First of the five domain-split PRs in docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md § Phase 2. Pure
mechanical re-wiring: routes move between files, no handler, gate, validator or
annotation changes, and not one URL moves.
New src/router/v1/admin/index.js owns the two things the group shares — the
`noindex, isLoggedIn, staffOnly` gate and the mount table — and declares no routes
itself. The gate sits ahead of every mount so a capability router extracted in a
later PR cannot silently ship without it. Four capability routers mount at the
prefix they already owned inside the monolith:
account.router.js 6 routes -> /admin/account (self-service, no adminOnly)
users.router.js 15 routes -> /admin/users (adminOnly, router-level)
invites.router.js 3 routes -> /admin/invites (adminOnly, per-route)
authProviders.router.js 4 routes -> /admin/auth (adminOnly, per-route)
admin.routes.js keeps the other 82 (6+15+3+4+82 = the 110 inventoried admin
routes) and is mounted last at the group root; none of the four prefixes appears
in it, so nothing depends on mount ordering. It disappears when PR 5 lands.
Handlers still live in admin.controller.js and usersShard.controller.js — this
re-wires routes, not logic. `adminOnly` moves with the routes that use it, and
`usersRouter.use(adminOnly)` is exactly equivalent to the old
`adminRouter.use('/users', adminOnly)` now that the router is mounted at /users.
All three generated gates are zero-diff:
routes.manifest.json unchanged (200 public + 2 internal)
routes.guards.json unchanged — no route lost or gained a gate
swagger-output.json unchanged, byte-for-byte
The spec staying byte-identical depends on the path normalization landed in the
preceding commit; without it the four collection routes would have documented as
/api/v1/admin/{users,invites,account}/ with a trailing slash.
Server tests green (434/434).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Prepares the committed spec for the admin router domain split
(docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md § Phase 2) by post-processing swagger-autogen's
output in swagger/swagger.js. No route, handler or annotation changes.
Trailing slashes are stripped from path keys. swagger-autogen builds a path by
string-concatenating the mount prefix with the route argument, so a capability
router mounted at /users whose collection route is router.get('/') documents as
/api/v1/admin/users/ — advertising a URL no client calls while dropping the one
the SPA, the Android app and the Discord bot all do. Express is indifferent
(non-strict routing treats the two as one route, and routes.manifest.json records
the canonical slash-less form), but the published spec is a contract. The split
creates one of these per capability router, so it is fixed once here rather than
by contorting the route declarations in every router file.
Path keys are also sorted. The generator emits them in router-traversal order, so
moving a route between files rewrites most of this ~5k-line committed artifact
even when the API is provably unchanged, burying the one line a reviewer needs to
see. OpenAPI attaches no meaning to path order, and scripts/routeManifest.js
already sorts for the same reason.
Verified inert: the regenerated spec is byte-for-byte the sorted form of the
previously committed one — same 198 operations, zero added or removed, and no
trailing-slash keys (there were none to strip yet; the guard is for the split).
A collision after normalization throws rather than silently dropping an
operation. Server tests green (434/434).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 1 of docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md. The tightened policy ships on
Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only alongside the unchanged enforced one for a
release; a follow-up PR flips it after the soak comes back clean.
The plan expected a two-directive delta. It is one. `form-action 'self'` was
described as absent because it is not in the directives object in app.js — but
the middleware runs with `useDefaults: true` and helmet's defaults already
supply it, so the header served in production has carried it all along. Caught
by capturing the live header from the running app instead of reading the config.
It is now written out explicitly in config/csp.js regardless: a security
directive should not depend on a third-party library's default surviving its
next major version. The enforced header's contents do not change at all, and a
test pins it verbatim.
So the whole behavioural delta is `frame-ancestors 'self'` -> `'none'`. That is
still the directive most worth soaking: a frame-ancestors report is generated by
the browser of whoever framed the site, which is the only way to find out that
something legitimately embeds us before an enforcing policy breaks it.
The policies move to config/csp.js, with the report-only one derived by spread
from the enforced one so the two cannot drift and the object reads as a diff.
`report-to` needs somewhere to point, so this adds POST /api/csp-report --
same-origin on purpose, since reports describe attacks against this site and
should not go to a third-party collector. It is mounted outside /api/v1 next to
/api/health: the browser learns the path from the policy header, never from a
client build, so it is not versioned client contract.
