The `:discordId` param validator on the five admin moderation routes used
`/^d{1,32}$/`, which matches 1-32 literal `d` characters instead of digits.
A real numeric Discord snowflake failed validation, so every
`/moderation/user/:discordId*` endpoint returned a 400 for valid input.
The backslash was dropped in a prior code-smell cleanup (12d50fd) that
intended `[0-9]` -> `\d`. Restore `\d` so the regex matches digits again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The ntfy service was configured with no published host port, on the
assumption that the public reverse proxy shares the compose network and
can dial ntfy:80 directly. It does not — Pangolin runs outside the
compose network and reaches every service through a published host port
(exactly why `app` publishes 3000). With no published port there was
nothing for the notification subdomain to forward to, so push delivery
could never work in production.
Publish container :80 on a host port (NTFY_HOST_PORT, default 2586,
binds 0.0.0.0 like `app`) and correct the now-inaccurate comments in
docker-compose.yml and ntfy/server.yml. Document NTFY_HOST_PORT in
.env.example. No code change — deploy config only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Staff are a superset of players — every player ability plus their staff
tools on top — but the /player/* group ran requireRole('player'), so a
signed-in admin/editor/moderator got 403 on their own linked game
accounts (e.g. GET /player/shard/accounts). On the Android client this
hid "My characters" and greyed the personal notification streams for
staff accounts, even when they had linked characters.
Drop the role gate: the group is now requireAuth-only. Every handler is
already self-scoped to the caller by req.user.id (with the pre-existing
isAdmin bypass still letting a genuine admin read any character), so this
only ever widens access to the caller's OWN data. Staff also reach the
identical self-scoped handlers under /admin/shard/* (same controller).
- player.routes.js: requireRole('player') -> requireAuth; corrected the
five stale "Player role required" 403 descriptions and regenerated
swagger-output.json.
- New test/playerRouteAccess.test.js mounts the router and asserts
player/admin/editor/moderator all reach the handler, anon still 401s,
and a disabled account still 403s. Suite: 420 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add opt-in "Trust this device" so a browser/app skips the TOTP step (never
the password) for 30 days, single-use bcrypt recovery codes as a 2FA-lockout
fallback, and admin trusted-device/MFA-reset management — backend, web UI,
OpenAPI spec, and tests.
- Schema: trusted_devices (sha256 token hash, looked up by unique index) and
recovery_codes (bcrypt, single-use). Both additive/idempotent.
- Session service: trust-token mint/hash/resolve + cap helpers; new rg_trust
httpOnly cookie (survives logout, revoked on untrust/password change/reset/
TOTP disable). JWTs stay stateless — trust is a server-side row, not a claim.
- Web + mobile login accept a trusted-device token / recovery code; login/totp
gains trustDevice + recoveryCode. Cap of 10/user with NO silent pruning — an
over-cap trust returns 409/trustLimitReached and the client prompts to revoke.
- Self-service /auth/me/trusted-devices* + recovery-codes*; admin
/admin/users/:id/trusted-devices* + /mfa/reset. All actions audit-logged.
- Client: "Trust this device" + recovery-code login options, one-time recovery
code display, Trusted Devices + Recovery Codes account panels, a TOTP-styled
revoke-to-continue cap modal, and admin per-user security controls.
