Module-uo#25 moved this pin onto website `edge` (52eac24) to unbreak
frozen-manifest during the engagement window, with its own note saying it
reverts to a `main` sha at the cutover. The cutover is step 4 of 7, merged as
#26, and website#180 landed the same code on `main` -- so the pin now names a
branch that no longer exists.
No regeneration, and the reason is checkable rather than asserted: website's
tree at 66bb3b9a (main, the cutover merge) and at 52eac24d (the edge head it
merged) are the SAME tree, e7a7240. `main` was zero commits ahead, so the merge
carried edge's tree unchanged. The frozen-manifest job clones a different commit
and reads identical bytes; routes.manifest.json cannot move.
What changes is what a reader learns from the file: which core this module was
last proved against, named by a ref they can still resolve.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The pin was `963d734` -- website `main` at the Teams cutover, MODULE_API **1.6.0**.
That core has no `ceilings.js`, no `registerEventTriggers` and no
`registerAudiences`, so this module has failed to load into it since Phase 11a
added the first of those calls, and `frozen-manifest` has been red on every
engagement PR since. The last green run was #39 (`6a276a7`, Phase 10's
protocol-5 ingest), which added no `register*` call and so still loaded.
The red X was never about the PR in front of it. This is the bump the org lead
scheduled for the moment website#178 landed; it should have ridden in
Module-uo#24 and did not.
New pin: `52eac24` -- website `edge` carrying MODULE_API 1.9.0
(`registerEngagementSeeds`) and the Phase 11b core fixes (website#179).
`routes.manifest.json` is unchanged and is NOT regenerated here: this phase's
work added triggers, bodies and rules, and not one route. The job's own check
confirms it -- 73 routes, all documented.
Reproduced locally the way the job does it: core at the new sha, manifest without
the module, module installed with `npm ci --omit=dev`, manifest with it, then
`frozenManifest.js --check`. The module registers cleanly (26 triggers, 3
audiences) and the check passes. `check:imports` and `check:bundle` clean.
Reverts to a `main` sha at the Phase 13 cutover.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Needs website#<core> (the cooldown key and the seed-rule ceiling).
1. Every owner-audienced trigger reached NOBODY. `resolveTarget` read
`link.user_id`; the model's `toSafe` returns `userId`. So the whole flagship
family -- houses, vendors, logins, unlinks, deaths, the governor's letter --
resolved to null and looked exactly like the ordinary unlinked-account case,
which the code treats as normal and deliberately does not log.
The test fake returned `user_id` and therefore agreed with the bug, while
`shardStreams.test.js`'s fake next door -- same model, the path this file says
it copies -- returned `userId`. The fake is now built by running the real
`toSafe` over a stubbed db row, so the shape is not a hand-written opinion.
2. `uo.house.refreshed`, the 26th trigger (the org lead's decision 11). The
warning's rule carries `delay_seconds: 900` so a player who repairs the house
inside the quarter-hour is never told it is in peril -- and nothing could
cancel it: `cancel_on` named only the collapse. The wire had carried the
transition all along; the mapper returned early on it.
It fires on `Ageless` as well as `LikeNew`, and `Ageless` is the common case:
a condemned house cannot be refreshed at all (`RefreshDecay()` refuses
`DecayType.Condemned`), so the rescue is the owner logging in, and their
newest house then reads `Ageless`. Ships a body and a seeded (disabled) rule
of its own; the cancellation is read off the WARNING's rule and works whether
or not the new one is enabled.
3. Every call-to-action in every in-universe body was a dead link, from two
independent mistakes. The client router prefixes a module's routes with its
ID (`/uo/houses`), not with module.json's `mounts` (`/shard/...`), so every
declared `example` was a 404 -- and an example is what the template editor
previews and test-sends with. And no `url` variable was ever populated by the
mapper, so the buttons rendered with an empty href and dropped out of the text
part entirely. Both now read `config/clientPaths.js`. Two tests close it.
4. A raw wire timestamp was signing off the Merchants' Guild's letter
(`2026-09-02T04:06:43.8397548Z`, mid-sentence). Core has no interpolation
filters by design, so the readable form is assembled in the mapper and arrives
as its own variable; the machine value stays, because an operator writes
`is at most` conditions against it.
Also fixes a latent flake: `hoursRemaining` floors a live clock, so a fixture at
a whole number asserted 19 or 20 depending on sub-millisecond timing.
527 module tests green (3 new). Proved end to end against real ServUO + the
release sidecar + a live SMTP catcher; see docs#<docs>.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
11a declared the triggers; this is the content behind them. Ships through
core's new api.registerEngagementSeeds (MODULE_API 1.9.0): 32 templates and 25
rules, every rule enabled = 0.
THE VOICE (decision 8). The game-powered families read from inside Britannia,
with a per-family in-fiction sender rather than one voice across all sixteen —
Lord Blackthorn's court writes about the crown's business (the seat, the ballot)
and nothing else, because a shard where Blackthorn writes to you personally about
a champion spawn is a shard where the letter about your governorship means
nothing. The Office of Deeds has houses, the Merchants' Guild vendors, a herald
guilds, the town crier champion spawns, a guildmaster skills and quests, the
Chronicler deaths, the keeper of the rolls leaderboards.
