return 'mass_emoji'
+  return null
+}
+
 async function isBypassed(message, cache) {
   if (cache.allowChannels.has(message.channelId)) return true
   const memberRoles = message.member ? message.member.roles.cache : null
@@ -62,8 +106,10 @@ async function handleMessageCreate(message) {
     const cache = await filterCache.getOrLoad(message.guildId)
     if (await isBypassed(message, cache)) return
 
-    if (await inviteFilter.containsForeignInvite(message)) {
+    const foreignCode = await inviteFilter.foreignInviteCode(message)
+    if (foreignCode) {
       await message.delete().catch(() => {})
+      await recordFilterHit(message, 'invite', foreignCode, 'warn')
       await applyWarnAction(message, 'Posted a Discord invite link')
       return
     }
@@ -71,17 +117,16 @@ async function handleMessageCreate(message) {
     const match = findMatch(message.content, cache.words)
     if (match) {
       await message.delete().catch(() => {})
+      await recordFilterHit(message, 'word', match.word, match.severity)
       if (match.severity === 'mute') await applyMuteAction(message, `Filtered word: ${match.word}`)
       else if (match.severity === 'warn') await applyWarnAction(message, `Filtered word: ${match.word}`)
       return
     }
 
-    if (
-      spamFilter.isRateLimited(message.guildId, message.author.id) ||
-      spamFilter.isMassMention(message) ||
-      spamFilter.isMassEmoji(message.content)
-    ) {
+    const spamType = detectSpam(message)
+    if (spamType) {
       await message.delete().catch(() => {})
+      await recordSpamHit(message, spamType)
       await applyWarnAction(message, 'Automated spam detection (rate limit / mass mention / mass emoji)')
     }
   } catch (err) {

bot/src/filter/inviteFilter.js

@@ -4,20 +4,23 @@
 // than silently letting an unresolvable link through.
 const INVITE_REGEX = /(?:discord\.gg|discord(?:app)?\.com\/invite)\/([a-zA-Z0-9-]+)/gi
 
-async function containsForeignInvite(message) {
+// Returns the first foreign (or unresolvable) invite code found in the message,
+// or null if the message contains no foreign invites. Returning the code (rather
+// than a bare boolean) lets the caller record which invite was blocked.
+async function foreignInviteCode(message) {
   const matches = [...message.content.matchAll(INVITE_REGEX)]
-  if (matches.length === 0) return false
+  if (matches.length === 0) return null
 
   for (const match of matches) {
     const code = match[1]
     try {
       const invite = await message.client.fetchInvite(code)
-      if (invite.guild?.id !== message.guildId) return true
+      if (invite.guild?.id !== message.guildId) return code
     } catch {
-      return true
+      return code
     }
   }
-  return false
+  return null
 }
 
-module.exports = { containsForeignInvite }
+module.exports = { foreignInviteCode }

bot/src/model/filterHits.js

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+// Automated content-filter hits (Phase 6b). Bot-owned; recorded whenever the
+// word filter or foreign-invite filter deletes a message. mod_actions still
+// records the resulting warn/mute separately. Schema: server/db/schema.sql
+// (filter_hits).
+const db = require('../db')
+
+async function record({ guildId, hitType, discordUserId, username, channelId, matched, actionTaken }) {
+  await db.query(
+    `INSERT INTO filter_hits (guild_id, hit_type, discord_user_id, username, channel_id, matched, action_taken)
+     VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
+    [guildId, hitType, discordUserId, username || null, channelId || null, matched || null, actionTaken],
+  )
+}
+
+module.exports = { record }

bot/src/model/memberEvents.js

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// Guild member join/leave events (Phase 6b). Bot-owned; the site reads these for
+// the moderation dashboard's members feed + invite-usage view. Schema in
+// server/db/schema.sql (member_events).
+const db = require('../db')
+
+async function record({ guildId, eventType, discordUserId, username, inviteCode, inviterId, inviterTag }) {
+  await db.query(
+    `INSERT INTO member_events (guild_id, event_type, discord_user_id, username, invite_code, inviter_id, inviter_tag)
+     VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
+    [guildId, eventType, discordUserId, username || null, inviteCode || null, inviterId || null, inviterTag || null],
+  )
+}
+
+module.exports = { record }

bot/src/model/spamHits.js

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// Automated spam-detection hits (Phase 6b). Bot-owned; recorded when the
+// rate-limit / mass-mention / mass-emoji checks trip. mod_actions still logs the
+// resulting warn separately. Schema: server/db/schema.sql (spam_hits).
+const db = require('../db')
+
+async function record({ guildId, spamType, discordUserId, username, channelId }) {
+  await db.query(
+    `INSERT INTO spam_hits (guild_id, spam_type, discord_user_id, username, channel_id)
+     VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
+    [guildId, spamType, discordUserId, username || null, channelId || null],
+  )
+}
+
+module.exports = { record }

client/src/App.jsx

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { AuthProvider } from './contexts/AuthContext.jsx'
 import { SiteProvider } from './contexts/SiteContext.jsx'
 import MaintenanceGate from './components/MaintenanceGate.jsx'
 import RequireAuth from './components/RequireAuth.jsx'
+import RoleGate from './components/RoleGate.jsx'
 
 // Public
 import Portal from './routes/public/Portal.jsx'
@@ -31,6 +32,8 @@ import DiscordBotAdmin from './routes/admin/views/DiscordBotAdmin.jsx'
 import AuthProvidersAdmin from './routes/admin/views/AuthProvidersAdmin.jsx'
 import UsersAdmin from './routes/admin/views/UsersAdmin.jsx'
 import AccountAdmin from './routes/admin/views/AccountAdmin.jsx'
+import Moderation from './routes/admin/views/Moderation.jsx'
+import ModerationUser from './routes/admin/views/ModerationUser.jsx'
 
 export default function App() {
   return (
@@ -73,6 +76,17 @@ export default function App() {
             <Route path="wiki" element={<WikiAdmin />} />
             <Route path="hero" element={<HeroEditor />} />
             <Route path="settings" element={<SettingsAdmin />} />
+            <Route
+              path="moderation"
+              element={
+                <RoleGate roles={['admin', 'moderator']}>
+                  <Outlet />
+                </RoleGate>
+              }
+            >
+              <Route index element={<Moderation />} />
+              <Route path="user/:discordId" element={<ModerationUser />} />
+            </Route>
             <Route path="activity" element={<ActivityAdmin />} />
             <Route path="bot-activity" element={<BotActivityAdmin />} />
             <Route path="discord-bot" element={<DiscordBotAdmin />} />

client/src/api/client.js

@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ export const api = {
     req('/auth/login', { method: 'POST', body: { username, password, ...extra } }),
   loginTotp: (challenge, code) =>
     req('/auth/login/totp', { method: 'POST', body: { challenge, code } }),
+  // Second factor for an SSO login (challenge is held in an httpOnly cookie set by
+  // the callback, so only the code is sent). Returns { user, returnTo }.
+  ssoLoginTotp: (code) => req('/auth/sso/totp', { method: 'POST', body: { code } }),
   logout: () => req('/auth/logout', { method: 'POST' }),
   // Public SSO provider discovery — drives the login-page provider buttons.
   authProviders: () => req('/auth/providers'),
@@ -117,6 +120,52 @@ export const api = {
     updateUser: (id, data) => req(`/admin/users/${id}`, { method: 'PUT', body: data }),
     deleteUser: (id) => req(`/admin/users/${id}`, { method: 'DELETE' }),
 
+    // ----- moderation dashboard (admin + moderator) -----
+    modSummary: () => req('/admin/moderation/stats/summary'),
+    modRecent: (params = {}) => {
+      const qs = new URLSearchParams()
+      if (params.type) qs.set('type', params.type)
+      if (params.limit) qs.set('limit', params.limit)
+      if (params.offset) qs.set('offset', params.offset)
+      const s = qs.toString()
+      return req(`/admin/moderation/recent${s ? `?${s}` : ''}`)
+    },
+    modSearch: (q) => req(`/admin/moderation/search?q=${encodeURIComponent(q)}`),
+    modMembers: (params = {}) => {
+      const qs = new URLSearchParams()
+      if (params.type) qs.set('type', params.type)
+      if (params.limit) qs.set('limit', params.limit)
+      if (params.offset) qs.set('offset', params.offset)
+      const s = qs.toString()
+      return req(`/admin/moderation/members${s ? `?${s}` : ''}`)
+    },
+    modFilterHits: (params = {}) => {
+      const qs = new URLSearchParams()
+      if (params.limit) qs.set('limit', params.limit)
+      if (params.offset) qs.set('offset', params.offset)
+      const s = qs.toString()
+      return req(`/admin/moderation/filter-hits${s ? `?${s}` : ''}`)
+    },
+    modSpamHits: (params = {}) => {
+      const qs = new URLSearchParams()
+      if (params.limit) qs.set('limit', params.limit)
+      if (params.offset) qs.set('offset', params.offset)
+      const s = qs.toString()
+      return req(`/admin/moderation/spam-hits${s ? `?${s}` : ''}`)
+    },
+    modUser: (discordId) => req(`/admin/moderation/user/${discordId}`),
+    modUserActions: (discordId, params = {}) => {
+      const qs = new URLSearchParams()
+      if (params.type) qs.set('type', params.type)
+      if (params.limit) qs.set('limit', params.limit)
+      if (params.offset) qs.set('offset', params.offset)
+      const s = qs.toString()
+      return req(`/admin/moderation/user/${discordId}/actions${s ? `?${s}` : ''}`)
+    },
+    modUserNotes: (discordId) => req(`/admin/moderation/user/${discordId}/notes`),
+    addModNote: (discordId, data) =>
+      req(`/admin/moderation/user/${discordId}/notes`, { method: 'POST', body: data }),
+
     // ----- account security (self-service 2FA) -----
     getAccount: () => req('/admin/account'),
     totpSetup: () => req('/admin/account/totp/setup', { method: 'POST' }),

client/src/components/RoleGate.jsx

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+import { Navigate } from 'react-router-dom'
+import { useAuth } from '../contexts/AuthContext.jsx'
+
+// Client-side role gate for admin sub-sections. Real enforcement is server-side
+// (requireRole); this just keeps the UI honest — a user without one of `roles`
+// is redirected rather than shown a page that will only 403 on every call.
+export default function RoleGate({ roles, children, redirect = '/admin' }) {
+  const { user } = useAuth()
+  if (user && !roles.includes(user.role)) return <Navigate to={redirect} replace />
+  return children
+}

client/src/contexts/AuthContext.jsx

@@ -37,6 +37,14 @@ export function AuthProvider({ children }) {
     return data.user
   }, [])
 
+  // Step 2 for SSO logins whose account has 2FA on. The pending challenge lives in
+  // an httpOnly cookie, so only the code is sent. Returns { user, returnTo }.
+  const ssoLoginTotp = useCallback(async (code) => {
+    const data = await api.ssoLoginTotp(code)
+    setUser(data.user)
+    return data
+  }, [])
+
   const logout = useCallback(async () => {
     try {
       await api.logout()
@@ -46,7 +54,7 @@ export function AuthProvider({ children }) {
   }, [])
 
   return (
-    <AuthContext.Provider value={{ user, loading, login, loginTotp, logout, refresh }}>
+    <AuthContext.Provider value={{ user, loading, login, loginTotp, ssoLoginTotp, logout, refresh }}>
       {children}
     </AuthContext.Provider>
   )

client/src/routes/admin/AdminLayout.jsx

@@ -4,11 +4,15 @@ import MoonDot from '../../components/MoonDot.jsx'
 import { useAuth } from '../../contexts/AuthContext.jsx'
 import { useSite } from '../../contexts/SiteContext.jsx'
 
+// `roles` (when present) restricts which roles see a nav item. Items without it
+// are shown to admin/editor as before. Moderators are further confined to just
+// their own section + account security (see the redirect effect below).
 const NAV = [
   { to: '/admin', label: 'Dashboard', end: true },
   { to: '/admin/posts', label: 'Posts' },
   { to: '/admin/wiki', label: 'Wiki' },
   { to: '/admin/hero', label: 'Hero Editor' },
+  { to: '/admin/moderation', label: 'Moderation', roles: ['admin', 'moderator'] },
   { to: '/admin/settings', label: 'Settings' },
   { to: '/admin/activity', label: 'Activity' },
   { to: '/admin/bot-activity', label: 'Bot Activity' },
@@ -23,6 +27,7 @@ const TITLES = {
   '/admin/posts': 'Posts',
   '/admin/wiki': 'Wiki Pages',
   '/admin/hero': 'Hero Editor',
+  '/admin/moderation': 'Moderation',
   '/admin/settings': 'Site Settings',
   '/admin/activity': 'Activity Log',
   '/admin/bot-activity': 'Bot Activity',
@@ -48,11 +53,31 @@ export default function AdminLayout() {
   const { mode } = useSite()
   const navigate = useNavigate()
   const location = useLocation()
-  const title = TITLES[location.pathname] || 'Admin'
+  const title =
+    TITLES[location.pathname] ||
+    (location.pathname.startsWith('/admin/moderation') ? 'Moderation' : 'Admin')
   // The hero canvas editor needs room — let it use the full content width.
   const wide = location.pathname === '/admin/hero'
   const modeDot = mode === 'live' ? 'var(--mode-live)' : 'var(--mode-maint)'
 
+  // Moderators only get the moderation section + their own account security.
+  const isModerator = user?.role === 'moderator'
+  const navItems = NAV.filter((n) => {
+    if (n.roles && !n.roles.includes(user?.role)) return false
+    if (isModerator) return n.to === '/admin/moderation' || n.to === '/admin/account'
+    return true
+  })
+
+  // Confine a moderator who deep-links (or is redirected to the index) to a page
+  // outside their remit — the API would 403 anyway, so send them to their home.
+  useEffect(() => {
+    if (!isModerator) return
+    const p = location.pathname
+    if (!p.startsWith('/admin/moderation') && p !== '/admin/account') {
+      navigate('/admin/moderation', { replace: true })
+    }
+  }, [isModerator, location.pathname, navigate])
+
   // Keep the admin out of search indexes (belt-and-suspenders with robots.txt).
   useEffect(() => {
     const meta = document.createElement('meta')
@@ -94,7 +119,7 @@ export default function AdminLayout() {
         </div>
 
         <nav style={{ flex: 1, padding: '14px 12px', display: 'flex', flexDirection: 'column', gap: 4 }}>
-          {NAV.map((n) => (
+          {navItems.map((n) => (
             <NavLink
               key={n.to}
               to={n.to}

client/src/routes/admin/AdminLogin.jsx

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ const honeypotStyle = {
 }
 
 export default function AdminLogin() {
-  const { user, login, loginTotp } = useAuth()
+  const { user, login, loginTotp, ssoLoginTotp } = useAuth()
   const navigate = useNavigate()
   const location = useLocation()
   const dest = location.state?.from?.pathname || '/admin'
@@ -42,10 +42,12 @@ export default function AdminLogin() {
   const [error, setError] = useState('')
   const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false)
 
-  // Two-factor step state.
+  // Two-factor step state. `ssoTotp` marks the SSO variant: the challenge lives in
+  // an httpOnly cookie (not React state), so the code posts to a different endpoint.
   const [stage, setStage] = useState('creds') // 'creds' | 'totp'
   const [challenge, setChallenge] = useState('')
   const [code, setCode] = useState('')
+  const [ssoTotp, setSsoTotp] = useState(false)
 
   // SSO providers to offer (empty if none configured) + any error the callback
   // bounced us back with (?sso_error=...).
@@ -57,6 +59,16 @@ export default function AdminLogin() {
     if (user) navigate(dest, { replace: true })
   }, [user, dest, navigate])
 
+  // The SSO callback bounces 2FA accounts back here with ?sso_totp=1 after the IdP
+  // step: it has staged an httpOnly TOTP challenge and needs the authenticator code
+  // before it will issue a session. Jump straight to the code step.
+  useEffect(() => {
+    if (new URLSearchParams(location.search).get('sso_totp')) {
+      setStage('totp')
+      setSsoTotp(true)
+    }
+  }, [location.search])
+
   // Load enabled SSO providers for the buttons. Failure is non-fatal — the page
   // still works with password login and simply shows no provider buttons.
   useEffect(() => {
@@ -101,16 +113,25 @@ export default function AdminLogin() {
     setError('')
     setBusy(true)
     try {
-      await loginTotp(challenge, code)
-      navigate(dest, { replace: true })
+      if (ssoTotp) {
+        const { returnTo } = await ssoLoginTotp(code)
+        navigate(returnTo || '/admin', { replace: true })
+      } else {
+        await loginTotp(challenge, code)
+        navigate(dest, { replace: true })
+      }
     } catch (err) {
+      const expired = err.status === 401 && /expired/i.test(err.message)
       setError(
-        err.status === 401 && /expired/i.test(err.message)
+        expired
           ? 'Your verification session expired. Please sign in again.'
           : 'Invalid verification code.',
       )
       setBusy(false)
-      if (err.status === 401 && /expired/i.test(err.message)) setStage('creds')
+      if (expired) {
+        setStage('creds')
+        setSsoTotp(false)
+      }
     }
   }
 