- OpenAPI regenerated; 33 new server tests (all suites green).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add an Architecture section with a Mermaid diagram of the full data path
(SPA/mobile clients -> layered Express backend -> MariaDB, and the uo-link
sidecar bridge to the ServUO shard) plus a Contents entry. Same diagram is
mirrored in the docs repo (docs/website/ARCHITECTURE.md).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
So the dev stub IdP's account-picker renders at the correct mobile size when it
opens in an Android Custom Tab during SSO testing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Dev environments have no real OAuth provider configured, so GET /auth/providers
returns [] and the native mobile SSO flow cannot be exercised locally. Add
dependency-free dev tooling under scripts/dev/:
- stub-idp.js: stub OAuth2/OIDC IdP (authorize picker, token, userinfo)
- seed-sso-provider.js: registers a 'devstub' auth_providers row + pre-links
each principal's sub to a dev account (SSO is link-only)
- sso-bridge-smoketest.js: drives the full app flow headless (PKCE → start →
IdP → callback → deep link → exchange) and asserts a bearer pair
- README.md: host + emulator usage
Verified end-to-end against the local site: player and admin principals both
sign in and receive the correct role. DEV ONLY — never deploy the stub.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The footer's "Shard Status" link targeted /site/status; point it at the
richer live shard page at /site/shard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address the SonarQube copy-paste findings that reflect real duplication (as
opposed to the intentional cross-package / admin-player mirror copies, which
are by-design and left as-is):
- shardState.model.js: listOnline() re-inlined the exact field mapping that
shapeOnline() already provides (used by listOnlineLinked). Collapse it onto
shapeOnline so the two can no longer drift.
- shardState.db.js: extract a single upsertRow(table, pkCol, pk, fields,
{coalesce}) builder for the five near-identical INSERT ... ON DUPLICATE KEY
UPDATE bodies (online/houses/champs/guilds/governors). shard_online keeps its
COALESCE-on-NULL semantics via the coalesce flag.
- botConfig/emailConfig/uoLinkConfig .db.js: generate get()/upsert() from a
shared singletonConfigDb(table, cols) factory instead of three byte-identical
copies.
Behavior unchanged; full server suite (381 tests) passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Clears the 124 CODE_SMELL findings from the SonarQube scan (server, client,
and bot). All changes are behaviour-preserving refactors — no route, protocol,
schema, or config changes — verified against the full server (381) and client
(43) test suites plus a clean client build.
By rule:
- S3776 (20, cognitive complexity): extract helpers/handlers so each function
drops under the threshold — shard model upsert builders, page/wiki update,
block validation, notification stream mapping (dispatch table), SSO mobile
login, shard ingest deps, uo-link socket backfill/connect, the bot slash-
command dispatchers + discord manager, and the Shard/UserDetail/HeroEditor/
CharacterStats React components.
- S4624 (34, nested template literals): pull inner templates into locals /
a withQs() helper; rewrite shardEvents.describe() as a formatter table.
- S3358 (35, nested ternaries): lift to if/else vars, lookup maps, small
components, or guarded JSX expressions.
- S6479 (12, array-index React keys): key by stable content instead of index
(two in-editor lists left as-is; index matches their by-index edit model).
- S6353 (6): [0-9]/[^0-9] -> \d/\D. S125 (5): reword state-shape comments that
parsed as code. S3800/S3782 (botScore): JSDoc-type PATH_WEIGHTS tuples.
- S6481 (2): memoize Auth/Site context values (and SiteContext brand).
- S4144: dedupe HeroEditor upload handler into useImageUpload().
- S1126 (2), S6035, S5869 (redundant A-Z under /i), S5843 (town-name regex ->
prefix list): assorted one-liners.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The lcov reports only feed SonarQube's Coverage metric — the "Unit Tests" tile
stayed "-" because we never provided a test-execution report (a separate input
via sonar.testExecutionReportPaths, in SonarQube's own Generic Test Execution
XML format, which the lcov/junit reporters don't produce).
Add a dependency-free custom node:test reporter (scripts/sonar-test-reporter.mjs)
that emits that XML — repo-root-relative <file path> entries matching sonar.tests,
integer-ms durations — and wire it into both the server and client coverage runs
in sonarqube.yml, plus sonar.testExecutionReportPaths in sonar-project.properties.
Verified locally: server 380 + client 43 test cases, well-formed XML, all three
reporters (spec/lcov/sonar) coexist in one `node --test` invocation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stand up a client test suite on Node's built-in runner (no vitest/jsdom — the
targeted modules are plain ESM with no browser/DOM deps) and cover the
meaningful client logic, not presentational components:
- api/client.js: the fetch wrapper — always sends the session cookie, maps a
non-2xx response to a thrown ApiError (body.message → statusText fallback),
resolves an empty body to null, sets Content-Type for JSON but NOT for raw
FormData uploads, and builds/encodes query strings + path params.