It is necessarily unauthenticated -- browsers send reports with no session, and
gating it would silence exactly the anonymous visitors worth hearing about -- so
it is bounded on every axis:
* both wire formats, since report-uri (Firefox/Safari) sends hyphenated keys
in application/csp-report and report-to (Chrome) sends camelCase envelopes
in application/reports+json; handling one silently drops half the browsers,
* report-to also needs the Reporting-Endpoints response header or it is inert,
* 16 KB body cap, per-IP rate limit, fixed field allowlist, every logged field
truncated (script-sample is attacker-influenced and can carry a whole inline
script),
* always 204, even for malformed input: a 4xx would reach the global error
handler, which logs the offending body -- turning an open endpoint into a
log-flood primitive.
Nothing is persisted; reports go to the `csp` log tag.
routes.manifest.json moves 199 -> 200, which is the freeze from PR 0 working as
designed: the one new URL is visible as a reviewed +1 rather than slipping
through. Swagger regenerated to match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
PR 0 of the router domain split (docs/website/API_V2_PLAN.md § Phase 2). The
split promises that admin.routes.js can be carved into one router file per
business capability without moving a single URL. That promise has to be proved
by a diff, not asserted in review — this lands the tool that proves it, with no
router file moved.
scripts/routeManifest.js walks the live Express stack (runtime introspection,
not source parsing: route paths in admin.routes.js sit on the line *after*
`adminRouter.get(`, which defeats greps) and writes a sorted { method, path }
list to routes.manifest.json. It reproduces the frozen baseline in
docs/website/api-route-inventory.json byte-for-byte — 199 public routes plus 2
on the internal listener — so the freeze is confirmed accurate, not just
claimed.
Scope is /api/** and /.well-known/** plus the internal app. The SPA catch-all,
/uploads and /brand are filesystem-conditional static mounts, so including them
would make the output depend on whether CI had built the client. Static mounts
are not API contract.
Also emits routes.guards.json — a review aid, not a contract: per route, the
handler count and the *named* middleware on its mount chain. Router-level
`use(noindex, isLoggedIn, staffOnly)` gates never appear in an individual
route's own stack, so an extracted capability router that forgot to re-apply
one would otherwise publish authenticated endpoints silently. Names are a hint
only (requireRole(...) returns an anonymous arrow), but a vanished requireAuth
is unambiguous — and the test suite asserts every /admin/** and /player/**
route still carries it.
The plan's optional unauthenticated-status snapshot was tried and dropped, as
it allowed: against the dead-port mariadb pool the tests use, the sweep sits on
the pool's acquire timeout and had not finished after two minutes. A flaky
two-minute gate is worse than none; the requireAuth assertion covers the same
regression deterministically.
CI runs `npm run routes:manifest -- --check` on every PR, so a URL change can
only merge by deliberately committing the new manifest.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a sync-project-tree workflow that regenerates this repo's tracked-file
tree and opens (or force-updates) a PR against RunicGateway/docs whenever the
layout on main changes. Never writes to the docs repo's main directly. Reuses
the existing REGISTRY_USER / REGISTRY_TOKEN secrets. Tree rendering lives in
.gitea/scripts/gen_tree.py (deterministic, dirs-first ordering).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
windowValue mapped only the 24h/7d keys and used `?? row.d30` as the fallback:
const col = { '24h': row.d1, '7d': row.d7 }[key] ?? row.d30
so a null d1/d7 (which the function is documented to tolerate) returned the
30-day count instead of 0, inflating the 24h/7d moderation tiles. It happens to
be masked today because `SUM(created_at >= ?)` nulls d1/d7/d30 only in unison,
but the contract is wrong and the existing test used an all-null row that hid it.
Map all three window keys explicitly so each reads its own column and a null
coerces to 0 via `Number(col) || 0`. Add a regression test with a null narrow
column and a non-null d30.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The `:discordId` param validator on the five admin moderation routes used
`/^d{1,32}$/`, which matches 1-32 literal `d` characters instead of digits.
A real numeric Discord snowflake failed validation, so every
`/moderation/user/:discordId*` endpoint returned a 400 for valid input.
The backslash was dropped in a prior code-smell cleanup (12d50fd) that
intended `[0-9]` -> `\d`. Restore `\d` so the regex matches digits again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The ntfy service was configured with no published host port, on the
assumption that the public reverse proxy shares the compose network and
can dial ntfy:80 directly. It does not — Pangolin runs outside the
compose network and reaches every service through a published host port
(exactly why `app` publishes 3000). With no published port there was
nothing for the notification subdomain to forward to, so push delivery
could never work in production.
