`the manifest and the module's declared mounts agree` was written in phase 1 with
its own exception named in a comment: when `admin.users.detail` arrives, its
routes live on a resource core owns and the test must grow the exception
deliberately rather than let a route outside every declared mount arrive
unnoticed. This is that growth, and the test did its job — it failed on the first
run after the slot was filled.
A route is now legitimate if it is under a declared prefix OR under the mount of
a slot `module.json` declares, and a declared slot that contributes no route
fails too: core never checks that a declared slot was filled (`checkDeclared`
covers `mounts` alone), so this is the only place an exception widening the check
for nothing is noticed. Verified by pointing the slot mount at a path nothing
serves and watching it fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PMH6bw1jXMgbyF3ZWGEzSM
R1's identity link, site-side, and R13's first extension slot. A player types
/link in game, the plugin hands them a six-character code privately, and they
enter it here; the site records who owns which Steam account, and an operator
sees that on core's own `/admin/users/:id` page.
**The site is the author of record and the game holds nothing.** There is no
per-account store in Rust that survives a wipe, and phase 7 needs the site
authoritative anyway — it pushes permissions INTO the game keyed by Steam id. A
copy in the game would be a second thing to reconcile every wipe, for no question
it could answer better.
## D24 — a code is minted by ONE server, so every server is asked
Nothing in six characters says where it came from. The fleet is asked in turn and
the first `link.ok` wins; the others answer `unknown` and nothing happens there,
because a code is only spent at the server that actually holds it. Asking the
player to pick was rejected: a wrong pick would come back indistinguishable from
a wrong code, and that is the one refusal which must not be ambiguous.
**"Every reachable server refused" is not the same answer as "a server was
unreachable."** Collapsing them tells a player whose server is down that their
code is wrong — so they run /link again on that same server and are told the same
thing for as long as it stays down. `unsure` is that case, and it says to try
again rather than to fetch a new code.
## D23 — a Steam id another account holds is refused, never moved
The primary key is `steam_id`, and it is load-bearing rather than tidy: phase 7
grants permissions against a link and phase 13 hangs entitlements off it, so a
silent move is an account takeover performed by typing six characters. The
refusal names the holder, because the advice is unusable without it. The INSERT
is a plain INSERT for the same reason — `ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE` here would BE
that move — and the duplicate-key error is the refusal for the race the check
above cannot close.
The way out is `/unlink` in game, which reaches the site off the ingest feed
rather than through a route (the plugin has no link to delete). D25 adds the
other way out: staff can sever a link from the admin panel, for a player who
cannot reach that Steam account in game.
## The slot, and the hole it found in this repo's own generator
`admin.users.detail` is declared in `module.json` AND registered in `index.js`
AND filled by the chunk — three places, because the server half and the client
half are different registrations that share one name.
`swaggerFragment.js` knew only about tier routers, so the two routes under
`/admin/users/:id` were generated by nothing: a fragment that was internally
consistent and described two routes fewer than the module serves. A slot's mount
is core's and cannot be derived here, so it is a fourth constant beside
`TIER_BASE` — held to account by the frozen-manifest job, which was verified to
catch exactly this by removing the two paths and watching it fail.
## Smaller things worth knowing
- **Core's `useAsync` has no `refresh`.** A counter in the deps is how a page
re-reads after its own write; it blanks while it re-reads, which is right here
and is exactly what made it wrong for a poll.
- **Every player-portal nav row needs an `icon`** — core draws one on every row,
and the client suite says so. This module had no icons file until now, because
the public header is text buttons.
- The two new frame kinds are STAFF-only. Neither carries a code, but both name a
Steam id beside a website account's activity, and that join is not a public
fact about what happened on a server.
- The link code route carries its own rate limiter rather than core's
`accountChangeLimiter`: this is guessing somebody else's secret, not changing
your own password, and a shared counter would let one policy set the other.
Protocol 3 on all three declaration sites; 17 new tests, 136 green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PMH6bw1jXMgbyF3ZWGEzSM
Phase 5 is the Android app's leg of this module's read path (R10), and it
gates its Rust navigation on one capability string the way `module-uo`'s five
shard rows gate on `shard`. There was no such string here: the five this module
declared all name a SURFACE, and core flattens every started module's
capabilities into one list, so `servers` is a word another module could declare
tomorrow and silently reveal these screens on a site that does not run Rust.
`rust` is the string only this module can mean. It is asserted against
`module.json`'s own `id` rather than a literal, so the two cannot drift.