client/src/routes/admin/views/Moderation.jsx

@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
+import { useState } from 'react'
+import { useNavigate } from 'react-router-dom'
+import { Loading, ErrorState } from '../../../components/PageState.jsx'
+import { useAsync } from '../../../lib/useAsync.js'
+import { ago, dateTime } from '../../../lib/format.js'
+import { api } from '../../../api/client.js'
+
+const WINDOWS = [
+  { key: '24h', label: 'Last 24h' },
+  { key: '7d', label: 'Last 7 days' },
+  { key: '30d', label: 'Last 30 days' },
+]
+const TYPES = [
+  { key: null, label: 'All' },
+  { key: 'ban', label: 'Bans' },
+  { key: 'kick', label: 'Kicks' },
+  { key: 'mute', label: 'Mutes' },
+  { key: 'warn', label: 'Warnings' },
+]
+const MOD_TILES = [
+  { key: 'ban', label: 'Bans' },
+  { key: 'kick', label: 'Kicks' },
+  { key: 'mute', label: 'Mutes' },
+  { key: 'warn', label: 'Warnings' },
+]
+// Second tile row → jumps the events panel to the matching stream.
+const EVENT_TILES = [
+  { key: 'joins', label: 'Joins', tab: 'members' },
+  { key: 'leaves', label: 'Leaves', tab: 'members' },
+  { key: 'filter_hits', label: 'Filter hits', tab: 'filter' },
+  { key: 'spam_hits', label: 'Spam hits', tab: 'spam' },
+]
+const EVENT_TABS = [
+  { key: 'members', label: 'Members' },
+  { key: 'filter', label: 'Filter hits' },
+  { key: 'spam', label: 'Spam hits' },
+]
+
+export default function Moderation() {
+  const navigate = useNavigate()
+  const [win, setWin] = useState('24h')
+  const [typeFilter, setTypeFilter] = useState(null)
+  const [eventTab, setEventTab] = useState('members')
+
+  const { loading, error, data } = useAsync(
+    () =>
+      Promise.all([
+        api.admin.modSummary(),
+        api.admin.modRecent({ limit: 100 }),
+        api.admin.modMembers({ limit: 50 }),
+        api.admin.modFilterHits({ limit: 50 }),
+        api.admin.modSpamHits({ limit: 50 }),
+      ]),
+    [],
+  )
+
+  if (loading) return <Loading />
+  if (error) return <ErrorState message="Could not load moderation data." />
+
+  const [summary, recent, members, filterHits, spamHits] = data
+  const counts = summary.windows?.[win] || {}
+  const feed = typeFilter ? recent.filter((r) => r.action_type === typeFilter) : recent
+  const goUser = (id) => navigate(`/admin/moderation/user/${id}`)
+
+  return (
+    <section>
+      <UserSearch onPick={goUser} />
+
+      {/* Window selector */}
+      <div style={{ display: 'flex', gap: 8, margin: '4px 0 14px' }}>
+        {WINDOWS.map((w) => (
+          <button key={w.key} onClick={() => setWin(w.key)} className="pill" style={win === w.key ? activePill : undefined}>
+            {w.label}
+          </button>
+        ))}
+      </div>
+
+      {/* Moderation-action tiles (click filters the recent-actions feed) */}
+      <div className="grid-4" style={{ gap: 14, marginBottom: 14 }}>
+        {MOD_TILES.map((t) => (
+          <Tile
+            key={t.key}
+            value={counts[t.key] ?? 0}
+            label={t.label}
+            active={typeFilter === t.key}
+            onClick={() => setTypeFilter(typeFilter === t.key ? null : t.key)}
+          />
+        ))}
+      </div>
+
+      {/* Event tiles (click jumps the events panel to that stream) */}
+      <div className="grid-4" style={{ gap: 14, marginBottom: 8 }}>
+        {EVENT_TILES.map((t) => (
+          <Tile
+            key={t.key}
+            value={counts[t.key] ?? 0}
+            label={t.label}
+            sub={t.key === 'joins' && counts.invite_joins ? `${counts.invite_joins} via invite` : null}
+            active={eventTab === t.tab}
+            onClick={() => setEventTab(t.tab)}
+          />
+        ))}
+      </div>
+      <p className="sans dim" style={{ fontSize: '0.78rem', margin: '0 0 24px' }}>
+        Counts are for the selected window. Member, filter, and spam events are captured live by the bot.
+      </p>
+
+      {/* Recent moderation actions */}
+      <div style={rowHead}>
+        <h2 className="display" style={h2}>Recent actions</h2>
+        <div style={{ display: 'flex', gap: 6, flexWrap: 'wrap' }}>
+          {TYPES.map((t) => (
+            <button key={t.label} onClick={() => setTypeFilter(t.key)} className="pill" style={typeFilter === t.key ? activePill : undefined}>
+              {t.label}
+            </button>
+          ))}
+        </div>
+      </div>
+      <div className="panel-flat" style={{ marginBottom: 30 }}>
+        <table className="adm-table">
+          <thead>
+            <tr>
+              <th className="adm-th">Action</th>
+              <th className="adm-th">Target</th>
+              <th className="adm-th">Staff</th>
+              <th className="adm-th">Reason</th>
+              <th className="adm-th">When</th>
+            </tr>
+          </thead>
+          <tbody>
+            {feed.length === 0 && (
+              <tr><td className="adm-td" colSpan={5} style={muted}>No matching actions.</td></tr>
+            )}
+            {feed.map((a) => (
+              <tr key={a.id}>
+                <td className="adm-td"><span className={`badge badge-${a.action_type}`}>{a.action_type}</span></td>
+                <td className="adm-td">
+                  <span className="link-accent" onClick={() => goUser(a.target_user_id)}>{a.target_tag || a.target_user_id}</span>
+                  {a.linked_account && <span className="badge badge-editor" style={{ marginLeft: 8 }}>site: {a.linked_account.username}</span>}
+                </td>
+                <td className="adm-td">
+                  {a.is_automated ? <span className="badge badge-auto">Automated</span> : <span style={{ color: 'var(--text)' }}>{a.staff_tag || a.staff_user_id}</span>}
+                </td>
+                <td className="adm-td" style={{ color: 'var(--muted)', maxWidth: 280 }}>{a.reason || '—'}</td>
+                <td className="adm-td dim" title={dateTime(a.created_at)}>{ago(a.created_at)}</td>
+              </tr>
+            ))}
+          </tbody>
+        </table>
+      </div>
+
+      {/* Event streams panel */}
+      <div style={rowHead}>
+        <h2 className="display" style={h2}>Events</h2>
+        <div style={{ display: 'flex', gap: 6, flexWrap: 'wrap' }}>
+          {EVENT_TABS.map((t) => (
+            <button key={t.key} onClick={() => setEventTab(t.key)} className="pill" style={eventTab === t.key ? activePill : undefined}>
+              {t.label}
+            </button>
+          ))}
+        </div>
+      </div>
+      {eventTab === 'members' && <MembersTable rows={members} onUser={goUser} />}
+      {eventTab === 'filter' && <FilterTable rows={filterHits} onUser={goUser} />}
+      {eventTab === 'spam' && <SpamTable rows={spamHits} onUser={goUser} />}
+    </section>
+  )
+}
+
+function Tile({ value, label, sub, active, onClick }) {
+  return (
+    <button
+      onClick={onClick}
+      style={{
+        textAlign: 'left',
+        padding: 20,
+        border: `1px solid ${active ? 'var(--accent)' : 'var(--line)'}`,
+        borderRadius: 12,
+        background: 'var(--panel-grad)',
+        cursor: 'pointer',
+      }}
+    >
+      <div className="display" style={{ fontSize: '2rem', color: 'var(--head)', lineHeight: 1 }}>{value}</div>
+      <div className="card-kicker" style={{ marginTop: 8, marginBottom: 0 }}>{label}</div>
+      {sub && <div className="sans dim" style={{ fontSize: '0.68rem', marginTop: 4 }}>{sub}</div>}
+    </button>
+  )
+}
+
+function MembersTable({ rows, onUser }) {
+  return (
+    <div className="panel-flat">
+      <table className="adm-table">
+        <thead>
+          <tr>
+            <th className="adm-th">Event</th>
+            <th className="adm-th">User</th>
+            <th className="adm-th">Invite</th>
+            <th className="adm-th">When</th>
+          </tr>
+        </thead>
+        <tbody>
+          {rows.length === 0 && <tr><td className="adm-td" colSpan={4} style={muted}>No member events yet.</td></tr>}
+          {rows.map((m) => (
+            <tr key={m.id}>
+              <td className="adm-td"><span className={`badge ${m.event_type === 'join' ? 'badge-pub' : 'badge-ban'}`}>{m.event_type}</span></td>
+              <td className="adm-td"><span className="link-accent" onClick={() => onUser(m.discord_user_id)}>{m.username || m.discord_user_id}</span></td>
+              <td className="adm-td dim">
+                {m.invite_code ? (
+                  <span>{m.invite_code}{m.inviter_tag ? ` · by ${m.inviter_tag}` : ''}</span>
+                ) : '—'}
+              </td>
+              <td className="adm-td dim" title={dateTime(m.created_at)}>{ago(m.created_at)}</td>
+            </tr>
+          ))}
+        </tbody>
+      </table>
+    </div>
+  )
+}
+
+function FilterTable({ rows, onUser }) {
+  return (
+    <div className="panel-flat">
+      <table className="adm-table">
+        <thead>
+          <tr>
+            <th className="adm-th">Type</th>
+            <th className="adm-th">User</th>
+            <th className="adm-th">Matched</th>
+            <th className="adm-th">Action</th>
+            <th className="adm-th">When</th>
+          </tr>
+        </thead>
+        <tbody>
+          {rows.length === 0 && <tr><td className="adm-td" colSpan={5} style={muted}>No filter hits yet.</td></tr>}
+          {rows.map((f) => (
+            <tr key={f.id}>
+              <td className="adm-td"><span className={`badge ${f.hit_type === 'invite' ? 'badge-ban' : 'badge-warn'}`}>{f.hit_type}</span></td>
+              <td className="adm-td"><span className="link-accent" onClick={() => onUser(f.discord_user_id)}>{f.username || f.discord_user_id}</span></td>
+              <td className="adm-td" style={{ color: 'var(--text)', maxWidth: 240 }}>{f.matched || '—'}</td>
+              <td className="adm-td"><span className={`badge badge-${f.action_taken === 'delete' ? 'auto' : f.action_taken}`}>{f.action_taken}</span></td>
+              <td className="adm-td dim" title={dateTime(f.created_at)}>{ago(f.created_at)}</td>
+            </tr>
+          ))}
+        </tbody>
+      </table>
+    </div>
+  )
+}
+
+const SPAM_LABEL = { rate_limit: 'Rate limit', mass_mention: 'Mass mention', mass_emoji: 'Mass emoji' }
+
+function SpamTable({ rows, onUser }) {
+  return (
+    <div className="panel-flat">
+      <table className="adm-table">
+        <thead>
+          <tr>
+            <th className="adm-th">Type</th>
+            <th className="adm-th">User</th>
+            <th className="adm-th">When</th>
+          </tr>
+        </thead>
+        <tbody>
+          {rows.length === 0 && <tr><td className="adm-td" colSpan={3} style={muted}>No spam hits yet.</td></tr>}
+          {rows.map((s) => (
+            <tr key={s.id}>
+              <td className="adm-td"><span className="badge badge-warn">{SPAM_LABEL[s.spam_type] || s.spam_type}</span></td>
+              <td className="adm-td"><span className="link-accent" onClick={() => onUser(s.discord_user_id)}>{s.username || s.discord_user_id}</span></td>
+              <td className="adm-td dim" title={dateTime(s.created_at)}>{ago(s.created_at)}</td>
+            </tr>
+          ))}
+        </tbody>
+      </table>
+    </div>
+  )
+}
+
+// User lookup: search by Discord id or a historical username snapshot.
+function UserSearch({ onPick }) {
+  const [term, setTerm] = useState('')
+  const [results, setResults] = useState(null)
+  const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false)
+
+  async function run(e) {
+    e.preventDefault()
+    const q = term.trim()
+    if (!q) return
+    setBusy(true)
+    try {
+      setResults(await api.admin.modSearch(q))
+    } finally {
+      setBusy(false)
+    }
+  }
+
+  return (
+    <div style={{ marginBottom: 22 }}>
+      <form onSubmit={run} style={{ display: 'flex', gap: 8 }}>
+        <input className="input" placeholder="Search by Discord ID or username…" value={term} onChange={(e) => setTerm(e.target.value)} style={{ maxWidth: 360 }} />
+        <button type="submit" className="btn btn-primary btn-sq" disabled={busy}>{busy ? 'Searching…' : 'Look up'}</button>
+      </form>
+      {results && results.length === 0 && (
+        <p className="sans dim" style={{ fontSize: '0.82rem', marginTop: 10 }}>No moderated users match “{term}”.</p>
+      )}
+      {results && results.length > 0 && (
+        <div className="panel-flat" style={{ marginTop: 10 }}>
+          <table className="adm-table">
+            <tbody>
+              {results.map((r) => (
+                <tr key={r.target_user_id} style={{ cursor: 'pointer' }} onClick={() => onPick(r.target_user_id)}>
+                  <td className="adm-td" style={{ color: 'var(--head)' }}>{r.target_tag || '(unknown tag)'}</td>
+                  <td className="adm-td dim" style={{ fontFamily: 'ui-monospace,Menlo,monospace', fontSize: '0.8rem' }}>{r.target_user_id}</td>
+                  <td className="adm-td dim">{r.action_count} action{Number(r.action_count) === 1 ? '' : 's'}</td>
+                  <td className="adm-td dim">last {ago(r.last_seen)}</td>
+                </tr>
+              ))}
+            </tbody>
+          </table>
+        </div>
+      )}
+    </div>
+  )
+}
+
+const activePill = { background: 'var(--blue)', color: 'var(--ink)', borderColor: 'var(--accent)' }
+const rowHead = { display: 'flex', alignItems: 'center', justifyContent: 'space-between', gap: 12, flexWrap: 'wrap', marginBottom: 12 }
+const h2 = { margin: 0, fontSize: '1.25rem', color: 'var(--head)' }
+const muted = { color: 'var(--muted)' }

client/src/routes/admin/views/ModerationUser.jsx

@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+import { useCallback, useState } from 'react'
+import { useParams, Link } from 'react-router-dom'
+import { Loading, ErrorState } from '../../../components/PageState.jsx'
+import { useAsync } from '../../../lib/useAsync.js'
+import { dateTime, ago } from '../../../lib/format.js'
+import { api } from '../../../api/client.js'
+import { useAuth } from '../../../contexts/AuthContext.jsx'
+
+const ACTION_TABS = [
+  { key: 'warn', label: 'Warnings' },
+  { key: 'mute', label: 'Mutes' },
+  { key: 'kick', label: 'Kicks' },
+  { key: 'ban', label: 'Bans' },
+]
+
+function fmtDuration(seconds) {
+  if (!seconds) return null
+  if (seconds % 86400 === 0) return `${seconds / 86400}d`
+  if (seconds % 3600 === 0) return `${seconds / 3600}h`
+  if (seconds % 60 === 0) return `${seconds / 60}m`
+  return `${seconds}s`
+}
+
+export default function ModerationUser() {
+  const { discordId } = useParams()
+  const { user } = useAuth()
+  const isAdmin = user?.role === 'admin'
+  const [tab, setTab] = useState('warn')
+  const [tick, setTick] = useState(0)
+  const reload = useCallback(() => setTick((t) => t + 1), [])
+
+  const { loading, error, data } = useAsync(
+    () =>
+      Promise.all([
+        api.admin.modUser(discordId),
+        api.admin.modUserActions(discordId, { limit: 200 }),
+        api.admin.modUserNotes(discordId),
+      ]),
+    [discordId, tick],
+  )
+
+  if (loading) return <Loading />
+  if (error) return <ErrorState message="Could not load this user’s history." />
+
+  const [summary, actions, notes] = data
+  const counts = summary.counts || {}
+  const tabActions = actions.filter((a) => a.action_type === tab)
+
+  return (
+    <section>
+      <Link to="/admin/moderation" className="link-accent" style={{ fontSize: '0.85rem' }}>
+        ← Back to moderation
+      </Link>
+
+      {/* Header */}
+      <div style={{ padding: 22, border: '1px solid var(--line)', borderRadius: 12, background: 'var(--panel-grad)', margin: '12px 0 20px' }}>
+        <div style={{ display: 'flex', alignItems: 'baseline', gap: 12, flexWrap: 'wrap' }}>
+          <span className="display" style={{ fontSize: '1.5rem', color: 'var(--head)' }}>
+            {summary.tag || '(unknown user)'}
+          </span>
+          {summary.linked_account && (
+            <span className="badge badge-editor">site account: {summary.linked_account.username}</span>
+          )}
+        </div>
+        <div className="sans dim" style={{ fontFamily: 'ui-monospace,Menlo,monospace', fontSize: '0.8rem', marginTop: 4 }}>
+          {discordId}
+        </div>
+        <div style={{ display: 'flex', gap: 18, marginTop: 14, flexWrap: 'wrap' }}>
+          {ACTION_TABS.map((t) => (
+            <Count key={t.key} label={t.label} value={counts[t.key] || 0} />
+          ))}
+          <Count label="Notes" value={summary.notes_count || 0} />
+        </div>
+      </div>
+
+      {/* Tabs */}
+      <div style={{ display: 'flex', gap: 6, flexWrap: 'wrap', marginBottom: 14, borderBottom: '1px solid var(--line-soft)', paddingBottom: 12 }}>
+        {ACTION_TABS.map((t) => (
+          <TabButton key={t.key} active={tab === t.key} onClick={() => setTab(t.key)}>
+            {t.label} ({counts[t.key] || 0})
+          </TabButton>
+        ))}
+        <TabButton active={tab === 'notes'} onClick={() => setTab('notes')}>
+          Notes ({summary.notes_count || 0})
+        </TabButton>
+      </div>
+
+      {tab === 'notes' ? (
+        <NotesTab discordId={discordId} notes={notes} isAdmin={isAdmin} onAdded={reload} />
+      ) : (
+        <ActionTable rows={tabActions} showDuration={tab === 'mute'} />
+      )}
+    </section>
+  )
+}
+
+function Count({ label, value }) {
+  return (
+    <div>
+      <div className="display" style={{ fontSize: '1.4rem', color: 'var(--head)', lineHeight: 1 }}>{value}</div>
+      <div className="card-kicker" style={{ marginTop: 4, marginBottom: 0 }}>{label}</div>
+    </div>
+  )
+}
+
+function TabButton({ active, onClick, children }) {
+  return (
+    <button
+      onClick={onClick}
+      className="sans"
+      style={{
+        border: '1px solid var(--line)',
+        borderRadius: 8,
+        padding: '7px 14px',
+        cursor: 'pointer',
+        fontSize: '0.85rem',
+        background: active ? 'var(--blue)' : 'transparent',
+        color: active ? 'var(--ink)' : 'var(--muted)',
+        borderColor: active ? 'var(--accent)' : 'var(--line)',
+      }}
+    >
+      {children}
+    </button>
+  )
+}
+
+function ActionTable({ rows, showDuration }) {
+  return (
+    <div className="panel-flat">
+      <table className="adm-table">
+        <thead>
+          <tr>
+            <th className="adm-th">Reason</th>
+            <th className="adm-th">Actor</th>
+            {showDuration && <th className="adm-th">Duration</th>}
+            <th className="adm-th">When</th>
+          </tr>
+        </thead>
+        <tbody>
+          {rows.length === 0 && (
+            <tr>
+              <td className="adm-td" colSpan={showDuration ? 4 : 3} style={{ color: 'var(--muted)' }}>
+                Nothing here.
+              </td>
+            </tr>
+          )}
+          {rows.map((a) => (
+            <tr key={a.id}>
+              <td className="adm-td" style={{ color: 'var(--text)' }}>{a.reason || '—'}</td>
+              <td className="adm-td">
+                {a.is_automated ? (
+                  <span className="badge badge-auto">Automated</span>
+                ) : (
+                  <span style={{ color: 'var(--text)' }}>{a.staff_tag || a.staff_user_id}</span>
+                )}
+              </td>
+              {showDuration && <td className="adm-td dim">{fmtDuration(a.duration_seconds) || '—'}</td>}
+              <td className="adm-td dim" title={dateTime(a.created_at)}>{dateTime(a.created_at)}</td>
+            </tr>
+          ))}
+        </tbody>
+      </table>
+    </div>
+  )
+}
+
+function NotesTab({ discordId, notes, isAdmin, onAdded }) {
+  const [body, setBody] = useState('')
+  const [visibility, setVisibility] = useState('staff_only')
+  const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false)
+  const [err, setErr] = useState('')
+
+  async function add() {
+    if (!body.trim()) return
+    setBusy(true)
+    setErr('')
+    try {
+      await api.admin.addModNote(discordId, { body: body.trim(), visibility })
+      setBody('')
+      setVisibility('staff_only')
+      onAdded()
+    } catch (e) {
+      setErr(e.message || 'Could not save the note.')
+    } finally {
+      setBusy(false)
+    }
+  }
+
+  return (
+    <div>
+      <div style={{ marginBottom: 18 }}>
+        {err && <p className="sans" style={{ margin: '0 0 8px', color: '#d98b84', fontSize: '0.85rem' }}>{err}</p>}
+        <textarea
+          className="textarea"
+          placeholder="Add a staff note about this user…"
+          value={body}
+          onChange={(e) => setBody(e.target.value)}
+          rows={3}
+          style={{ width: '100%' }}
+        />
+        <div style={{ display: 'flex', gap: 10, alignItems: 'center', marginTop: 8, flexWrap: 'wrap' }}>
+          <select value={visibility} onChange={(e) => setVisibility(e.target.value)} className="select" style={{ maxWidth: 200 }}>
+            <option value="staff_only">Staff only</option>
+            {isAdmin && <option value="admin_only">Admin only</option>}
+          </select>
+          <button onClick={add} disabled={busy || !body.trim()} className="btn btn-primary btn-sq">
+            {busy ? 'Saving…' : 'Add note'}
+          </button>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+
+      <div className="panel-flat">
+        <table className="adm-table">
+          <thead>
+            <tr>
+              <th className="adm-th">Note</th>
+              <th className="adm-th">Author</th>
+              <th className="adm-th">Visibility</th>
+              <th className="adm-th">When</th>
+            </tr>
+          </thead>
+          <tbody>
+            {notes.length === 0 && (
+              <tr>
+                <td className="adm-td" colSpan={4} style={{ color: 'var(--muted)' }}>No notes yet.</td>
+              </tr>
+            )}
+            {notes.map((n) => (
+              <tr key={n.id}>
+                <td className="adm-td" style={{ color: 'var(--text)', whiteSpace: 'pre-wrap' }}>{n.body}</td>
+                <td className="adm-td dim">{n.author_username || n.author_tag || '—'}</td>
+                <td className="adm-td">
+                  <span className={`badge ${n.visibility === 'admin_only' ? 'badge-ban' : 'badge-editor'}`}>
+                    {n.visibility === 'admin_only' ? 'admin only' : 'staff'}
+                  </span>
+                </td>
+                <td className="adm-td dim" title={dateTime(n.created_at)}>{ago(n.created_at)}</td>
+              </tr>
+            ))}
+          </tbody>
+        </table>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  )
+}