Publish container :80 on a host port (NTFY_HOST_PORT, default 2586,
binds 0.0.0.0 like `app`) and correct the now-inaccurate comments in
docker-compose.yml and ntfy/server.yml. Document NTFY_HOST_PORT in
.env.example. No code change — deploy config only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Staff are a superset of players — every player ability plus their staff
tools on top — but the /player/* group ran requireRole('player'), so a
signed-in admin/editor/moderator got 403 on their own linked game
accounts (e.g. GET /player/shard/accounts). On the Android client this
hid "My characters" and greyed the personal notification streams for
staff accounts, even when they had linked characters.
Drop the role gate: the group is now requireAuth-only. Every handler is
already self-scoped to the caller by req.user.id (with the pre-existing
isAdmin bypass still letting a genuine admin read any character), so this
only ever widens access to the caller's OWN data. Staff also reach the
identical self-scoped handlers under /admin/shard/* (same controller).
- player.routes.js: requireRole('player') -> requireAuth; corrected the
five stale "Player role required" 403 descriptions and regenerated
swagger-output.json.
- New test/playerRouteAccess.test.js mounts the router and asserts
player/admin/editor/moderator all reach the handler, anon still 401s,
and a disabled account still 403s. Suite: 420 pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add opt-in "Trust this device" so a browser/app skips the TOTP step (never
the password) for 30 days, single-use bcrypt recovery codes as a 2FA-lockout
fallback, and admin trusted-device/MFA-reset management — backend, web UI,
OpenAPI spec, and tests.
- Schema: trusted_devices (sha256 token hash, looked up by unique index) and
recovery_codes (bcrypt, single-use). Both additive/idempotent.
- Session service: trust-token mint/hash/resolve + cap helpers; new rg_trust
httpOnly cookie (survives logout, revoked on untrust/password change/reset/
TOTP disable). JWTs stay stateless — trust is a server-side row, not a claim.
- Web + mobile login accept a trusted-device token / recovery code; login/totp
gains trustDevice + recoveryCode. Cap of 10/user with NO silent pruning — an
over-cap trust returns 409/trustLimitReached and the client prompts to revoke.
- Self-service /auth/me/trusted-devices* + recovery-codes*; admin
/admin/users/:id/trusted-devices* + /mfa/reset. All actions audit-logged.
- Client: "Trust this device" + recovery-code login options, one-time recovery
code display, Trusted Devices + Recovery Codes account panels, a TOTP-styled
revoke-to-continue cap modal, and admin per-user security controls.
- OpenAPI regenerated; 33 new server tests (all suites green).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add an Architecture section with a Mermaid diagram of the full data path
(SPA/mobile clients -> layered Express backend -> MariaDB, and the uo-link
sidecar bridge to the ServUO shard) plus a Contents entry. Same diagram is
mirrored in the docs repo (docs/website/ARCHITECTURE.md).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
So the dev stub IdP's account-picker renders at the correct mobile size when it
opens in an Android Custom Tab during SSO testing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Dev environments have no real OAuth provider configured, so GET /auth/providers
returns [] and the native mobile SSO flow cannot be exercised locally. Add
dependency-free dev tooling under scripts/dev/:
- stub-idp.js: stub OAuth2/OIDC IdP (authorize picker, token, userinfo)
- seed-sso-provider.js: registers a 'devstub' auth_providers row + pre-links
each principal's sub to a dev account (SSO is link-only)
- sso-bridge-smoketest.js: drives the full app flow headless (PKCE → start →
IdP → callback → deep link → exchange) and asserts a bearer pair
- README.md: host + emulator usage
Verified end-to-end against the local site: player and admin principals both
sign in and receive the correct role. DEV ONLY — never deploy the stub.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The footer's "Shard Status" link targeted /site/status; point it at the
richer live shard page at /site/shard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address the SonarQube copy-paste findings that reflect real duplication (as
opposed to the intentional cross-package / admin-player mirror copies, which
are by-design and left as-is):
- shardState.model.js: listOnline() re-inlined the exact field mapping that
shapeOnline() already provides (used by listOnlineLinked). Collapse it onto
shapeOnline so the two can no longer drift.