WHAT STAYS PLAIN (decision 9). Nine of the 25 point at core's notify.event /
inapp.event and author nothing, and the line is drawn where fiction costs
something real: a failed-login notice written as "a stranger sought entry to thy
account" is indistinguishable in register from the phishing mail it warns about,
and a moderator reading uo.cheat.detected at 2am wants a name, a rule and a
timestamp rather than a scroll. Both account-security triggers, server up/down,
and the five staff/admin-ceiling ones.
THE GOVERNOR'S LETTER (decision 10) — uo.governor.appointed, the 25th trigger.
§8.6 records that uo.points.rank_changed cannot address a person because top[]
names a mobile serial, and the same reasoning was silently assumed to cover the
governor. It does not: city.update's `governor` is written by BridgeJson.Actor(),
which emits serial, name, acct AND webId. The winner is addressable today with no
protocol change. It fires from the same frame, the same transition and the same
never-on-first-sight guard as uo.governor.elected, which stays exactly as
declared — the town's bulletin and the governor's letter are two triggers because
one trigger means one rule means one template, and they are not the same text.
An operator can run either alone.
PRESENTATIONAL FRAGMENTS, because a template has no conditionals by design and an
unset optional interpolates to the empty string. Phase 5a's `forWhom` precedent:
the ternary stays in the mapper and its result arrives as a declared optional.
Two shapes — a LABEL always has a value and carries a sentence's spine
(houseLabel falls back to a seal number); a TRAILING FRAGMENT may be empty and
leads with its own space, so `{{slainBy}}.` closes as "has fallen." either way.
Additive, so no version bump.
A render sweep over all 32 bodies, twice — once with every declared example and
once with required variables only — is what found these. Three defects it caught:
an optional `{{region}}` in a subject line ("A notice concerning thy house at ");
multi-optional ledger lines rendering "On hand: gold. Charged each period:
gold." on a pre-v5 frame, now assembled in the mapper from the parts actually
present, the same argument place() already makes; and a leading trailing-fragment
opening a body with a stray space.
The labels stay `required: false` deliberately — a missing one must never REFUSE
an emit, since a dropped notification is worse than a cosmetic hole — so nothing
at runtime would notice a mapper that forgot one. engagementSeeds.test.js is what
notices.
524 module tests green; check:imports and check:bundle clean. check:swagger
reports STALE from CRLF alone and regenerates byte-identical — no route changed.
Refs docs ENGAGEMENT.md Phase 11b, decisions 8, 9, 10.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
module-uo's half of ENGAGEMENT.md Phase 11: every trigger DECLARATION, the
wire-kind mapping that fires them, and the three registered audiences. No rule
and no template is seeded here -- that is 11b -- so nothing this adds sends
anybody anything until an operator writes a rule.
server/config/shardTriggers.js declares the 24, grouped by the audience kind
each family exercises, and every variable carries the `example` the template
editor previews and test-sends with. Ceilings: 10 `owner`, 2 `members`, 7
`authenticated`, 2 `staff`, 3 `admin` (the value core adds in the same window).
`uo.cheat.detected` at `staff` is the declaration the lattice exists for.
server/utils/shardEngagement.js maps the wire to those ids, hung off
shardIngest.ingest beside the SSE broadcast and the push tickle, and reads like
shardPush.js on purpose -- owner resolution is why neither can be a pure mapper.
Three things live here because a rule cannot express them:
* Transitions. champ.update and city.update are full-state upserts, so without
a per-process tracker a sidecar reconnect reads as twenty spawns starting.
A FIRST sighting is never a transition.
* Thresholds. conditions.js compares a declared variable against a LITERAL, so
"within 24 hours of dismissal" is not expressible; and vendor.listing is a
sweep frame re-emitted on any price change, so per-frame would flood. The
crossing is tracked here and `hoursRemaining` is declared so an operator can
still narrow with `is at most`.
* The members audience. "The members of THIS guild" differs every firing, so
it travels on the envelope as recipientUserIds (Phase 6 decision 2).
**The fan-out runs BEFORE the state write, and that ordering is load-bearing.**
account.unlinked drops the shard_account_links row that names the one person who
needs to be told; house.remove drops the house whose stored ownerAcct is the only
place a collapsed house's owner appears; guild.leave/remove need the roster and
board mirrors to name who left. Resolving afterwards finds nobody, every time.
Four rows of 8.6 deliberately do not ship, each with its reason recorded in
docs (docs#194): uo.market.item_listed (a saved search, no per-user query store),
uo.guild.joined (core's team.member.joined already fires for it -- a UO guild IS
a Team and this module is the provider), uo.link.requested (no addressable
recipient by construction, ~5-minute TTL), and uo.points.rank_changed's personal
half (top[] names a serial, links are keyed by account).
coreApi -> ^1.8.0: the module now calls registerEventTriggers and declares
`ceiling: 'admin'`, so a 1.7.0 core would refuse the ceiling and a 1.6.0 one
would not have the method at all.
39 new tests; 509/509 pass. check:imports, check:bundle and check:swagger clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The website half of the protocol-5 bump. Engagement Phase 10.