- lib/shardEvents.js: describe() across event kinds (payload vs live frame,
actor name→acct→"Someone" fallback, sale pluralization, champ.update
branches) and the categoryOf table-consistency check.
- data/regionBuckets.js: the presence roll-up, incl. the first-match-wins
ordering and the "buckets always reconcile to the total" invariant.
- lib/heroLayout.js: parseLayout's version/shape guard and heroBackground's
default-vs-custom branch.
- lib/format.js: the date/label formatters + relative-time buckets.
Wiring so these actually count:
- client/package.json gains a `test` script (node --test);
- pr-checks.yml runs the client tests as a PR gate;
- sonarqube.yml generates a client LCOV report and sonar-project.properties
feeds it alongside the server report (SF paths resolve to client/src/...).
43 client tests; coverage on the tested modules: format/regionBuckets/
heroLayout 100%, api client 86%, shardEvents 80%.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add controller-level unit tests (mock req/res, monkeypatched collaborators)
focused on security boundaries and decision logic the API must not regress:
- auth.controller: honeypot handling, non-enumerating generic-fail for every
credential failure, inactive-account refusal, the TOTP challenge branch that
must NOT issue a session, register-mode gating + dup-username 409, and logout
that always clears the cookie and revokes the session (even on error).
- invite.controller: user created at the invite's PRESET role, and the lost
double-accept race rolling back the just-created user.
- passwordReset.controller: identical generic 200 whether or not the email
matched (incl. internal errors), per-account mail-failure isolation, the
single-use consume race, and revoke-everywhere-on-reset with no auto-login.
- public.controller: staff-only draft visibility, token-gated page preview,
wiki search precedence + unknown-filter handling, contact 502.
- shard.controller (public): the PUBLIC_KINDS feed allowlist and the public
house view stripping owner/price — both leak-prevention boundaries.
Lifts: auth.controller 46%→94%, passwordReset 33%→93%,
public.controller 28%→65%, shard.controller 45%→68% line coverage;
server aggregate 63.5%→70.4%.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add meaningful unit tests for three server models with untested business
logic, each against an in-memory fake db (no DB required):
- pages.model: slug validation + reserved-name guard, slug immutability,
the protected ON-via-update / OFF-only-via-unprotect asymmetry, publish
stamping, draft invisibility to public reads, dup-slug → 409, block gate.
- shardState.model: partial-refresh field dropping (vitals must not clobber
login fields), is_idoc derivation, economy clamp/ordering/Number coercion,
presence zero-snapshot defaults, payload-fallback shaping, and the
camelCase read-shaping contract the site + Android client depend on.
- moderation.model: five-feed window merge, userSummary count/total
semantics (total sums unknown types too), and graceful degradation when
bot config is missing.
Lifts: pages.model 23%→82%, moderation.model 27%→85%,
shardState.model 33%→62% line coverage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
SonarQube reported 0% coverage because the analysis workflow never ran
the test suite — the scanner does static analysis only and was handed no
coverage report, and sonar-project.properties defined no report path.
Generate an LCOV report in sonarqube.yml before the scan using Node's
built-in test coverage (run from the repo root so SF: paths are
server/src/... and resolve against the project base dir), and point
the scanner at it via sonar.javascript.lcov.reportPaths. Node's lcov
coverage reporter needs Node >= 22, so the coverage job pins node 22.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address SonarQube security hotspots on the website:
- server/src/app.js: replace `contentSecurityPolicy: false` with a helmet CSP
tuned for the built React SPA (script-src 'self'; style-src adds 'unsafe-inline'
for React inline styles + the Google Fonts stylesheet; font-src gstatic; img-src
allows data:/https: for uploads, embedded body images and BRAND_* assets;
connect-src 'self' for REST+SSE). upgrade-insecure-requests is intentionally
omitted (TLS terminates at the proxy; keeps local `npm start` over http working).
The /api/docs Swagger UI route gets a scoped looser policy (inline script/style)
since swagger-ui-express injects an inline bootstrap.