client/src/routes/admin/views/UserEditor.jsx

@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ export default function UserEditor({ user, onClose, onSaved }) {
           <select value={form.role} onChange={set('role')} className="select">
             <option value="admin">admin</option>
             <option value="editor">editor</option>
+            <option value="moderator">moderator</option>
           </select>
         </label>
       </div>

client/src/routes/admin/views/UsersAdmin.jsx

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ import { dateTime } from '../../../lib/format.js'
 import { api } from '../../../api/client.js'
 import UserEditor from './UserEditor.jsx'
 
+const ROLE_BADGE = { admin: 'badge-admin', editor: 'badge-editor', moderator: 'badge-moderator' }
+
 export default function UsersAdmin() {
   const [tick, setTick] = useState(0)
   const reload = useCallback(() => setTick((t) => t + 1), [])
@@ -16,7 +18,7 @@ export default function UsersAdmin() {
     <section>
       <div style={{ display: 'flex', alignItems: 'center', justifyContent: 'space-between', marginBottom: 18, flexWrap: 'wrap', gap: 12 }}>
         <p className="sans muted" style={{ margin: 0, fontSize: '0.9rem' }}>
-          Manage admin and editor accounts
+          Manage admin, editor, and moderator accounts
         </p>
         <button onClick={() => setEditing('new')} className="btn btn-primary btn-sq">
           + Add user
@@ -44,7 +46,7 @@ export default function UsersAdmin() {
                     {u.username}
                   </td>
                   <td className="adm-td">
-                    <span className={`badge ${u.role === 'admin' ? 'badge-admin' : 'badge-editor'}`}>{u.role}</span>
+                    <span className={`badge ${ROLE_BADGE[u.role] || 'badge-editor'}`}>{u.role}</span>
                   </td>
                   <td className="adm-td dim">{u.last_login_at ? dateTime(u.last_login_at) : 'never'}</td>
                   <td className="adm-td" style={{ textAlign: 'right' }}>

client/src/styles/theme.css

@@ -613,6 +613,29 @@ button[disabled] {
   color: var(--muted);
   border: 1px solid var(--line);
 }
+.badge-moderator {
+  background: rgba(224, 176, 112, 0.12);
+  color: #e0b070;
+  border: 1px solid rgba(224, 176, 112, 0.4);
+}
+/* Action-type badges for the moderation dashboard. */
+.badge-ban {
+  background: rgba(217, 139, 132, 0.16);
+  color: #d98b84;
+  border: 1px solid rgba(217, 139, 132, 0.4);
+}
+.badge-kick,
+.badge-mute,
+.badge-warn {
+  background: rgba(224, 176, 112, 0.12);
+  color: #e0b070;
+  border: 1px solid rgba(224, 176, 112, 0.4);
+}
+.badge-auto {
+  background: rgba(127, 153, 189, 0.14);
+  color: #9fb0c6;
+  border: 1px solid var(--line);
+}
 .link-accent {
   color: var(--accent);
   text-decoration: none;

docker-compose.yml

@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ services:
       - uploads:/app/uploads
       # Bind-mount logs to the host so app.log is directly readable at ./logs/
       - ./logs:/app/logs
+    # Only the PUBLIC API port (3000) is published. The internal server<->bot
+    # port (INTERNAL_PORT, default 3001) is deliberately NOT listed here, so it
+    # stays reachable only over the private compose network — Pangolin/the public
+    # reverse proxy can never forward to it. See issue #33.
     # Binds 0.0.0.0 (no 127.0.0.1 prefix) so Pangolin can reach the container.
     ports:
       - "3000:3000"
@@ -47,7 +51,17 @@ services:
     env_file: .env
     environment:
       DB_HOST: db
-      SITE_INTERNAL_URL: http://app:3000/api/v1/internal/bot-config
+      # Pin the bot's own listen port. Both services share env_file: .env, so
+      # without this the site's PORT=3000 leaks in and the bot binds 3000 instead
+      # of 4100 — then the server's BOT_INTERNAL_URL (http://bot:4100) can't reach
+      # it ("failed to fetch" in the admin panel). Must match that URL's port.
+      PORT: 4100
+      # Likewise override the log filename so the bot doesn't inherit the site's
+      # LOG_FILE and write into app.log — keep the bot's log distinct.
+      LOG_FILE: bot.log
+      # Internal config fetch goes to the app's UNPUBLISHED internal port (3001),
+      # not the public 3000. Keep the port in sync with the app's INTERNAL_PORT.
+      SITE_INTERNAL_URL: http://app:3001/internal/bot-config
       SITE_PUBLIC_URL: http://app:3000/api/v1/public
       LOG_DIR: /app/bot/logs
     depends_on:

server/.env.example

@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
 
 NODE_ENV=development
 PORT=3000
+# Separate, unpublished port for server<->bot internal traffic (the decrypted
+# bot-token route). Must match the port in bot/.env's SITE_INTERNAL_URL and must
+# never be exposed through a public reverse proxy. See issue #33.
+INTERNAL_PORT=3001
 # Logging — written to BOTH the console and a log file (default <server>/logs/app.log).
 LOG_LEVEL=debug         # console verbosity: error | warn | info | debug
 FILE_LOG_LEVEL=debug    # file verbosity
@@ -77,8 +81,11 @@ CLIENT_ORIGIN=http://localhost:5173
 # Discord bot — internal API (server <-> bot/). BOT_INTERNAL_KEY MUST be
 # byte-for-byte identical to the same variable in bot/.env.example — it is the
 # only auth on both sides' /internal/* routes, so a mismatch silently breaks
-# every server<->bot call with 401s. The Discord bot TOKEN itself is not an env
-# var — it's entered in the admin panel (Discord Bot page) and stored
+# every server<->bot call with 401s. It also guards the server's
+# /internal/bot-config route, which returns the DECRYPTED Discord token: with
+# NODE_ENV=production the app REFUSES TO START if this is blank, a documented
+# placeholder, or shorter than 16 chars (a warning only in dev). The Discord bot
+# TOKEN itself is not an env var — it's entered in the admin panel and stored
 # encrypted in the DB (see the bot_config table / SECRET_ENC_KEY above).
 BOT_INTERNAL_URL=http://localhost:4100
 BOT_INTERNAL_KEY=dev-only-change-me-bot-key

server/db/schema.sql

@@ -6,9 +6,12 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (
   id            INT AUTO_INCREMENT PRIMARY KEY,
   username      VARCHAR(32)  NOT NULL UNIQUE,
   password_hash VARCHAR(72)  NOT NULL,
-  role          ENUM('admin','editor') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'admin',
+  role          ENUM('admin','editor','moderator') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'admin',
   totp_secret   VARCHAR(64)  NULL,          -- base32 TOTP secret (opt-in 2FA)
   totp_enabled  TINYINT(1)   NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+  -- Any session token issued before this instant is rejected (see requireAuth).
+  -- Bumped on password change / "log out everywhere". NULL = no cutoff yet.
+  tokens_valid_after DATETIME NULL,
   created_at    DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
   last_login_at DATETIME NULL
 ) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4;
@@ -176,6 +179,22 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS mobile_refresh_tokens (
   INDEX idx_mrt_expires (expires_at)
 ) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4;
 
+-- Denylist of revoked web/cookie session tokens, keyed on the JWT `jti` minted
+-- per session in createSession. A single logout adds this session's jti here;
+-- requireAuth rejects any token whose jti is present. Rows self-expire: expires_at
+-- mirrors the token's own exp, after which the JWT fails verification anyway, so
+-- the row is dead weight and gets pruned. "Log out everywhere" / password change
+-- do NOT use this table — they bump users.tokens_valid_after instead (one row vs.
+-- one-per-session). This is the web/cookie analogue of mobile_refresh_tokens.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS revoked_sessions (
+  jti        CHAR(36) PRIMARY KEY,           -- the session's JWT jti (uuid v4)
+  user_id    INT NULL,
+  expires_at DATETIME NOT NULL,              -- mirrors the token exp (prune after)
+  revoked_at DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  CONSTRAINT fk_revoked_sessions_user FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+  INDEX idx_revoked_sessions_expires (expires_at)
+) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4;
+
 -- Discord bot control (Phase 1). Singleton row (id = 1) holding the bot's
 -- config — the token is encrypted at rest (bot_token_enc) the same way OAuth
 -- client secrets are, and is only ever decrypted server-side to push to the
@@ -349,6 +368,83 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS invite_log (
   INDEX idx_invite_log_guild (guild_id, created_at)
 ) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4;
 
+-- Guild member join/leave events (Phase 6b). Powers the dashboard's joins/leaves
+-- feeds and the invite-usage view. Bot-owned (written by bot/src/discord/
+-- guildMemberAdd.js + guildMemberRemove.js). For joins, invite_code/inviter_*
+-- record which invite was used when the bot could attribute it (best-effort, see
+-- bot/src/discord/inviteTracker.js) — NULL when undeterminable or for leaves.
+-- These are member lifecycle events, not moderation actions, hence separate from
+-- mod_actions.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS member_events (
+  id              INT AUTO_INCREMENT PRIMARY KEY,
+  guild_id        VARCHAR(32)  NOT NULL,
+  event_type      ENUM('join','leave') NOT NULL,
+  discord_user_id VARCHAR(32)  NOT NULL,
+  username        VARCHAR(120) NULL,
+  invite_code     VARCHAR(20)  NULL,
+  inviter_id      VARCHAR(32)  NULL,
+  inviter_tag     VARCHAR(120) NULL,
+  created_at      DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  INDEX idx_member_events_guild (guild_id, created_at),
+  INDEX idx_member_events_user (guild_id, discord_user_id, created_at),
+  INDEX idx_member_events_invite (guild_id, invite_code)
+) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4;
+
+-- Automated content-filter hits (Phase 6b): one row per message the word filter
+-- or the foreign-invite filter deleted. Separate from mod_actions (which still
+-- records the resulting warn/mute) so the dashboard can show filter volume in
+-- its own right. `matched` holds the offending word (word hits) or the blocked
+-- invite code (invite hits); `action_taken` is what the pipeline did. Bot-owned
+-- (bot/src/discord/messageFilter.js).
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS filter_hits (
+  id              INT AUTO_INCREMENT PRIMARY KEY,
+  guild_id        VARCHAR(32)  NOT NULL,
+  hit_type        ENUM('word','invite') NOT NULL,
+  discord_user_id VARCHAR(32)  NOT NULL,
+  username        VARCHAR(120) NULL,
+  channel_id      VARCHAR(32)  NULL,
+  matched         VARCHAR(200) NULL,
+  action_taken    ENUM('delete','warn','mute') NOT NULL,
+  created_at      DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  INDEX idx_filter_hits_guild (guild_id, created_at),
+  INDEX idx_filter_hits_user (guild_id, discord_user_id, created_at)
+) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4;
+
+-- Automated spam-detection hits (Phase 6b): rate-limit / mass-mention /
+-- mass-emoji triggers. As with filter_hits, mod_actions still logs the resulting
+-- warn; this records the detection itself for the dashboard's spam feed.
+-- Bot-owned (bot/src/discord/messageFilter.js via bot/src/filter/spamFilter.js).
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS spam_hits (
+  id              INT AUTO_INCREMENT PRIMARY KEY,
+  guild_id        VARCHAR(32)  NOT NULL,
+  spam_type       ENUM('rate_limit','mass_mention','mass_emoji') NOT NULL,
+  discord_user_id VARCHAR(32)  NOT NULL,
+  username        VARCHAR(120) NULL,
+  channel_id      VARCHAR(32)  NULL,
+  created_at      DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  INDEX idx_spam_hits_guild (guild_id, created_at),
+  INDEX idx_spam_hits_user (guild_id, discord_user_id, created_at)
+) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4;
+
+-- Staff notes on a Discord user, surfaced in the admin moderation dashboard
+-- (Phase 6). Unlike the tables above, this one is SERVER-owned — it is written
+-- and read only by the main site (moderation.controller), never by the bot.
+-- Keyed by discord_user_id (a snowflake, matching mod_actions.target_user_id) so
+-- notes attach to a Discord identity even when it has no linked site account.
+-- Notes are never user-visible; admin_only notes are further restricted to the
+-- admin role (moderators see staff_only only) — enforced in the query layer.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS mod_notes (
+  id              INT AUTO_INCREMENT PRIMARY KEY,
+  discord_user_id VARCHAR(32)  NOT NULL,
+  author_user_id  INT          NULL,
+  author_tag      VARCHAR(120) NULL,
+  body            TEXT         NOT NULL,
+  visibility      ENUM('staff_only','admin_only') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'staff_only',
+  created_at      DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+  CONSTRAINT fk_mod_notes_author FOREIGN KEY (author_user_id) REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
+  INDEX idx_mod_notes_user (discord_user_id, created_at)
+) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4;
+
 -- Migrations for databases created before the wiki upgrade. Each statement uses
 -- IF NOT EXISTS so re-running on every boot is a harmless no-op. New installs get
 -- these columns from the CREATE TABLE above; existing installs get them here.
@@ -357,6 +453,12 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS invite_log (
 -- Opt-in TOTP two-factor columns for databases created before login hardening.
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS totp_secret VARCHAR(64) NULL;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS totp_enabled TINYINT(1) NOT NULL DEFAULT 0;
+-- Session-revocation cutoff for databases created before token revocation landed.
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS tokens_valid_after DATETIME NULL;
+-- Moderation dashboard (Phase 6): add the 'moderator' role to databases created
+-- before it. MODIFY has no IF NOT EXISTS form, but re-declaring the same ENUM is
+-- an idempotent no-op, so it is safe to run on every boot.
+ALTER TABLE users MODIFY COLUMN role ENUM('admin','editor','moderator') NOT NULL DEFAULT 'admin';
 
 ALTER TABLE wiki_pages ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS excerpt VARCHAR(400) NULL;
 ALTER TABLE wiki_pages ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS category_id INT NULL;

server/src/auth/session.middleware.js

@@ -15,6 +15,18 @@ const sessionService = require('./session.service')
 const users = require('../model/users/users.model')
 const log = require('../utils/logger')('session')
 
+// True if this session was issued at or before the user's tokens_valid_after
+// cutoff (i.e. revoked by a password change / log-out-everywhere). Both the JWT
+// iat and the cutoff are second-granular, so the comparison is inclusive: a token
+// minted in the same second as the bump must still be revoked (otherwise it would
+// survive its full lifetime through that 1s alignment). The only cost is that a
+// re-login within the same second as the change is rejected until the next second
+// — a self-healing blip, and far preferable to leaving a stale token valid.
+function isBeforeCutoff(session, tokensValidAfter) {
+  if (!tokensValidAfter || session.createdAt == null) return false
+  return session.createdAt <= new Date(tokensValidAfter).getTime()
+}
+
 // Best-effort: if the request carries a valid session token, attach the decoded
 // session (no DB hit), its auth method, and request metadata. Never rejects —
 // anonymous requests simply pass through with req.session undefined.
@@ -38,6 +50,18 @@ async function requireAuth(req, res, next) {
   try {
     const user = await users.getById(session.userId)
     if (!user) return res.status(401).json({ message: 'Unauthorized' }) // deleted since token issued
+
+    // Revocation, enforced here (not in stateless token verification):
+    //   1. per-user cutoff — password change / "log out everywhere" bumps
+    //      tokens_valid_after; any token issued before it is dead.
+    //   2. per-session denylist — a single logout adds this jti to revoked_sessions.
+    if (isBeforeCutoff(session, user.tokens_valid_after)) {
+      return res.status(401).json({ message: 'Unauthorized' })
+    }
+    if (await sessionService.isSessionRevoked(session.sessionId)) {
+      return res.status(401).json({ message: 'Unauthorized' })
+    }
+
     req.user = user
     req.session = session
     req.authMethod = session.authMethod

server/src/auth/session.service.js

@@ -14,16 +14,20 @@
 //     role,
 //     authMethod,  // 'local' | 'totp' | 'mobile' | 'sso'
 //     createdAt,   // ms epoch the token was issued (JWT iat)
+//     expiresAt,   // ms epoch the token expires (JWT exp), or null
 //     lastSeenAt,  // ms epoch this session was last validated
 //   }
 //
-// NOTE: revocation/invalidation are stubs. JWTs are stateless, so there is no
-// server-side session store yet — these are documented hook points for a future
-// store (e.g. a denylist of jti, or mobile refresh-token records).
+// Revocation for web/cookie sessions is backed by two stores: a per-session jti
+// denylist (revoked_sessions — single logout) and a per-user cutoff
+// (users.tokens_valid_after — password change / log out everywhere). requireAuth
+// consults both. The functions here are the seam the controllers call.
 