Schema — twelve columns and two indexes.
shard_houses gains next_stage, estimated_collapse, decay_period_sec and
dynamic_decay. estimated_collapse is nullable and stays null far more often than
not, deliberately: under dynamic decay ServUO draws each stage at random on entry,
so collapse is knowable only at IDOC. A null means "not knowable", never "not yet
read".
shard_vendors gains owner_acct plus seven fee columns and an index on dismissal_at.
owner_acct is the structural one — the table has carried owner_name since protocol
3, but a character name joins to nothing, and only the game account reaches
shard_account_links. Until now a vendor row named an owner the site could not
resolve to a person. dismissal_at + owner_acct are what let Phase 11's
uo.vendor.expiring find "vendors about to be dismissed" and turn each into a
person, without scanning every shop.
Ingest.
Both new field groups arrive NESTED and are flattened into columns on the way in,
then re-nested on the way out — the same trick shardMarket already uses for
`location`. That is not stylistic: the visibility projection matches literal JSON
keys, so the stored read model and the live wire frame have to spell a group
identically or one admin rule covers only one of the two paths. It also means a
field added inside a group later inherits the group's gate instead of defaulting to
visible; there is a test that adds an imaginary future fee field and asserts exactly
that.
Two write-back asymmetries, both load-bearing:
* ownerName is written ONLY when the frame carries one. house.update also writes
that column, from a different sweep, and a pre-v5 overlay's house.decay carries
no ownerName at all — coalescing to null would let every decay transition erase
a name the registry had already resolved.
* The schedule and fee columns are written UNCONDITIONALLY, including as nulls. A
schedule is a claim about the future and goes stale on its own: roll a shard
back to a pre-v5 overlay, or let a house leave IDOC, and the right stored value
is nothing. A dismissal date nobody is maintaining is worse than none.
dismissalAt is taken from the shard rather than recomputed. The shard resolved it
against ServUO's two vendor systems, whose charge, funds and pay interval all
differ; re-deriving it here would be a second implementation of PlayerVendor's own
rule.
Visibility — three classifications, each chosen rather than inherited.
* house.decay's `schedule` defaults to `anonymous`. The countdown IS the public
IDOC page's content and a house at IDOC is already announced in game. Listed
anyway so a shard that considers a precise collapse time an unfair advantage can
raise it — and one nested rule takes the whole schedule with it.
* vendor.listing's `fees` defaults to `admin`, the only default in the market
feature that does not reproduce prior behaviour, because there is no prior
behaviour to reproduce. Shop name, owner and location are already visible to any
player through the in-game Vendor Search gump, which is the argument for
publishing them. Held gold, daily charge and dismissal date are visible to the
OWNER only, on that vendor's own gump. Publishing them anonymously would be a
new disclosure and a targeting aid — which shops are about to be abandoned, and
how much coin is in each.
* account.login.result is admin-only BY OMISSION. KIND_FEATURE is the map of kinds
an admin may widen, and there is no rung below admin that an IP plus an auth
verdict belongs on. The omission is the decision, and a test says so by name.
owner_acct needs no rule: rule 1 locks it by suffix. And the new columns are in no
REST read model's column list — they exist for Phase 11's server-side trigger and
reach no client at all.
The pin, and the protocol-4 bug seen from the other side.
Both declaration sites go to 5 (the model constant and schema.sql's CREATE default),
plus the one-shot migration, guarded `protocol < 5` so an install that missed an
earlier step is carried the whole way.
The schema test used to assert `DEFAULT 4` at each site. That is exactly how
protocol 4 shipped with the emitters moved and one site left behind: every site
agreed with itself and the test passed. It now reads DEFAULT_PROTOCOL from the
model, so the assertion is "the declarations AGREE", and the one-shot migration
test is written once against the current version instead of being hand-copied per
bump.
470 tests pass, 16 new. Verified end to end on the live rig against a real ServUO
and the release sidecar.
Docs: RunicGateway/docs link/v5.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The protocol-4 cutover moved `link`'s PROTOCOL_VERSION, the overlay's
`overlay.toml` and this module's ingest — `guild.roster` and `guild.leave`
landed with the Teams cutover — but left both of this module's pin sites at 3.
A fresh install therefore came up speaking 3 to a protocol-4 sidecar, and a
sidecar answers a stale client with `409 protocol version mismatch` rather than
mis-parsing it. The failure is total and silent: every REST read fails, the WS
closes on ws.hello, and the operator sees an empty marketplace, an empty guild
board and no shard status, with the cause only in the server log. It cleared
only when an admin edited the number by hand in Admin → Shard.
Found while standing up a demo deployment for the marketing site's screenshots.
- `DEFAULT_PROTOCOL` → 4 (the constant used before an admin has saved anything)
- the `uo_link_config.protocol` column default → 4, at both declaration sites
- a protocol-4 one-shot mirroring the protocol-3 one, guarded by its own marker
so an operator who deliberately pins an older sidecar stays pinned, and
written `protocol < 4` so an install that never took the protocol-3 migration
is carried the whole way rather than one step
- three regression tests: the column default, the marker ordering, and the
`< 4` predicate
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The phase table still showed phase 4 - delivery: the admin Modules
screen plus the Docker path - as not started. The module system shipped
on 2026-08-12: the admin Modules screen exists, the MODULES environment
variable resolves manifests at container start, and this module has been
released four times through that path, most recently v1.0.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
v1.0.0 installed and then died on every boot:
module "uo" failed to load — {"stage":"register","reason":"Cannot find
module './commands/guild.command'"}
`server/commands/` arrived with the Teams cutover (2d1d91e, `/guild`). The
release assembles the tarball from an include list, that list was hardcoded in
release.yml, and it was never told about the new directory — so the bundle
shipped without it and the module was dead on the operator's box.