- client/vite.config.js: disable the inline module-preload polyfill so code-split
builds keep `script-src 'self'` valid (RichTextEditor is a separate chunk).
- bot/src/app.js, server/src/internalApp.js: disable x-powered-by on the two
internal-only listeners (the public app already strips it via helmet).
- shardEvents dedupe key: SHA-1 -> SHA-256 truncated to 40 hex chars (fits the
existing CHAR(40) column, no migration; it is a content fingerprint, not a
security value). schema.sql comment updated to match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
Wire the self-hosted SonarQube server into Gitea via a Gitea Actions
workflow. Runs on push to `main` (post-merge) and workflow_dispatch, so
it feeds the dashboard without gating any PR. Adds sonar-project.properties
(project key runic-gateway-website; server/client/bot sources, server tests,
node_modules/dist/generated excluded).
Requires two one-time Gitea settings: secret SONAR_TOKEN and variable
SONAR_HOST_URL. The scan does not wait on the Quality Gate, keeping it
fully non-blocking.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The schema loader stripped only full-line -- comments, then split the
file on ';'. A trailing comment containing a semicolon (e.g. the
mobile_auth_sessions.session_id column: `-- uuid; carried inside...`)
chopped the CREATE TABLE in half, so MariaDB got the fragment and failed
with `error ... near '' at line 3`, crash-looping the server on boot.
Strip -- comments on every line (full-line and trailing) before the ';'
split. Safe because the schema never places -- inside a string literal.
Verified by running ensureSchema() against a fresh MariaDB: all 49 tables
create cleanly and mobile_auth_sessions has all 11 columns.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add the server side of Android App Links (M9 follow-up, docs/android/APP_LINKS.md):
- GET /.well-known/assetlinks.json at the web root, gated by the new admin
setting `mobile_app_links_enabled` (default off -> 404; on-but-no-fingerprint
-> 404). Emits the Digital Asset Links statement for the fixed published
package (MOBILE_APP_PACKAGE) + MOBILE_APP_CERT_SHA256 fingerprint(s).
- mobileSso `/start` additionally accepts this shard's own self-origin
https://<host>/mobile/callback when App Links are enabled — one additive
exact-match entry, derived from APP_BASE_URL/request origin, never client
input; the custom-scheme allowlist is never narrowed. The settings lookup is
short-circuited for non-https redirects so custom-scheme rejections stay fast.
- settings.isMobileAppLinksEnabled() (fail-closed) + getPublic().mobileAppLinks;
admin updateSettings validates the boolean; seed default off.
Tests: test/appLinks.test.js (route gating + allowlist). Full suite 284 pass.
Swagger unchanged (web-root verification file is #swagger.ignore'd).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
Adds the self-service device-session surface the mobile-SSO spec requires, on
top of the existing mobile_refresh_tokens store.
- Schema: device_name + last_used_at columns on mobile_refresh_tokens (nullable,
additive via the ALTER section; seeded to now on insert). With single-use
rotation each login/refresh inserts a fresh row, so the active row's timestamp
is the session's last activity, and the label is carried forward on refresh.
- Model: listActiveForUser (one row per live device, no token hash) +
revokeByIdForUser (ownership-scoped, idempotent).
- GET /auth/me/sessions + DELETE /auth/me/sessions/:id (role-agnostic, behind
requireAuth). Named distinctly from /auth/me/devices (push endpoints).
- device_name is an optional field on /auth/mobile/login and
/auth/mobile/sso/exchange so the app can label a device.
- Client: an "Active Devices" panel on the player account page (list + sign a
device out), plus the PlayerLogin change to honor the mobile SSO bridge's
{ redirect } deep link on a 2FA completion.
- Swagger DeviceSession schema + regenerated spec; 3 controller tests. Full
server suite green (274); client builds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a Mobile SSO Authorization Bridge so the native app can "Sign in with
Google/Discord" without shipping any OAuth secret. It EXTENDS the existing
/auth/sso/* redirect flow (same PKCE-vs-IdP, link-only + opt-in provisioning,
TOTP gate) and terminates in the existing mobile bearer tokens — not a parallel
auth path.