 const crypto = require('crypto')
 
 const token = require('./token')
+const revokedSessions = require('../model/revokedSessions/revokedSessions.model')
+const users = require('../model/users/users.model')
 const log = require('../utils/logger')('session')
 
 // Valid authentication methods. 'local'/'totp' are the web flows; 'mobile' is the
@@ -32,10 +36,24 @@ const log = require('../utils/logger')('session')
 // authenticated without changing this module per provider.
 const AUTH_METHODS = ['local', 'totp', 'mobile', 'google', 'discord', 'oidc', 'sso']
 
+// The claim that positively marks a token as a real, full session. Every JWT in
+// the app is signed with the same secret and is distinguished only by claims, so
+// a session must be identified by what it *is* (typ === 'session'), never by the
+// mere absence of some other marker. Only the session-minting paths below stamp
+// it; flow/challenge tokens (the TOTP challenge, the SSO transaction cookie) do
+// not, so — even though they verify against the same secret — they can never be
+// mistaken for a session. See issue #32 (sso_tx token-type confusion).
+const SESSION_TYP = 'session'
+
 // Build a Session object from a decoded JWT payload. Returns null for anything
-// that is not a full session (e.g. a stage-tagged TOTP challenge token).
+// that is not a full session. Validation is positively typed: a token qualifies
+// only if it was explicitly minted as a session. As belt-and-suspenders we also
+// reject any token carrying a non-session marker (stage = TOTP challenge, kind =
+// SSO transaction), so a future minting path that forgets to omit those still
+// can't produce an accepted session.
 function sessionFromDecoded(decoded, now = Date.now()) {
-  if (!decoded || decoded.stage) return null
+  if (!decoded || decoded.typ !== SESSION_TYP) return null
+  if (decoded.stage || decoded.kind) return null
   return {
     sessionId: decoded.jti || null,
     userId: decoded.id,
@@ -43,6 +61,7 @@ function sessionFromDecoded(decoded, now = Date.now()) {
     role: decoded.role,
     authMethod: decoded.authMethod || 'local',
     createdAt: decoded.iat ? decoded.iat * 1000 : null,
+    expiresAt: decoded.exp ? decoded.exp * 1000 : null,
     lastSeenAt: now,
   }
 }
@@ -56,7 +75,7 @@ function sessionFromDecoded(decoded, now = Date.now()) {
 function createSession(user, authMethod = 'local') {
   const method = AUTH_METHODS.includes(authMethod) ? authMethod : 'local'
   const sessionId = crypto.randomUUID()
-  const raw = token.signToken(user, { authMethod: method, jti: sessionId })
+  const raw = token.signToken(user, { authMethod: method, jti: sessionId, typ: SESSION_TYP })
   const session = sessionFromDecoded(token.verifyToken(raw))
   log.info('session created', { userId: user.id, username: user.username, authMethod: method, sessionId })
   return { token: raw, session }
@@ -124,7 +143,7 @@ function mintMobileTokens(user, meta = {}, now = Date.now()) {
   const sessionId = crypto.randomUUID()
   const accessToken = token.signToken(
     user,
-    { authMethod: 'mobile', jti: sessionId },
+    { authMethod: 'mobile', jti: sessionId, typ: SESSION_TYP },
     { expiresIn: MOBILE_ACCESS_TTL },
   )
   // 256 bits of entropy, url-safe. Opaque — carries no claims.
@@ -179,23 +198,52 @@ function sessionMeta(req) {
   return { ip, userAgent, deviceHash }
 }
 
-// ── Revocation / invalidation (stubs) ──────────────────────────────────────
-// JWTs are stateless: there is no store to revoke against yet. These are the
-// hook points a future session store (jti denylist, mobile refresh records)
-// will implement. They log and report success so callers can wire them in now.
+// ── Revocation / invalidation ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Web/cookie sessions are JWTs, so revocation is enforced by requireAuth reading
+// two server-side stores these functions write:
+//   • revoked_sessions — a per-session jti denylist (single logout)
+//   • users.tokens_valid_after — a per-user cutoff (log out everywhere)
+// A jti + its expiry (from the decoded token) are needed to denylist one session;
+// invalidating all of a user's sessions only needs their id.
 
-function revokeSession(sessionId) {
-  log.info('revokeSession (stub — no session store yet)', { sessionId })
+// Revoke a single session by its jti. Needs the token's expiry so the denylist
+// row can self-prune once the JWT would fail verification anyway. Idempotent.
+async function revokeSession(sessionId, { userId = null, expiresAt } = {}) {
+  if (!sessionId) {
+    log.warn('revokeSession called without a sessionId (jti) — nothing to revoke')
+    return false
+  }
+  // Fall back to the max JWT lifetime if the caller didn't pass the token's exp,
+  // so the denylist row still outlives any token carrying this jti.
+  const exp = expiresAt || Date.now() + token.cookieMaxAge()
+  await revokedSessions.revoke({ jti: sessionId, userId, expiresAt: exp })
+  log.info('session revoked', { sessionId, userId })
   return true
 }
 
-function invalidateSession(sessionId) {
-  log.info('invalidateSession (stub — no session store yet)', { sessionId })
-  return true
+// Alias kept for callers that speak of "invalidating" one session.
+async function invalidateSession(sessionId, opts) {
+  return revokeSession(sessionId, opts)
 }
 
-function invalidateAllUserSessions(userId) {
-  log.info('invalidateAllUserSessions (stub — no session store yet)', { userId })
+// Has this session (jti) been individually revoked? Used by requireAuth on every
+// authenticated request. Broad "valid after" cutoffs are checked separately by
+// the middleware against the fresh user row it already loads.
+async function isSessionRevoked(sessionId) {
+  if (!sessionId) return false
+  return revokedSessions.isRevoked(sessionId)
+}
+
+// Invalidate every session a user holds (password change / log out everywhere)
+// by advancing their tokens_valid_after cutoff. Covers cookie sessions issued
+// before now regardless of jti.
+async function invalidateAllUserSessions(userId) {
+  if (!userId) {
+    log.warn('invalidateAllUserSessions called without a userId')
+    return false
+  }
+  await users.invalidateSessions(userId)
+  log.info('all user sessions invalidated', { userId })
   return true
 }
 
@@ -209,6 +257,7 @@ module.exports = {
   sessionMeta,
   revokeSession,
   invalidateSession,
+  isSessionRevoked,
   invalidateAllUserSessions,
   // Mobile bearer sessions.
   createMobileSession,

server/src/auth/ssoState.js

@@ -19,6 +19,14 @@ const token = require('./token')
 const TX_COOKIE = 'sso_tx'
 const TX_TTL = '10m' // a login round-trip is quick; abandon after 10 minutes
 
+// Second leg of an SSO login for an account that has TOTP enabled. The callback
+// authenticated the user with the IdP but must NOT bypass their second factor
+// (see issue #31), so instead of minting a session it stages this signed,
+// httpOnly cookie and routes the browser through the TOTP form — mirroring the
+// local password→TOTP gate. TTL matches the local challenge window.
+const TOTP_COOKIE = 'sso_totp'
+const TOTP_TTL = '5m'
+
 // base64url of random bytes — used for the nonce and the PKCE verifier.
 function randomUrlSafe(bytes = 32) {
   return crypto.randomBytes(bytes).toString('base64url')
@@ -56,4 +64,38 @@ function verifyTx(txToken, stateNonce) {
   return decoded
 }
 
-module.exports = { TX_COOKIE, TX_TTL, createTx, verifyTx, codeChallengeFor, randomUrlSafe }
+// Stage the pending second factor for an SSO login. Carries the context the
+// callback already resolved (userId, provider, authMethod, returnTo) so that
+// presenting a valid code alone finishes the login. It is deliberately NOT a
+// session: `stage: 'totp'` makes session validation reject it (same marker the
+// local TOTP challenge uses), and `kind: 'sso_totp'` both reinforces that and
+// scopes it to the SSO completion endpoint.
+function createTotpPending({ userId, provider, authMethod, returnTo }) {
+  return token.signToken(
+    { id: userId }, // subject only; identity is re-loaded fresh when the code is verified
+    { stage: 'totp', kind: 'sso_totp', provider, authMethod, returnTo },
+    { expiresIn: TOTP_TTL },
+  )
+}
+
+// Verify a pending-TOTP cookie. Returns the payload
+// ({ id, provider, authMethod, returnTo, ... }) or null if missing/expired/wrong-kind.
+function verifyTotpPending(pendingToken) {
+  if (!pendingToken) return null
+  const decoded = token.verifyToken(pendingToken)
+  if (!decoded || decoded.stage !== 'totp' || decoded.kind !== 'sso_totp') return null
+  return decoded
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  TX_COOKIE,
+  TX_TTL,
+  TOTP_COOKIE,
+  TOTP_TTL,
+  createTx,
+  verifyTx,
+  createTotpPending,
+  verifyTotpPending,
+  codeChallengeFor,
+  randomUrlSafe,
+}

server/src/internalApp.js

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+// Standalone Express app for server<->bot internal traffic. It is mounted on its
+// OWN http listener (INTERNAL_PORT, default 3001) in server.js — an unpublished,
+// compose-network-only port, mirroring how the bot exposes its internal API on
+// 4100. Crucially it is NOT part of the public API app (app.js), so /internal/*
+// (which returns the DECRYPTED Discord bot token) can never ride the same
+// listener Pangolin proxies to the world. Shared-secret gated by
+// requireInternalKey inside internal.routes. See issue #33.
+const express = require('express')
+
+const internalRouter = require('./router/v1/internal/internal.routes')
+
+const internalApp = express()
+
+internalApp.use(express.json())
+
+// Liveness probe for this listener (no secret required); mirrors the bot's
+// /health on 4100. Useful for compose healthchecks without exposing anything.
+internalApp.get('/health', (req, res) => res.json({ status: 'ok' }))
+
+// requireInternalKey is applied inside internal.routes.
+internalApp.use('/internal', internalRouter)
+
+// Anything else on this listener is not a real internal route.
+internalApp.use((req, res) => res.status(404).json({ message: 'Not found' }))
+
+module.exports = internalApp

server/src/model/modNotes/modNotes.db.js

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+// Staff notes on a Discord user (server-owned, see db/schema.sql mod_notes).
+// Notes are never user-visible; admin_only notes are filtered out for non-admin
+// callers at this layer via includeAdminOnly.
+const { query } = require('../../utils/db')
+
+async function listForUser(discordId, { includeAdminOnly = false } = {}) {
+  const visClause = includeAdminOnly ? '' : "AND n.visibility = 'staff_only'"
+  return query(
+    `SELECT n.id, n.discord_user_id, n.author_user_id, n.author_tag,
+            n.body, n.visibility, n.created_at,
+            u.username AS author_username
+       FROM mod_notes n
+       LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = n.author_user_id
+      WHERE n.discord_user_id = ? ${visClause}
+      ORDER BY n.id DESC`,
+    [discordId],
+  )
+}
+
+async function insert({ discordUserId, authorUserId = null, authorTag = null, body, visibility = 'staff_only' }) {
+  const res = await query(
+    `INSERT INTO mod_notes (discord_user_id, author_user_id, author_tag, body, visibility)
+     VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
+    [discordUserId, authorUserId, authorTag, body, visibility],
+  )
+  return res.insertId
+}
+
+async function getById(id) {
+  const rows = await query(
+    `SELECT n.id, n.discord_user_id, n.author_user_id, n.author_tag,
+            n.body, n.visibility, n.created_at,
+            u.username AS author_username
+       FROM mod_notes n
+       LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = n.author_user_id
+      WHERE n.id = ? LIMIT 1`,
+    [id],
+  )
+  return rows[0] || null
+}
+
+async function countForUser(discordId, { includeAdminOnly = false } = {}) {
+  const visClause = includeAdminOnly ? '' : "AND visibility = 'staff_only'"
+  const rows = await query(
+    `SELECT COUNT(*) AS c FROM mod_notes WHERE discord_user_id = ? ${visClause}`,
+    [discordId],
+  )
+  return Number(rows[0].c)
+}
+
+module.exports = { listForUser, insert, getById, countForUser }

server/src/model/modNotes/modNotes.model.js

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+const modNotesDb = require('./modNotes.db')
+
+async function listForUser(discordId, { includeAdminOnly = false } = {}) {
+  return modNotesDb.listForUser(discordId, { includeAdminOnly })
+}
+
+async function add({ discordUserId, author, body, visibility = 'staff_only' }) {
+  const id = await modNotesDb.insert({
+    discordUserId,
+    authorUserId: author ? author.id : null,
+    authorTag: author ? author.username : null,
+    body,
+    visibility,
+  })
+  return modNotesDb.getById(id)
+}
+
+module.exports = { listForUser, add }

server/src/model/moderation/moderation.db.js

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+// Read-only access to the bot-owned moderation tables (mod_actions) for the
+// admin moderation dashboard (Phase 6). These tables are normally owned by the
+// bot process (bot/src/db.js) — see the comment in db/schema.sql — but they live
+// in the same physical database, so the site reads them directly through the
+// shared pool rather than round-tripping the bot over the internal API. This
+// module NEVER writes them; all writes still belong to the bot.
+//
+// mod_actions is the single source of truth for ban/kick/mute/warn (every warn
+// command also mirrors into `warnings`, so counting mod_actions avoids double
+// counting). Accounts are correlated to Discord ids via user_identities
+// (provider='discord', subject=<snowflake>), the same link the SSO flow writes.
+const { query } = require('../../utils/db')
+
+const TYPES = ['ban', 'kick', 'mute', 'warn']
+
+// Per-type counts across three nested windows in a single scan. Boolean
+// comparisons yield 1/0 in MariaDB, so SUM(created_at >= cutoff) counts the
+// rows inside each window. Returns raw rows: [{ action_type, d1, d7, d30 }].
+async function countsByWindow({ cutoff24h, cutoff7d, cutoff30d }) {
+  return query(
+    `SELECT action_type,
+            SUM(created_at >= ?) AS d1,
+            SUM(created_at >= ?) AS d7,
+            SUM(created_at >= ?) AS d30
+       FROM mod_actions
+      WHERE created_at >= ?
+      GROUP BY action_type`,
+    [cutoff24h, cutoff7d, cutoff30d, cutoff30d],
+  )
+}
+
+const ACTION_SELECT = `
+  SELECT ma.id, ma.guild_id, ma.action_type,
+         ma.target_user_id, ma.target_tag,
+         ma.staff_user_id, ma.staff_tag,
+         ma.reason, ma.duration_seconds, ma.created_at,
+         ui.user_id AS target_site_user_id,
+         u.username AS target_site_username
+    FROM mod_actions ma
+    LEFT JOIN user_identities ui
+      ON ui.provider = 'discord' AND ui.subject = ma.target_user_id
+    LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = ui.user_id`
+
+// Most-recent-first action feed, optionally filtered by type. limit/offset
+// pagination matching the activity-log convention.
+async function recentActions({ type = null, limit = 50, offset = 0 } = {}) {
+  const where = type ? 'WHERE ma.action_type = ?' : ''
+  const params = type ? [type, limit, offset] : [limit, offset]
+  return query(`${ACTION_SELECT} ${where} ORDER BY ma.id DESC LIMIT ? OFFSET ?`, params)
+}
+
+// Full action history for one Discord user, optionally filtered by type.
+async function userActions(discordId, { type = null, limit = 50, offset = 0 } = {}) {
+  const where = type
+    ? 'WHERE ma.target_user_id = ? AND ma.action_type = ?'
+    : 'WHERE ma.target_user_id = ?'
+  const params = type ? [discordId, type, limit, offset] : [discordId, limit, offset]
+  return query(`${ACTION_SELECT} ${where} ORDER BY ma.id DESC LIMIT ? OFFSET ?`, params)
+}
+
+// All-time per-type counts for one user.
+async function userCounts(discordId) {
+  return query(
+    `SELECT action_type, COUNT(*) AS c FROM mod_actions
+      WHERE target_user_id = ? GROUP BY action_type`,
+    [discordId],
+  )
+}
+
+// Latest username snapshot the bot recorded for this Discord id (usernames drift).
+async function latestTag(discordId) {
+  const rows = await query(
+    'SELECT target_tag FROM mod_actions WHERE target_user_id = ? ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT 1',
+    [discordId],
+  )
+  return rows[0] ? rows[0].target_tag : null
+}
+
+// Linked site account for a Discord id, if any (via user_identities).
+async function linkedAccount(discordId) {
+  const rows = await query(
+    `SELECT u.id, u.username, u.role
+       FROM user_identities ui
+       JOIN users u ON u.id = ui.user_id
+      WHERE ui.provider = 'discord' AND ui.subject = ?
+      LIMIT 1`,
+    [discordId],
+  )
+  return rows[0] || null
+}
+
+// ── Phase 6b: member events + filter/spam hits (bot-owned, read-only) ──
+
+// Join/leave counts per window (grouped by event_type).
+async function memberCountsByWindow({ cutoff24h, cutoff7d, cutoff30d }) {
+  return query(
+    `SELECT event_type,
+            SUM(created_at >= ?) AS d1,
+            SUM(created_at >= ?) AS d7,
+            SUM(created_at >= ?) AS d30
+       FROM member_events
+      WHERE created_at >= ?
+      GROUP BY event_type`,
+    [cutoff24h, cutoff7d, cutoff30d, cutoff30d],
+  )
+}
+
+// Attributed-invite join counts per window (joins whose invite we identified).
+async function inviteJoinCountsByWindow({ cutoff24h, cutoff7d, cutoff30d }) {
+  const rows = await query(
+    `SELECT SUM(created_at >= ?) AS d1, SUM(created_at >= ?) AS d7, SUM(created_at >= ?) AS d30
+       FROM member_events
+      WHERE event_type = 'join' AND invite_code IS NOT NULL AND created_at >= ?`,
+    [cutoff24h, cutoff7d, cutoff30d, cutoff30d],
+  )
+  return rows[0]
+}
+
+// Row-count per window for a simple event table. `table` is an internal literal
+// ('filter_hits' | 'spam_hits'), never user input — see the caller allowlist.
+async function tableCountsByWindow(table, { cutoff24h, cutoff7d, cutoff30d }) {
+  const rows = await query(
+    `SELECT SUM(created_at >= ?) AS d1, SUM(created_at >= ?) AS d7, SUM(created_at >= ?) AS d30
+       FROM ${table} WHERE created_at >= ?`,
+    [cutoff24h, cutoff7d, cutoff30d, cutoff30d],
+  )
+  return rows[0]
+}
+
+async function recentMemberEvents({ type = null, limit = 50, offset = 0 } = {}) {
+  const where = type ? 'WHERE event_type = ?' : ''
+  const params = type ? [type, limit, offset] : [limit, offset]
+  return query(
+    `SELECT id, guild_id, event_type, discord_user_id, username, invite_code, inviter_id, inviter_tag, created_at
+       FROM member_events ${where} ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT ? OFFSET ?`,
+    params,
+  )
+}
+
+async function recentFilterHits({ limit = 50, offset = 0 } = {}) {
+  return query(
+    `SELECT id, guild_id, hit_type, discord_user_id, username, channel_id, matched, action_taken, created_at
+       FROM filter_hits ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT ? OFFSET ?`,
+    [limit, offset],
+  )
+}
+
+async function recentSpamHits({ limit = 50, offset = 0 } = {}) {
+  return query(
+    `SELECT id, guild_id, spam_type, discord_user_id, username, channel_id, created_at
+       FROM spam_hits ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT ? OFFSET ?`,
+    [limit, offset],
+  )
+}
+
+// User-lookup: match a Discord id exactly, or a username snapshot (target_tag)
+// by prefix, returning the most recently seen distinct targets. Powers the
+// dashboard search box (usernames drift, so we search historical snapshots too).
+async function searchTargets(term, { limit = 20 } = {}) {
+  return query(
+    `SELECT ma.target_user_id, MAX(ma.target_tag) AS target_tag,
+            COUNT(*) AS action_count, MAX(ma.created_at) AS last_seen
+       FROM mod_actions ma
+      WHERE ma.target_user_id = ? OR ma.target_tag LIKE ?
+      GROUP BY ma.target_user_id
+      ORDER BY last_seen DESC
+      LIMIT ?`,
+    [term, `${term}%`, limit],
+  )
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  TYPES,
+  countsByWindow,
+  recentActions,
+  userActions,
+  userCounts,
+  latestTag,
+  linkedAccount,
+  searchTargets,
+  // Phase 6b
+  memberCountsByWindow,
+  inviteJoinCountsByWindow,
+  tableCountsByWindow,
+  recentMemberEvents,
+  recentFilterHits,
+  recentSpamHits,
+}