Nothing caught it, and that is the more interesting half. Every PR check runs
against the whole repo — `frozen-manifest` even installs the module into core by
tarring the entire tree — but a release is a SUBSET of the repo, and the subset
exists nowhere except the release. The pre-publish check in release.yml only
stats the paths `module.json` declares, and a file reached by a require inside
`register()` is named in none of them, so it passed on a bundle that could not
load.
The include list stays an include list — release.yml's header makes that case
and it still holds. What changes is that it is declared ONCE, in ci/bundle.json,
with two readers instead of one:
• release.yml assembles from it (via jq) rather than from its own copy.
• server/scripts/checkBundle.js asks, in PR checks, whether it still covers
everything `server/index.js` reaches — following requires transitively and
through function bodies, which is where index.js deliberately puts them.
And the release gains a real loadability check: `checkBundle.js --bundle` walks
the ASSEMBLED tree and asserts every relative require resolves inside it. Asked
of the artifact rather than the source, so it also catches a half-failed copy or
a list naming a path that has moved.
Requiring the entry point would not have worked as a check: index.js requires
inside `register()` because require order is load-bearing (`core.init(ctx)` must
run before anything under `router/`), so requiring it evaluates one line and
reports success on a bundle missing every router it has.
Both modes were verified against the real defect — each fails with `commands`
removed and passes with it present.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WnDSWzpUjw8t8C2hghysNz
A bundle used to cost a second pull request whose entire content was a number.
The workflow published only when a merge to `main` left `module.json` at a
version with no release yet, so a merge that did not touch that line released
nothing. Measured rather than argued: v0.3.0 (2026-08-12) is the only release
this repo has ever cut, while the nine Teams phases and the cutover landed on
`main` in the week since.
Adopt the engine `link` and `installer` already run - feat!/BREAKING CHANGE ->
major, feat -> minor, fix|perf -> patch, nothing releasable -> no release. The
number that ships is the tag, and CI writes it into the `module.json` inside the
bundle, with an assertion that the rewrite happened: a bundle carrying the wrong
version would install under a number that is not the one it was released as.
`module.json`'s version is kept as a floor rather than deleted - a version above
the newest tag still releases at that version - so the declared model survives as
the special case it always was, and is still how a `coreApi` bump overrules the
subjects. `workflow_dispatch` covers what the rules cannot reach: leave `version`
blank to bump the newest tag by `bump`, or name an exact version. Where the log
and the input disagree the larger bump wins, because a button pressed on a log
full of `feat:` would otherwise publish its `patch` default over a minor's worth
of work.
Two things carried over from `link` at the same time: a tag pushed without a
release behind it is now recovered rather than making that state permanent, and
the changelog moved into the plan step (so the assemble step clears `$OUT`, not
`dist/`, which now holds it).
On this repo's `main` the engine computes v0.4.0. The workflow still never
writes to a branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The pin said "edge @ Teams phase 3" and edge is about to stop existing. More to
the point, this module has since gained the Team provider, three declared slots,
the /guild command and the contribution names on those slots - none of which the
pinned core knew about, so the frozen-manifest job has been proving this module
against a core older than half of it.
routes.manifest.json does not move: the job compares core-with-module against
core-without-module, so core's own Teams routes cancel out and what is left is
this module's 73, unchanged. Verified locally against the cutover core before
moving the pin rather than after.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Core no longer fills a slot by name - it offers a contribution and the module
that owns the page says where each one goes (MODULE_API 1.6.0, amended). The
three slot names are unchanged and stay this module's own vocabulary; what is
new is the second argument saying which of core's three contributions belongs
in each place.
Nothing here worked differently before. The change is for every game that is
not this one: core used to fill the literal name uo.guild.detail, so a second
module declaring a place under its own id got an empty page and no error.
The registration fake gained the same validation core does, including the
contribution catalogue - written down rather than imported, since this suite
runs against the built chunk with no core in the process, which makes it a
claim about core that has to be re-read when core's list changes.
42 client tests, 437 server tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Found on the live rig, with the shard's guild feature gated to staff: the
refusal still read "link your account — this shard shows guild information to
linked players". Signing in reaches `logged_in` and linking a game account
reaches `player`; `staff` and `admin` are roles an operator grants, and no
amount of linking earns them. Inviting someone to do something that changes
nothing is worse than plainly saying no.
Also drops the host name from the list embed's title. `ctx.site` carries a base
URL and no brand name, so naming the deployment there could only ever mean
printing its hostname into a title on the shard's own Discord server.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The first command through `api.registerSlashCommands` (MODULE_API 1.6.0,
TEAMS.md §7.1). The definition and the handler both live here; the bot pulls the
definition and runs no line of this module.