- shardState.db.js: extract a single upsertRow(table, pkCol, pk, fields,
{coalesce}) builder for the five near-identical INSERT ... ON DUPLICATE KEY
UPDATE bodies (online/houses/champs/guilds/governors). shard_online keeps its
COALESCE-on-NULL semantics via the coalesce flag.
- botConfig/emailConfig/uoLinkConfig .db.js: generate get()/upsert() from a
shared singletonConfigDb(table, cols) factory instead of three byte-identical
copies.
Behavior unchanged; full server suite (381 tests) passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Clears the 124 CODE_SMELL findings from the SonarQube scan (server, client,
and bot). All changes are behaviour-preserving refactors — no route, protocol,
schema, or config changes — verified against the full server (381) and client
(43) test suites plus a clean client build.
By rule:
- S3776 (20, cognitive complexity): extract helpers/handlers so each function
drops under the threshold — shard model upsert builders, page/wiki update,
block validation, notification stream mapping (dispatch table), SSO mobile
login, shard ingest deps, uo-link socket backfill/connect, the bot slash-
command dispatchers + discord manager, and the Shard/UserDetail/HeroEditor/
CharacterStats React components.
- S4624 (34, nested template literals): pull inner templates into locals /
a withQs() helper; rewrite shardEvents.describe() as a formatter table.
- S3358 (35, nested ternaries): lift to if/else vars, lookup maps, small
components, or guarded JSX expressions.
- S6479 (12, array-index React keys): key by stable content instead of index
(two in-editor lists left as-is; index matches their by-index edit model).
- S6353 (6): [0-9]/[^0-9] -> \d/\D. S125 (5): reword state-shape comments that
parsed as code. S3800/S3782 (botScore): JSDoc-type PATH_WEIGHTS tuples.
- S6481 (2): memoize Auth/Site context values (and SiteContext brand).
- S4144: dedupe HeroEditor upload handler into useImageUpload().
- S1126 (2), S6035, S5869 (redundant A-Z under /i), S5843 (town-name regex ->
prefix list): assorted one-liners.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The lcov reports only feed SonarQube's Coverage metric — the "Unit Tests" tile
stayed "-" because we never provided a test-execution report (a separate input
via sonar.testExecutionReportPaths, in SonarQube's own Generic Test Execution
XML format, which the lcov/junit reporters don't produce).
Add a dependency-free custom node:test reporter (scripts/sonar-test-reporter.mjs)
that emits that XML — repo-root-relative <file path> entries matching sonar.tests,
integer-ms durations — and wire it into both the server and client coverage runs
in sonarqube.yml, plus sonar.testExecutionReportPaths in sonar-project.properties.
Verified locally: server 380 + client 43 test cases, well-formed XML, all three
reporters (spec/lcov/sonar) coexist in one `node --test` invocation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stand up a client test suite on Node's built-in runner (no vitest/jsdom — the
targeted modules are plain ESM with no browser/DOM deps) and cover the
meaningful client logic, not presentational components:
- api/client.js: the fetch wrapper — always sends the session cookie, maps a
non-2xx response to a thrown ApiError (body.message → statusText fallback),
resolves an empty body to null, sets Content-Type for JSON but NOT for raw
FormData uploads, and builds/encodes query strings + path params.
- lib/shardEvents.js: describe() across event kinds (payload vs live frame,
actor name→acct→"Someone" fallback, sale pluralization, champ.update
branches) and the categoryOf table-consistency check.
- data/regionBuckets.js: the presence roll-up, incl. the first-match-wins
ordering and the "buckets always reconcile to the total" invariant.
- lib/heroLayout.js: parseLayout's version/shape guard and heroBackground's
default-vs-custom branch.
- lib/format.js: the date/label formatters + relative-time buckets.
Wiring so these actually count:
- client/package.json gains a `test` script (node --test);
- pr-checks.yml runs the client tests as a PR gate;
- sonarqube.yml generates a client LCOV report and sonar-project.properties
feeds it alongside the server report (SF paths resolve to client/src/...).
43 client tests; coverage on the tested modules: format/regionBuckets/
heroLayout 100%, api client 86%, shardEvents 80%.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add controller-level unit tests (mock req/res, monkeypatched collaborators)
focused on security boundaries and decision logic the API must not regress:
- auth.controller: honeypot handling, non-enumerating generic-fail for every
credential failure, inactive-account refusal, the TOTP challenge branch that
must NOT issue a session, register-mode gating + dup-username 409, and logout
that always clears the cookie and revokes the session (even on error).