The README says why it is not redundant with `id`: `id` is a mount prefix, and
MODULE_API.md §2.9 forbids a client inferring a route from a capability. Gating
on `id` would quietly make those the same thing.
Decided by the org lead as D16, 2026-09-16.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4
Phase 4. `/rust` is the server list and the module's landing page (D12);
`/rust/servers/:id` is one server with four tabs — feed, leaderboard, who is
on, wipes (D13). Everything selectable lives in the URL, so any view of the
page is a link. The feed and the presence list poll every twenty seconds while
the tab is visible and not at all when it is not (D14); the leaderboard and the
wipe list load once. `site.footer.status` is filled with a live server and
player count (D15).
Nothing on these pages calls a game server. Every field comes from this
module's own tables, which is what the phase criterion is about: the site
renders the last thing each server said while every server is off.
Walking that criterion in a browser against a live rig found four defects, two
of them already shipped in phase 3:
* An unreachable refresh called `putState` — the whole-row write — with two
fields, so a host that rebooted lost its hostname, map, size, seed and wipe
id. The list then read "Offline" with nothing beside it, which is not "here
is what we know" but "we have never heard of it". `markUnreachable` now
moves three columns and mentions no others.
* "Last reported" read `updated_at`, which a FAILED poll writes too — so an
offline server claimed it had reported just now, every thirty seconds, for
as long as it stayed down. `last_seen_at` is the new column, moved only by a
frame that arrived.
* Feed rows showed a bare time of day, so three events from six weeks ago all
read as this afternoon once the feed was filtered to a past wipe.
* `/rust/servers/typo` rendered core's ErrorState under its own heading and
read "No such server / Something went wrong", sending a reader who mistyped
a URL looking for an outage.
Also: a detail route (`GET …/servers/:id`), because it is the only route under
that path that can say a server does not exist — the other four answer an empty
list for an id nobody configured, and each of those is a good answer to its own
question.
`useAsync` cannot poll: it blanks its data on every dependency change, so a
twenty-second refresh built on it would clear the killfeed and re-fill it four
times a minute. `hooks/usePolled.js` is the module's own, invisible when it
succeeds and keeping the rows when it fails.
The client test fake was *nearly* core — it prefixed routes without stripping
the trailing separator, so the first module to register an index route failed
the nav check for a link that works in a browser. It now copies core's line
character for character.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4
The module half of the read path. Seven tables, an ingest cursor, four public
routes, and one file whose only job is deciding who may see what.
**The record and the window are different things.** `rust_player_wipe_stats` and
`rust_gather_totals` are permanent and per-wipe, so all-time is those rows SUMmed
rather than a second set of counters that can disagree with them — that is R12's
"per-wipe detail plus all-time rollups" in one table instead of two.
`rust_events` is a bounded 30-day window of raw frames for the killfeed, and
`rust_presence` is a board: replaced wholesale, never appended.
**The feed is a cursor, not a socket, and the header says why.** Core runs Node
20, where a global WebSocket is still behind a flag, so a socket means taking
`ws` — against a release that asserts it has no runtime dependencies (D5). The
deciding argument is the other one though: a socket needs a cursor anyway, for
whatever it missed while the module was restarting, and the catch-up path is the
one that has to be right. A cursor alone is one mechanism exercised every five
seconds rather than two where the second only runs after an outage.
**The cursor advances after the batch, never before.** A crash between the two
re-reads events already counted, which inflates a total; the other order loses
them silently and for ever. One is visible and bounded, the other is invisible
and permanent, so the code fails in the visible direction. A server with no
cursor starts at the sidecar's current END rather than at zero — replaying a
fortnight of deaths into stats for wipes the site never saw is not a catch-up.
**`catalogue.js` is a security boundary, default-deny.** Protocol 2 carries IP
addresses (login attempts, approvals, bans), one player's report about another,
and the grid reference of somebody's base. They are stored, because an operator
chasing ban evasion needs them; they are not served below the admin tier. The
allowlist lives here rather than as a field on the wire, because a boundary
declared by the sender is one a compromised or merely out-of-date game host can
widen — the same reason core's own shard fan-out filters on the serving side. A
kind this build has never heard of is not public, and a test holds the list
against PROTOCOL.md §8.4 so that adding a kind to the protocol without
classifying it fails a build.
`PROTOCOL_VERSION` goes to 2 here in the same change as the emitters, though this
module consumes none of the new frames yet: the sidecar refuses a mismatched
client with a 409, so a module left on 1 would stop being able to read the board
it has been reading all along. A constant that lags the deployment is an outage
with a version number on it.