`/guild` and not `/team`, deliberately. Core does not own the word for a Team —
that is what deleted its Team pages in phase 3 — so it does not publish the noun
in a channel either. Core ships the dispatcher and zero commands.
The audience rungs are re-resolved in the handler rather than assumed: a shard
that gates guilds to staff does not become public because the question arrived
over Discord. The provider's own staleness guard is honoured too, so a stale
board answers "not connected" instead of reporting what it still holds, and
`resolveUserId` is exported rather than copied so "linked" means here what it
means on the roster.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two lines only core cannot supply for itself.
`uo.guild.header` is a third declared slot, at the top of the page, for core's
per-Team notification control. A third rather than a corner of the feed because a
slot holds one component and the first fill wins: the control is an action ON this
page and the other two are content IN it, and separate slots are what let this
module say so.
`pageUrlTemplate` tells core where a guild page actually is. Teams are a contract
primitive with no core surface — core owns the tables and the access rules, this
module owns the word "guild" and therefore the page — which leaves core unable to
write a link to one. A notification email that cannot take you to the thread it is
about is most of the way to useless. Core substitutes `{externalId}` and does
nothing else with it; a template naming its own host is refused at registration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
`frozen-manifest` has been failing since Teams phase 2, on this PR and on #11
before it, for a reason that has nothing to do with either: the pinned core
(website#140, the module-system de-UO slice) predates `api.registerTeamProvider`,
which this module has called since phase 1 of its Teams work. The module therefore
fails to LOAD in the pinned checkout — "api.registerTeamProvider is not a function"
— and a module that does not load adds no routes, which the job correctly reports
as the module having removed everything it serves.
So the red was real and was pointing at the pin, exactly as the pin's own comment
says it should: core moves for reasons that have nothing to do with this module,
and a bump is a deliberate commit saying which core the module was last proved
against.
Bumped to `edge` at Teams phase 3 (website#152) — the first core that has both
`registerTeamProvider` and the roster projection this module now implements.
Reproduced the whole job locally against that core: core's own manifest is current
at the new pin, the module loads, and the difference is 73 routes, all documented.
`routes.manifest.json` is unchanged and needed no regeneration, which is the
expected result for a client-only change.
Not bumped to the phase 4 core, deliberately: that is website#153 and is not merged
yet. Nothing in this module needs it — the second slot is a client-side
declaration, invisible to the route manifest.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The mirror of the activity feed, one phase later. Core owns the Team forum —
membership, manual grants and the member/guest split are all core's rules, and a
module reimplementing any of them would be reimplementing a security boundary — but
core publishes no Team page, because it does not own the word "guild". So this
module declares the place and core puts the forum in it.
TWO declarations rather than one, and that is the interesting part. A slot holds one
component and the first fill wins, so folding the forum into `uo.guild.detail`
alongside the feed would hand core the decision about where each of its two
contributions sits on a page this module owns. Separate slots also keep them
independent: with the forum switched off, the feed renders exactly as before.
The registration test now asserts the set of declared slots and that EVERY one of
them is rendered by the page that owns it, rather than naming a single slot twice.
A slot nothing renders is a slot core fills into the void.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The module's half of the org lead's correction: Teams is the contract, guilds
are the presentation, and the presentation is this module's.
Adds `/uo/guilds/:id` — the detail view the board never had — with the roster
from this module's OWN board, which is the same data it answers core's Team
provider from. Reading core's projection of our own answer back would be a round
trip through a staler copy of it.
The page declares `uo.guild.detail` and core fills it with the Team activity
feed. That is the one part of this page core cannot hand over: only core can
resolve whether the viewer is inside the Team, and the public/members split on
that feed is a security boundary. The guild is named in OUR terms — core maps
its own Team from the module id and the external id — so this module never holds
core's row id or slug.
`TeamOverviewStrip` is deleted with the core Team page it filled.
`team.member.row` is not declared here either: the useful thing to put in a
roster row is a link to the character behind it, and nothing core could supply
identifies one.
`GET /public/shard/guilds/:id` backs the page, gated and projected through the
same `guilds` feature as the board — so an operator who raises that audience
raises this too, and the locked acct/webId fields never survive below admin. A
roster is where those appear in bulk, which makes this the endpoint where
getting the projection wrong would matter most.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The module's half of TEAMS.md phase 3.
`projectRoster` is the optional fourth provider method and the only one core
calls on a request path. Core holds the roster and owns its public shape; the
question that is this module's is who is allowed to look, because the audience
rungs and their configuration live here.
The answer is all-or-nothing, which is the honest translation rather than a
shortcut: a rung is a property of the FEATURE, and there is no configuration in
which some members of a guild are public and others are not.
The refusal semantics INVERT here, and the tests say so. For the other three
methods a refusal means "change nothing" and an empty array would be
destructive. Core fails CLOSED on this one, so the dangerous answer is the
opposite — returning every key because the config could not be read would
publish a roster an operator gated to staff. Every path that cannot reach a
confident answer refuses, including the catch.