- invite.controller: user created at the invite's PRESET role, and the lost
double-accept race rolling back the just-created user.
- passwordReset.controller: identical generic 200 whether or not the email
matched (incl. internal errors), per-account mail-failure isolation, the
single-use consume race, and revoke-everywhere-on-reset with no auto-login.
- public.controller: staff-only draft visibility, token-gated page preview,
wiki search precedence + unknown-filter handling, contact 502.
- shard.controller (public): the PUBLIC_KINDS feed allowlist and the public
house view stripping owner/price — both leak-prevention boundaries.
Lifts: auth.controller 46%→94%, passwordReset 33%→93%,
public.controller 28%→65%, shard.controller 45%→68% line coverage;
server aggregate 63.5%→70.4%.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add meaningful unit tests for three server models with untested business
logic, each against an in-memory fake db (no DB required):
- pages.model: slug validation + reserved-name guard, slug immutability,
the protected ON-via-update / OFF-only-via-unprotect asymmetry, publish
stamping, draft invisibility to public reads, dup-slug → 409, block gate.
- shardState.model: partial-refresh field dropping (vitals must not clobber
login fields), is_idoc derivation, economy clamp/ordering/Number coercion,
presence zero-snapshot defaults, payload-fallback shaping, and the
camelCase read-shaping contract the site + Android client depend on.
- moderation.model: five-feed window merge, userSummary count/total
semantics (total sums unknown types too), and graceful degradation when
bot config is missing.
Lifts: pages.model 23%→82%, moderation.model 27%→85%,
shardState.model 33%→62% line coverage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
SonarQube reported 0% coverage because the analysis workflow never ran
the test suite — the scanner does static analysis only and was handed no
coverage report, and sonar-project.properties defined no report path.
Generate an LCOV report in sonarqube.yml before the scan using Node's
built-in test coverage (run from the repo root so SF: paths are
server/src/... and resolve against the project base dir), and point
the scanner at it via sonar.javascript.lcov.reportPaths. Node's lcov
coverage reporter needs Node >= 22, so the coverage job pins node 22.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address SonarQube security hotspots on the website:
- server/src/app.js: replace `contentSecurityPolicy: false` with a helmet CSP
tuned for the built React SPA (script-src 'self'; style-src adds 'unsafe-inline'
for React inline styles + the Google Fonts stylesheet; font-src gstatic; img-src
allows data:/https: for uploads, embedded body images and BRAND_* assets;
connect-src 'self' for REST+SSE). upgrade-insecure-requests is intentionally
omitted (TLS terminates at the proxy; keeps local `npm start` over http working).
The /api/docs Swagger UI route gets a scoped looser policy (inline script/style)
since swagger-ui-express injects an inline bootstrap.
- client/vite.config.js: disable the inline module-preload polyfill so code-split
builds keep `script-src 'self'` valid (RichTextEditor is a separate chunk).
- bot/src/app.js, server/src/internalApp.js: disable x-powered-by on the two
internal-only listeners (the public app already strips it via helmet).
- shardEvents dedupe key: SHA-1 -> SHA-256 truncated to 40 hex chars (fits the
existing CHAR(40) column, no migration; it is a content fingerprint, not a
security value). schema.sql comment updated to match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
Wire the self-hosted SonarQube server into Gitea via a Gitea Actions
workflow. Runs on push to `main` (post-merge) and workflow_dispatch, so
it feeds the dashboard without gating any PR. Adds sonar-project.properties
(project key runic-gateway-website; server/client/bot sources, server tests,
node_modules/dist/generated excluded).
Requires two one-time Gitea settings: secret SONAR_TOKEN and variable
SONAR_HOST_URL. The scan does not wait on the Quality Gate, keeping it
fully non-blocking.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The schema loader stripped only full-line -- comments, then split the
file on ';'. A trailing comment containing a semicolon (e.g. the
mobile_auth_sessions.session_id column: `-- uuid; carried inside...`)
chopped the CREATE TABLE in half, so MariaDB got the fragment and failed
with `error ... near '' at line 3`, crash-looping the server on boot.
Strip -- comments on every line (full-line and trailing) before the ';'
split. Safe because the schema never places -- inside a string literal.