server/src/model/moderation/moderation.model.js

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+// Business logic for the moderation dashboard: reshapes the raw mod_actions
+// reads into the shapes the admin UI consumes, and annotates each action with
+// whether it was an automated (bot) action. For a Discord bot the application_id
+// IS the bot's user id, and the filter/spam pipeline records automated actions
+// with staff_user_id = the bot user (see bot/src/discord/messageFilter.js), so
+// staff_user_id === bot_config.application_id reliably flags automated actions
+// without needing new columns on mod_actions.
+const moderationDb = require('./moderation.db')
+const botConfigDb = require('../botConfig/botConfig.db')
+const { zeroCounts, annotate, reshapeWindows, windowValue } = require('./moderation.pure')
+
+const DAY_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000
+const WINDOW_KEYS = ['24h', '7d', '30d']
+
+async function botApplicationId() {
+  try {
+    const cfg = await botConfigDb.get()
+    return cfg ? cfg.application_id : null
+  } catch {
+    return null
+  }
+}
+
+// Counts by type across 24h / 7d / 30d windows for the overview tiles. Covers
+// moderation actions (mod_actions) plus the Phase 6b event streams: member
+// joins/leaves, attributed invite joins, and filter/spam hits.
+async function summary() {
+  const now = Date.now()
+  const cutoffs = {
+    cutoff24h: new Date(now - DAY_MS),
+    cutoff7d: new Date(now - 7 * DAY_MS),
+    cutoff30d: new Date(now - 30 * DAY_MS),
+  }
+
+  const [modRows, memberRows, inviteRow, filterRow, spamRow] = await Promise.all([
+    moderationDb.countsByWindow(cutoffs),
+    moderationDb.memberCountsByWindow(cutoffs),
+    moderationDb.inviteJoinCountsByWindow(cutoffs),
+    moderationDb.tableCountsByWindow('filter_hits', cutoffs),
+    moderationDb.tableCountsByWindow('spam_hits', cutoffs),
+  ])
+
+  const windows = reshapeWindows(modRows).windows
+  const joinRow = memberRows.find((r) => r.event_type === 'join')
+  const leaveRow = memberRows.find((r) => r.event_type === 'leave')
+  for (const w of WINDOW_KEYS) {
+    windows[w].joins = windowValue(joinRow, w)
+    windows[w].leaves = windowValue(leaveRow, w)
+    windows[w].invite_joins = windowValue(inviteRow, w)
+    windows[w].filter_hits = windowValue(filterRow, w)
+    windows[w].spam_hits = windowValue(spamRow, w)
+  }
+  return { windows }
+}
+
+// Recent event feeds for the overview's secondary panel (Phase 6b).
+async function members(opts) {
+  return moderationDb.recentMemberEvents(opts)
+}
+async function filterHits(opts) {
+  return moderationDb.recentFilterHits(opts)
+}
+async function spamHits(opts) {
+  return moderationDb.recentSpamHits(opts)
+}
+
+async function recent(opts) {
+  const appId = await botApplicationId()
+  return annotate(await moderationDb.recentActions(opts), appId)
+}
+
+async function userActions(discordId, opts) {
+  const appId = await botApplicationId()
+  return annotate(await moderationDb.userActions(discordId, opts), appId)
+}
+
+// Header data for the per-user history page: latest known tag, linked site
+// account (if any), and all-time counts per action type.
+async function userSummary(discordId) {
+  const [countRows, tag, linked] = await Promise.all([
+    moderationDb.userCounts(discordId),
+    moderationDb.latestTag(discordId),
+    moderationDb.linkedAccount(discordId),
+  ])
+  const counts = zeroCounts()
+  let total = 0
+  for (const row of countRows) {
+    const c = Number(row.c) || 0
+    if (counts[row.action_type] !== undefined) counts[row.action_type] = c
+    total += c
+  }
+  return {
+    discord_user_id: discordId,
+    tag,
+    linked_account: linked,
+    counts,
+    total_actions: total,
+  }
+}
+
+async function search(term, opts) {
+  return moderationDb.searchTargets(term, opts)
+}
+
+module.exports = { summary, recent, userActions, userSummary, search, members, filterHits, spamHits }

server/src/model/moderation/moderation.pure.js

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+// Pure reshaping/annotation helpers for the moderation dashboard, deliberately
+// free of any DB (or other side-effecting) imports so they can be unit-tested
+// without opening a database pool. moderation.model re-exports these.
+
+function zeroCounts() {
+  return { ban: 0, kick: 0, mute: 0, warn: 0 }
+}
+
+// Tag each action as automated (staff is the bot) and fold the joined
+// user_identities columns into a linked_account object. The string coercion
+// matters — snowflakes can arrive as number or string from different columns.
+function annotate(rows, appId) {
+  return rows.map((r) => {
+    const isAutomated = appId != null && String(r.staff_user_id) === String(appId)
+    return {
+      ...r,
+      is_automated: isAutomated,
+      linked_account: r.target_site_user_id
+        ? { id: r.target_site_user_id, username: r.target_site_username }
+        : null,
+    }
+  })
+}
+
+// Fold the per-type window rows into the { windows: { '24h', '7d', '30d' } }
+// shape the dashboard tiles consume, zero-filling any type with no rows.
+function reshapeWindows(rows) {
+  const windows = { '24h': zeroCounts(), '7d': zeroCounts(), '30d': zeroCounts() }
+  for (const row of rows) {
+    const t = row.action_type
+    if (windows['24h'][t] === undefined) continue
+    windows['24h'][t] = Number(row.d1) || 0
+    windows['7d'][t] = Number(row.d7) || 0
+    windows['30d'][t] = Number(row.d30) || 0
+  }
+  return { windows }
+}
+
+// Pull the count for one window key ('24h'|'7d'|'30d') out of a
+// { d1, d7, d30 } sum row, coercing to a number and tolerating a null row.
+function windowValue(row, key) {
+  if (!row) return 0
+  const col = key === '24h' ? row.d1 : key === '7d' ? row.d7 : row.d30
+  return Number(col) || 0
+}
+
+module.exports = { zeroCounts, annotate, reshapeWindows, windowValue }

server/src/model/revokedSessions/revokedSessions.db.js

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+const { query } = require('../../utils/db')
+
+// SQL for the revoked_sessions denylist. Rows are keyed on a session's JWT `jti`
+// and carry the token's own expiry so they can be pruned once the underlying JWT
+// would fail verification anyway. This is the web/cookie analogue of
+// mobile_refresh_tokens (opaque, DB-stored, revocable).
+
+// Add a jti to the denylist. INSERT IGNORE makes a repeat logout of the same
+// session a harmless no-op (the PK already exists). Returns rows changed.
+async function add({ jti, userId = null, expiresAt }) {
+  const res = await query(
+    `INSERT IGNORE INTO revoked_sessions (jti, user_id, expires_at)
+     VALUES (?, ?, ?)`,
+    [jti, userId, new Date(expiresAt)],
+  )
+  return Number(res.affectedRows || 0)
+}
+
+// True if this jti is on the denylist and not yet past its stored expiry. Past
+// expiry the token itself is already invalid, so a lingering row need not match.
+async function isRevoked(jti) {
+  if (!jti) return false
+  const rows = await query(
+    'SELECT 1 FROM revoked_sessions WHERE jti = ? AND expires_at > NOW() LIMIT 1',
+    [jti],
+  )
+  return rows.length > 0
+}
+
+// Housekeeping: drop rows whose token has already expired. Returns rows removed.
+async function pruneExpired() {
+  const res = await query('DELETE FROM revoked_sessions WHERE expires_at < NOW()')
+  return Number(res.affectedRows || 0)
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  add,
+  isRevoked,
+  pruneExpired,
+}

server/src/model/revokedSessions/revokedSessions.model.js

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+// Web/cookie session denylist. Thin logic layer over revokedSessions.db — mirrors
+// the users/mobileSessions split (.db = SQL, .model = the API the rest of the app
+// calls). A "revoked session" is a single JWT jti added on logout; requireAuth
+// checks isRevoked on every authenticated request. Broad invalidation
+// ("everywhere" / password change) does NOT live here — it bumps
+// users.tokens_valid_after instead.
+
+const db = require('./revokedSessions.db')
+
+// Add a session's jti to the denylist (single-session logout). Idempotent.
+async function revoke({ jti, userId, expiresAt }) {
+  return db.add({ jti, userId, expiresAt })
+}
+
+// True if the given jti has been revoked (and its token hasn't expired yet).
+async function isRevoked(jti) {
+  return db.isRevoked(jti)
+}
+
+// Drop denylist rows whose token has already expired.
+async function pruneExpired() {
+  return db.pruneExpired()
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  revoke,
+  isRevoked,
+  pruneExpired,
+}

server/src/model/users/users.db.js

@@ -54,6 +54,13 @@ async function touchLastLogin(id) {
   return query('UPDATE users SET last_login_at = NOW() WHERE id = ?', [id])
 }
 
+// Move the "tokens valid after" cutoff to now, invalidating every session token
+// issued before this instant (password change / log out everywhere). requireAuth
+// compares each session's issued-at against this column.
+async function bumpTokensValidAfter(id) {
+  return query('UPDATE users SET tokens_valid_after = NOW() WHERE id = ?', [id])
+}
+
 // Store a (not-yet-enabled) TOTP secret for a user. Enabling is a separate step
 // so a secret is never trusted until the user has confirmed one code.
 async function setTotpSecret(id, secret) {
@@ -78,6 +85,7 @@ module.exports = {
   countUsers,
   countAdmins,
   touchLastLogin,
+  bumpTokensValidAfter,
   setTotpSecret,
   enableTotp,
   disableTotp,

server/src/model/users/users.model.js

@@ -58,9 +58,18 @@ async function update(id, { username, password, role }) {
   if (role !== undefined) fields.role = role
   if (password) fields.password_hash = await bcrypt.hash(password, SALT_ROUNDS)
   await usersDb.updateUser(id, fields)
+  // A password change must revoke existing sessions ("change password to log
+  // everyone out"), so bump the cutoff whenever the hash was rotated.
+  if (password) await usersDb.bumpTokensValidAfter(id)
   return getById(id)
 }
 
+// Invalidate every session token this user currently holds ("log out everywhere")
+// by advancing their tokens_valid_after cutoff to now.
+async function invalidateSessions(id) {
+  return usersDb.bumpTokensValidAfter(id)
+}
+
 async function remove(id) {
   return usersDb.deleteUser(id)
 }
@@ -85,6 +94,7 @@ module.exports = {
   validatePassword,
   list,
   update,
+  invalidateSessions,
   remove,
   count,
   countAdmins,

server/src/router/v1/admin/admin.routes.js

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ const account = require('./account.controller')
 const botActivity = require('./botActivity.controller')
 const authProviders = require('./authProviders.controller')
 const discordBot = require('./discordBot.controller')
+const moderation = require('./moderation.controller')
 const { isLoggedIn, requireRole } = require('../../../utils/auth')
 const noindex = require('../../../middleware/noindex')
 const validate = require('../../../middleware/validate')
@@ -23,6 +24,11 @@ adminRouter.use(noindex, isLoggedIn)
 // management, site mode, and settings are restricted to the admin role.
 const adminOnly = requireRole('admin')
 
+// Moderation-dashboard gate. Moderators get the moderation views; admins can do
+// everything a moderator can. Sensitive writes (admin_only notes) add an extra
+// admin check inside the controller.
+const modAccess = requireRole('admin', 'moderator')
+
 // ── Account security (self-service, any logged-in role) ───────────────
 // Not behind adminOnly: an editor manages their own 2FA too.
 adminRouter.get(
@@ -30,7 +36,7 @@ adminRouter.get(
   // #swagger.tags = ['Admin · Account']
   // #swagger.summary = 'Get the current account (self)'
   // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
-  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'The account', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/User" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'The account', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/AccountStatus" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Not authenticated', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   account.getAccount,
 )
@@ -39,7 +45,7 @@ adminRouter.post(
   // #swagger.tags = ['Admin · Account']
   // #swagger.summary = 'Begin 2FA enrollment (returns secret + QR)'
   // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
-  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'otpauth URL and QR data to scan', content: { "application/json": { schema: { type: "object", properties: { otpauth_url: { type: "string" }, qr: { type: "string" } } } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'otpauth URL and QR data to scan', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/TotpSetup" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Not authenticated', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[409] = { description: 'Two-factor already enabled', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   account.totpSetup,
@@ -50,7 +56,7 @@ adminRouter.post(
   // #swagger.summary = 'Enable 2FA by confirming a code'
   // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
   /* #swagger.requestBody = { required: true, content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/TotpCodeRequest" } } } } */
-  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: '2FA enabled', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Message" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: '2FA enabled', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/TotpState" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[400] = { description: 'Setup not started, or invalid code', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Not authenticated', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[409] = { description: 'Two-factor already enabled', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
@@ -64,7 +70,7 @@ adminRouter.post(
   // #swagger.summary = 'Disable 2FA by confirming a code'
   // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
   /* #swagger.requestBody = { required: true, content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/TotpCodeRequest" } } } } */
-  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: '2FA disabled', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Message" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: '2FA disabled', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/TotpState" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[400] = { description: 'Not enabled, or invalid code', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Not authenticated', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   body('code').isString().trim().isLength({ min: 6, max: 8 }),
@@ -78,7 +84,7 @@ adminRouter.get(
   // #swagger.tags = ['Admin · Account']
   // #swagger.summary = 'List linked SSO identities (self)'
   // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
-  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Linked identities', content: { "application/json": { schema: { type: "array", items: { type: "object", properties: { provider: { type: "string" }, email: { type: "string" } } } } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Linked identities', content: { "application/json": { schema: { type: "array", items: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/LinkedIdentity" } } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Not authenticated', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   account.listIdentities,
 )
@@ -88,7 +94,7 @@ adminRouter.delete(
   // #swagger.summary = 'Unlink an SSO identity (self)'
   // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
   // #swagger.parameters['provider'] = { in: 'path', required: true, schema: { type: 'string' }, description: 'Provider id.' }
-  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Unlinked', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Message" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Unlinked', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/UnlinkedFlag" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Not authenticated', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[404] = { description: 'No linked account for that provider', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   param('provider').matches(/^[a-z0-9-]+$/),
@@ -136,7 +142,7 @@ adminRouter.get(
   // #swagger.tags = ['Admin · Dashboard']
   // #swagger.summary = 'Dashboard summary counts'
   // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
-  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Summary counts (posts, wiki, users, site mode)', content: { "application/json": { schema: { type: "object", additionalProperties: true } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Summary: site mode, last change, post/user counts and recent activity', content: { "application/json": { schema: { type: "object", properties: { site_mode: { type: "string", example: "live" }, last_change: { type: "object", properties: { at: { type: "string", nullable: true }, by: { type: "string", nullable: true } } }, counts: { type: "object", properties: { posts: { type: "object", additionalProperties: true }, users: { type: "integer" } } }, recent_activity: { type: "array", items: { type: "object", additionalProperties: true } } } } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Not authenticated', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   ctrl.dashboard,
 )
@@ -147,7 +153,7 @@ adminRouter.put(
   // #swagger.description = 'Switch the site between live and maintenance.'
   // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
   /* #swagger.requestBody = { required: true, content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/SiteModeRequest" } } } } */
-  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Updated site mode', content: { "application/json": { schema: { type: "object", properties: { mode: { type: "string", example: "maintenance" } } } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Updated site mode', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/SiteModeState" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[400] = { description: 'Validation error', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/ValidationError" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Not authenticated', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[403] = { description: 'Admin role required', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
@@ -257,7 +263,7 @@ adminRouter.delete(
   // #swagger.summary = 'Delete a post'
   // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
   // #swagger.parameters['id'] = { in: 'path', required: true, schema: { type: 'integer' }, description: 'Post id.' }
-  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Deleted', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Message" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Deleted (echoes the id)', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/DeletedId" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Not authenticated', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[404] = { description: 'Not found', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   param('id').isInt(),
@@ -318,7 +324,7 @@ adminRouter.delete(
   // #swagger.summary = 'Delete a wiki category'
   // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
   // #swagger.parameters['id'] = { in: 'path', required: true, schema: { type: 'integer' }, description: 'Category id.' }
-  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Deleted', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Message" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Deleted (echoes the id)', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/DeletedId" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Not authenticated', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[404] = { description: 'Not found', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   param('id').isInt(),
@@ -457,7 +463,7 @@ adminRouter.delete(
   // #swagger.summary = 'Delete a wiki page'
   // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
   // #swagger.parameters['slug'] = { in: 'path', required: true, schema: { type: 'string' }, description: 'Wiki page slug.' }
-  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Deleted', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Message" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Deleted (echoes the slug)', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/DeletedSlug" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Not authenticated', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[404] = { description: 'Not found', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   ctrl.deleteWiki,
@@ -521,7 +527,7 @@ adminRouter.post(
   // #swagger.summary = 'Emergency unban an IP (admin only)'
   // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
   /* #swagger.requestBody = { required: true, content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/UnbanRequest" } } } } */
-  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Unbanned', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Message" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Unbanned (echoes the ip and whether an entry was cleared)', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/UnbanResult" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[400] = { description: 'Invalid IP', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/ValidationError" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Not authenticated', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[403] = { description: 'Admin role required', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
@@ -636,7 +642,7 @@ adminRouter.delete(
   // #swagger.description = 'Built-in providers cannot be deleted — disable them instead.'
   // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
   // #swagger.parameters['id'] = { in: 'path', required: true, schema: { type: 'string' }, description: 'Provider id.' }
-  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Deleted', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Message" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Deleted', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/DeletedFlag" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[400] = { description: 'Built-in provider cannot be deleted', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Not authenticated', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[403] = { description: 'Admin role required', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
@@ -647,6 +653,91 @@ adminRouter.delete(
   authProviders.remove,
 )
 