The anonymous case is answered directly rather than by handing `viewerLevel` a
synthetic request. Given one with no `req.user` it falls through to
`auth.getUserFromRequest`, which expects real cookies and throws on a fake — and
that throw would have become a refusal, so every anonymous visitor would have
been served an empty roster on a shard whose guilds are public. Caught by the
tests, not by reading.
`team.overview` gets a live population reading beside core's stored one. Core's
number comes from the last roster sync and is coarse by construction; this is
the `presence.online` feed this module already holds. It is explicitly not a
per-Team presence figure — the shard publishes a global aggregate and no
per-guild breakdown exists on the wire, so claiming one would be inventing a
number — and it renders nothing at all when it has nothing true to say.
`team.member.row` is left unfilled. The useful thing to put there is a link to
the character behind a row, and the props core can supply do not identify one:
the member key and the site account id are withheld from every public roster.
An empty cell beats a guess.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The module half of the Protocol 4 rank amendment (servuo-plugins, same wire
version -- Protocol 4 is unreleased on `edge`, so it is amended rather than
bumped).
`shard_guild_members` gains `rank`, `rank_cliloc` and `rank_name`. The provider
then answers the question it previously could not: `getTeamLeaders()` returns
EVERY member at rank 4, not just the board's single `leader_serial`. That
limitation was the whole reason the wire grew a per-member rank -- TEAMS.md §2.5
treats multiple leaders as the normal case and core has always supported them.
The board's `leader_serial` is folded in as a floor rather than replaced. It
comes from a different frame, so on a shard whose roster has not been re-emitted
since the amendment it is the only leadership signal there is, and moving to
ranks must not lose it.
## NULL rank is a real state, and it is load-bearing
The shard withholds the rank for a staff account, because ServUO's
`PlayerMobile.GuildRank` reports Leader for anyone at GameMaster or above
whatever their actual rank. Every layer here preserves that:
- the ingest stores NULL rather than defaulting to 0, which would be a
demotion this code invented;
- `leader` requires an integer rank >= 4, so absence is never leadership;
- the leaders query compares on `rank`, and NULL is excluded by the comparison.
Reading a missing rank as either 0 or "leader" would republish the exact lie the
shard went out of its way not to send.
## Rank labels
Three sources, in order: a custom rank's literal string, then the operator's
cliloc table, then the five standard names. The last exists because the cliloc
table is populated only if someone ran the client-file extraction, and a roster
on a shard that has not should still read "Warlord" rather than nothing. A
failing lookup falls back rather than failing the roster -- a label is decoration,
and losing it must not lose the data.
`rank` is backticked everywhere it is written, like `int` on shard_online: it is
reserved in MySQL 8 and merely a keyword in MariaDB, so it parses bare here and
must not be relied on to.
The schema fragment carries ALTERs as well as the CREATE. No production install
has this table -- it is new in an unreleased protocol -- but `edge` deployments do,
from the roster work that landed before the amendment, and CREATE TABLE IF NOT
EXISTS adds a table and never a column. Same gap the sidecar's own store hit when
`guilds.members` was added.
## Verification
The unit tests stub the db layer, so the round trip was proved separately: the
VERBATIM roster frame captured from the live ServUO run was fed through the real
ingest into MariaDB and then read back through the provider.
stored: 0x1F5 rank=4 0x1F6 rank=3 0x1F7 rank=2 0x1F8 rank=1
0x1F9 rank=NULL (the GameMaster) 0x2E0 rank=4
provider: leaders = [0x1F5, 0x2E0] <- two, which the board alone cannot express
labels = Leader / Warlord / Emissary / Member, with no cliloc table
0x1F9 = not a leader, no label
9/9 checks. Suite 413 -> 421 tests, all passing.
Refs docs/link/v4.md §2.3, docs/website/TEAMS.md §2.5
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Team provider's db layer built its query helper as `core.db.query(...)`. The
facade has no `db` member -- every other *.db.js in this module destructures
`query` from it directly -- so every call threw `Cannot read properties of
undefined (reading 'query')`.
The failure mode is the bad part. That throw is caught by the provider's own
error handling and turned into `{ ok: false, reason: 'roster unreadable: …' }`,
which is a perfectly valid refusal -- so core would have accepted it, held the
projection it had, and reported staleness. A provider that answers correctly and
never returns data, forever, with nothing in any log louder than a warning.
Invisible to the unit tests because they stub every db function, so the helper
was never called. Found by running a real roster frame through the ingest and
then asking the provider what it saw, against the real database.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
A UO guild is a Team. This registers module-uo as the authoritative source of
them (MODULE_API 1.6.0, docs/website/TEAMS.md §2.3) and answers the three
questions core asks, from the board and the roster Protocol 4 put there.
`externalId` is the persistent ServUO `Guild.Id`, which survives a rename -- so
core sees "an id whose name changed" and applies its rename rule rather than an
unrelated new guild appearing beside the old one. That mapping is this module's
to make: only the game knows what identity survives what.
The most important code here is the refusal guard, and it is deliberately
conservative. Core's contract is that module unavailability becomes staleness and
never emptiness, and this module is the only thing that can honour it -- an empty
array from here reads as an authoritative "there are none", and core archives
Teams and departs members from an authoritative answer. Three states refuse: no
uo-link configured, the integration disabled, and the socket not connected.