- Schema: mobile_auth_sessions + mobile_auth_codes (short-lived, self-pruning;
authorization code stored hash-only, PKCE challenge is a hash by construction).
- GET /auth/mobile/sso/start: validate provider enabled + redirect_uri by EXACT
allowlist match (never prefix), seed a bridge session, reuse the SSO redirect
tagged mode:'mobile' (new redirectToIdp helper extracted from beginFlow).
- SSO callback + finishSsoTotp gain a mode:'mobile' branch: mint a single-use,
hashed, PKCE-bound code and redirect to the fixed app callback (code + echoed
state, never a token) instead of setting a cookie. 2FA keeps full parity via
the existing web TOTP form (now carrying the bridge session).
- POST /auth/mobile/sso/exchange: verify Layer-B PKCE (before burning the code),
single-use consume, then issue the SAME pair as /auth/mobile/login.
- Discovery reuses GET /auth/providers; refresh/logout reuse /auth/mobile/*.
- Rate limits: /start per-IP+provider, /exchange per-IP. Boot-time +
opportunistic prune of both tables (no cron, mirrors revoked_sessions).
- Redirect allowlist is MOBILE_AUTH_REDIRECT_URIS (default the one fixed
runicgateway://auth/callback); App Link URIs can be appended per shard later.
- Swagger regenerated; 39 tests (model single-use/gating + full controller
matrix: bad/expired/reused code, PKCE mismatch, disabled provider, redirect
allowlist, TOTP-through-bridge). Full suite green (271).
Refs docs/website/BACKEND_DESIGN.md, docs/android/PLAN.md §9 (M9).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Android app's embedded push distributor (M7 Part 2) needs the shard's
client-facing ntfy relay URL to build its device topic endpoint, but the M7
Part 1 backend only used the NTFY_* vars server-side and never surfaced them.
Add a `push: { ntfyUrl }` block to settings.getPublic(), sourced from
NTFY_PUBLIC_URL or the first NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS entry (never the possibly
internal NTFY_BASE_URL); null when unconfigured, so the app shows push as
unavailable for that shard. Additive, non-sensitive, forward-compatible.
- Extend the PublicSettings swagger schema; regenerate swagger-output.json.
- publicBrand.test.js: cover null / NTFY_PUBLIC_URL / NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS.
- Document NTFY_PUBLIC_URL in .env.example and (docs PR) BACKEND_DESIGN.md.
Full server suite green (250 pass).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Additive, v1-only backend contract for the Android app's opt-in push (Part 1 of
M7; docs/android/PLAN.md §11). The app is a pure consumer — this lands the
endpoints, fan-out, and relay it needs.
- Schema: push_devices (per-device endpoint) + notification_subscriptions
(per-user opted-in streams), FK→users ON DELETE CASCADE.
- Stream catalog + event→stream mapping (config/notificationStreams.js): public
streams (news.post, server.status, idoc.warning, champ.start, governor.election)
drawn ONLY from the SSE PUBLIC_KINDS allowlist; personal owner-keyed streams
(vendor.sale, house.idoc, account.login). Full-state upserts (champ/city) fire
only on a real transition via an injectable tracker.
- Fan-out (utils/pushDispatch.js): content-free tickles ({ stream, ref }) POSTed
to each subscribed device; never throws. Two producers — shardIngest.ingest
(beside the SSE broadcast) and the create/publish-post path (news.post).
Personal events resolve to the owner via shardLinks. SSRF guard: endpoints must
be HTTPS, non-private, and on the NTFY_BASE_URL/NTFY_ALLOWED_ORIGINS allow-set —
enforced at registration and every publish.
- Routes under the role-agnostic self surface (never /admin): POST|GET
/auth/me/devices, DELETE /auth/me/devices/:id, GET
/auth/me/notifications/streams, GET|PUT /auth/me/notifications/subscriptions.
Swagger regenerated (4 paths, PushDevice/NotificationStreams/etc. schemas).
- ntfy service in docker-compose.yml: pinned image, declarative ./ntfy/server.yml,
no published host port, anonymous unguessable topics (no accounts) — zero
interactive setup. No publish token required (content-free design); optional
NTFY_PUBLISH_TOKEN honored.