+// ── Moderation dashboard (admin + moderator) ──────────────────────────
+// Read-only views over the bot's mod_actions log, plus staff notes. The whole
+// sub-path is gated for the moderator role (admins included).
+adminRouter.use('/moderation', modAccess)
+adminRouter.get(
+  '/moderation/stats/summary',
+  // #swagger.tags = ['Admin · Moderation']
+  // #swagger.summary = 'Moderation action counts for 24h/7d/30d (admin or moderator)'
+  // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
+  moderation.getSummary,
+)
+adminRouter.get(
+  '/moderation/recent',
+  // #swagger.tags = ['Admin · Moderation']
+  // #swagger.summary = 'Recent moderation actions, optionally filtered by type'
+  // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
+  moderation.getRecent,
+)
+adminRouter.get(
+  '/moderation/search',
+  // #swagger.tags = ['Admin · Moderation']
+  // #swagger.summary = 'Look up moderated users by Discord id or username snapshot'
+  // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
+  moderation.search,
+)
+adminRouter.get(
+  '/moderation/members',
+  // #swagger.tags = ['Admin · Moderation']
+  // #swagger.summary = 'Recent member join/leave events (optionally filtered by type)'
+  // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
+  moderation.getMembers,
+)
+adminRouter.get(
+  '/moderation/filter-hits',
+  // #swagger.tags = ['Admin · Moderation']
+  // #swagger.summary = 'Recent automated content-filter hits'
+  // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
+  moderation.getFilterHits,
+)
+adminRouter.get(
+  '/moderation/spam-hits',
+  // #swagger.tags = ['Admin · Moderation']
+  // #swagger.summary = 'Recent automated spam-detection hits'
+  // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
+  moderation.getSpamHits,
+)
+adminRouter.get(
+  '/moderation/user/:discordId',
+  // #swagger.tags = ['Admin · Moderation']
+  // #swagger.summary = 'Per-user moderation summary (counts, latest tag, linked account)'
+  // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
+  param('discordId').matches(/^[0-9]{1,32}$/),
+  validate,
+  moderation.getUser,
+)
+adminRouter.get(
+  '/moderation/user/:discordId/actions',
+  // #swagger.tags = ['Admin · Moderation']
+  // #swagger.summary = 'Full moderation action history for a user'
+  // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
+  param('discordId').matches(/^[0-9]{1,32}$/),
+  validate,
+  moderation.getUserActions,
+)
+adminRouter.get(
+  '/moderation/user/:discordId/notes',
+  // #swagger.tags = ['Admin · Moderation']
+  // #swagger.summary = 'Staff notes for a user (admin_only notes hidden from moderators)'
+  // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
+  param('discordId').matches(/^[0-9]{1,32}$/),
+  validate,
+  moderation.getUserNotes,
+)
+adminRouter.post(
+  '/moderation/user/:discordId/notes',
+  // #swagger.tags = ['Admin · Moderation']
+  // #swagger.summary = 'Add a staff note (admin_only visibility requires the admin role)'
+  // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
+  param('discordId').matches(/^[0-9]{1,32}$/),
+  body('body').isString().trim().isLength({ min: 1, max: 4000 }),
+  body('visibility').optional().isIn(['staff_only', 'admin_only']),
+  validate,
+  moderation.addUserNote,
+)
+
 // ── User management (admin only) ──────────────────────────────────────
 adminRouter.use('/users', adminOnly)
 adminRouter.get(
@@ -672,7 +763,7 @@ adminRouter.post(
   /* #swagger.responses[409] = { description: 'Username already taken', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   body('username').isString().trim().isLength({ min: 3, max: 32 }),
   body('password').isString().isLength({ min: 8, max: 64 }),
-  body('role').optional().isIn(['admin', 'editor']),
+  body('role').optional().isIn(['admin', 'editor', 'moderator']),
   validate,
   ctrl.createUser,
 )
@@ -692,7 +783,7 @@ adminRouter.put(
   param('id').isInt(),
   body('username').optional().isString().trim().isLength({ min: 3, max: 32 }),
   body('password').optional().isString().isLength({ min: 8, max: 64 }),
-  body('role').optional().isIn(['admin', 'editor']),
+  body('role').optional().isIn(['admin', 'editor', 'moderator']),
   validate,
   ctrl.updateUser,
 )
@@ -702,7 +793,7 @@ adminRouter.delete(
   // #swagger.summary = 'Delete a user (admin only)'
   // #swagger.security = [{ "cookieAuth": [] }, { "bearerAuth": [] }]
   // #swagger.parameters['id'] = { in: 'path', required: true, schema: { type: 'integer' }, description: 'User id.' }
-  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Deleted', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Message" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Deleted (echoes the id)', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/DeletedId" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[400] = { description: 'Cannot delete your own account or the last admin', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Not authenticated', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
   /* #swagger.responses[403] = { description: 'Admin role required', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */

server/src/router/v1/admin/moderation.controller.js

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+// Admin moderation dashboard (Phase 6). Read-only views over the bot's
+// mod_actions log plus server-owned staff notes. Mounted behind the
+// admin+moderator RBAC gate (see admin.routes.js). The only mutation here is
+// adding a staff note; admin_only notes are further restricted to the admin role.
+const moderation = require('../../../model/moderation/moderation.model')
+const modNotes = require('../../../model/modNotes/modNotes.model')
+const modNotesDb = require('../../../model/modNotes/modNotes.db')
+const activity = require('../../../model/activity/activity.model')
+
+const log = require('../../../utils/logger')('moderation')
+
+const VALID_TYPES = new Set(['ban', 'kick', 'mute', 'warn'])
+const MAX_LIMIT = 200
+const DEFAULT_LIMIT = 50
+
+// Parse ?limit/&offset the same way the activity log does: numeric, capped.
+function pageParams(req) {
+  const limit = Math.min(Number(req.query.limit) || DEFAULT_LIMIT, MAX_LIMIT)
+  const offset = Number(req.query.offset) || 0
+  return { limit, offset }
+}
+
+// Optional ?type filter — ignored unless it is a known action type.
+function typeParam(req) {
+  const t = req.query.type
+  return VALID_TYPES.has(t) ? t : null
+}
+
+function isAdmin(req) {
+  return req.user && req.user.role === 'admin'
+}
+
+async function getSummary(req, res) {
+  try {
+    return res.json(await moderation.summary())
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('summary failed', { error: err.message })
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
+async function getRecent(req, res) {
+  try {
+    const { limit, offset } = pageParams(req)
+    return res.json(await moderation.recent({ type: typeParam(req), limit, offset }))
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('recent failed', { error: err.message })
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
+async function search(req, res) {
+  try {
+    const term = (req.query.q || '').trim()
+    if (!term) return res.json([])
+    return res.json(await moderation.search(term, { limit: 20 }))
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('search failed', { error: err.message })
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
+// ── Phase 6b event feeds ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+const MEMBER_TYPES = new Set(['join', 'leave'])
+
+async function getMembers(req, res) {
+  try {
+    const { limit, offset } = pageParams(req)
+    const t = MEMBER_TYPES.has(req.query.type) ? req.query.type : null
+    return res.json(await moderation.members({ type: t, limit, offset }))
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('members failed', { error: err.message })
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
+async function getFilterHits(req, res) {
+  try {
+    const { limit, offset } = pageParams(req)
+    return res.json(await moderation.filterHits({ limit, offset }))
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('filterHits failed', { error: err.message })
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
+async function getSpamHits(req, res) {
+  try {
+    const { limit, offset } = pageParams(req)
+    return res.json(await moderation.spamHits({ limit, offset }))
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('spamHits failed', { error: err.message })
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
+async function getUser(req, res) {
+  try {
+    const summary = await moderation.userSummary(req.params.discordId)
+    const notesCount = await modNotesDb.countForUser(req.params.discordId, {
+      includeAdminOnly: isAdmin(req),
+    })
+    return res.json({ ...summary, notes_count: notesCount })
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('getUser failed', { error: err.message })
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
+async function getUserActions(req, res) {
+  try {
+    const { limit, offset } = pageParams(req)
+    return res.json(
+      await moderation.userActions(req.params.discordId, { type: typeParam(req), limit, offset }),
+    )
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('getUserActions failed', { error: err.message })
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
+async function getUserNotes(req, res) {
+  try {
+    const notes = await modNotes.listForUser(req.params.discordId, {
+      includeAdminOnly: isAdmin(req),
+    })
+    return res.json(notes)
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('getUserNotes failed', { error: err.message })
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
+async function addUserNote(req, res) {
+  try {
+    const visibility = req.body.visibility === 'admin_only' ? 'admin_only' : 'staff_only'
+    // admin_only notes can carry sensitive judgement calls — restrict to admins.
+    if (visibility === 'admin_only' && !isAdmin(req)) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ message: 'Only admins can add admin-only notes' })
+    }
+    const note = await modNotes.add({
+      discordUserId: req.params.discordId,
+      author: req.user,
+      body: req.body.body,
+      visibility,
+    })
+    await activity.log({
+      req,
+      action: 'moderation.note.add',
+      detail: { discordUserId: req.params.discordId, visibility },
+    })
+    return res.status(201).json(note)
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('addUserNote failed', { error: err.message })
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  getSummary,
+  getRecent,
+  search,
+  getMembers,
+  getFilterHits,
+  getSpamHits,
+  getUser,
+  getUserActions,
+  getUserNotes,
+  addUserNote,
+}

server/src/router/v1/auth/auth.controller.js

@@ -96,8 +96,24 @@ async function loginTotp(req, res) {
   }
 }
 
-function logout(req, res) {
+// Clear the caller's cookie AND revoke this session server-side, so a copy of the
+// token (proxy log, shared machine, XSS-exfiltrated cookie) can't keep being used
+// after logout. attachSession populated req.session (best-effort) with the jti +
+// expiry; if there was no valid session, there's simply nothing to revoke.
+async function logout(req, res) {
   clearAuthCookie(req, res)
+  try {
+    if (req.session?.sessionId) {
+      await sessionService.revokeSession(req.session.sessionId, {
+        userId: req.session.userId,
+        expiresAt: req.session.expiresAt,
+      })
+      await activity.log({ req, userId: req.session.userId, action: 'auth.logout' })
+    }
+  } catch (err) {
+    // Never fail the logout on a revocation/logging hiccup — the cookie is cleared.
+    log.error('logout revoke error', err)
+  }
   return res.json({ message: 'Logged out.' })
 }
 

server/src/router/v1/auth/auth.routes.js

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ const { body } = require('express-validator')
 
 const { login, loginTotp, logout, me, HONEYPOT_FIELD } = require('./auth.controller')
 const { isLoggedIn } = require('../../../utils/auth')
+const { attachSession } = require('../../../auth/session.middleware')
 const { loginLimiter } = require('../../../middleware/rateLimit')
 const { slowLogin, backoffGuard } = require('../../../middleware/loginProtection')
 const validate = require('../../../middleware/validate')
@@ -65,8 +66,11 @@ authRouter.post(
 authRouter.post(
   '/logout',
   // #swagger.tags = ['Auth']
-  // #swagger.summary = 'Log out (clear the session cookie)'
+  // #swagger.summary = 'Log out (clear the cookie and revoke this session)'
   /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Logged out', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Message" } } } } */
+  // Best-effort attach (never rejects) so the controller can revoke this session's
+  // jti — logout stays a no-op for an already-anonymous caller.
+  attachSession,
   logout,
 )
 authRouter.get(

server/src/router/v1/auth/sso.controller.js

@@ -19,6 +19,10 @@ const registry = require('../../../auth/providers/registry')
 const sessionService = require('../../../auth/session.service')
 const ssoState = require('../../../auth/ssoState')
 const token = require('../../../auth/token')
+const totp = require('../../../utils/totp')
+const botScore = require('../../../middleware/botScore')
+const loginProtection = require('../../../middleware/loginProtection')
+const { needsTotp } = require('./auth.controller')
 
 const log = require('../../../utils/logger')('sso')
 
@@ -56,6 +60,13 @@ function txCookieOptions(req) {
   return { ...token.cookieOptions(req), maxAge: 10 * 60 * 1000 }
 }
 
+// httpOnly cookie carrying the staged pending-TOTP token for the second-factor
+// step. Same standard options; TTL matches the token so a stale cookie can't
+// outlive the challenge it holds.
+function totpCookieOptions(req) {
+  return { ...token.cookieOptions(req), maxAge: 5 * 60 * 1000 }
+}
+
 // GET /auth/providers — public discovery. Never touches secrets.
 async function listProviders(req, res) {
   try {
@@ -148,6 +159,23 @@ async function finishLogin(req, res, providerId, kind, tx, profile) {
   if (!user) return res.redirect(loginError('not_linked'))
 
   const authMethod = sessionService.AUTH_METHODS.includes(kind) ? kind : 'sso'
+
+  // 2FA parity with the local login (auth.controller): if the account has TOTP
+  // enabled, an SSO sign-in must NOT bypass the second factor. Stage a signed,
+  // httpOnly challenge and route the browser through the TOTP form instead of
+  // minting a session here. See issue #31.
+  if (needsTotp(user)) {
+    const pending = ssoState.createTotpPending({
+      userId: user.id,
+      provider: providerId,
+      authMethod,
+      returnTo: sanitizeReturn(tx.returnTo) || undefined,
+    })
+    res.cookie(ssoState.TOTP_COOKIE, pending, totpCookieOptions(req))
+    log.info('sso login: awaiting TOTP', { provider: providerId, id: user.id, ip: req.ip })
+    return res.redirect('/admin/login?sso_totp=1')
+  }
+
   const { token: sessionToken } = sessionService.createSession(user, authMethod)
   token.setAuthCookie(req, res, sessionToken)
   await users.recordLogin(user.id)
@@ -156,6 +184,44 @@ async function finishLogin(req, res, providerId, kind, tx, profile) {
   return res.redirect(sanitizeReturn(tx.returnTo) || '/admin')
 }
 
+// POST /auth/sso/totp — second factor for an SSO login whose account has TOTP on.
+// Reads the staged pending-TOTP cookie, verifies the authenticator code, then
+// mints the full session. Mirrors auth.controller.loginTotp: a wrong code is a
+// failed attempt (backoff + bot score), and the response is JSON (the login page
+// completes this step over fetch and then navigates to returnTo).
+async function finishSsoTotp(req, res) {
+  const pending = ssoState.verifyTotpPending(req.cookies && req.cookies[ssoState.TOTP_COOKIE])
+  if (!pending) {
+    return res.status(401).json({ message: 'Your verification session expired. Please sign in again.' })
+  }
+  try {
+    const user = await users.getRawById(pending.id)
+    if (!user || !user.totp_enabled || !totp.verifyCode(user.totp_secret, req.body.code)) {
+      botScore.recordLoginFailure(req.ip)
+      loginProtection.recordFailure(req.ip)
+      log.warn('sso TOTP verify failed', { id: pending.id, ip: req.ip })
+      return res.status(401).json({ message: 'Invalid verification code.' })
+    }
+
+    // Second factor satisfied — clear the staged cookie and issue the real session.
+    res.clearCookie(ssoState.TOTP_COOKIE, token.cookieOptions(req))
+    loginProtection.recordSuccess(req.ip)
+    const authMethod = sessionService.AUTH_METHODS.includes(pending.authMethod) ? pending.authMethod : 'sso'
+    const { token: sessionToken } = sessionService.createSession(user, authMethod)
+    token.setAuthCookie(req, res, sessionToken)
+    await users.recordLogin(user.id)
+    await activity.log({ req, userId: user.id, action: 'auth.sso.login', detail: { provider: pending.provider, totp: true } })
+    log.info('sso login success (2fa)', { provider: pending.provider, id: user.id, ip: req.ip })
+    return res.json({
+      user: { id: user.id, username: user.username, role: user.role },
+      returnTo: sanitizeReturn(pending.returnTo) || '/admin',
+    })
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.error('sso totp error', err)
+    return res.status(500).json({ message: 'Internal Server Error' })
+  }
+}
+
 // Attach the external identity to the account that initiated linking (tx.linkUserId
 // was captured behind requireAuth at /link start, so the signed tx authorizes it).
 async function finishLink(req, res, providerId, tx, profile) {
@@ -173,4 +239,4 @@ async function finishLink(req, res, providerId, tx, profile) {
   return res.redirect(`/admin/account?linked=${providerId}`)
 }
 
-module.exports = { listProviders, start, linkStart, callback, beginFlow, finishLogin, finishLink }
+module.exports = { listProviders, start, linkStart, callback, beginFlow, finishLogin, finishSsoTotp, finishLink }

server/src/router/v1/auth/sso.routes.js

@@ -1,11 +1,18 @@
 const express = require('express')
+const { body } = require('express-validator')
 
 const ctrl = require('./sso.controller')
 const { requireAuth } = require('../../../auth/session.middleware')
-const { ssoStartLimiter } = require('../../../middleware/rateLimit')
+const { ssoStartLimiter, loginLimiter } = require('../../../middleware/rateLimit')
+const { slowLogin, backoffGuard } = require('../../../middleware/loginProtection')
+const validate = require('../../../middleware/validate')
 
 const ssoRouter = express.Router()
 
+// Same throttling stack the local login/TOTP endpoints use — the SSO TOTP step is
+// a code-guessing surface too (cheapest rejection first).
+const loginGuards = [backoffGuard, slowLogin, loginLimiter]
+
 // Public discovery — the login page reads this to render provider buttons.
 ssoRouter.get(
   '/providers',
@@ -57,4 +64,22 @@ ssoRouter.get(
   ctrl.callback,
 )
 
+// Second factor for an SSO login whose account has TOTP enabled. The callback
+// stages an httpOnly pending-TOTP cookie and bounces the browser to the login
+// page (?sso_totp=1); the page posts the code here to finish and receive a session.
+ssoRouter.post(
+  '/sso/totp',
+  // #swagger.tags = ['Auth · SSO']
+  // #swagger.summary = 'Complete an SSO login with a TOTP code'
+  // #swagger.description = 'Second step when a linked account has 2FA enabled. Reads the staged pending-TOTP cookie set by the callback plus the current authenticator code, and on success sets the session cookie. Rate limited and behind bot/backoff guards.'
+  /* #swagger.requestBody = { required: true, content: { "application/json": { schema: { type: "object", required: ["code"], properties: { code: { type: "string" } } } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Session issued', content: { "application/json": { schema: { type: "object", properties: { user: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/SafeUser" }, returnTo: { type: "string" } } } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[401] = { description: 'Invalid code or expired challenge', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[429] = { description: 'Too many attempts (rate limited / backoff)', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/Error" } } } } */
+  ...loginGuards,
+  body('code').isString().trim().isLength({ min: 6, max: 8 }),
+  validate,
+  ctrl.finishSsoTotp,
+)
+
 module.exports = ssoRouter

server/src/router/v1/internal/internal.routes.js

@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ const ctrl = require('./internal.controller')
 const router = express.Router()
 