**The third is the one worth arguing about.** The board is durable and survives an
outage, so serving it while disconnected looks harmless. It is not: core cannot
tell a board five minutes stale from one five days stale, and a complete answer
licenses destruction. There is a test named for that.
A fourth refusal has no equivalent anywhere else: a guild whose roster has not
arrived. Protocol 4's roster comes on its own frames, separately from the
`guild.update` that creates the board row, so there is a real window where a
155-member guild has zero roster rows. The board's own `members` count is the only
thing that distinguishes "the roster is late" from "this guild is empty", and it
is checked -- with the count in the refusal message, because it is the evidence.
The other side is tested too: when the board says zero, an empty roster is the
truth and withholding it would freeze a disbanding guild's membership forever.
Two limitations, both honest and both in the code as comments:
- **`rankLabel` is null.** The wire's roster member is the standard actor object
(`serial`, `name`, `player`, `acct?`, `webId?`) and carries no guild rank.
Inventing a label from the leader flag would be core displaying something this
module made up.
- **One leader, not several.** TEAMS.md §2.5 expects multiple leaders from
`GuildRank.Rank >= 4` and core supports them, but Protocol 4 does not put rank
on the wire, so the only leadership visible here is the board's single
`leader_serial`. Raising it to the full set is a protocol change, not
something this module can fix.
`online` comes from `shard_online` rather than the roster, which carries no
per-member presence and only a board-level count -- the same source the public
"who's online" surface already uses. `userId` prefers the roster's own `web_id`
(what the shard asserted at roster time) and falls back to the `shard_account_links`
join for a member whose row predates their link; resolving it here rather than in
core is the contract, since core reading `shard_account_links` would be core
naming a module's table.
`coreApi` stays `^1.3.0` -- 1.6.0 satisfies it, which is what makes the bump minor.
18 provider tests plus two on the entry point: that all three methods are
registered, and that registration performs no query. The second matters because
register() runs while core's app.js is still being required with the pool pointed
at a dead port, which both routeManifest.js and swagger.js depend on.
`fakeApi` gained `registerTeamProvider` with the same `once` rule core applies --
one provider per deployment, so a second registration has to fail here too rather
than passing a shape core rejects at load.
411 -> 413 tests, all passing.
Refs docs/website/TEAMS.md §2.3, Part 12 phase 2
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Protocol 2 gave the guild board a member *count* and nothing else, so the Guilds
page could say a guild had 155 members but never who they were, and
findGuildForActor deliberately answered only for leaders because membership for
rank-and-file was not in the feed at all. Protocol 4 puts it there.
`shard_guild_members` holds one row per member per guild, keyed on
(guild_id, serial). `guild.roster` replaces a guild's rows; `guild.leave` removes
one. A guild.remove now clears the membership too, so a disbanded guild does not
leave orphaned rows behind.
The chunking needs explaining. A roster over the shard's per-frame cap arrives as
several frames carrying seq/more/total. The sidecar reassembles them for its own
GET /guilds board, but the live WebSocket feed and the /history backfill both
carry the individual frames — so this ingest sees them unreassembled.
It copes without buffering, because a table expresses what the sidecar's single
JSON column could not: the frame carrying seq 0 clears the guild first, and every
frame then upserts its own rows. Upsert rather than insert because the /history
backfill replays stored frames on every reconnect, and a redelivery has to be a
no-op rather than a duplicate-key error. The cost is a sub-second window during a
multi-frame update where the table holds part of a roster; buffering to close it
would duplicate the sidecar's reassembly for a projection that is already only as
fresh as a 60s sweep.
On visibility: both kinds are mapped to the existing `guilds` feature. Without
that mapping rule 2 fails an unmapped kind closed to admin-only, which would have
quietly kept rosters off the public page forever. Mapping them is safe because a
roster is the first frame carrying locked fields inside an ARRAY of actors rather
than one nested actor, and the projection walker already recurses into arrays and
matches acct/webId by suffix — so a member's account name is stripped below admin
by exactly the rule that already strips guild.leader.acct. There is a test for
that specifically, because the difference is a public page listing character names
versus one publishing 150 account names.
`acct`/`web_id` are still stored, since that is what lets a linked member be
matched to a site user; they are just never projected below admin.
guild.leave is appended to the event log, as the departure counterpart to
guild.join and for the same reason — it is what a "so-and-so left" feed reads.
guild.roster stays out: it is board state like guild.update, and it is the one fat
frame on the wire, so logging it would put a full membership snapshot into
shard_events on every membership change.
The PUBLIC_KINDS guard test caught the addition, which is what it is for; its
expected set now carries a v4 group alongside the v3 one.
Refs: docs/website/TEAMS.md Part 12 Phase 1
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Until now this was the one part of the platform that had never been scanned.
The 75 files here arrived in the Phase 3 extraction and left their Sonar
history behind in core's project, so a whole module's worth of shipped code
has no dashboard at all.
Adds sonar-project.properties (project key Module-uo) and a sonarqube.yml
mirroring website's: push to main, never a PR gate, nothing waiting on the
quality gate.