- Tests: pushDispatch (mapping, PUBLIC_KINDS gate, owner-keying, SSRF guard,
content-free payload) + notifications route auth gate. Full suite green (247).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Branding is already returned by GET /public/settings (the `brand` block:
name/colors/logo/hero/favicon, per-shard from BRAND_*). §8.6 of the Android
plan asks to confirm it — this makes it a first-class part of the contract so
the app's OpenAPI codegen produces typed branding instead of an untyped map.
- Swagger: add Brand + PublicSettings schemas; /public/settings now references
PublicSettings (was additionalProperties:true). Brand documents that asset
fields may be site-relative paths (resolve against the base URL).
- test/publicBrand.test.js locks the brand theming contract the app depends on
(all fields present; BRAND_* defaults; admin site_title/contact_email
overrides; accentInt never leaked).
No behavior change to the response — it already carried `brand`; this types and
guards it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
Expose a small backend identity/version descriptor (§8.4 of the Android plan)
so a client can positively recognize a Runic Gateway backend on first-run and
run a version-mismatch guard, instead of inferring from an incidental shape.
- New config/version.js: { service: 'runic-gateway', api: 'v1', server: <pkg> }.
- GET /public/status now includes a `version` block (the app already calls this
on first-run, so it gets identity + version in one round trip).
- New GET /public/version: a lightweight, DB-free identity endpoint — the
canonical target for the version guard and a cheap liveness check.
- Swagger: PublicVersion schema + version on PublicStatus; /version annotated.
- test/publicVersion.test.js covers the config shape and the DB-free 200.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
Add /auth/me/account* — the canonical "me" endpoints for every authenticated
role (Android app §6.4/§8.1). Reuses the existing account.controller handlers
(getAccount, changeUsername, changePassword, TOTP setup/enable/disable, list/
unlink identities) verbatim behind requireAuth (any role) — no logic
duplication. The app gets one self surface and never has to touch /admin; the
old /player/account/* and /admin/account/* routes stay for web back-compat.
New routes (all bearer- or cookie-auth, any active role):
- GET /auth/me/account
- PATCH /auth/me/account/username
- PATCH /auth/me/account/password
- POST /auth/me/account/totp/setup|enable|disable
- GET /auth/me/account/identities
- DELETE /auth/me/account/identities/:provider
Mounted as a sub-router; the bare GET /auth/me is unchanged. Swagger
regenerated with #swagger annotations. Adds test/authMe.test.js (the group
gate rejects unauthenticated callers with 401).
Verified end-to-end against MariaDB: a player and an editor both drive the
same surface (role-agnostic), username/password changes work, a password
change revokes the caller's old bearer token, and validation/401 paths behave.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
Add a full password-reset flow — the prerequisite for the Android app
(docs/android/PLAN.md §8.2), which hands off to the website for reset
rather than shipping a native screen.
Backend:
- password_resets table: stores only the sha256 hash of an opaque 32-byte
token (mirrors user_invites / mobile_refresh_tokens), single-use, ~1h TTL.
- model/passwordResets + users.getActiveByEmail (email is non-unique, so a
request can match several accounts, each emailed its own link).
- mailer.sendPasswordReset (fails soft when email is unconfigured).
- Endpoints: POST /auth/password/forgot (always a generic 200 — no account
enumeration), GET|POST /auth/password/reset/:token. Confirming rotates the
hash and revokes every session (web cutoff + mobile refresh tokens); it does
not auto-login, so a 2FA account still passes TOTP next sign-in. Also serves
SSO-only accounts (null hash) as their set-initial-password path.
- Dedicated request/confirm rate limiters. Swagger regenerated.
Web:
- ForgotPassword + ResetPassword pages, routes /account/forgot and
/account/reset/:token, and a "Forgot your password?" link on the login page.
Tests: test/passwordResets.test.js (5). All server tests pass; client builds;
end-to-end smoketest against MariaDB passes (no-enumeration, single-use, hash
rotation, session revoke, login with the new password).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