 // Shared-secret gated, not session-gated — the caller is the bot process, not
-// a logged-in browser. Mounted before any auth/session middleware in v1.router.
+// a logged-in browser. This router is mounted on the standalone internalApp
+// (its own unpublished port), never on the public /api app. See internalApp.js.
 router.use(requireInternalKey)
 
 router.get(

server/src/router/v1/public/public.routes.js

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ publicRouter.get(
   // #swagger.tags = ['Public']
   // #swagger.summary = 'Site mode / status'
   // #swagger.description = 'Current site mode (live or maintenance) so the client can show the maintenance page.'
-  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Site status', content: { "application/json": { schema: { type: "object", properties: { mode: { type: "string", example: "live" } } } } } } */
+  /* #swagger.responses[200] = { description: 'Site status', content: { "application/json": { schema: { $ref: "#/components/schemas/PublicStatus" } } } } */
   ctrl.getStatus,
 )
 publicRouter.post(

server/src/router/v1/v1.router.js

@@ -5,13 +5,13 @@ const v1Router = express.Router()
 const authRouter = require('./auth/auth.routes')
 const publicRouter = require('./public/public.routes')
 const adminRouter = require('./admin/admin.routes')
-const internalRouter = require('./internal/internal.routes')
 
 v1Router.use('/auth', authRouter)
 v1Router.use('/public', publicRouter)
 v1Router.use('/admin', adminRouter)
-// Shared-secret gated (not session-gated) — server<->bot only, never exposed
-// through the public reverse proxy. See server/src/middleware/requireInternalKey.js.
-v1Router.use('/internal', internalRouter)
+// NOTE: /internal is intentionally NOT mounted here. Those routes return the
+// decrypted Discord bot token and must never share the public listener that
+// Pangolin proxies. They live on a separate, unpublished port via
+// server/src/internalApp.js (started in server.js). See issue #33.
 
 module.exports = v1Router

server/src/server.js

@@ -2,16 +2,24 @@ require('dotenv').config()
 const http = require('http')
 
 const app = require('./app')
+const internalApp = require('./internalApp')
 const botScore = require('./middleware/botScore')
 const { ensureSchema, close } = require('./utils/db')
 const { seedDefaults, createInitialAdminFromEnv } = require('../db/seed')
 const settings = require('./model/settings/settings.model')
+const revokedSessions = require('./model/revokedSessions/revokedSessions.model')
 const mailer = require('./utils/mailer')
 const createLogger = require('./utils/logger')
+const { evaluateBotInternalKey } = require('./utils/botInternalKey')
 const pkg = require('../package.json')
 
 const log = createLogger('server')
 const PORT = Number(process.env.PORT) || 3000
+// Separate, UNPUBLISHED listener for server<->bot /internal/* traffic. Kept off
+// the public PORT so the decrypted-token route can't ride the listener Pangolin
+// proxies to the world (issue #33). Must match the port in the bot's
+// SITE_INTERNAL_URL (docker-compose.yml).
+const INTERNAL_PORT = Number(process.env.INTERNAL_PORT) || 3001
 const HOST = '0.0.0.0' // bind all interfaces so Pangolin / the LAN can reach it
 
 async function start() {
@@ -25,12 +33,35 @@ async function start() {
     smtp: mailer.isConfigured() ? 'configured' : 'not configured (mailto fallback)',
   })
 
+  // Fail fast if the server<->bot shared secret is weak/placeholder. Fatal in
+  // production (the /internal/bot-config route hands back the decrypted Discord
+  // token and this key is its only guard); a warning otherwise.
+  const keyCheck = evaluateBotInternalKey({
+    key: process.env.BOT_INTERNAL_KEY,
+    nodeEnv: process.env.NODE_ENV,
+  })
+  if (keyCheck.fatal) {
+    log.error(keyCheck.message)
+    process.exit(1)
+  } else if (!keyCheck.ok) {
+    log.warn(keyCheck.message)
+  }
+
   log.info('ensuring database schema...')
   await ensureSchema()
   log.info('seeding defaults...')
   await seedDefaults()
   await createInitialAdminFromEnv()
 
+  // Clear out session-denylist rows whose token has already expired (dead weight).
+  // Best-effort — a prune failure must never block startup.
+  try {
+    const pruned = await revokedSessions.pruneExpired()
+    if (pruned) log.info(`pruned ${pruned} expired revoked-session row(s)`)
+  } catch (err) {
+    log.warn('revoked-session prune failed', { error: err.message })
+  }
+
   const mode = await settings.get('site_mode')
   log.info(`site mode: ${String(mode || 'live').toUpperCase()}`)
 
@@ -39,10 +70,18 @@ async function start() {
     log.info(`listening on http://${HOST}:${PORT}  (API at /api/v1, health at /api/health)`)
   })
 
-  setupShutdown(server)
+  // Internal server<->bot API on a separate, unpublished port. NEVER expose this
+  // through Pangolin/the public reverse proxy — it serves the decrypted Discord
+  // bot token to the bot process over the private compose network only (#33).
+  const internalServer = http.createServer(internalApp)
+  internalServer.listen(INTERNAL_PORT, HOST, () => {
+    log.info(`internal API listening on http://${HOST}:${INTERNAL_PORT}  (server<->bot only — do NOT proxy)`)
+  })
+
+  setupShutdown(server, internalServer)
 }
 
-function setupShutdown(server) {
+function setupShutdown(server, internalServer) {
   let closing = false
   const shutdown = async (signal) => {
     if (closing) return
@@ -50,6 +89,7 @@ function setupShutdown(server) {
     log.warn(`${signal} received — shutting down gracefully`)
     botScore.stopSweeper() // stop the bot-store cleanup interval
     server.close(() => log.info('http server closed'))
+    if (internalServer) internalServer.close(() => log.info('internal http server closed'))
     try {
       await close()
       log.info('database pool closed')

server/src/utils/botInternalKey.js

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+// Boot-time validation of BOT_INTERNAL_KEY — the shared secret that is the ONLY
+// auth on the server<->bot /internal/* routes (which return the decrypted Discord
+// bot token). A missing, placeholder, or trivially short key would leave that
+// endpoint effectively unguarded, so in production we refuse to start; in dev we
+// warn but continue so local work isn't blocked. See issue #33.
+
+// The placeholders shipped in the repo's .env.example files. If any of these
+// reaches production it means the operator never generated a real key.
+const PLACEHOLDERS = new Set([
+  'change-me-to-a-long-random-string', // root .env.example
+  'dev-only-change-me-bot-key', // server/.env.example, bot/.env.example
+])
+
+const MIN_LENGTH = 16
+
+// Returns { ok, fatal, message }. `fatal` is only ever true in production —
+// callers should exit non-zero on fatal, and log a warning (but continue) when
+// !ok && !fatal.
+function evaluateBotInternalKey({ key, nodeEnv } = {}) {
+  const value = key || ''
+
+  let reason = null
+  if (value.length === 0) reason = 'BOT_INTERNAL_KEY is not set'
+  else if (PLACEHOLDERS.has(value)) reason = 'BOT_INTERNAL_KEY is still the documented placeholder value'
+  else if (value.length < MIN_LENGTH) reason = `BOT_INTERNAL_KEY is too short (< ${MIN_LENGTH} chars)`
+
+  if (!reason) return { ok: true, fatal: false, message: null }
+
+  const production = nodeEnv === 'production'
+  const detail =
+    `${reason}. It is the only guard on /internal/bot-config, which returns the ` +
+    'decrypted Discord bot token.'
+
+  return {
+    ok: false,
+    fatal: production,
+    message: production
+      ? `${detail} Refusing to start in production — set a long random BOT_INTERNAL_KEY (matching bot/.env).`
+      : `${detail} Continuing because NODE_ENV is not "production" — set a strong value before deploying.`,
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = { evaluateBotInternalKey, PLACEHOLDERS, MIN_LENGTH }

server/swagger/swagger.js

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ const doc = {
     { name: 'Admin · Settings', description: 'Site settings (admin only)' },
     { name: 'Admin · Activity', description: 'Admin activity log' },
     { name: 'Admin · Bot Activity', description: 'Bot-scoring/ban state and emergency unban (admin only)' },
+    { name: 'Admin · Discord Bot', description: 'Discord bot token/config and live status (admin only)' },
     { name: 'Admin · Auth Providers', description: 'SSO provider configuration (admin only)' },
     { name: 'Admin · Users', description: 'User management (admin only)' },
   ],
@@ -144,7 +145,11 @@ const doc = {
         properties: {
           accessToken: { type: 'string', description: 'Short-lived bearer JWT.' },
           refreshToken: { type: 'string', description: 'Long-lived, revocable refresh token.' },
-          expiresIn: { type: 'integer', description: 'Access token lifetime in seconds.', example: 900 },
+          expiresIn: {
+            type: 'string',
+            description: 'Access token lifetime as a duration string (zeit/ms format, e.g. "15m").',
+            example: '15m',
+          },
           user: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/SafeUser' },
         },
       },
@@ -173,27 +178,59 @@ const doc = {
           name: { type: 'string', maxLength: 100, example: 'Lord British' },
         },
       },
+      // Public discovery shape (GET /auth/providers) — enough for the login page
+      // to render a button and start the flow. Never exposes secrets or endpoints.
       Provider: {
         type: 'object',
         properties: {
           id: { type: 'string', example: 'google' },
           name: { type: 'string', example: 'Google' },
-          kind: { type: 'string', enum: ['oidc', 'oauth2'], example: 'oidc' },
+          icon: {
+            type: 'string',
+            description: "Icon hint — the provider kind ('google' | 'discord' | 'oidc' | 'oauth2').",
+            example: 'google',
+          },
+          loginUrl: {
+            type: 'string',
+            description: 'Relative URL to begin the redirect flow.',
+            example: '/api/v1/auth/sso/google/start',
+          },
+          priority: { type: 'integer', description: 'Sort order (ascending).', example: 1 },
         },
       },
+      // Admin-facing provider config (GET/POST/PUT /admin/auth/providers). The
+      // client secret is write-only and NEVER returned — `hasSecret` reports
+      // whether one is stored. `builtin` marks google/discord (fixed kind/name),
+      // and `health` is the config-completeness check used to gate visibility.
       ProviderConfig: {
         type: 'object',
         properties: {
           id: { type: 'string', example: 'okta' },
-          kind: { type: 'string', enum: ['oidc', 'oauth2'], example: 'oidc' },
+          kind: { type: 'string', enum: ['google', 'discord', 'oidc', 'oauth2'], example: 'oidc' },
           name: { type: 'string', example: 'Okta' },
           enabled: { type: 'boolean', example: true },
           clientId: { type: 'string' },
+          hasSecret: { type: 'boolean', description: 'Whether a client secret is stored (the secret itself is never returned).', example: true },
           authorizeUrl: { type: 'string', format: 'uri' },
           tokenUrl: { type: 'string', format: 'uri' },
           userinfoUrl: { type: 'string', format: 'uri' },
           scopes: { type: 'string', example: 'openid email profile' },
           priority: { type: 'integer', example: 10 },
+          builtin: { type: 'boolean', description: 'True for the fixed google/discord providers.', example: false },
+          health: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/ProviderHealth' },
+        },
+      },
+      ProviderHealth: {
+        type: 'object',
+        description: 'Config-completeness check that gates whether a provider is offered to end users.',
+        properties: {
+          valid: { type: 'boolean', example: true },
+          missing: {
+            type: 'array',
+            description: 'Names of required config fields that are still missing.',
+            items: { type: 'string' },
+            example: [],
+          },
         },
       },
       ProviderCreateRequest: {
@@ -220,11 +257,14 @@ const doc = {
           category: { type: 'string', example: 'news' },
           title: { type: 'string', example: 'Server maintenance this weekend' },
           slug: { type: 'string', example: 'server-maintenance-this-weekend' },
-          body: { type: 'string' },
-          image_url: { type: 'string', example: '/uploads/1700000000-abcd.png' },
+          excerpt: { type: 'string', nullable: true },
+          body: { type: 'string', nullable: true },
+          image_url: { type: 'string', nullable: true, example: '/uploads/1700000000-abcd.png' },
           published: { type: 'boolean', example: true },
+          author_id: { type: 'integer', nullable: true, example: 1 },
           created_at: { type: 'string', format: 'date-time' },
           updated_at: { type: 'string', format: 'date-time' },
+          published_at: { type: 'string', format: 'date-time', nullable: true },
         },
       },
       PostCreateRequest: {
@@ -330,6 +370,84 @@ const doc = {
         required: ['ip'],
         properties: { ip: { type: 'string', example: '203.0.113.5' } },
       },
+      // ── Actual mutation-response shapes ─────────────────────────────────────
+      // These endpoints do NOT return the generic { message } envelope; they echo
+      // the affected resource id/slug or a boolean flag. Documented here as-is so
+      // the spec matches the controllers. (The shapes are intentionally recorded
+      // rather than normalized — see the audit note if standardizing later.)
+      AccountStatus: {
+        type: 'object',
+        description: 'Self-service account security status (GET /admin/account).',
+        properties: {
+          id: { type: 'integer', example: 1 },
+          username: { type: 'string', example: 'admin' },
+          role: { type: 'string', enum: ['admin', 'editor'], example: 'admin' },
+          totp_enabled: { type: 'boolean', example: true },
+        },
+      },
+      TotpSetup: {
+        type: 'object',
+        description: 'Enrollment material returned by POST /account/totp/setup.',
+        properties: {
+          otpauthUrl: { type: 'string', example: 'otpauth://totp/UOMysticmoon:admin?secret=...' },
+          qr: { type: 'string', description: 'QR code as a data: URL.', example: '...' },
+        },
+      },
+      TotpState: {
+        type: 'object',
+        description: 'Result of enabling/disabling 2FA.',
+        properties: { totp_enabled: { type: 'boolean', example: true } },
+      },
+      LinkedIdentity: {
+        type: 'object',
+        properties: {
+          provider: { type: 'string', example: 'google' },
+          email: { type: 'string', format: 'email', nullable: true, example: 'user@example.com' },
+          linked_at: { type: 'string', format: 'date-time' },
+        },
+      },
+      SiteModeState: {
+        type: 'object',
+        description: 'Result of PUT /admin/site-mode.',
+        properties: {
+          site_mode: { type: 'string', enum: ['live', 'maintenance'], example: 'maintenance' },
+          changed_at: { type: 'string', format: 'date-time' },
+          changed_by: { type: 'string', example: 'admin' },
+        },
+      },
+      PublicStatus: {
+        type: 'object',
+        description: 'Public site status (GET /public/status).',
+        properties: {
+          mode: { type: 'string', enum: ['live', 'maintenance'], example: 'live' },
+          status_message: { type: 'string', example: '' },
+        },
+      },
+      // Delete/mutation acknowledgements — each echoes the affected resource key
+      // or a boolean flag rather than a { message } string.
+      DeletedId: {
+        type: 'object',
+        properties: { id: { type: 'integer', example: 12 } },
+      },
+      DeletedSlug: {
+        type: 'object',
+        properties: { slug: { type: 'string', example: 'getting-started' } },
+      },
+      DeletedFlag: {
+        type: 'object',
+        properties: { deleted: { type: 'boolean', example: true } },
+      },
+      UnlinkedFlag: {
+        type: 'object',
+        properties: { unlinked: { type: 'boolean', example: true } },
+      },
+      UnbanResult: {
+        type: 'object',
+        properties: {
+          ip: { type: 'string', example: '203.0.113.5' },
+          removed: { type: 'boolean', description: 'Whether the IP had an entry that was cleared.', example: true },
+        },
+      },
     },
   },
 }

server/test/botInternalKey.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+const { test } = require('node:test')
+const assert = require('node:assert/strict')
+
+const { evaluateBotInternalKey, MIN_LENGTH } = require('../src/utils/botInternalKey')
+
+const STRONG = 'x'.repeat(MIN_LENGTH + 8)
+
+test('a strong key is ok in every environment', () => {
+  for (const nodeEnv of ['production', 'development', undefined]) {
+    const r = evaluateBotInternalKey({ key: STRONG, nodeEnv })
+    assert.equal(r.ok, true)
+    assert.equal(r.fatal, false)
+    assert.equal(r.message, null)
+  }
+})
+
+test('empty key is fatal in production, warn otherwise', () => {
+  const prod = evaluateBotInternalKey({ key: '', nodeEnv: 'production' })
+  assert.equal(prod.ok, false)
+  assert.equal(prod.fatal, true)
+
+  const dev = evaluateBotInternalKey({ key: '', nodeEnv: 'development' })
+  assert.equal(dev.ok, false)
+  assert.equal(dev.fatal, false)
+})
+
+test('undefined key behaves like empty', () => {
+  const r = evaluateBotInternalKey({ key: undefined, nodeEnv: 'production' })
+  assert.equal(r.ok, false)
+  assert.equal(r.fatal, true)
+})
+
+test('documented placeholders are rejected (fatal in production)', () => {
+  for (const key of ['change-me-to-a-long-random-string', 'dev-only-change-me-bot-key']) {
+    const r = evaluateBotInternalKey({ key, nodeEnv: 'production' })
+    assert.equal(r.ok, false, `placeholder should be rejected: ${key}`)
+    assert.equal(r.fatal, true)
+  }
+})
+
+test('a too-short key is rejected', () => {
+  const short = 'a'.repeat(MIN_LENGTH - 1)
+  const r = evaluateBotInternalKey({ key: short, nodeEnv: 'production' })
+  assert.equal(r.ok, false)
+  assert.equal(r.fatal, true)
+
+  const dev = evaluateBotInternalKey({ key: short, nodeEnv: 'development' })
+  assert.equal(dev.ok, false)
+  assert.equal(dev.fatal, false)
+})
+
+test('a key exactly MIN_LENGTH long is accepted', () => {
+  const r = evaluateBotInternalKey({ key: 'a'.repeat(MIN_LENGTH), nodeEnv: 'production' })
+  assert.equal(r.ok, true)
+})