Two things differ from core's config, both because this repo is shaped
differently:
- There is no src/ to point sonar.sources at — the server half keeps
boot.js/core.js/index.js at server/ root beside its subdirectories — so
the whole tree is included and the non-source parts are excluded. That
direction is deliberate: a new top-level server directory is scanned by
default rather than silently unscanned.
- server/scripts and client/scripts are IN. checkImports.js and
checkExternals.js are the enforcement of MODULE_API.md 5.1 and 3.6, they
carry their own test suites, and both have already shipped defects a
reviewer missed. Build code that decides whether a release is allowed out
is not throwaway code.
The workflow builds the client chunk before running either suite, for the
reason pr-checks.yml already calls load-bearing: build.test.js and
registration.test.js read dist/entry.js and SKIP without it, so the other
order reports coverage for a suite that quietly asked less than it looks like
it did.
Both suites run from the repo root rather than with --prefix, so the LCOV SF:
paths come out repo-root-relative and resolve against sonar.sources. That is
why the server suite's --require is spelled out here instead of reusing
`npm test --prefix server`, whose path is relative to server/.
Verified locally: 385 server test cases across 57 covered files and 40 client
cases, both LCOV and Generic Test Execution XML well-formed with
repo-root-relative paths.
Needs one-time setup in the Gitea UI before it can run — secret SONAR_TOKEN
and variable SONAR_HOST_URL, same as the other repos.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The frozen-manifest job read ETIMEDOUT from the registry installing the client
deps, after it had already cloned core at the pin and proved core's own manifest
regenerates — a red X that meant nothing about this PR. There are five `npm ci`
calls across the three jobs and the runner is shared, so this will recur.
npm's own retry, turned up at the workflow level so every install gets it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nineteen `#swagger` descriptions carried a `\'` inside a single-quoted string.
That is correct JavaScript and wrong here: swagger-autogen does not evaluate the
annotation as JS, so the backslash survives into the spec and Swagger UI renders
"the shard\'s published ruleset" to a reader. Replaced with a typographic
apostrophe, which the same files already use elsewhere.
Found by opening /api/docs in a browser against a real core with this module
installed — the fragment was valid JSON, the paths were right, every test passed,
and it was still wrong on screen. Nothing that reads the artifact can see this;
only reading the rendered page can.
Also documents the four environment variables this module reads
(UOLINK_BASE_URL / _WS_URL / _PROTOCOL, TOWNCRIER_DURATION_SEC). Core's
.env.example is dropping them in the paired website PR: they were never core's,
and a half-copy in two repos goes stale silently.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The three artifacts that make this module installable and checkable, closing
phase 3's extraction. Nothing about what the module serves changes: the same 72
URLs, the same behaviour.
**The OpenAPI fragment (MODULE_API.md §2.8, §6.1a) was never built, on either
side.** The 417 `#swagger` annotations came across in slice 1 and went nowhere,
and core's /api/docs.json merged nothing — so every route this module serves was
in no spec at all, which is core's standing rule ("never ship a route that isn't
in the spec") being broken by the extraction rather than by a route.
`server/scripts/swaggerFragment.js` generates it. The prefixes are DERIVED: the
script runs the module's own `register()` against a recording api and asks
`require.cache` which file each router came from, so a mount prefix exists in one
place — `server/index.js` — and not in a table beside it. The 31 schemas moved
here from core's swagger.js, namespaced `Uo…` because core wins every key
collision in the merge; `Error` and `ValidationError` stay referenced by core's
names, since they resolve in the merged document.
**The frozen route manifest (§5.3)** is derived too, and by subtraction: CI
clones core at the ref pinned in ci/core-ref.json, generates its manifest without
this module and then with it, and the difference is what this module serves. That
buys the half of §5.3 that matters most for free — a module that shadowed or
displaced one of core's routes shows up as a REMOVAL, not merely as an addition
elsewhere. The same job checks the fragment against ground truth: every route
must have an operation and every operation must be a route.
**The release workflow** publishes `module-uo-<version>.tar.gz` plus a manifest
carrying its sha256. The version is declared in module.json rather than computed
from commit subjects, and the workflow never writes to a branch — it tags and
publishes — so `main` needs no push exception. The bundle is assembled from an
include list, because an exclude list ships whatever it forgot.
Four annotation defects, inherited from core and never visible until something
generated a spec from these files: two `requestBody` literals a brace short (the
route documented with an empty body), and two descriptions whose inner quoting
swagger-autogen cannot survive — it re-quotes `"` and a backtick to `'` before
evaluating, so either inside a single-quoted description ends the string early
and the annotation is dropped. It reports each one and then prints Success in
green, so the generator now captures its diagnostics and makes them fatal.
Also fixed while writing it: passing one shared `doc` to swagger-autogen six
times. It renders components.schemas from an EXAMPLE object and writes the result
back into what it was handed, so each pass re-wrapped the last and the fragment
came out at 484 MB.
- 409 server tests (+21), 40 client tests unchanged
- swagger-fragment.json: 69 paths covering all 72 routes
- routes.manifest.json: 72 routes; core's own surface unchanged, 0 removals
- verified end to end by assembling the bundle exactly as CI will, unpacking it
into a real core and regenerating the manifest
Refs: docs/website/MODULE_SYSTEM.md §2.7.1, MODULE_API.md §2.8, §5.3, §6.1a
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