95 server tests, 20 client tests, every guard green, and `routes.manifest.json`
regenerated against a real core at the pinned ref: 10 routes, all documented,
none of core's moved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4
Phase 2 of docs/modules/rust/PLAN.md. Phase 1 built five guards and ran them by
hand; this repo had no workflows at all, so nothing gated the branch that gets
released and there was no way to release it.
Three pieces:
- **release.yml** — the derived-version engine link, installer and Module-uo
already run (conventional-commit subjects since the newest tag; module.json's
version survives as a floor; workflow_dispatch as the backdoor), assembling the
bundle from an include list and publishing the tarball, the install manifest
carrying its sha256, and SHA256SUMS. The tag is the number that ships and CI
stamps it into the bundle's own module.json.
- **pr-checks.yml** — server tests, check:imports, check:bundle, check:swagger,
the client build, client tests and check:externals, plus frozen-manifest.
- **frozen-manifest** — clones core at the sha pinned in ci/core-ref.json,
generates its route table without this module and with it, and takes the
difference. It ran locally against that exact ref: six routes, all documented,
no core route moved. That is the first proof by a running core that /rust
collides with nothing — phase 1 could only check it by reading, because core
mounts /status and /version at a tier root where the loader's own collision
probe cannot see them.
The bundle carries no node_modules, because the shipped half declares no runtime
dependencies (org lead, phase 2). checkBundle.js holds both halves of that: the
include list still covers everything server/index.js reaches, and no dependency
has appeared without the release learning to pack it. Verified by breaking it —
dropping "model" from the list names the exact edit and exits 1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4
module-rust, id 'rust', built from the Integration Kit's template. Phase 1's job
is the kit's own argument: get every seam working at once with almost nothing in
them, so that afterwards you break exactly one at a time.
What is here:
* /rust on all three tiers, because the loader holds module.json's mounts against
what is registered in BOTH directions -- so the declaration and the
registration land together or not at all. The player tier is honestly thin: it
answers the server list on the authenticated tier, delegating to the same model
the public tier uses so the two cannot drift while they are meant to be the
same. It is the address the app will call, registered now rather than moved
later.
* Two tables. rust_servers is configuration an operator writes; rust_server_state
is what a sidecar reported. Separate tables because they have different
writers, lifetimes and audiences -- and because purging observed state while
keeping the configuration is a thing an operator will want.
* Per-server sidecar tokens through ctx.secretBox, write-only in the API. The
admin list reports hasToken and never the credential, and an empty token on a
save leaves the stored one alone -- a form that posts its own blank field would
otherwise erase a credential every time somebody renamed a server.
* A real sidecar client. It never throws: every call answers {ok, status, data},
and the status is what tells a wrong URL from a wrong token from a mismatched
protocol -- all three present as 'the site says my server is offline' and each
has a different fix.
* The five guards, green: check:imports, check:swagger, check:externals, and both
suites.
What is deliberately NOT registered: the Team provider, triggers, audiences,
engagement seeds, notification streams, the four event catalogues, and the two
extension slots. Each arrives with the phase that has something real to put in
it, and a test asserts their absence so that removing it is deliberate. A
declared trigger nothing emits and a declared slot nothing fills are both
surfaces an operator can configure and then wait on, which is worse than an
absent one because the absence is visible.
Two corrections to the kit's template, both feedback for a later phase:
* registration.test.js read one page BY NAME to check declared slots are
rendered, so a module declaring none dies on ENOENT before reaching the loop
that would have been empty. It now scans every file under src/routes.
* test/_fakes.js supplied validator: {}. An admin router that builds validation
chains at file scope cannot be required with that, so the fake holds the real
express-validator -- for the same reason it holds a real express Router.
The kit was right about noGameConnection.test.js: its header predicts that a
module adding a sidecar client will see the check go red, names sidecarClient.js
as the file to allow, and says narrow it rather than delete it. That is exactly
what happened on the first run, and the fix was the one line the header names.
Installed into a real core and verified: the module reaches 'started', publishes
its capability, serves its chunk, and renders a server whose server.hello
originated in a live Rust server.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4
The org's standard furniture for a new repo: licence, code of conduct, security
policy, contributing guide, issue and pull-request templates, and the ignore
rules. No module yet — that arrives as the first pull request, so this branch
exists to open one against.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016wDDVXWMDz82WqE1i969r4