server/test/moderation.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+// Unit tests for the moderation dashboard's pure reshaping/annotation logic.
+// DB-free (like the rest of this suite) — the SQL layer is exercised manually
+// against a dev database per the plan's verification steps.
+const { test } = require('node:test')
+const assert = require('node:assert/strict')
+
+const moderation = require('../src/model/moderation/moderation.pure')
+
+test('reshapeWindows: folds rows into windows and zero-fills missing types', () => {
+  const rows = [
+    { action_type: 'ban', d1: 1, d7: 3, d30: 5 },
+    { action_type: 'warn', d1: 0, d7: 2, d30: 9 },
+  ]
+  const { windows } = moderation.reshapeWindows(rows)
+  assert.deepEqual(windows['24h'], { ban: 1, kick: 0, mute: 0, warn: 0 })
+  assert.deepEqual(windows['7d'], { ban: 3, kick: 0, mute: 0, warn: 2 })
+  assert.deepEqual(windows['30d'], { ban: 5, kick: 0, mute: 0, warn: 9 })
+})
+
+test('reshapeWindows: coerces string/decimal SUM results to numbers', () => {
+  const { windows } = moderation.reshapeWindows([{ action_type: 'mute', d1: '2', d7: '2', d30: '4' }])
+  assert.strictEqual(windows['24h'].mute, 2)
+  assert.strictEqual(windows['30d'].mute, 4)
+})
+
+test('reshapeWindows: ignores unknown action types (e.g. future enum values)', () => {
+  const { windows } = moderation.reshapeWindows([{ action_type: 'filter_hit', d1: 9, d7: 9, d30: 9 }])
+  assert.deepEqual(windows['24h'], { ban: 0, kick: 0, mute: 0, warn: 0 })
+})
+
+test('reshapeWindows: empty input yields all-zero windows', () => {
+  const { windows } = moderation.reshapeWindows([])
+  assert.deepEqual(windows, {
+    '24h': { ban: 0, kick: 0, mute: 0, warn: 0 },
+    '7d': { ban: 0, kick: 0, mute: 0, warn: 0 },
+    '30d': { ban: 0, kick: 0, mute: 0, warn: 0 },
+  })
+})
+
+test('annotate: flags automated when staff id matches the bot application id', () => {
+  const [row] = moderation.annotate([{ staff_user_id: '999', target_site_user_id: null }], '999')
+  assert.equal(row.is_automated, true)
+})
+
+test('annotate: string/number snowflake mismatch still matches (coerced)', () => {
+  // mod_actions stores staff_user_id as VARCHAR, but bot_config.application_id
+  // could arrive as a number — the compare must coerce both sides.
+  const [row] = moderation.annotate([{ staff_user_id: 999, target_site_user_id: null }], '999')
+  assert.equal(row.is_automated, true)
+})
+
+test('annotate: staff action (id differs from bot) is not automated', () => {
+  const [row] = moderation.annotate([{ staff_user_id: '111', target_site_user_id: null }], '999')
+  assert.equal(row.is_automated, false)
+})
+
+test('annotate: no bot application id configured means nothing is automated', () => {
+  const [row] = moderation.annotate([{ staff_user_id: '999', target_site_user_id: null }], null)
+  assert.equal(row.is_automated, false)
+})
+
+test('annotate: folds joined identity columns into linked_account', () => {
+  const [row] = moderation.annotate(
+    [{ staff_user_id: '1', target_site_user_id: 7, target_site_username: 'perry' }],
+    null,
+  )
+  assert.deepEqual(row.linked_account, { id: 7, username: 'perry' })
+})
+
+test('annotate: no linked identity yields null linked_account', () => {
+  const [row] = moderation.annotate([{ staff_user_id: '1', target_site_user_id: null }], null)
+  assert.equal(row.linked_account, null)
+})
+
+test('windowValue: picks the right column per window key and coerces to number', () => {
+  const row = { d1: '2', d7: 5, d30: '11' }
+  assert.strictEqual(moderation.windowValue(row, '24h'), 2)
+  assert.strictEqual(moderation.windowValue(row, '7d'), 5)
+  assert.strictEqual(moderation.windowValue(row, '30d'), 11)
+})
+
+test('windowValue: null row (no rows in window) yields 0', () => {
+  assert.strictEqual(moderation.windowValue(null, '24h'), 0)
+  assert.strictEqual(moderation.windowValue(undefined, '30d'), 0)
+})
+
+test('windowValue: null sum column yields 0', () => {
+  assert.strictEqual(moderation.windowValue({ d1: null, d7: null, d30: null }, '7d'), 0)
+})

server/test/requireInternalKey.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+const { test } = require('node:test')
+const assert = require('node:assert/strict')
+
+const requireInternalKey = require('../src/middleware/requireInternalKey')
+const { startApp } = require('./_helper')
+
+const KEY = 'test-internal-key-1234567890'
+
+async function withApp(run) {
+  const prev = process.env.BOT_INTERNAL_KEY
+  process.env.BOT_INTERNAL_KEY = KEY
+  const app = await startApp((a) => {
+    a.get('/internal/thing', requireInternalKey, (req, res) => res.json({ ok: true }))
+  })
+  try {
+    await run(app)
+  } finally {
+    await app.close()
+    if (prev === undefined) delete process.env.BOT_INTERNAL_KEY
+    else process.env.BOT_INTERNAL_KEY = prev
+  }
+}
+
+test('requireInternalKey: 401 when no key header is sent', async () => {
+  await withApp(async (app) => {
+    const res = await fetch(`${app.url}/internal/thing`)
+    assert.equal(res.status, 401)
+  })
+})
+
+test('requireInternalKey: 401 on a wrong key', async () => {
+  await withApp(async (app) => {
+    const res = await fetch(`${app.url}/internal/thing`, {
+      headers: { 'X-Internal-Key': 'nope' },
+    })
+    assert.equal(res.status, 401)
+  })
+})
+
+test('requireInternalKey: 200 with the correct key', async () => {
+  await withApp(async (app) => {
+    const res = await fetch(`${app.url}/internal/thing`, {
+      headers: { 'X-Internal-Key': KEY },
+    })
+    assert.equal(res.status, 200)
+    const body = await res.json()
+    assert.deepEqual(body, { ok: true })
+  })
+})
+
+test('requireInternalKey: 401 when the expected key is empty (never a wildcard)', async () => {
+  const prev = process.env.BOT_INTERNAL_KEY
+  process.env.BOT_INTERNAL_KEY = ''
+  const app = await startApp((a) => {
+    a.get('/internal/thing', requireInternalKey, (req, res) => res.json({ ok: true }))
+  })
+  try {
+    // Even sending an empty key must not match an empty expected key.
+    const res = await fetch(`${app.url}/internal/thing`, { headers: { 'X-Internal-Key': '' } })
+    assert.equal(res.status, 401)
+  } finally {
+    await app.close()
+    if (prev === undefined) delete process.env.BOT_INTERNAL_KEY
+    else process.env.BOT_INTERNAL_KEY = prev
+  }
+})

server/test/session.test.js

@@ -10,7 +10,10 @@ const { test, after } = require('node:test')
 const assert = require('node:assert/strict')
 
 const sessionService = require('../src/auth/session.service')
+const ssoState = require('../src/auth/ssoState')
 const authFacade = require('../src/utils/auth')
+const revokedSessions = require('../src/model/revokedSessions/revokedSessions.model')
+const usersModel = require('../src/model/users/users.model')
 const db = require('../src/utils/db')
 
 after(() => db.close())
@@ -36,6 +39,9 @@ test('createSession → validateSession round-trips a Session object', () => {
   assert.equal(session.authMethod, 'local')
   assert.ok(session.sessionId, 'sessionId (jti) is present')
   assert.equal(typeof session.createdAt, 'number')
+  // exp is carried so logout can set a self-pruning denylist row expiry.
+  assert.equal(typeof session.expiresAt, 'number')
+  assert.ok(session.expiresAt > session.createdAt, 'expiresAt is after createdAt')
 
   // Validating the same token off a request yields the same identity.
   const validated = sessionService.validateSession(reqWithCookie(token))
@@ -68,6 +74,28 @@ test('a partial (TOTP challenge) token is NOT a valid session', () => {
   assert.equal(sessionService.decodeIdentity(challenge), null)
 })
 
+test('an SSO transaction (sso_tx) flow token is NOT a valid session (issue #32)', () => {
+  // The sso_tx cookie is a JWT signed with the same secret as sessions, carrying
+  // kind:'sso_tx' and id:'sso' but no `stage`. Before the fix it passed the
+  // blocklist check and validated as a bogus { userId:'sso' } session, which fooled
+  // non-DB identity checks (e.g. siteMode's maintenance-preview bypass).
+  const { txToken } = ssoState.createTx({ provider: 'google', mode: 'login' })
+  assert.equal(sessionService.validateSession(reqWithCookie(txToken)), null)
+  assert.equal(sessionService.validateSession(reqWithBearer(txToken)), null)
+  assert.equal(sessionService.decodeIdentity(txToken), null)
+  assert.equal(sessionService.validateBearerToken(txToken), null)
+  // And the historical facade used by siteMode must report no user.
+  assert.equal(authFacade.getUserFromRequest(reqWithCookie(txToken)), null)
+})
+
+test('a bare identity token with no session marker is NOT a valid session', () => {
+  // A JWT carrying only { id, username, role } (e.g. a legacy token, or one minted
+  // for some other purpose) must not validate: sessions are positively typed.
+  const bare = authFacade.signToken(USER)
+  assert.equal(sessionService.validateSession(reqWithCookie(bare)), null)
+  assert.equal(sessionService.decodeIdentity(bare), null)
+})
+
 test('upgradeSessionAfterTotp accepts a challenge and rejects a session token', () => {
   const challenge = sessionService.createPartialSession(USER)
   const decoded = sessionService.upgradeSessionAfterTotp(challenge)
@@ -86,10 +114,62 @@ test('validateSession / decodeIdentity return null for missing or garbage input'
   assert.equal(sessionService.decodeIdentity('not-a-jwt'), null)
 })
 
-test('revoke / invalidate stubs report success without throwing', () => {
-  assert.equal(sessionService.revokeSession('sid-1'), true)
-  assert.equal(sessionService.invalidateSession('sid-1'), true)
-  assert.equal(sessionService.invalidateAllUserSessions(USER.id), true)
+test('revokeSession denylists the jti with the token expiry', async () => {
+  // Stub the store (the DB is intentionally unreachable in these tests) and
+  // capture what the seam persists. sessionService holds the same module object,
+  // so overwriting the method here is what it calls.
+  const calls = []
+  const orig = revokedSessions.revoke
+  revokedSessions.revoke = async (args) => { calls.push(args); return 1 }
+  try {
+    const exp = Date.now() + 60_000
+    const ok = await sessionService.revokeSession('sid-1', { userId: USER.id, expiresAt: exp })
+    assert.equal(ok, true)
+    assert.equal(calls.length, 1)
+    assert.equal(calls[0].jti, 'sid-1')
+    assert.equal(calls[0].userId, USER.id)
+    assert.equal(calls[0].expiresAt, exp)
+  } finally {
+    revokedSessions.revoke = orig
+  }
+})
+
+test('revokeSession is a no-op (returns false) without a sessionId', async () => {
+  let called = false
+  const orig = revokedSessions.revoke
+  revokedSessions.revoke = async () => { called = true; return 1 }
+  try {
+    assert.equal(await sessionService.revokeSession(undefined), false)
+    assert.equal(called, false, 'nothing is persisted when there is no jti')
+  } finally {
+    revokedSessions.revoke = orig
+  }
+})
+
+test('isSessionRevoked delegates to the denylist (and short-circuits on null)', async () => {
+  const orig = revokedSessions.isRevoked
+  revokedSessions.isRevoked = async (jti) => jti === 'revoked-sid'
+  try {
+    assert.equal(await sessionService.isSessionRevoked('revoked-sid'), true)
+    assert.equal(await sessionService.isSessionRevoked('fresh-sid'), false)
+    assert.equal(await sessionService.isSessionRevoked(null), false)
+  } finally {
+    revokedSessions.isRevoked = orig
+  }
+})
+
+test('invalidateAllUserSessions bumps the user cutoff (and guards a missing id)', async () => {
+  const ids = []
+  const orig = usersModel.invalidateSessions
+  usersModel.invalidateSessions = async (id) => { ids.push(id); return undefined }
+  try {
+    assert.equal(await sessionService.invalidateAllUserSessions(USER.id), true)
+    assert.deepEqual(ids, [USER.id])
+    assert.equal(await sessionService.invalidateAllUserSessions(undefined), false)
+    assert.deepEqual(ids, [USER.id], 'no bump when userId is missing')
+  } finally {
+    usersModel.invalidateSessions = orig
+  }
 })
 
 test('sessionMeta derives ip / userAgent / deviceHash from the request', () => {

server/test/ssoCallback.test.js

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ const activity = require('../src/model/activity/activity.model')
 const authProviders = require('../src/model/authProviders/authProviders.model')
 const userIdentities = require('../src/model/userIdentities/userIdentities.model')
 const registry = require('../src/auth/providers/registry')
+const totp = require('../src/utils/totp')
 const db = require('../src/utils/db')
 
 after(() => db.close())
@@ -114,3 +115,75 @@ test('bad state (CSRF) → rejected before any provider work', async () => {
   assert.equal(res.redirectedTo, '/admin/login?sso_error=bad_state')
   assert.equal(res.cookies[token.COOKIE_NAME], undefined)
 })
+
+// ── 2FA parity: SSO must not bypass TOTP (issue #31) ────────────────────────
+
+test('linked account with TOTP → staged challenge, NO session, routed to TOTP', async () => {
+  userIdentities.findByProviderSubject = async () => ({ user_id: 7 })
+  users.getById = async (id) => ({ id, username: 'alice', role: 'admin', totp_enabled: 1 })
+  const tx = ssoState.createTx({ provider: 'google', mode: 'login', returnTo: '/admin/posts' })
+  const res = mockRes()
+  await ssoCtrl.callback(makeReq(tx), res)
+
+  assert.equal(res.cookies[token.COOKIE_NAME], undefined, 'no full session before 2FA')
+  assert.ok(res.cookies[ssoState.TOTP_COOKIE], 'pending-TOTP cookie staged')
+  assert.equal(res.redirectedTo, '/admin/login?sso_totp=1')
+  assert.equal(logged.length, 0, 'login not logged until the second factor passes')
+  // The staged cookie carries the resolved context and is not a usable session.
+  const pending = ssoState.verifyTotpPending(res.cookies[ssoState.TOTP_COOKIE])
+  assert.equal(pending.id, 7)
+  assert.equal(pending.provider, 'google')
+  assert.equal(pending.returnTo, '/admin/posts')
+})
+
+function makeTotpReq(pendingToken, code) {
+  return {
+    cookies: pendingToken ? { [ssoState.TOTP_COOKIE]: pendingToken } : {},
+    body: { code },
+    ip: '127.0.0.1', protocol: 'http', get: () => 'localhost', headers: {},
+  }
+}
+
+test('finishSsoTotp: correct code → session issued, pending cookie cleared, login logged', async () => {
+  users.getRawById = async (id) => ({ id, username: 'alice', role: 'admin', totp_enabled: 1, totp_secret: 'S' })
+  totp.verifyCode = () => true
+  const pending = ssoState.createTotpPending({ userId: 7, provider: 'google', authMethod: 'google', returnTo: '/admin/posts' })
+  const res = mockRes()
+  await ssoCtrl.finishSsoTotp(makeTotpReq(pending, '123456'), res)
+
+  assert.ok(res.cookies[token.COOKIE_NAME], 'session cookie set after 2FA')
+  assert.ok(res.cleared.includes(ssoState.TOTP_COOKIE), 'pending-TOTP cookie cleared')
+  assert.equal(res.body.returnTo, '/admin/posts')
+  assert.equal(res.body.user.id, 7)
+  assert.equal(logged.at(-1).action, 'auth.sso.login')
+  assert.equal(logged.at(-1).detail.totp, true)
+})
+
+test('finishSsoTotp: wrong code → 401, no session', async () => {
+  users.getRawById = async (id) => ({ id, username: 'alice', role: 'admin', totp_enabled: 1, totp_secret: 'S' })
+  totp.verifyCode = () => false
+  const pending = ssoState.createTotpPending({ userId: 7, provider: 'google', authMethod: 'google' })
+  const res = mockRes()
+  await ssoCtrl.finishSsoTotp(makeTotpReq(pending, '000000'), res)
+
+  assert.equal(res.statusCode, 401)
+  assert.match(res.body.message, /Invalid verification code/)
+  assert.equal(res.cookies[token.COOKIE_NAME], undefined)
+})
+
+test('finishSsoTotp: missing/expired pending cookie → 401 expired', async () => {
+  const res = mockRes()
+  await ssoCtrl.finishSsoTotp(makeTotpReq(null, '123456'), res)
+  assert.equal(res.statusCode, 401)
+  assert.match(res.body.message, /expired/i)
+  assert.equal(res.cookies[token.COOKIE_NAME], undefined)
+})
+
+test('finishSsoTotp: a local /login/totp challenge is not accepted here', async () => {
+  // A stage:'totp' token without kind:'sso_totp' must be rejected by this endpoint.
+  const localChallenge = token.signTotpChallenge({ id: 7 })
+  const res = mockRes()
+  await ssoCtrl.finishSsoTotp(makeTotpReq(localChallenge, '123456'), res)
+  assert.equal(res.statusCode, 401)
+  assert.match(res.body.message, /expired/i)
+})

server/test/ssoState.test.js

@@ -1,10 +1,18 @@
+// Point the DB at a closed port before requiring the auth layer: session.service
+// (used by one test below) pulls in the users model → db pool at load, and an idle
+// pool would keep this process alive. None of these tests touch the database.
 process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'test-secret'
+process.env.DB_HOST = '127.0.0.1'
+process.env.DB_PORT = '59999'
 
-const { test } = require('node:test')
+const { test, after } = require('node:test')
 const assert = require('node:assert/strict')
 const crypto = require('crypto')
 
 const ssoState = require('../src/auth/ssoState')
+const db = require('../src/utils/db')
+
+after(() => db.close())
 
 test('createTx → verifyTx round-trips the flow payload', () => {
   const tx = ssoState.createTx({ provider: 'google', mode: 'login', returnTo: '/admin/posts' })
@@ -36,3 +44,27 @@ test('verifyTx rejects a non-tx token', () => {
   const notTx = token.signToken({ id: 1, username: 'a', role: 'admin' })
   assert.equal(ssoState.verifyTx(notTx, 'anything'), null)
 })
+
+test('createTotpPending → verifyTotpPending round-trips the SSO 2FA context', () => {
+  const pending = ssoState.createTotpPending({ userId: 7, provider: 'google', authMethod: 'google', returnTo: '/admin/posts' })
+  const payload = ssoState.verifyTotpPending(pending)
+  assert.ok(payload)
+  assert.equal(payload.id, 7)
+  assert.equal(payload.provider, 'google')
+  assert.equal(payload.authMethod, 'google')
+  assert.equal(payload.returnTo, '/admin/posts')
+  assert.equal(payload.stage, 'totp')
+})
+
+test('a pending-TOTP token is NOT accepted as a session (stage + kind reject it)', () => {
+  const sessionService = require('../src/auth/session.service')
+  const pending = ssoState.createTotpPending({ userId: 7, provider: 'google', authMethod: 'google' })
+  assert.equal(sessionService.decodeIdentity(pending), null)
+})
+
+test('verifyTotpPending rejects a plain session and a bare TOTP challenge', () => {
+  const token = require('../src/auth/token')
+  assert.equal(ssoState.verifyTotpPending(token.signToken({ id: 1, username: 'a', role: 'admin' })), null)
+  assert.equal(ssoState.verifyTotpPending(token.signTotpChallenge({ id: 1 })), null)
+  assert.equal(ssoState.verifyTotpPending(null), null)
+})