Verified by running ensureSchema() against a fresh MariaDB: all 49 tables
create cleanly and mobile_auth_sessions has all 11 columns.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add the server side of Android App Links (M9 follow-up, docs/android/APP_LINKS.md):
- GET /.well-known/assetlinks.json at the web root, gated by the new admin
setting `mobile_app_links_enabled` (default off -> 404; on-but-no-fingerprint
-> 404). Emits the Digital Asset Links statement for the fixed published
package (MOBILE_APP_PACKAGE) + MOBILE_APP_CERT_SHA256 fingerprint(s).
- mobileSso `/start` additionally accepts this shard's own self-origin
https://<host>/mobile/callback when App Links are enabled — one additive
exact-match entry, derived from APP_BASE_URL/request origin, never client
input; the custom-scheme allowlist is never narrowed. The settings lookup is
short-circuited for non-https redirects so custom-scheme rejections stay fast.
- settings.isMobileAppLinksEnabled() (fail-closed) + getPublic().mobileAppLinks;
admin updateSettings validates the boolean; seed default off.
Tests: test/appLinks.test.js (route gating + allowlist). Full suite 284 pass.
Swagger unchanged (web-root verification file is #swagger.ignore'd).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NgyHnrNa8WwG3doxvxjuCr
Adds the self-service device-session surface the mobile-SSO spec requires, on
top of the existing mobile_refresh_tokens store.
- Schema: device_name + last_used_at columns on mobile_refresh_tokens (nullable,
additive via the ALTER section; seeded to now on insert). With single-use
rotation each login/refresh inserts a fresh row, so the active row's timestamp
is the session's last activity, and the label is carried forward on refresh.
- Model: listActiveForUser (one row per live device, no token hash) +
revokeByIdForUser (ownership-scoped, idempotent).
- GET /auth/me/sessions + DELETE /auth/me/sessions/:id (role-agnostic, behind
requireAuth). Named distinctly from /auth/me/devices (push endpoints).
- device_name is an optional field on /auth/mobile/login and
/auth/mobile/sso/exchange so the app can label a device.
- Client: an "Active Devices" panel on the player account page (list + sign a
device out), plus the PlayerLogin change to honor the mobile SSO bridge's
{ redirect } deep link on a 2FA completion.
- Swagger DeviceSession schema + regenerated spec; 3 controller tests. Full
server suite green (274); client builds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a Mobile SSO Authorization Bridge so the native app can "Sign in with
Google/Discord" without shipping any OAuth secret. It EXTENDS the existing
/auth/sso/* redirect flow (same PKCE-vs-IdP, link-only + opt-in provisioning,
TOTP gate) and terminates in the existing mobile bearer tokens — not a parallel
auth path.
- Schema: mobile_auth_sessions + mobile_auth_codes (short-lived, self-pruning;
authorization code stored hash-only, PKCE challenge is a hash by construction).
- GET /auth/mobile/sso/start: validate provider enabled + redirect_uri by EXACT
allowlist match (never prefix), seed a bridge session, reuse the SSO redirect
tagged mode:'mobile' (new redirectToIdp helper extracted from beginFlow).
- SSO callback + finishSsoTotp gain a mode:'mobile' branch: mint a single-use,
hashed, PKCE-bound code and redirect to the fixed app callback (code + echoed
state, never a token) instead of setting a cookie. 2FA keeps full parity via
the existing web TOTP form (now carrying the bridge session).
- POST /auth/mobile/sso/exchange: verify Layer-B PKCE (before burning the code),
single-use consume, then issue the SAME pair as /auth/mobile/login.
- Discovery reuses GET /auth/providers; refresh/logout reuse /auth/mobile/*.
- Rate limits: /start per-IP+provider, /exchange per-IP. Boot-time +
opportunistic prune of both tables (no cron, mirrors revoked_sessions).
- Redirect allowlist is MOBILE_AUTH_REDIRECT_URIS (default the one fixed
runicgateway://auth/callback); App Link URIs can be appended per shard later.
- Swagger regenerated; 39 tests (model single-use/gating + full controller
matrix: bad/expired/reused code, PKCE mismatch, disabled provider, redirect
allowlist, TOTP-through-bridge). Full suite green (271).
Refs docs/website/BACKEND_DESIGN.md, docs/android/PLAN.md §9 (M9).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
